

DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

American Higher Education:
Toward an Uncertain Future

Volume I

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Volume I*

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**American Higher Education:
Toward an Uncertain Future
Volume I**



DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

American Higher Education: Toward an Uncertain Future

Volume I

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Preface to the Issue "American Higher Education: Toward an Uncertain Future." Volume I.

DÆDALUS, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, has been appearing as a quarterly publication since the winter of 1958. On only two occasions during these years have the Editors thought it reasonable to devote two consecutive issues to a single subject; on only one occasion did we think it necessary to make each of these issues a "double" issue. Our decision to do so again reflects our judgment that higher education is as important a matter as any we are likely to treat in the coming decade, and that this may, for many reasons, be a particularly propitious moment for inquiring again into institutions and practices that are known to be troubled, but on which so much in contemporary American society inevitably depends.

Specific planning for these issues began early in 1974 when invitations to contribute were extended to well over a hundred men and women. The longer-range planning, however, began earlier, going back to the establishment within the Academy in the autumn of 1969 of the Assembly on University Goals and Governance. In requesting contributions to these special issues of the Journal, I wrote as follows:

While not every anniversary calls for a "celebration," a decent observance of an important event is certainly always in order. In recent months the Editors of *Dædalus* have been giving thought to how the Journal might choose to mark the tenth anniversary next autumn of the beginnings of the so-called "university troubles." Since the date happens to coincide also with the fifth year of the establishment of the Academy's Assembly on University Goals and Governance, the occasion would seem to call for some special attention by the Academy's Journal.

After considerable deliberation, we have concluded that there would be an advantage in having *Dædalus* devote a special issue to the subject of American higher education. We expect that the issue would accomplish three purposes: first, it would encourage reflection on how the last ten years have altered American colleges and universities, and how events that once claimed the attention of the mass media appear today, when, in theory, a somewhat more dispassionate perspective is possible; second, and perhaps more importantly, it would provide the opportunity for interpretations to be made of the condition and problems of American higher educational institutions today, suggesting, perhaps, why certain questions that attract attention may be less important than others that are scarcely discussed or remarked on; finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would provide the occasion for consideration of where American higher education may be tending in the decade ahead, and what its opportunities may in fact be. Hopefully, the contributions to such a volume would help stimulate a discussion of the purposes and goals of higher education that is presently not taking place.

To encourage the widest expression of opinion and, hopefully, the widest participation, we are asking for contributions of from 500 to 5,000 words, in whatever form, and dealing with whatever themes seem particularly urgent to you. It may be that you will wish to write a long, formal essay; such an essay would be most welcome. Alternatively, you may prefer to write more briefly, preparing, in effect, a memorandum that you are willing to share with others on a quite specific aspect of the higher educational problem.

Together with the letter of invitation I sent a memorandum of my own which I hoped would provoke certain of those who received it. That memorandum, in a somewhat abbreviated form, is printed in this volume as "Thoughts on Higher

Educational Purposes and Goals." In the correspondence that followed, the greatest number indicated that they would contribute, and that they would do whatever they could to meet what for many seemed a very imminent deadline. A number, however, excused themselves on the ground that they could not possibly find time for composing even a memorandum of 500 words. Certain of the letters suggested all too eloquently the frenzied character of modern academic life.

Among those who came to discuss the matter with us, at least one expressed an unsettling point of view. She asked, in effect, whether we were not too close to the "events" of the 1960s to describe or analyze them dispassionately. In her graphic words, "the scabs are scarcely formed over the wounds; it may be too dangerous to touch them now." Readers will have to judge for themselves whether the warning was justified. Whatever their judgment, a close reading of the articles in these issues will certainly confirm the importance of the campus turmoil of the 1960s; the memory of the events of that period continues to influence thought, behavior, and expectations today in ways that are not always acknowledged. Just as the economic depression of the 1930s was a compelling presence for a whole generation of men and women long after mass unemployment had virtually disappeared in the early years of the war, so the peculiar indignities suffered by many within academic institutions half a decade ago continue to fester, producing significant results that are expressed in many of the articles published in these volumes. One cannot understand the mood within higher educational institutions today without reference to these historical memories.

That these memories remain is incontestable; that they have generated a new thinking about both the universities and the larger American society is also evident. While no de Tocqueville has come forward to raise the question of whether liberty will survive the advent in contemporary industrial society of a new and deeper passion for equality, many who write in these pages are clearly preoccupied with the values that seem to be developing in contemporary America. Some are frightened by what they see as a lack of concern for intellectual values; others worry about what they think to be a reduced social consciousness. The reader cannot fail to be struck by the differences that are expressed. The kinds of unanimity common in the United States in the years during and after World War II, or in the wake of the Soviet Union's success with Sputnik, are no longer to be found. If a balance sheet were to be drawn up listing those who derive some solace from what has happened recently, and those who remain greatly troubled, the latter would appear to be in the majority, though in something less than an overwhelming number. It is important to note that many who write in these pages believe that the "radicalism" of the 1960s and early 1970s served a useful purpose; many others disagree.

It is this phenomenon of disagreement, not only about the import of recent happenings within colleges and universities, but also about the nature of American democracy itself, that conveys a second impression that seems superficially to contradict the first. While the problems confronting colleges and universities are acknowledged to be serious—some would go so far as to say that they are grave—faith in the possibilities of higher educational reform remains remarkably high. It is extraordinary that this should be the case for so many who have written. The "boosterism" of the early 1960s is gone, but there are still a great many who expect (indeed, demand) that colleges and universities do what almost no one today would expect any other of America's traditional institutions to be capable of. While it would be invidious to compare what is demanded of colleges and universities with what is expected of other established institutions, the idea insinuates itself in all too many of

the essays published in these volumes that education is still America's great hope. Despite all the shocks that have been administered to educational institutions and to certain of their traditional values, there is something approaching optimism in these pages. An unsympathetic reader might wish to charge certain of the authors with being excessively and unreasonably hopeful. Is the optimism merely the residue of an earlier American faith in the possibilities of education? Or is there a larger significance in this insistence that education can and must be reformed for the good of the larger society?

To ask these questions is inevitably to ask about the character of contemporary American society. Because universities in their European origins boast medieval birth dates, it is easy to forget that American institutions of higher education, as they exist today, are largely the creation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ideas about professionalism, certification, the need for expertise, and the character of the academic profession itself are all too frequently the residues of that period, reflecting privileges, practices, and possibilities that were acceptable then, and that are not necessarily suited to the social order that now exists. Yet, to raise questions about these practices—as many of the authors in these volumes insist on doing—is to touch what others believe to be the very integrity of the higher educational system. It would be wrong to understate the degree of difference on fundamental issues reflected in these pages. These differences are real, and they cannot be ascribed simply to generational or political preferences. Much of the argument touches on fundamental values, about which there is so clearly no longer any consensus.

Five years ago, educators debated whether students ought to serve on boards of trustees, what powers the faculties might reasonably share with others including students, what new institutions (such as the “ombudsman,” for example) needed to be created to make higher educational institutions more responsive to their own internal opinion. There is scarcely any hint of such concerns in these volumes. “Governance” in the terms used in the late 1960s would appear no longer to be a preoccupying matter. Instead, there is a very real worry about how institutions will fare confronted with the prospect of “no growth,” not to mention the shrinkage that they must now anticipate. The relations between public and private colleges and universities and various governmental bodies, both federal and state, are recognized to have crucial importance. So, also, is the issue of how certain institutions will fare in a time of growing clamor for “accountability.” H.E.W. guidelines, while intended to alleviate discrimination with respect to race and sex, are seen to have potentials for a kind of governmental intervention that carries substantial risks for the future autonomy of higher educational institutions, even when their intent is acknowledged to be good. Many who write in these pages are concerned about the institutional “freedoms” that are so lightly being abandoned. Given the prospect of a “steady state” in the size of faculties, and given the large number of comparatively young and middle-aged men and women who today enjoy tenured positions in most institutions, concern is expressed about how new talent will be recruited. What opportunities will exist for those who are now seeking to enter the profession? How is the profession going to be affected by the growing unionization that is becoming increasingly common? Is there any likelihood that new values will prevail, and that these will put an end to the fiction that the majority of professors are active or potential scholars? How, if at all, is it going to be possible to insist that greater numbers of faculty find satisfaction simply in being effective teachers?

These concerns, though frequently expressed, are clearly secondary to a more

crucial issue, emphasized repeatedly, which has to do with what is taught, by whom, and for whom. The liberal arts curriculum of yesterday would seem no longer to be adequate; there are few who detect very great vigor in what passes for "general education" today. As a result, there are numerous and often contradictory proposals for major curricular change. The issue of learning, its content and form, is recognized to be as important as any now confronting American higher education. At a time when many are concerned with securing meaningful (and adequately remunerated) employ for the millions who emerge with college and university degrees, a too great preoccupation with creating conditions that would contribute principally to the development of an "educated" or "intelligent" citizenry may seem to be a form of romantic indulgence. Yet, as will be apparent in these volumes, the concern with *Bildung*—indeed, the preoccupation with its possibilities—is real. If there is considerable worry over the "incoherence and trendiness" that assumed such force in the curriculum during the 1960s, there is concern also with the excessive specialization that has a much longer history in higher education. Also, there is very real alarm over the bureaucratic mentality which is playing havoc with so many traditional educational purposes. No one proposes a return to the situation that existed before the "troubles" began. The debate is entirely over the kinds of innovations that may reasonably be contemplated.

Those who look for a "fully-developed program of curricular reform" in these pages will be disappointed; those who look for the elements of an "agenda" on the subject will find it easy to construct one. They will recognize that there are subtle but important disagreements among those who have written, and that these have as much to do with the purposes of education as with the means available to achieve them. It is easy to suggest that certain institutions, the vocationally oriented, for example, should aim for certain objectives, while others pursue goals of another kind. While such diversity is not to be disparaged, it cannot substitute for the resolution of a larger problem, which is to know how to combine preparation for a vocational or professional calling with preparation for something other than work. One is not underestimating the significance of professional competence, or denying the centrality of earning a living, when one suggests that institutions of higher education cannot make these concerns the whole of their educational purpose. Yet, it is all too obvious that there are many pressures in American society working towards a system of "post-secondary education" which would make training or "skilling" their principal objective.

The debate is only beginning to be joined, and it ought not to be seen as simply an argument between traditionalists and innovators. This is not a repetition of the discussion that occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century when a rigid, classically-oriented college curriculum was challenged by the new theoretical and applied sciences. Much more is at stake today; the continued viability of the concept of the liberally-educated person is involved. Whether that person is characterized as civilized, cultivated, or learned, whether those qualities are looked for in the possession of certain concrete knowledge or in a capacity to reason in certain ways and to solve certain kinds of problems, or whether it is seen to inhere in certain life-styles that are not instinctive to the individual is a matter of great import. How any of these things can be taught, by whom, and with what incentives, are issues about which reasonable people will—and in these volumes certainly do—disagree.

The disagreement is not only about the incentive systems that need to be considered in encouraging people to learn (or to teach), and to know whether they are in

fact succeeding in either. It is also, and no less importantly, about the content of education itself. We know something about the chaos of existing university curricula. How is some modicum of order to be achieved if still other matters are to be introduced, as some insist that they must be? Is our cultural parochialism as intense as some suggest? If so, what, if anything, can be done to reduce it? What will the introduction of yet new perspectives do to what little remains of an earlier consensus about what it is useful to teach and to know? If there are some who see the need for making the university even more responsive to the external world, others ask whether the process has not already proceeded too far. Can the university be the haven for every kind of activity? Can it, for that matter, instruct in every kind of discipline? Can it be hospitable to every kind of talent? Among those who have written for these volumes, with some few exceptions, the opinion is predominantly in favor of making the university more open, more responsive to new curricular possibilities. The idea of a "core of knowledge" has little appeal. Instead, there are numerous suggestions for new efforts that need to be considered, particularly as older biases—sexual, racial, and ethnic—decline, and as new educational possibilities are perceived.

Because every plan for curricular reform is in some way linked to the character of the academic profession, there is a substantial interest in that subject. Again, as in so many other matters that touch higher education, we are only now beginning to have the data on which sure judgments may be based. Whether the values of the profession are changing, and how, whether the current economic recession is going to have serious continuing implications for the profession as a whole, what the consequences of opening the profession to individuals and groups previously discriminated against may prove to be, are all considered, along with more traditional issues that have been debated for many years and that touch on the willingness of able scholars to subordinate their research interests or ambitions to an obligation to teach. Such reflection inevitably leads back to a consideration of the nature of contemporary higher educational institutions and of the values that they express. Again, it is striking to note how much is still expected of America's colleges and universities. Whatever the disenchantment with them, there is still extant an immense reservoir of respect for their current accomplishments, and, even more, for their presumed potential.

In higher education, autobiography is a resource whose value ought never to be underestimated. While there is always the hazard of mistaking one's own experience, within one's own institution or local community, to be representative of a larger, national pattern, there is much to be said for exploiting the knowledge that is made available through such observation. The first of the two *Dædalus* volumes concludes with a number of essays that are intended to suggest the uses of such inquiry. Their importance cannot be doubted.

All such reflection, however, does nothing to alter the fact that higher education needs desperately to be developed as a subject of sustained and deliberate scholarship. While no academic discipline can be established by fiat, many, in recent years, have been vastly expanded and modified through the insistence of public and private agencies that the subjects they treat are both too serious and too complex to depend on *ad hoc* and occasional inquiry. These two *Dædalus* volumes ought to suggest something about the range of institutions that exist—that, indeed, call out for study—and they ought to alert us to certain of the concerns that should dominate such study. Innumerable questions are raised in these pages; regrettably, the answers are not to be found in books already published; nor are they to be found in the raw data that fill the files of federal agencies and state educational administrations. The

need quite obviously is for new kinds of research and inquiry by individuals and groups prepared to examine educational matters with the imagination and insight generally reserved for the study of other major public concerns, including those that involve the economy, social welfare, and national defense. In the absence of such systematic study on a scale never previously attempted, higher education's future must remain uncertain.

These volumes are the work of the Assembly on University Goals and Governance. The Assembly has been an activity of the American Academy for half a decade; its purpose has been the articulation of new possibilities for higher education. Just as the Assembly's First Report, with its 85 Theses, helped legitimate the discussion of certain academic reforms, the hope is that these volumes may serve a somewhat similar purpose. They are intended to stimulate new thought and action; they ought to be regarded as the Second Report of the Assembly.

Thanks are due to two Presidents of the Academy, Talcott Parsons and Harvey Brooks, for their unfailing support of the Assembly's work. The Panel of Academy Advisers, whose members are listed elsewhere in these volumes, was always ready to help when called upon. Finally, and most importantly, we feel a special debt to Martin Meyerson, President of the University of Pennsylvania, who has served as chairman of the Assembly, officially or unofficially, from the beginning. Despite his numerous other commitments, President Meyerson always found time for the work of the Assembly.

We wish also to acknowledge the invaluable help given us by the Ford Foundation. Their generous funding brought the Assembly into existence in 1969 and sustained its numerous activities during the next five years. We are grateful also to the Rockefeller Foundation and to the Edgar Stern Fund for their support. The Academy is deeply appreciative of the opportunity to expand its activities in an area where it has long recognized its obligations.

S. R. G.

STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD

Thoughts on Higher Educational Purposes and Goals: A Memorandum

THE ASSEMBLY ON University Goals and Governance, established in the autumn of 1969, began its work at a time when disorder and disruption were endemic in many academic communities, both at home and abroad. Despite powerful and compelling pressures, the Assembly chose not to focus its study on the causes of university unrest, believing that these matters were already receiving adequate attention by other specially constituted bodies, and that the Assembly could add little to what they were already doing. There was no disposition to deny the significance of the disruptions then occurring or to minimize the threat that such violence posed to life and property. Nor was there any tendency to underestimate the importance that a general public revulsion with colleges and universities might have on the support of higher education. Too many valuable academic traditions risked being destroyed or damaged for anyone to make light of the troubles. They deserved the undivided attention of many and the concern of all, but there was no advantage in everyone attending only to them, putting all other work aside. In formulating the scope of their own effort, the principal officers of the Assembly recommended that the increased public preoccupation with colleges and universities be used to generate a greater awareness of certain basic higher educational problems—problems that went beyond the simple “restoration of order.”

So, in November 1969, when academic leaders feared the coming months and fretted lest the spring bring a repetition of the disorders of the preceding years, the Assembly's Prospectus spoke of the need to study higher educational problems in the largest possible context. At a time when the public was increasingly agitated by evidence of what appeared to be an immediate and overwhelming “crisis,” and when there were insistent demands for solutions to a small number of immediate problems, the Assembly proposed instead to study broader, often neglected educational issues. Those responsible for writing the Assembly's Prospectus thought of their effort as providing precisely the kinds of insights that might contribute solutions to both immediate and long-range problems.

The Assembly's Prospectus spoke of two stages, each extending over a single year. During the initial twelve months, five policy councils were to be organized to deliberate on certain fundamental issues; during the next twelve months, the findings of the Assembly would be reviewed in forums and seminars held throughout the country. Neither of these objectives was in fact realized in the form originally contemplated. While meetings and conferences were held in various parts of the country, and while opinions were sought from groups and individuals known to differ on substantive issues, the Assembly never realized one of its prime purposes—to foster a continuing “national debate” on the future of American higher education.

Perhaps the whole concept of a "national debate" on a significant public issue was unrealistic, betraying a sentiment that owed far too much to the conventional jargon of the mass media. In a highly complex and differentiated society that spills over a continent, where the public's attention span is severely limited—extending generally for a year or two at most—the possibility of a sustained and serious discussion of any public issue is limited. Higher education failed to capture and hold public attention for many of the same reasons as other of the "crises" of the tumultuous 1960s. Each "crisis" seemed to have its "year"; each enjoyed attention for a moment, receding into obscurity not because specific "problems" were resolved, but because public attention wandered, moving on to something new. Higher education took its place in a long line of other "causes"—urban blight, environmental decay, racism, poverty, and crime in the streets—that managed to command public attention for a season, but that seemed incapable of retaining the public's interest.

When the officers of the Assembly came to issue their First Report in January 1971, the news media had already withdrawn their reporters, photographers, and other professional personnel from the campuses of the country, having found other matters to concern them. The time for more sustained and dispassionate reflection seemed at hand. The colleges and universities of the country were asked to explore major proposals for academic renewal, contained in eighty-five Assembly "Theses." It was hoped that these Theses would contribute to the kinds of public discussion that had not been possible so long as "trashing" and "nonnegotiable demands" claimed the interest of those who cared for and about the future of American higher education. Attention was given to defining and organizing the groups that might be expected to launch such discussions; thought was given also to how such groups might be motivated to pursue certain of the larger purposes of the Assembly. It was important that individual institutions consider how to implement certain of the Theses, so that they did not simply remain a catalogue of desirable goals, but would in time become reflected in the practice of our universities.

Today, three years later, the Assembly's Theses—explicit recommendations for the reform of American higher education—have lost little of their urgency. Indeed, many of the suggestions made by the Assembly are now firmly established educational practices in institutions throughout the country. However, the spirit that informs the Assembly's First Report cannot be said to prevail in many educational institutions in the United States today. Inevitably, one is asked to explain why this is the situation.

Some will say that it is simply the times that are out of joint, that this is not the moment for bold educational ventures: public (and private) monies for innovation and growth are no longer available; professorial and legislative resistance to major innovation is substantial; student interest in reform has declined; public apathy concerning education in general and higher education in particular has reached new proportions. All these factors have undoubtedly contributed to the diminished interest in higher education, but they do not by themselves explain the current apathy. The "crisis" of the universities preoccupied great numbers of men and women in the 1960s; the Assembly's expectation was that higher education would remain high on the agenda of public issues throughout the 1970s. The Assembly began its work with one firm conviction—that education, not disruption, was its proper domain, and that educational matters were as vital as any that affected American society.

Today, when higher education has receded from the front pages of all newspapers, when television has few student demonstrations to film and no non-negotiable demands to report, when the federal government seems generally bereft of ideas on higher education, and when state legislatures wrangle usually over the size of budgets and university presidents dash about searching for new monies to offset inflationary costs for which increased student tuition and fees are quite insufficient, there is an almost instinctive concern within every institution to look out for itself, to create those conditions that will guarantee its own "survival" and possibly increase its competitive advantage. There is not much talk of reform: the problem is to get through a difficult time, a time of "no growth" and of persistently rising costs. Colleges and universities seem frightened and confused; they are as autarchic in their behavior as they have ever been, and as many institutions around them appear to be.

In these circumstances, the rhetoric of the 1950s and early 1960s that once dwelled on the "mission" of the university seems shopworn and anachronistic. Academic administrators, faculties, trustees, and students all respond to the same signals: each tells the other—as if out of a need to gain confidence through hearing certain words repeated and amplified—that the time for academic expansion is over; prudence demands caution, and caution recommends retrenchment.

The administrator, charged by his trustees with keeping the institution solvent in a time of massive cost increases, is largely preoccupied with maintaining a balanced budget, doing away with what yesterday were thought to be educational necessities, but are now declared to be inessential frills. To an extent that was not true previously, presidents and deans are judged for their ability to manage and husband funds. Even where they have been selected as "crisis managers," they are generally prized for their efficiency as fiscal agents.

The professor, realizing that there are no greener pastures elsewhere, knowing that his mobility is limited, and understanding all too well the economic and psychological plight of his graduate students and younger colleagues, learns to live with the new economic restraints. The "golden age" for the liberal arts professor appears to be over; still, if one enjoys tenure, the situation is acceptable. One simply learns to live with less, or at least with less than one had expected to have. Because research grants and research facilities are sometimes less ample than they were only a few years ago, there is much complaining in certain quarters. The times are propitious for introspection, and also for cursing those who govern in high places, whether in the university, the state, or the nation.

Students, for their part, have often fallen back into many of their traditional attitudes, sometimes concealing their yearning for "success," professional achievement, and personal recognition with a rhetoric that still owes something to the idealism of the 1960s. They, too, however, learn to accommodate themselves to the "system"; there seems little enough profit in trying to fight it. Many lose themselves in study or play; most colleges and universities in the country provide ample opportunities for both.

The economic plight of institutions of higher learning, which is incontestable—as much the "crisis" of the 1970s as disruption and violence were the preoccupying problems of the 1960s—might have caused institutions to promote policies emphasizing their interdependence. Instead, it has served to date principally to provoke attitudes that are defensive and separatist. It is a melancholy tale "of every tub on its own bottom," and of precious little concern being shown for

those who find it particularly difficult to weather the economic storm. If the situation is discouraging—and who would deny that it is—there are always Panglosses about who give promise of a better tomorrow. Some suggest that the malaise is caused by politics, and that the fate of educational institutions is linked to the person sitting in the White House or in the Governor's chair. An idea that would have been inconceivable even as recently as twenty years ago has become commonplace. The cornucopia for higher education is thought to be located in Washington; if it can be opened to those who so obviously deserve to share in its abundance, all major problems will be resolved. Politics is assumed to be the medium through which plenty—educational plenty, as well as every other kind of plenty—will be guaranteed.

Others, of even more romantic disposition, look constantly for a contemporary equivalent of the Manhattan Project. In their somewhat distorted representations of recent history, they say that American colleges and universities realized themselves—came into their own—during World War II. At that critical juncture, they argue, higher educational institutions proved themselves, found something useful to do, and thereby gained the respect and gratitude of the nation. Yesterday, these same voices were urging universities to bestir themselves to “solve” the problems of the cities and of the environment; some years earlier, they recommended that the complex and divisive issues of racial injustice be settled. Today, these “romantics” have a new cause. The institutions of higher learning are asked to address themselves to the newest, the most recently perceived crisis, that of energy. Energy, we are told, is *the* problem of the 1970s; the universities of the country are urged to seize their opportunity. Few who so blithely issue these calls to action have any very precise notion of the dimensions of the “energy crisis,” or know what the universities might explicitly do to work toward its solution.

Finally, those with an even longer historical memory, recall the days when college and university presidents spoke with authority, when men like Eliot and Gilman presided over great institutions and delivered educational messages that resounded in the land. The need, we are told, is for a new breed of academic presidents who will know how to articulate purposes, indicate directions, and mobilize their colleagues and others to support policies they favor. Those who think in these terms distort and romanticize the past; they have little sense of the differences between the past and the present. They show little appreciation of the difficulties of the tasks they so gratuitously assign to others; they tend to exaggerate vastly the moral, political, and intellectual authority of those who happen to sit (for a season or two) in academic presidential chairs.

Higher education in America is not in need of striking new pronouncements; even less does it need new activities to demonstrate its usefulness to the nation. It is not even certain—though this may seem heresy to some—that it would profit greatly from increased federal support, for purposes now defined. The problems of higher education are often internal to itself; these problems will not be resolved if certain individuals become “leaders” and speak eloquently to the vast bureaucratic machines that they alone are able to call into action. The colleges and universities of America are not in need of new “Manhattan Projects,” nor is it at all certain that they stand to gain significantly from whatever happens in elections in 1976, 1980, or 1984. The reform or, better, the renewal of American higher education will be helped through the establishment of a greater consensus on educational purposes and goals. What the Assembly set itself as its task in 1969 remains to be

done. The objective in 1969 was not to calm dissent. The purpose, today, cannot be to discover a rationale for what is being done, so that funds become more readily available for existing programs, particularly for those that appear to be in danger. A larger perspective is demanded, and it is by no means certain that this perspective can be provided by the weary academic foot soldier—the professor—or even by his commander—the dean or president—who imagines himself to be on the firing line and who knows all too well what the threatened cost of fuel oil may mean to his institution's already precarious budget. When fires appear to be burning everywhere—no longer set by rebellious students but by more impersonal economic forces—all talk of goals may seem academic. The officers of the Assembly persist in believing that nothing is more practical, and that nothing is more urgent.

The Assembly reiterates its support of its 85 Theses; they continue to express a fundamental commitment to a new kind of higher educational enterprise. In its Prospectus, the Assembly said that it wished to “be judged less by the paper it generates and more by the process of deliberation and exchange it initiates.” That promise remains valid today. The first words of the Prospectus, written in 1969, bear repeating: “In the American democracy, education has always provided access for opportunity; today, college and university education is becoming the most important means for this access.” The first of the Assembly's 85 Theses took up this theme, noting that higher educational opportunity was still unequally distributed, and that this inequality called for an immediate remedy. The emphasis was intentional; the Assembly continues to accept these principles as being central to a reform of higher education; without them, there can be no “renewal.”

Although the Assembly has never used the word “democracy” loosely, it has never been reluctant to use it. The Assembly's concern has always been with “justice,” and not simply with social justice. Fairness and equality of treatment have been the explicit aims of the Assembly, in part because each offers some guarantee of the survival of democracy. The Assembly's purpose has always been to encourage higher educational institutions to reform themselves so that they might serve larger numbers, providing opportunity to men and women previously barred, making equality a more meaningful concept to a nation racked by envy, disillusion, uncertainty, and resentment, and to do these things in such a way that would preserve and advance the cause of learning.

The Assembly addressed itself to the American democracy, and, by implication at least, to those few other islands and isolated capes that remain democratic in a world increasingly characterized by totalitarian and authoritarian rule. For reasons of civility as well as policy, there is little point in dwelling today on the repressive character of certain national states, nor does it make sense to use such terms as the “institutions of the free world,” redolent of a very different era. Silence on these matters, however, does not alter the fact that educational institutions are peculiarly vulnerable to the political climate in which they exist, and that they cannot avoid being influenced by it. American colleges and universities are free today—particularly today—in a way that higher educational institutions in many parts of the world cannot pretend to be. This is not a boast; it is an incontestable fact, along with another that is all too rarely admitted: a significant number of American institutions figure among the better higher educational institutions of the world today—this, by any criterion. This was not always true; it was not true in 1874; it is important that it continue to be true in 2004.

The challenge to American higher education today is to preserve and enhance quality, while acknowledging the importance of justice. This can be accomplished only by recognizing the necessity of diversity—true diversity, and not the kind that distinguishes among institutions as to whether they serve two-year students, four-year students, or both graduate students and undergraduates. Nor is it enough that some are called private while others qualify as public. Such distinctions are frequently less significant than they ought to be. They conceal a conformity that makes too many colleges and universities pale images of a handful of accepted models, whose reputation for excellence is all too infrequently examined. Institutions expend far too much effort in trying to demonstrate that they are like others; in the process, they lose sight of their real opportunities and make both their students and their faculties seem inadequate when contrasted with others reputed to be excellent. So long as diversity of talent and interest is not admitted—so long as certain values are denied—there will always be a “pecking order” which is as inimical to those at the top as it is to those at the bottom.

The object of higher education in the United States must be to seek purposefully to serve new clienteles, aspiring to different kinds of goods. If educational institutions perpetuate certain kinds of inequalities—accepting disadvantage by reason of sex, age, color, or social class—they commit one kind of injustice, which is not overcome by rushing into the opposite direction and pretending that standards do not exist for those who have been “disadvantaged.” If they remain irrelevant and meaningless institutions to the millions whom they admit, they fail in another sense. True diversity promises the possibility of a place for those now left out; it promises also a more meaningful educational experience for many who are now accepted, but whose only interest appears to be to get through, acquire the certificate that gives proof of their attendance, and then dismiss the experience as an episode not worth repetition or reflection.

The colleges and universities of the country would do well to reflect on the quality of their instructional systems, the character of their curricula, and the value of the educational product they presume to sell. It is imperative that this be done in all areas, and that it touch undergraduate, graduate, and professional education. Nothing, perhaps, is more serious than the lack of a unifying educational experience for those enrolled in American colleges and universities. The argument that the proliferation of knowledge makes this impossible is not convincing; it simply legitimates an educational practice that pretends that everything is equally valuable, and that nothing need be known universally. So long as the existing system prevails, study will take the form of instruction in individual courses, randomly chosen, with performance judged by examination, and degrees awarded on the basis of credit hours passed. A more coherent educational philosophy ought to undergird a system of instruction intended to prepare young men and women for living in a world whose complexity is incontestable. Unprecedented opportunities exist today to know and understand the world we inhabit—its past no less than its present. Provincialism and parochialism are constant dangers in the American democracy as in others. These dangers need to be guarded against, even as necessary compromises are made with the powerful forces that support localism in the name of personal, group, or national identity. An educational system that does not make curriculum its first concern—that does not see what a revised higher educational curriculum might be in the context of today’s opportunities—is not even beginning to realize its potential.

The colleges and universities of the country began by being “finishing schools”

for boys; in time, certain of them chose also to admit girls. Late in the nineteenth century, graduate and professional programs proliferated, and young adults joined the company of full-time students. Today, many decades later, most institutions of higher learning are still overwhelmingly preoccupied with the instruction of men and women coming from these two very restricted age cohorts. It is time that this practice was changed. The education of adults—on a part-time or full-time basis—must become *the* prime responsibility of America's colleges and universities. Their objective must be educational in the broadest sense: vocational interests ought not to be despised, but these ought never to be introduced at the expense of more general interests.

The great classic works of art, literature, and philosophy were not produced for the exclusive edification and delectation of a cohort of young men and women. The problems of contemporary society are not susceptible to intelligent discussion if the dialogue is invariably between aging professors and students twenty or thirty years their juniors; nor is the quality of the debate improved if teacher and student belong to the same "generation." Contemporary American life is impoverished precisely because the colleges and universities of the country have been so reluctant to make lifetime learning their principal purpose. The mass media cannot satisfy the adult's craving for knowledge or his need for intelligent dialogue.

Diversity and differentiation of institutions, comprehensive curricular reform, an absolute commitment to lifetime learning—these are the objectives that ought to preoccupy institutions of higher learning in the coming years. Such preoccupations, were they to become general, would revitalize institutions now overwhelmed by lesser concerns. Education—in the broadest sense—ought again to become a principal responsibility of those who bear the titles of professor, dean, and president. They, together with trustees, legislators, and students (of the new breed, which will be preponderantly adult), are legatees of an educational possibility that remains largely unfulfilled.

The possibilities for learning have never been greater; the resources—human and material—have never been more abundant. American colleges and universities are offered an opportunity that they cannot ignore, imagining that others will do what they themselves do not choose to do. The realities are sobering; they suggest that America's colleges and universities must learn to help themselves, knowing that this implies something other than beating the other out, copying the other, or simply battenning down the hatches and waiting (or praying) for 1976. The time to act is now; the principles that must undergird all higher educational effort will necessarily express the idea of justice. Justice presumes respect, it calls for cooperation, and it is based on the reality of interdependence.

One reads these last words and blushes before the rhetoric that has managed to intrude itself. But one can only feel impatient with the deflationary attitudes so characteristic of American higher education today. No one seriously recommends imprudent management of resources; no one doubts that monies are harder to come by today than they were in the recent past. The question, however, is whether the fiscal situation ought to govern the educational aspirations of institutions.

American colleges and universities have a great deal to answer for, but they have no cause to humble themselves. Whatever their individual or collective faults, they are as nothing when compared with those of their principal traducers. In the late

1960s and early 1970s, they suffered too much easy abuse; the moral pretense and self-righteousness of both the extreme left and the extreme right ought to have been attacked more vigorously. Today, when the more obvious hypocrisies of the "law and order" men stand exposed, there is the danger of forgetting how much silliness paraded itself as "radical opinion" on the other side. Students were right to point out the hazards of the institutional bigness and impersonality all too common in many colleges and universities. However inchoately, they detected the sheer vulgarity of a too great concern with expansion and growth, which mistook quantity for quality and made education seem another business enterprise. When students spoke of colleges and universities as "prisons" and deplored their own lack of freedom, however, they were fantasizing in ways that ought never to have been countenanced. No group in American society is more privileged than the young; none is offered greater freedom; of none is so little asked and to none so much given. It is extraordinary that these things were not said—and constantly reiterated—throughout the late 1960s.

So, also, is it remarkable that students were able for several years to claim that *they* were the university, that the university existed for *them*, and that it was *they* who ought to have a governing voice in all major decisions affecting their lives in the university. Rarely has such a major property been claimed by young men and women whose own investment in their patrimony was of so limited and transient a nature. Again, it was the exaggeration of the claim that needs to be argued against, and not the impulse that led it to be made in the first instance. There were, incontestably, legitimate and real grievances; the students who insisted on drawing attention to them were right to do so. When the claims were exaggerated out of all proportion, however, they simply became grotesque.

In such an environment, rational discourse became difficult, if not impossible. The mentality that saw only the need for "battles," "parties," "caucuses," and "confrontations" was inimical to serious reflection on the basic problems of higher education. Inevitably, reforms came to be equated with resolving particular difficulties, defusing dangerous pockets of resistance, and coping with powerful political and other forces. It was not a good time for any "academic" exercise—least of all one which had to do with the purposes of higher education. Now, when these dangers no longer exist, the financial crisis is used to counsel moderation and restraint. Perhaps all such counsel is seriously mistaken. Perhaps this is as good a time as any to reflect more generally about where American higher education has recently been and where it ought now properly to go.

It is pointless to speak of diversity in the abstract. A system is not made "diverse" because part of it provides technical education and another part offers instruction in the liberal arts. Any number of highly centralized national systems of higher education show a similar diversity. Americans have reflected too rarely on the advantage their system offers in not being entirely in the control of the federal government. Even if all higher education in the United States were public, there would still, in theory, be at least fifty public systems, one for each state. In fact, the country is advantaged in having both a public and a private sector, with considerable differentiation both between and within each of these categories. Even though the private sector has been declining in recent years—in the percentage of students enrolled—several of the private institutions remain the most conspicuous centers of scholarship and learning in the country and several others continue to provide services and instruction of a kind that would never be offered in public in-

*After all, we gave
them the chance
to break it by in
Vietnam!*

stitutions. It is much too late in the day to pretend that the private institutions are "superior" to the public—they are not—but it is not too late to say that the American system of higher education would be greatly impoverished if all institutions were public, with a handful of rich private colleges and universities existing beside them.

While the private institutions are unquestionably fulfilling a public function, the best argument for their survival is not the fiscal one that their facilities would have to be duplicated at public expense if they ceased to exist. The rationale for the existence of private institutions is precisely that they live through private benefaction, encouraging private choice. This does not mean that they ought never to qualify for certain kinds of public funding. It does suggest that they ought not to become dependent on public support. If they are to be free of the kinds of bureaucratic controls that presently characterize public institutions, they must show their continued capacity to generate a substantial part of their own income and to do this without reference to federal or state authority.

The "dead hand of bureaucracy" is a cliché, but with sufficient truth to merit some attention. American higher education has not only become big; in all too many areas it has also become sclerotic. The solution for its *immobilism* is not to be found in a romantic attachment to smallness, but in a more deliberate and inventive grappling with the problems of bigness. There is nothing more dispiriting than the easy way in which most institutions seek to model themselves after the few that are said to be good. If there are, indeed, advantages in having both public and private institutions, with substantial differences among them, this can be demonstrated most concretely by academic curricula of great variety that reflect these differences.

The curriculum of a college or university is (or ought to be) its principal defining element. This in no way undervalues the role geographic location, intellectual and material resources, as well as tradition and reputation play in attracting students or in recruiting and retaining faculty. Institutional reputations are slow to build; they may be even more difficult to dismantle. Many American colleges and universities live with reputations that bear only the slightest resemblance to the reality that students find once they have actually enrolled. These reputations may as often be linked to athletic prowess as to intellectual or social distinctiveness. There is no reason to expect these situations to change in the near future. Nevertheless, the educational offerings of an institution—and not only in the courses given—make possible an educational diversity infinitely greater than any that now exists.

It is increasingly obvious today that no institution will excel in all fields. It is questionable whether any ought to aspire to do so. The permutations of possible learning experiences are virtually infinite; American colleges and universities have not been nearly inventive enough in reflecting on what these might be. They have experimented with too few learning devices; in this, one speaks not so much of technological innovation as of the various kinds of innovations in relations between teacher and student and among students or teachers, often from quite distinct disciplines. The United States is probably more innovative in all these matters than certain other modern societies, but, given its possibilities, it has not even begun to realize its potential.

The reluctance to change is tied to the common academic insistence that all subjects (and courses) have equal merit. This notion is in sharp contrast to an earlier academic tradition which emphasized a fixed curriculum that all educated men and women were expected to follow. In the earlier period every discipline had its place

in an established hierarchy; today, each exists by itself, with occasional, fairly tenuous links to others, but essentially surviving on its own internal strength (not least, its capacity to generate interest, expressed as enrollment, among a sufficient number of students). In this situation, faculties, in all but the smallest institutions, are essentially collections of departments. Collegueship, insofar as it exists, exists departmentally. While nothing can probably be done to alter this situation rapidly in most institutions, some effort should be made to conceive of educational programs that are not so narrowly based, and that might be quickly made available to significant numbers of students. One institution ought to differ from another precisely in the way that it approaches the task of providing educational experience beyond what is available along purely disciplinary lines. But even within the traditional disciplines, there are opportunities for innovation in instruction far beyond those that are commonly acknowledged. The easy imitation of a handful of accepted norms ought to be looked at with far greater suspicion than is now the case.

✓ For greater instructional diversity to exist—not for its own sake, but for the sake of the students—a wholly new concept of studentship needs to be conceived. It is extraordinary that so few institutions have made a substantial commitment to the education of adults. Even where they have, they have done so surreptitiously, concealing even from themselves what they have been compelled to do. A number of large, private, poorly endowed universities live from their adult student tuition income. Too many of them cannot bear to accept that this is the source of their financial equilibrium; they seek to represent themselves as good undergraduate colleges, and pride themselves on the number of Ph.D.s that they produce. It is regrettable that they feel obliged to engage in such pathetic deception of the public (and of themselves). If the education of adults had a greater prestige, these attitudes would be unthinkable. It is time for many institutions, in both the public and the private sectors, to conceive of their student bodies as essentially adult, men and women of all ages who attend for disparate reasons, but who understand that what the college or university can offer them is not available elsewhere.

Higher educational institutions cannot wait for the demand to manifest itself and then respond by offering specific courses (probably in the evening). They ought, rather, to engage in systematic studies of what adults in a society like our own need to know, or would profit from knowing, and seek to make these things available to ever larger groups during the day, at night, on weekends, in the summer, and at many convenient sites. This cannot happen if each academic department remains an entity unto itself; nor will it happen when a “dean of adult education” is appointed. Perhaps the whole concept of “adult education,” with its remedial, vocational, or entertainment potential, is thoroughly out of date. Nor does it make sense to use a phrase like “continuing education,” which is a redundancy. Institutions must be committed to the proposition that men and women in the prime of life, no less than the young and the old, are in constant need of learning and discussing together. If physical fitness has become an American preoccupation—as to some extent, it has—then intellectual fitness is no less necessary and no less desirable. Intellectual fitness, like physical fitness, cannot be accomplished through any single activity which all will deliberately choose. Nor can it be achieved at one moment for a lifetime. It presumes a more or less permanent commitment; its appeal is precisely that it provides substantial pleasures while offering very concrete benefits.

Higher educational institutions need to conceptualize a comparable role for themselves in the intellectual sphere. When they have done so, they will become

useful to adults in ways that they cannot claim to be today. If this happens, men and women may be prepared to pay for (or support through their taxes) educational programs that do not now exist. When many colleges and universities enroll men and women of all ages, they will have the large public constituency that they currently lack. That change, in itself, will do more to make higher education (and education more generally) a national concern than would any number of the more short-range policies that are now favored.

The change in the 1970s must come from within; from college and university administrators, obviously, but also from faculties, students, trustees, and alumni who share some kind of commitment to the possibilities of higher education. When sufficient numbers of these men and women have begun systematically to call for change, there is at least the possibility that state and federal legislators as well as corporate and private donors will begin to listen with new interest to what spokesmen for colleges and universities are saying. The new educational possibilities are immense; they need to be linked to the kind of society which the United States currently is but also to the one that it aspires to be. In the absence of a more subtle sense of the nature and requirements of the American democracy—in the absence of a more precise delineation of democracy's potentials—there can only be the partial and halting reforms of the moment, and with them the overwhelming preoccupation with budgets and administration. These last are not trivia; it would be foolish to deny their great importance. They do not, however, give sustenance to a system that needs desperately to clarify its goals.

FELIX GILBERT

Reflections on "Higher Education"

IN THE EARLY SUMMER of 1945, when I was stationed with the Army in Germany, one of the issues occupying us was whether and when the German universities ought to be reopened. I was sent to Heidelberg to get an impression of the availability of non-Nazi professors and of the physical possibilities and difficulties. Among the faculty members whom I and a colleague interviewed was Karl Jaspers. As we were leaving, Jaspers, to whom I had brought greetings from a brother-in-law in England, singled me out and asked me whether I could come back in the afternoon since I might be able to answer a question that puzzled him. A few hours later, therefore, I again sat opposite Jaspers; he told me the University of Heidelberg had never had a formal constitution. As he and some of his colleagues thought it was time to have the work of the University placed on a firm legal footing, he was drafting a constitution for the University. In the preamble he had written that the aim of the University was to create an "intellectual aristocracy" ("*geistige Aristokratie*"). He wondered whether the proclamation of such an aim was compatible with the educational program of the occupying powers and whether a document with such a statement would get their needed approval. My answer was brief and definite. I said that I was quite sure that the American occupying authorities would never permit publication of a document containing such a formula.

I am aware that Jaspers' question was somewhat naïve, and my answer, although under the existing circumstances correct, rather crude. But the naïveté and crudity of this exchange serve to illuminate the basic conflict between the concept of equality inherent in the idea of democracy and the elitist assumptions underlying the notion of "Higher Education."

When we say "higher" we assume that something of the same kind exists that is lower. The notion of "Higher Education," therefore, presupposes that Higher Education supplies something better than is provided in other forms of education; in its most obvious sense the concept assumes that Higher Education follows after other educational processes and adds to what they had offered. But the notion of Higher Education also embodies the view that the number of those who receive a higher education is smaller than the number of those who do not pass through to that higher final stage in the educational process. Higher Education is not the top floor in a quadratic building, but a rather small triangle at the apex of a pyramid.

Until recently it aroused neither astonishment nor criticism that a small group of the population received a better education than the rest. Systems of education are reflections of the social structure in which they exist; a hierarchically organized system of education in which the more advanced, the more comprehensive—briefly, the "better"—education was reserved to a small upper group corresponded to the class structure of most industrial societies. This society assigned to the institutions of

Higher Education (that meant for them primarily the university and will be the meaning also in these reflections) the task to form man as he ought to be; it was the man of the social upper group which the university was forming. This connection between university education and social upper group was a characteristic development of the nineteenth century. In preceding centuries the son of a member of the nobility, accompanied by his governor, might have attended briefly a university. But these seats of learning had nothing to do with forming the behavior, the concepts of honor, and the elegant tastes of the aristocracy before the French Revolution. The universities were then drab places with learned pedants, uncouth students, and a few scholars of genius. This changed with the industrial age. The knowledge which man could acquire at universities gained in practical importance. The universities supplied the specialized training in economy, technology, law which was needed. Moreover, the universities gave to the middle classes which interpenetrated the ruling aristocracy a rationalization, a justification, for their claims to power and influence: a humanist philosophy which declared knowledge to be man's distinguishing and most eminent feature.

Our notion of Higher Education is complex. It contains an elitist element, a professional element, and a philosophical element. It provides an entrance ticket to the upper strata of society. It is assumed to impart specialized knowledge imperative for the functioning and managing of the intricate apparatus of modern society, and it claims to provide a guide for life and action by enlightening man about the conditions of human existence.

By separating the constituent elements of our concept of Higher Education, the problems associated with this notion immediately emerge. Higher Education is in conflict with crucial social and political ideas of the democratic age, and the various tasks which are assigned to it are exclusive of each other. Not much needs to be said about the contrast between an education that confines its supreme efforts to a limited group and democratic egalitarian principles; this contrast has been obvious for a long time. Americans have been aware of it since the early years of independence, as Jefferson's proposals for school legislation in 1781 show. The United States has never fully developed the duality of the school system that has been characteristic of Europe. There two school systems existed side by side, the one for the "masses," the other that opened the doors to the university—the *lycée*, the *Gymnasium*, the "public" schools—for the children of the social upper group. Certainly, various attempts were made in Europe to counteract the effects of education on preserving and deepening class division, and they led to a number of practical measures and school reform after World War II. The trend was to establish a basic school which would allow talent to be recognized, to give the talented child a training that would prepare him for the university, and to support his university studies by financial grants. This is not the place to discuss the extent to which these reforms fulfilled the purpose of making study at the university accessible to youths of all social groups. Even in a system which succeeds in giving the chance of Higher Education to those who merit it, the number of those who receive it will be limited. This is unavoidable for a number of reasons. It might be enough to mention that effective instruction can be given only to limited numbers, and that with a greater number of students the expenses for libraries and laboratories rise to heights that are financially not feasible. Even if Higher Education is no longer the preserve of those with wealth and social prestige, it remains selective.

The principle of reserving Higher Education to those with special gifts influences the aims to which the general program and the instruction are directed. Emphasis on the student with special talents increases the trend toward specialization which goes hand in hand with professionalization, especially since the extension of Higher Education to the less pecunious classes of society focuses attention on the economic value of Higher Education.

Again, this development must be traced back into the nineteenth century; it was closely connected with the rise of the natural sciences and their increasing importance in academic life. They began to absorb to a steadily increasing degree the financial resources at the disposal of the universities. The quick advance and the many discoveries in these rapidly developing natural sciences forced students to a concentration on their work which separated them increasingly from students in other fields of knowledge. Moreover, there was also incompatibility, at least in the nineteenth century, between philosophy with its metaphysical elements and the empiricism of nineteenth-century natural sciences, the one containing an authoritarian element, the other rejecting all theories that could not be proved by experiment.

Of course, the attitude maintained by scientific organizations before the public is that a broadly based education, including the humanities, is the best preparation for professional specialization on the graduate level. But their practice hardly agrees with this theory. Admission to professional graduate schools is hardly possible without having taken a number of special courses preparing for the later work, and the time left to study in other fields becomes increasingly restricted. Moreover, the number of courses which students must take in their special field is steadily increased by an accreditation system which forces departments even at small institutions to have a "full program"; since there is no point in having such a full program if the courses it offers are not taken, there is a tendency to increase the number of required courses for those majoring in the department.

Higher education might have succumbed more slowly or less completely to the trend toward specialization and professionalization if the strength of the philosophical element in higher education had not steadily declined. My use of the term "philosophical element" should not be misunderstood. Such a "philosophical element" is in existence if there is agreement on a normative image of man, and if the study at the university is seen as the means which leads to the realization of this ideal. Philosophy does not create this image; rather, it justifies the image whose features might be formed in a variety of ways. The idea of the university which accompanied the rise of bourgeois society in the nineteenth century had its origin in the efforts of the neo-humanist movement to revive the ideals of classical antiquity in the modern world. The wisdom of the ancient philosophers was the common root from which all modern scholarship and science sprang. That was the underlying assumption. It is reflected in Burckhardt's thesis of the decisive importance of the revival of antiquity for the emergence of the modern world and in Jowett's view that the reading of Plato would make young British aristocrats into competent modern statesmen. The classical scholars were the leading men at the university, the high priests of Higher Education. But as frequently happens, closer acquaintance did not confirm the picture formed on first impression. Acquisition of greater knowledge of the ancient world which was the necessary accompaniment to the emphasis on the study of the classics revealed the difference between the neo-humanist ideal and the reality of the ancient world. Nevertheless, traces of the time when classical

scholarship was regarded as the heart and soul of Higher Education can still be found in the high reputation which classical studies enjoy at all universities despite having often degenerated into violent philological squabbles, into mere antiquarianism, or into endless reediting of the same sources.

Modern historical scholarship grew up in the shadow of classical studies and when the preeminent role of the classics in "Higher Education" became undermined, history took over. History could serve as a unifying element in "Higher Education" because it was conceived as a world process in which all human activities are interconnected and advance in equal steps so that the present emerges as product of the past. It was a process which was assumed to show the victory of moral forces and to provide a moral guide. But, in the course of time, the belief that historical insight could provide a normative idea of man became questioned. Many of the assumptions on which this belief had been founded were sloughed off—especially the optimistic confidence that history showed a triumph of moral forces. However, the crucial factor in the changed attitude to the value of history has been the tenuousness of the bond which ties present and past together. Has the world of the late twentieth century—of new means of transportation and communication, of new instruments of destruction, of new psychological insights and of new ethics, of a shift of power away from Europe to new centers—left any meaningful relationship to the past, even to the recent past of the nineteenth century? There is no simple answer to this question. But at best the historical dimension forms only a part of the world in which man now lives.

Being a historian I feel urged to say that this does not eliminate the value of history as a field of scholarship. Theology, philosophy, classics, history—they all were once the center around which the other fields of knowledge gravitated: work in these fields has not become futile because they no longer dominate the intellectual universe. In the case of history, the diminution of stature has perhaps even opened the road to wider explorations. If classical studies have withdrawn into themselves, historians are broadening out into other areas of knowledge. Nevertheless, a field of knowledge which might be regarded as giving unity and connection to the various areas of research and might create an accepted and acceptable order of values no longer exists. A university has dissolved into a large number of different disciplines.

There is a contrast between the situation which has developed and the expectations which the public connects with the notion of a man of high standing in the academic world, between the knowledge which he imparts and the wisdom that is ascribed to him. The managers of political parties would hardly ask to collect signatures of prominent men in the scholarly and scientific world in support of their candidates if they did not expect that the public would assign particular value to the views of such men. They are expected to possess a general philosophical outlook which permits them to judge a particular case from a wider view. Of course, there are public affairs on which members of certain academic professions are particularly competent to express opinions. Historians who work in the field of American history can and ought to say something about the damage that would be caused to the American self-image if a president who had violated basic ideas of civil rights and of legal procedures were to be in power when the nation celebrates the bicentennial of its independence; but expertise or even eminence in a special field of knowledge does not guarantee that kind of insight and intelligence which the treatment of political and social issues or similar affairs demands. According to my experience, it can by no means be taken for granted that the discussion of politics and foreign

policy among eminent academic men is ahead of the level of such discussions among undergraduates. A genius can be one-sided, and some fields of knowledge might even invite intellectual attitudes which form an obstacle to an appreciation of the nature of present-day political and social problems. For instance, a theoretical mathematician might have difficulties grasping that in political and social life the past is a concrete reality which, at least to a certain extent, determines the path of the future, that political and social life is not a *tabula rasa* on which a society can be built according to rational principles. Even in intellectual life gifts can be limited to one particular sphere; the highly learned man does not need to be a highly educated man.

I can imagine the objection that, by inflating the importance of the term "Higher Education," I create difficulties where no difficulties exist, or at least more problems than there really are. It could be said that what we really are concerned with when we talk about *Higher Education* is a more concrete phenomenon: the university as a place of higher learning.

Now it is entirely true that the notion of higher learning does not involve the difficulties which are inherent in the concept Higher Education. In learning one advances from step to step, and the more difficult and abstract stages of this process might rightly be called higher learning. What you are taught in places of higher learning is expected to enable you to do a better and more creative job in the fields for which you are trained. There can be no question that training for the higher grades in our professions has become the chief claim of our universities, our technological institutes, our professional schools, seminars, and so forth.

Still, confounding Higher Education and higher learning instead of distinguishing them has its great dangers. It does not do justice to the requirements of higher learning, nor does it confront squarely the problems and limits of Higher Education.

A decisive problem of the institutes of higher learning is the relation of research and teaching, and this issue becomes obscured if higher learning and Higher Education are confounded. Unquestionably in many fields research has become so specialized and complicated that it requires special institutes, teamwork, and full-time researchers. In almost all disciplines the scholar who wants to remain abreast with what others are doing and wants to make a contribution of his own must have full free time. On the other hand, the traditions of Higher Education declare that research and teaching go hand in hand. I do not want to postulate that research and teaching should be entirely separated. On the basis of what have been, I admit, few and superficial contacts, I would say that I have not been overly impressed by the Russian system where the universities are teaching institutions and the academies primarily places of research. But the traditional assumption that the aim of universities is Higher Education leads us away from looking at the universities as they are now and from organizing them according to their purposes.

This identification of higher learning and Higher Education also distorts the meanings and tasks of education. It is based on a normative image of man which finds fulfillment and realization in all fields of knowledge and in all human activities. Whereas learning implies increasing specialization, education in our democratic society will always be concerned with the question of giving wider groups a share in the normative image of man. Essential features of this norm came from the academic disciplines which in the United States are called the humanities, but the

image dissolved when the authority of the humanities paled with the emergence of the natural sciences. They looked in a different direction, not toward man, but toward the structure of nature and of the universe. The more the rapid advances in the natural sciences were astounding, unsettling, and overwhelming, the more it became enigmatic what man meant in this new universe and what our new knowledge means for the potentialities and limitations of the human image. It is the failure of searching for an answer to this question which makes it difficult to believe that learning and education can be bound together again. The image of man is in the center of all questions of education. Without such an image people can learn, but only with such an image can they be educated.

These reflections are written on the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles in an office high up in a skyscraper. Through my window I look down on a garden with luxuriously flowering plants among which sculptures—firm human figures, abstract forms, globes and cylinders—are distributed. The path which divides the garden leads up to a large modern building, and every day around noon the students stream down from this building along the path—a colorful mass, almost like a moving bed of flowers. The diversity of colors in this mass seems like a mirror of the variety of their background, their racial origin, their aims. They are not from a secluded intellectual aristocracy; they will go into all paths of life. But what will they take along when they have left the garden? Is what they have learned now completed and left far behind them? Will the garden remain a remote aesthetic paradise without relation to the reality of life? Or are they aware that what they have learned was only the beginning of a search which will never end?

PETER CAWS

Instruction and Inquiry

IN THE COURSE of this essay I shall sketch briefly two speculative theories: a theory of instruction and a theory of academic evolution. Between them they are capable of explaining a lot of what has been going on in the last ten years, and if correct they have far-reaching consequences for the future of the university. The restoration of a kind of puzzled tranquillity to the campuses seems to have reassured everyone that the university will be allowed to have a future after all, at any rate insofar as this depends on the tolerance of its inhabitants. The threat to survival now comes from economic forces rather than revolutionary ones. But this does not mean that the nature and purpose of the institution are any clearer than before. A framework is still needed in which what happens inside the university can be thought about together with what happens outside it, and thus lent intelligibility in terms wider than its own.

I take the university, as usual, to consist of its faculty and students, who are served by the administration. "Administration" *means* service; the "-minis-" comes directly from "*minus*," servants being the lesser members of the household. There is nothing belittling about such an interpretation. The religious tradition out of which most universities grew elevated the concept of service to spiritual heights, and the fact that it, too, grew bureaucratized and self-important does not destroy the value of this attitude. The religious analogy has, it is true, a serious defect as it applies to the university today: it worked very well as long as the service was the service of God, but it does not work so well if there is no generally shared conviction as to the transcendent purpose of the institution. Of course even God's purposes required interpretation; hence the need for popes and archbishops. In the case of the university, the need is for a real head, not a vicarious one—a president, perhaps—to interpret the human rather than the divine mission of those over whom he presides. (I use the term "he" in its Middle English sense as referring to persons not sexually differentiated.)

It is not my intention to dwell on administrative questions, but these remarks suggest a parenthesis. If the foregoing analysis has any force, it follows that the president should not in fact be an administrator and should avoid at all costs the temptation to think of himself as one. His role should be that not of a servant, but of a leader. He should not, in other words, have to busy himself with things that an administrator could do, like budgets and public relations. On the other hand, if he does have to busy himself with things of this sort, he should have some title other than president, since, in spite of vicissitudes in the national government, this title still carries honorific connotations. A president far removed in his daily preoccupations from the institution's true purpose cannot help but affect the private morale and the public image of the institution itself. An examination of the balance

of time and energy consumed in the university on academic as opposed to non-academic activities shows that we waste progressively more and more of our effort on the latter, and small wonder, if the titular head of the organization has or allows himself to waste *all* his effort on them. It would make a great difference to the spirit, and more difference than one might expect to the practice, of higher education if presidents were active and respected scholars, whose acceptance of the position for a limited period were made possible by the appointment of trained nonacademic administrators over whose decisions they and their faculty had veto power. It is partly a question of how the intellectual life is to be represented in the public eye, whether by its authentic exponents or by purveyors of educational clichés.

But enough of that. The object of my remarks is the interrelation in the university between three entities: the faculty member, the student, and the body of knowledge that it is the former's responsibility, according to the accepted view, to teach the latter and to enlarge or correct by his research. I begin with this body of knowledge itself. The striking thing about it is that it would not exist were it not for the population of learned men and women who know it. It has to be *embodied*; and for this, real bodies and, in particular, heads are required. The fact that there are libraries and other artifacts does not mean that these are capable of carrying the substance of culture or intellect by themselves; they are external helps, mechanisms of storage, but without significance apart from the individuals who draw upon them and animate what they contain. Everything that belongs to the domain of human knowledge is now known by somebody, actually or potentially: actually if there is an individual to whose present stock it belongs, in the sense that he could recall it at will; potentially if there is an individual who, alone or in collaboration with others, is capable of recovering it from the store in which it has been deposited. These two cases correspond to what George Sarton called knowledge of the first and second kinds. Some things once belonged to the domain, but have passed irrecoverably out of it—works no copies of which have survived, languages which became extinct before they could be recorded. Other things are provisionally inaccessible, but will become accessible again; still others are as yet undiscovered.

The process of education is the internalization in an individual of an assortment of things already known by other individuals, together with some discovered by himself, the latter mostly either trivial or duplicating what is routinely discovered by members of his culture. When educated, he becomes one of the holders, for his generation, of the stock of knowledge which will eventually be passed on to the next. Some few people make discoveries which actually enlarge the stock, and it is conventionally assumed that this is one of the tasks of members of university faculties; it is their ability to do this, demonstrated in a Ph.D. thesis, that admits them to membership. The faculty consists of people who can do things easily, or at least (to take a meaning somewhere between the Latin *facilis* and the American professorate) competently. The student comes to the university in order to complete the process of internalization or at any rate to advance it. He is anxious to acquire (*studium*, "zeal") what his professors claim to possess (*fateri*, "avow").

This acquisition will contribute to the construction, in the student's head, of a complex relational structure whose main lines were laid down in his genes and whose progressive definition has been going on continuously since birth. This structure will be partially homologous with corresponding structures in the heads of the other people with whom he can communicate. Between all the heads, as I have already indicated, the totality of human knowledge will be distributed, but for the

moment our concern is with just one head. Its internal structure (let us call it, according to an ancient and honorable hypothesis, a *mental* structure) is, taken as a whole, absolutely idiosyncratic, and even the parts that are most obviously homologous with the mental structures of others (the individual's knowledge of the English language, say, or of physics) have their own peculiarities. (No two people have *exactly* the same vocabulary in English.) The continuous building up of this inner structure I will call instruction, "in-struction," a remarkable process that with input channels of very limited capacity yields mental complexities of a very high order. The main secret of this achievement is, of course, the possession of a language, a linear device which feeds more or less constantly all human minds equipped to receive it, especially during the period of their education. ("Education" does *not* mean "drawing out." What is in the head from the beginning is important, but it is important that it be kept in as a basis for other things that are to be put or taken in. What "education" really means is "leading up"; higher education means higher up.)

Now the things an individual is, at any given moment, capable of adding on to the mental structure already acquired depend, of course, on the history of its "instruction" and on the devices of communication he commands. Mental structures, like human culture itself, grow by a process of *bricolage*—that is, by the wholesale addition of pre-formed structures, fragments just picked up or perhaps pedagogically broken off for easy assimilation. A good instructor will know what such fragments look like and will point them out ("to teach" means "to point out"). But the skill that consists in breaking down what is already known into assimilable morsels is not obviously related to the very different skill of diagnosing mental structures in order to see what they are ready to assimilate, and these in turn seem at first glance to have little to do with the skill (possessed in principle, as we have seen, by everybody on the faculty) of adding to one's own mental structure (for eventual communication, presumably, to others) items of new knowledge previously belonging to no structure at all. Yet these three are supposed to meet in the university routinely.

As to the diagnosis, it is not clear that anyone is particularly good at it. We know very little about the mechanisms of learning at any level beyond the elementary, and even if we did it would follow from the theory of instruction adumbrated above that the amount of information necessary to apply such knowledge to a particular case would be very large indeed. The details of mental structure that account for one individual's acquiring a skill or a language or a discipline suddenly and easily, while another struggles and finally abandons the attempt, are matters of almost total ignorance. The only thing that can safely be said is that every case will be different, and different not in trifling ways to be averaged out under some generally applicable curriculum, but in crucial ones. Under these circumstances, taking in a homogeneous age group and putting them in courses by twenties or thirties can only be regarded as a form of lunacy. Students in universities are usually educated by accident, and this might be institutionalized by trying to make the university a higher-order analogy of the "biological soup" out of which the earliest forms of life are supposed to have developed. The secret of evolutionary development is to have organisms swimming in their own nutrients (we still swim in oxygen). Children are surrounded by language, and that is how they learn it—they do not have to be instructed in it (in the conventional sense); it is instructed into them (in my sense). So the student in the university should be immersed in an "intellec-

tual soup," an image whose initial absurdity should not be allowed to spoil its aptness: it is the paradigmatic image of nutrition for an age afflicted with diluted substance and elaborate, costly, but inedible packaging. In a population as starved for ideas as our own, the opening of a few intellectual soup-kitchens would not be such a bad thing. The drawback of the image is its suggestion of homogeneity, but in the intellectual as in the biological case the nutrients can be so organized that chains of them are lying about, having the property that if the first element of the chain is ingested the rest follow easily. These *might* take the form of courses, provided that the final examination were given in the second week, to eliminate (without penalty) those who were not ready for the first element.

The crucial question is, what do these elements look like? Many of them presumably look like books or parts of books; the role of the faculty member as teacher is partly bibliographical, partly exemplary, partly instructional in the strict sense, in that he helps in the fitting on, as it were, of some recalcitrant fragment of new structure. (The latter role will for the most part be played in tutorials, not in courses.) But in particular what should they look like *in the university*? (I shall not try to answer that question here, but in the language of the textbooks I leave it as an exercise for the reader.) The university is not just a library, although almost any good library could be turned into a rudimentary university by the provision of some examiners. It is a university because of the presence of the faculty, who are precisely such examiners, in that they certify the graduates. (This is the only necessary, and by far the most important, thing they do so far as the students are concerned.) That is not all they are, presumably; they are there not only for purposes of instruction and certification, but also for purposes of *inquiry*. But for inquiry the students are not needed; in fact having to go to attend to them every Tuesday and Friday (and Monday and Thursday, and sometimes Wednesday) can be painfully distracting.

This is not the case, of course, for advanced students, the ones who are engaged in the same domain as the faculty member as researcher. Inquiry is a form of self-instruction for the inquirer and may be instruction, too, for someone else who is capable of following it. The situation where instruction and inquiry are thus linked, if not identical, is the ideal for the university. There are some disciplines in which this is the case almost by definition—for example, philosophy in one of its modes: Socrates instructed by inquiring, but then the content of his instruction was nothing else, in the first instance, than the value of inquiry itself: "the unexamined life is not worth living." One of the aims of university instruction is to produce inquirers, persons capable of original self-instruction; but that kind of inquiry can obviously go on elsewhere than in the university, in the marketplace, for example. The foundation of the Academy marked the transition to specialized inquiry and, hence, to esoteric instruction. And in one sense that transition epitomizes the academic evolution to an account of which I now turn.

Philosophy as Socrates practiced it should be taught implicitly from the very beginning of formal instruction, and explicitly as soon as the principles of free inquiry can be grasped, certainly not later than the high school. But in other domains where there is factual or methodological content of a cumulative kind to be mastered (and this includes much of the rest of philosophy), some sequence of instruction is inevitable. Knowing what that sequence should be is, as has been suggested, far from simple, but it is quite likely to follow, in broad outline, the path that the development of knowledge in the domain followed historically, or might

have followed historically if history had been better organized than it was. This is obviously a version of the recapitulation hypothesis: ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. In this case, however, the parallel is not between two lines of development, but between three; I shall claim that the growth of knowledge in the individual recapitulates not only the growth of knowledge in his culture, but also the growth of the institutional system that conserves and disseminates such knowledge.

This hypothesis has immediately to be qualified: I mean the *recent* growth of the institutional system. Its early history is not linear; in Europe the universities are in many cases more ancient foundations than the schools, and a great deal of early education went on privately, through tutors and the like. But if we look at the emergence of education as a deliberately organized public activity, the development proceeds from the general establishment of elementary schools in the nineteenth century, through the establishment of high schools for the population at large at about the turn of the century, to the opening up of the universities after World War II. I do not mean that these institutions were first thought of at these times, which is obviously false, but that they took their place in this order in the scheme of general education—that is, education in principle for *everybody*. In other words, when the public is pretty well saturated with elementary school graduates, high schools will take in a greater and greater proportion of the next higher age group, and when it is pretty well saturated with high school graduates, the same thing will happen on the next level.

Consider now the situation before this general upward movement began. Teaching at any level was a reasonably honorific activity; some teachers also wrote, others did not; the colleges fulfilled a largely social function; the few universities had their scholars, and these had some students, but were not swamped by them. The role of teachers or faculty members was disciplinary, exemplary, hortatory, discriminatory (in the positive sense); they were not expected necessarily to do “research,” although many of those who actually wanted to did so. This amiable state of affairs was ruined forever by the conjunction of a number of different developments. First of all, education as a general right (especially education as compulsory for everybody) reduced the status of the teacher to that of an underpaid civil servant. Secondly, more and more people stayed in school until they actually reached the limits of their intellectual capacity. This hardly ever happened in the elementary school; it became noticeable in the high schools, but reached crisis proportions only in the colleges and universities. (It is admittedly bad to ignore any talent a person possesses, but it is far worse to recognize talents he does not possess.) Thirdly, when the upward thrust reached the university level, the teachers it brought with it were treated as though they ought to have been in the university all along—they all became Ph.D.s and researchers, booted and saddled, overnight. Now it is not in the cards that more than a (relatively) few people should be capable of making nontrivial additions to the collective structure of knowledge, and a glance at the current literature will confirm this; and yet the design of the university, with its modest teaching loads for everybody, its patterns of promotion, and the rest, treats all the x hundred thousand faculty members as if they were inquirers in this strong sense as well as the instructors the system needs them to be.

This problem is compounded by the undeniable evolutionary fact that as time passes (and if reckoned in man-hours it passes ever more quickly) the frontier of knowledge advances, so that more and more territory has to be covered in order to get to it. I have not meant to suggest that the number of productive researchers is

constant; it, too, grows with the wider accessibility of education at the lower levels. It is just that it does not keep pace with the needed growth of the teaching profession at the college level, and this receding of the point at which research can usefully be commenced only makes matters worse for the others. Now it seems to me plausible to suggest that it was just this combination of factors, intersecting with (and, indeed, having in part produced) a new level of social awareness on the part of students, and thrown into relief by contrast with racial injustice and military adventurism, that nurtured the brief period of student revolution from 1964 to 1971 or so. The university, with its apparent self-delusions, its tacit promises, its uncomfortable challenge, nevertheless was seen as a luxury, an outrage, a disappointment, a public example. It had, in fact, got itself into an anachronistic corner. It is still there.

Now there is nothing wrong with general education up to the limit of every individual capacity; indeed it is the condition for the enjoyment of civilization by everybody, and there is no evidence that some have a better right to enjoy it than others. But this general education must be finished by the accepted age of majority—in our case eighteen—otherwise the conditions of democratic government are tainted. They are always tainted, of course, but there is no excuse for letting them remain so in avoidable ways, and it is clear that the job could be done by eighteen. It is also clear that the universities are, in fact, still doing it after that age. All this means is that the process ought to be accelerated. About three-quarters of what is done in the universities could, I am persuaded, be done in the schools. Even so, a great number of students, far greater than under the old conditions, would be able to profit by continuing into the university years, and they could still be taught by pure instructors, as it were, whose conditions of employment would not be tied to their productivity in inquiry. If senior professors do teach freshmen, they should do so not because of their pedagogical skills, but because of their exemplary status. It made a great difference to me to be lectured, as a new undergraduate at the Royal College of Science in London, by the Nobel prizewinner who headed the department; he gave the first course, which lasted about four weeks, and then was not seen again until a couple of years later. But that was in a system so selective that the whole college contained only a few hundred students. Now we have thousands of freshmen, still perhaps capable of being affected by such an experience, but not in groups of thirty, since there are not enough senior people to go round. In my ideal university, the scholar-president to whom I referred earlier would give the first course, in the auditorium, and nobody would ever forget it. . . .

The realities are otherwise. But change is still needed, and the burden of what I have been trying to say is that a new understanding, on the one hand, of what is going on in the student's head and, on the other, of what is going on in the evolution of the academy may point a direction for some components of that change. My claim is that what is going on in the student's head is radically idiosyncratic, so that while there is some virtue in collective activities of very broad appeal (such as being inspired in the big lecture just referred to), there is no virtue in activities that presuppose more than a very general similarity between heads. *All arguments of detail about the curriculum are absolutely pointless*; a realization of this truth would immediately result in the saving of thousands of hours and the avoidance of much acrimony and frustration. Arguments of principle, centering on what to do instead of lining up courses end to end until graduation, might be helpful. My claim in the latter connection is that the university is doing the wrong job, or the right job too

late, but that in either case nobody whose primary mission is instruction—that is, the facilitation of the internalizing process—for more than a few students at a time should be expected as a condition of employment to engage also in inquiry. The point at which instruction and inquiry coincide is always, apart from the Socratic case, at the very top of the cumulative structure of knowledge, and people who are helping droves of newcomers through the lower reaches of this structure (which is what most faculty members are doing) cannot at the same time be at the top. I do not mean this “top” to imply moral superiority, or superiority of any kind other than the etymological or specialized—any grown person knows and can accept the people who are “better” than he is at whatever it is he does.

But if people do not publish, how will we know when to promote them? I have suggested elsewhere that in the University Teaching Institute seniority alone might be a good enough criterion; in the university proper, which would be much smaller than it is now (and which would survive the gradual replacement of the Institute by a revitalized school system), the familiar measures of competence and excellence would still prevail. The mission of the university is to preserve and augment and communicate the *highest* products of human knowledge, and it ought not to be concerned with the quantitative aspects of the dissemination of its intermediate products, or with the rectification of inequalities in this dissemination. If it had said this clearly (or even thought it clearly) in 1964, and if it had been clear then, as it still is not, what agencies in society *are* properly concerned with these things, a lot of misunderstanding might have been averted. We need a staff of instructors, properly housed and affiliated, for this purpose; they might even be in colleges, if the college/university distinction, whose blurring in this essay only reflects its vagueness in the academy at large, were redrawn, although that would by now be like trying to shuffle a deck of cards back to its original order. History cannot be reversed, but it can perhaps advance to a more rational order in new terms.

These new terms will no doubt include the lifetime learning patterns that are now advocated more and more frequently, in which people would be able to seek out an instructor whenever they needed him for help with their self-instruction, and would not have to sign up for four years to qualify for this privilege. They might, if the university continues on its present course, include the progressive siphoning off of research into special institutes. They ought certainly to include the better *articulation* of instruction across the discontinuities that now isolate the various layers of it: elementary schools, high schools, colleges, graduate schools, and the rest. But my main contention in these pages has been that they must, if we are not to drown in our own publications, include some strategy for breaking the pious association of instruction with inquiry except at the most advanced level. How to do this without inhibiting the inquiry that ought to be done is problematic, although the problem may not be so tough as it looks. Changing the modalities of instruction to bring them into line with the variety of mental structures on which it operates might leave enough room for the inquiries people cannot help pursuing, while changing the criteria of employment might help to curtail the inquiries that are now pursued for ulterior reasons. Both instruction and inquiry could only be improved by some such rethinking of their interrelationship.

CHARLES FRANKEL

Reflections on a Worn-Out Model

THE SIGNIFICANCE of the chapter in the history of higher education which began ten years ago at Berkeley is still a matter of dispute, but of one thing there can be little question: it has left the higher educational community in a state of passivity, its imagination focused not on the problems or possibilities of the future, but on the unpleasantness of the recent past. In the public memory, the shouting and the fires have been put away as essentially evanescent phenomena, temporary in their causes and effects. In the minds of most university teachers and administrators, however, something very like a civil war has taken place, and they are living through its aftermath.

Is the analogy with civil war inflated? To be sure. The tendency to grandiosity was a not inconsiderable element in making the uproars of the past decade as loud as they were. The campus revolution was not honest-to-god. It was a charade, a protected piece of theater, a game. But there are games people play from which they never recover. The game played in colleges and universities during the last ten years was a passionate game, a game into which people threw themselves entirely and in which they thought their basic principles and honor were involved, a game from which they emerged exhausted and exposed, having revealed themselves to others and, worst of all, to themselves. It is not surprising, after this experience, that the academic world is obsessed with its traumas, and not in a mood to come actively or even intellectually to grips with its problems.

The present "calm," indeed, is better than the violence that preceded it, but that is about all that can be said in its favor. To begin with, it is less than universal. Toronto, Berlin, and Oxford, to take some not inconspicuous institutions, are still places where violent disruptions take place. They occur, too, in the United States. The calm, where it exists, is in the main the calm of numbness. Small sit-ins or brief ones are commonplace occurrences. Militant students can still keep people they do not like from speaking on their campuses. University presidents are verbally abused in public in ways unimaginable before the Berkeley uprising. People simply do not see the point of making an issue of such matters. That this situation can be described as a return to "normal" suggests what the last decade has done to university standards.

But perhaps the more important story is being told in developments that do not catch the public eye, and hardly catch, it would seem, even the eye of the academic world. Consider the following phenomena: grade inflation; the progressive elimination of foreign-language requirements from the curricula; the steady dilution even of mild distribution requirements; the regularity with which curricular reforms turn out to involve simply less reading and writing; the living conditions in dormitories, from which universities have almost entirely withdrawn their supervisory authority although they continue to pay the bills; the double-talk about quotas that are not quotas and *apartheid* that is not *apartheid*.

One may approve or disapprove of one or another of these developments. Not one, however, has been the product of a serious discussion of fundamentals; not one has been the product of a faculty initiative. They are decisions of expediency, made not out of conviction but dispiritedness. They betoken an indisposition to exercise authority and to lead, an absence of confidence, of will, of thought, a depth of demoralization, which, more than any other single matter, endangers the health and autonomy of higher education. Not even the lack of money is so serious. The professoriate, the permanent citizenry of universities, faces its future with its sense of community in tatters and its principles in disarray.

There could hardly be a worse time for it to choose to rest on its scars. For the issues that lie ahead are likely to have as profound and shaking an effect on colleges and universities as those through which we have just lived.

The issues that lie ahead, in their net thrust and direction, have to do, I believe, with the mounting inadequacy of the standard model of higher education that we have inherited. It is the model of the four-year college, sheltering people between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two, and joined to a university network designed to provide advanced training to a more limited number of people. The faculties of such institutions, both college and university, are composed, according to the model, of scholar-teachers, most of whom are engaged in significant research. These faculties exercise sole de facto authority over the issuance of certificates and degrees and over the selection of their professional colleagues.

This institution, in the British and American traditions, has always been thought to have, particularly at its undergraduate level, a moral and civic function even more important, in all probability, than its intellectual one. "Piety," "virtue" were the words that used to be used to describe what colleges should teach. Now that the clergy has lost its authority to fill these words with a content that everyone will accept, we use more elastic ones like "leadership," "social concern," "democratic" or "humanistic" values, or, most stretchable of all, "socialization." The moral and civic function, however, has remained fundamental, and it has been connected with two others—the effort, through the college, to guide the student to that field in which he can combine the best use of his talents and the greatest service to society, and the effort to introduce the student to the world of learning in such a way that he sees it not simply as the plaything of scholars but as a vocation in the service of God or Man. This conception of the moral and civic purpose of higher education, and its role in expanding individual opportunity, has lain behind the American effort to open the colleges to as many qualified people as possible, and to take the word "qualified" as standing for character and motivation, and not simply, or even mainly, for intellectual promise.

The classic model of higher education, however, has been a hybrid since the time, approximately a century ago, that the continental model of the graduate school, devoted to the intensive advancement of scholarship and the learned professions, was superimposed on the Anglo-Saxon model of the undergraduate college. Neither the graduate training of undergraduate teachers nor the prestige and promotion systems in which they work habituate them to see themselves as counselors or tutors in the virtues. The increasing specialization and sophistication of the fields of learning, and the more uncompromising demands for precise skills made by the economy, provide other strong reasons why higher education, at all levels, has been forced to attach more importance to sheer intellectual performance. Actual practice has been a com-

promise between these two functions (not to speak of others), and the model of a good higher education has also been a compromise, as suggested by phrases like "the well-rounded man" descriptive of its putative goal. Nor do I say this to complain. Any educational model not the work of zealots will recognize the diversity of human interests to be served, and will need to strike some balance among them.

Finally, because it has been perceived to have a transcendent moral as well as intellectual purpose, which external intrusions can damage, the model university has possessed a quasi-feudal status. Like a manorial estate, or a town with a charter of established privileges, it has had a hierarchical status-system, parental and governmental responsibilities toward its members, its own codes of conduct, and its own not inconsiderable sanctions to aid in their enforcement. Moreover, even when it has been entirely tax-supported, it has enjoyed, within broad limits, autonomy from the government and the courts.

This, of course, is a *model*. The majority of American institutions officially accredited as schools of postsecondary instruction were not more than faint approximations of it even before 1964. Nevertheless, what I have described has been, I think, the effective *norm*. The pressure was on institutions to try to live up to it, and if they differed from it, they were felt to be, and felt themselves to be, less than full-fledged members of the higher educational world. In the fifties and early sixties, for example, a long procession of two-year teachers' colleges was converted into four-year liberal arts colleges in deference to this conception of the normal and desirable.

Is this model adequate? To recover the power of self-direction, it seems to me, the higher educational community has to ask itself, deliberately and in the context of a sustained and controlled discussion and debate, what parts of this model can and should be preserved, what parts discarded, and what parts supplemented by quite different ideas of the normal and desirable.

I shall have to be brief, almost telegraphic, in suggesting my own beginning thoughts about these questions.

The Late-Adolescent School. The notion that the predominant norm for higher education should be the college and university for students seventeen to twenty-five must almost certainly go by the board. A college education is no longer a rare commodity. For many middle- and upper-class students it has been converted from a prerogative into a duty, somewhere in between unintelligible, boring, and onerous. The signs grow that many are looking for alternatives to it. Moreover, our higher educational institutions, for a long time, have had more married students, older students, and more students working full time on the outside than the traditional model has supposed. Most of these people, however, have been in municipal institutions and community colleges that rate, in the traditional perspective, as not-quite-really colleges. In this way the ratings within our educational system have given implicit endorsement to prevailing forms of social and economic stratification.

The inherited norm seems to me bad both for the universities and for equality of opportunity. Why should the institutions with the greatest access to distinguished scholarship and advanced research facilities be so largely restricted to students in the years seventeen to twenty-five, a considerable number of whom have only the vaguest idea of why they are where they are? The rearrangement of scholarship programs, living arrangements, and curricula to provide, say, one third of the places in residential universities to people of twenty-five, thirty, or older, might represent a more efficient and economical use of expensive resources, a fairer distribution of

educational opportunity, and a stabilizing and energizing change in the composition of student bodies.

The effects of the traditional model are visible, and their desirability challengeable. In seeking greater equality of opportunity, the policy of the colleges has been to seek to offer to hitherto disadvantaged seventeen-year-olds an opportunity to participate in that idyll of youth which, in imagination, the colleges have offered to middle- and upper-class young people. But the chance to choose people who have had jobs, and who have demonstrated, by their performance and the efforts they have made to continue their education, that they have the requisite equipment and motivation, offers a surer way of finding the right people, and strikes at a central reason for the maldistribution of educational achievement. The burden that poverty and deprivation put on the individual is that he takes longer, usually, to discover his opportunities and abilities. The chance to re-enter the educational system at an older age is thus of particular value to the disadvantaged.

The Norm of Uninterrupted Schooling. Closely connected to the traditional notion of colleges and universities as the preserves of the young is the idea that an education, ideally, ought not to be interrupted. The departures from this ideal increase: the undergraduate leave of absence; the year between college and graduate or professional school; the periods of retraining required by industry; the return of married women to school and the job market when their children are grown.

But the change in the norm of uninterrupted schooling is called for, I suspect, by more than such trends. Colleges, a generation ago, were populated mainly by students in two categories—the children of the privileged, who knew they were making the friends and learning the manners appropriate to people of station, and the upwardly mobile, jealous for position and eager not to throw their opportunities away. For both groups the parental disciplines of the classic college were more than bearable. They knew why they were going to school, knew that they had to go through this mill to be considered as having arrived at adulthood, and found their status as people at a halfway station both intelligible and agreeable.

This inner reserve from which the authority of the college as a communal political entity was largely drawn is now depleted. The greater affluence and changed social standards of our present society have brought to the colleges a large number of students who do not regard themselves as the children of a privileged elite (although many of them are), but who are not on the way up either. They do not expect to improve on their father's position, and many would hope not to have to live as he has. For such students a college education of the old style can seem like a sustained period of hanging in the void. They see themselves as being in college only because of parental and social pressure. Only those with active intellectual interests are likely to know why they are where they are, and these often find themselves frustrated by the diversions, distractions, and flim-flam of an institution in which they are a minority. Combined with the possibility of easy re-entry into universities at later ages, a policy of allowing young people to leave, of removing from them the pressure that the normal expectation is that they stay, should help create university populations with many fewer conscripts. We would do well to replace the norm of uninterrupted schooling, I think, by the norm of permanent and recurrent education, joined to the provision of jobs and training experiences for the age-group seventeen to twenty-five.

The Civic Function of Higher Education. One reason for the special status of the "normal" liberal-arts college is that it was traditionally thought to be the major, and almost the only, purveyor of secular moral instruction beyond the high school. But

this thought has long since been bypassed by events. For better or worse, the mass circulation magazines, particularly those aimed at the richer 50 percent of the population which has had an education beyond the secondary level, exercise a powerful influence in this realm. They are, in the French expression, "*l'école parallèle*." Equally to the point, and perhaps more encouraging, are developments in public television and the public-program activities of agencies like the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Endowment for the Arts, which can, if sustained and enlarged, serve major educational roles. The community college and adult education have also removed the monopoly of the liberal-arts college.

Still to be fully exploited for the purposes of civic education are the graduate and professional schools, although the latter, I believe, are less to be faulted than the former. It is odd to announce, at the undergraduate level, the glories of the humanities and the liberation to be gained from the study of the pure sciences, and then, at the graduate level, to give next to no attention to the larger social, human, and even intellectual significance of the specialized subjects studied. The notion that "general education" is an undergraduate concern and that a graduate school is professional not liberal is one of the expressions of the inherited hybrid model of higher education—Anglo-Saxon at the base, continental at the top.

"*Elitist*" and "*Democratic*" Higher Education. The distribution of the function of civic education more generously throughout the higher educational system makes possible another adjustment—the unapologetic concentration, by some colleges and universities, on the training of the 10 to 15 percent of the population equipped to make intellectual contributions to the arts, sciences, and learned professions. The present drift is relentlessly toward homogenization and the destruction of the most precious of all the characteristics of American higher education, its diversity. One reason for this drift is the dominance of the single model of the proper higher educational institution. It rapidly becomes an all-purpose model, making all distinctions fuzzy.

The question, of course, is whether the American public, with its egalitarian perspective, will be prepared to accept a postsecondary educational system in which clear distinctions exist between different kinds of institutions. The answer, in part, is that it has been doing so for a long time. Another part of the answer, I think, is that an educational system offering a broader range of alternatives, operating under an ampler notion of the normal and desirable, and less exclusively designed for the young, would be a more democratic system, more usable by those hitherto shut out.

In any case, the problem of numbers is probably lessening. The issue for the future is not to meet the steadily growing demand from one age group for an education basically conceived after one model. The figure of 50 percent, which represents the approximate present proportion of youth enrolled in institutions of postsecondary education, may well be the highwater mark. The problem for the future is to find the right 50 percent, and to provide the ways and means for sorting them out and directing them to the school best suited for them.

The Teachers. In this setting, the continued idolatry of the Ph.D. and the image of the teacher as also a productive research worker make for profound trouble. The members of teaching staffs of postsecondary institutions number, I believe, over four hundred thousand. It is a transparent pretense that most of them are engaged in significant research, or should be. It is merely an invitation to them, indeed, to look down on themselves when they perform their central task as teachers. Even in the most noted institutions, the quality and importance of research are spotty. Is

teaching less important, less intellectually demanding, less an art to be mastered or an achievement to be admired and rewarded?

Moreover, the coming of mass higher education, together with the confrontationist spirit of the decade since Berkeley, has altered the traditions of informal self-government within faculties. Although professors live within inherited traditions that are consensual and deferential, and that give a central place to the individual's quality of work, the pressures for unionization mount, as do the centralizing and standardizing tendencies turned loose by the courts and legislatures. If the autonomy and tone of the higher educational system as a whole are to be kept, there must probably be a group of institutions from which collective bargaining remains excluded.

Higher Educational Autonomy. The classic model of higher education bids fair to become increasingly inapplicable in one respect in which it is indispensable that it be preserved. This is the assignment of autonomy to institutions of advanced learning. Colleges and universities are being pulled steadily into the central legal system. Their decisions are being made for them by the courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies. This is only in part because they are all more dependent on public funds. It is also a consequence of the fact that, thanks in good part to the decade of Berkeley, the internal governance of universities has been conceded to be a proper field for close external supervision. The cries of oppression have been heard; that scourge of injustice, the Nixon administration, has come to the rescue. Universities receive less money than they used to do from the federal government, but, in recompense, they receive more paternal guidance and protection from sin.

The issue is the universities' basic ordering of their long-term obligations. Whatever the higher educational system's capacity or incapacity substantially to correct major social injustices by its own direct efforts alone, it is surely part of its mission not to perpetuate injustices in its own domain. But the remedies adopted must be proportionate to the wrongs to be cured and consistent with the universities' other obligations. In relation to racial and sexual discrimination, to come to particulars, the question must be asked whether public outcry, changed attitudes, and the heightened sensitivity to the issues of people within the higher educational community will not in most circumstances be sufficient to set things right, without adding the tender ministrations of government bureaucracies.

Practices like the HEW guidelines, which require university officials to explain their practices to suspicious functionaries and to work under presumptions of guilt, are nevertheless justified, it is said on their behalf, by their purposes. After all, they seek to root out racial and sexual discrimination, not Communists. But should we be prepared, in the name even of the best of causes, to establish the habit in government of reading universities' files, and giving its advice-with-sanctions in regard to the selection of students and faculty? The cost can be university autonomy, and that autonomy is the indispensable prerequisite for the authority of the university in free societies and the performance of its unique role.

The questions that have been shrugged off while blunderbuss methods of achieving social purposes have been used are extraordinary. Do we think it a good idea to domesticate, in universities, the habit of obedient conformity to political and bureaucratic pressures? What will universities be like after a generation of this sort of thing? And what assurance do we have that a future government will not use this power of inspection and punishment which has been conceded to it to promote causes for which the members of universities will have less sympathy? The Free Speech revolt, the war protests, the Movement, were not animated by trust of governmental

authority. What they have accomplished is the strengthening of the power of the most conservative government in fifty years to send its inspectors into universities.

It is an accomplishment which goes hand in hand with the growth, within higher educational institutions, of the bloc-system of governance and the adversary-system of administration and justice. The vetoes have been multiplied, the power to decide and act reduced. No doubt the older model of a university, framed to stand *in loco parentis* for adolescent students, needs considerable modification; but the model of a university in which teachers and students are organized into blocs and treated as though they were competing social classes is not an improvement. It is laughable in itself, and it runs at cross purposes to the effort to make teaching and learning a co-operative process.

The restoration of more informal and consensual procedures of academic consultation and governance is indispensable, I believe, to the reactivation of effective university self-government. In the larger political community it makes sense to provide elaborate procedures to ensure that individuals are able to protect themselves against exploitation, deception, and oppression by others, and particularly the powerful. But the presumption that teaching and studying ought to be carried on with the fear of *Homo lupus* always present has never characterized civilized educational practices. In few institutions today, let us hope, is it in fact the every-day working assumption. It is merely the ritualistic one, written into the formal rules and procedures—which does not prevent it from blocking the processes of self-government.

These reflections bring us back to the circumambient issues with which we began—the higher educational community's present state of mind and morale, and, more broadly, the recipient culture within which the discussion and conduct of higher education goes on. In the years since Berkeley we have had the chance to see some of that culture's special and disturbing faults. To the extent that they persist, the outlook is dim for a reasoned solution to many of the problems with which the colleges and universities are confronted.

When I think back to the campus troubles, what rises to the center of my mind is the sense they gave one of being caught inside something with a momentum of its own. One's colleagues, one's students seemed all to be reading from scripts prepared in advance. One's university went to its fate as though hypnotized, sleep-walking over the precipice. Even now, at some years remove, the impression that events followed a set path is fortified, not weakened. The degree to which the stories that unfolded on different campuses were similar is remarkable. A Platonic Idea of a campus revolution migrated from institution to institution, at each place issuing its commands and finding its obedient soldiers. Even differences in national educational traditions only slightly affected the relentless unoriginality of behavior. The slogans, alternatives, factionalisms, and compromises rehearsed at Berkeley and Columbia were rehearsed as well at Florence, Copenhagen, and Amsterdam.

What was it that gave events this headless momentum and common direction? I think it was the enviroing culture of higher education, the eyes that interpreted what was happening, the ears that heard the words, the mouths that formed the responses. The common culture took what was happening, read its own prepared meaning into it, and gave the play back to the actors to take their cues. "All of us," wrote Raymond Aron, about his experiences in Paris in 1968, "played a role in that period. I begin with myself, I freely say so, I played Tocqueville, which is not without a touch of the ridiculous, but others played Saint-Just, Robespierre or Lenin, which, all things con-

sidered, was even more ridiculous."¹ Perhaps people in Paris were somewhat more aware of whom they were impersonating than were people in America, but, if so, that is the principal difference.

The press is part, but only part, of the process by which events are kneaded into their stereotypes. The journalists come to a campus in trouble, listen to both sides, which is their job, give a hearing and, with it, significance and legitimacy to groups that have been obscure before, and thus change the balance of power and authority. More, they particularize the stories, telling their who, what, when, and where, all in the singular, and encouraging the misapprehension that what is taking place is an event local in its causes and manageable if local reforms are made. Worst of all, however, they are in a hurry, they must make their deadlines, they are only human, and there is nothing like an ideology à la mode to help in putting a story together and giving it a meaning. So the press and the media line up the disputants in the university: the conservatives vs. the progressives, the old vs. the young, the powerful vs. the helpless, the selfish vs. the idealistic. What can each man do but play his part?

Moreover, the ideology fades into the ideology that has spread into most of the empty spaces in the contemporary academic mind. Words have ritualistic uses. "Change," "innovation," "experimentation" are treated as automatically eulogistic terms. In this context all ambiguities in political nomenclature disappear as well. "Liberal" means, quite simply, the espousal of the new and therefore the better. "Radical" means the same thing, but with more impatience or perhaps more sincerity. "Conservative," by contrast, means hankering after the old and the worse—an attitude, needless to say, which is inexplicable in an intelligent man unless he is selfish and protecting his privileges. Once this vocabulary is sprinkled like powder over all issues, some stirring gymnastics are possible. One remains a "liberal" though one would deny the right to free speech to those with whom one disagrees; or one is labeled "conservative" because one does not think curricula should be redesigned to introduce the insights of the encounter movement. No issue is examined on the merits. Each is pegged into the timetable of history.

And history, of course, is like a well-trained regiment that moves in a straight line across a field. This presumption, too, colors the meaning of ideas and events. Thus, if one opposes racial discrimination, one ought also to oppose discrimination of rights and functions between young and old, or students and teachers. If one is of the opinion that redistribution of income is the wave of the future, one ought also to favor fewer classroom hours and more field trips, for that is the wave of the future, too. The basic paradox, said a writer in *Le Monde*, describing an international meeting of scholars to discuss the university emergency, is that so many of these people are "liberals" in politics and "conservatives" in education. Whether the "conservatism" amounted to more than a desire to preserve liberal principles of free speech and independent inquiry the author did not say. History will not put up with two-facedness.

The protection and reform of higher education will thus require something more than only specific programs. It will require a professoriate more concentrated on its common tasks and obligations, more ironically self-aware of what it has contributed to its own troubles, and better able to protect itself against its own vulgarisms.

REFERENCE

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C. VANN WOODWARD

The Erosion of Academic Privileges and Immunities

IN RECENT YEARS, the discussion of university goals and governance has tended to emphasize academic responsibilities, duties, and obligations, rather than academic privileges, immunities, and exemptions. The latter are largely traditional, of long standing, and tend to be taken for granted. The pressures for attention are more likely to fall upon shifting responsibilities to new or neglected groups, emerging duties to supply new services, urgently felt obligations to society and public problems.

Concern over these academic responsibilities, duties, and obligations may have become excessive at times and obsessive in some places. Humanitarian zeal and political commitments within the university community have probably resulted in over-response, as one crusade has succeeded another. I leave it to others to point out and deplore such excesses or to find still further outlets for university impulses to public service—if, indeed, any have been overlooked. In putting aside these issues, I am not dismissing their importance. I am certainly not denying that universities have responsibilities and duties, nor am I mocking honest attempts to meet them. Rather, I am saying that on the agenda of vital university issues, questions of institutional self-interest and self-protection deserve a place. And when these involve the very question of institutional survival, as I believe they do, they deserve a higher place on our agenda than they have had in recent years.

At a time when special privileges of all kinds are under attack, it is not fashionable to speak out for the preservation of any of them—particularly those that serve one's own institutional interests. Yet it is in such a time that institutional rights and privileges suffer most from erosion and neglect. There are indications that universities have been suffering seriously of late from such erosion and that it is time to direct attention to the losses sustained and the threat of further losses to come.

Some university privileges and immunities are based on law and some on quasi-legal understandings and arrangements, but the great majority of them are based on nothing more substantial than custom and tradition. The sturdiness and reliability of the latter depend in turn upon the esteem in which the university is held, the degree to which its members live up to traditional expectations, and the consistency with which it fulfills the roles that have won it the authority, the indulgencies, and the immunities to which it is accustomed.

The exemptions of university property and income from taxation are based on law under the assumption that universities are not "businesses" in the usual sense and are not engaged in profit-making and personal aggrandizement. The right of the university to police its own campus and keep the peace without unnecessary intervention of civil law and its agents is usually based on quasi-legal understandings with local civil governments. Beyond these immunities are those embraced in the traditional autonomy by which the university community assumes the right to

devise its own curriculum, select, promote, and discipline its own faculty, admit and exclude students, pass judgment on their performance, award degrees and certifications, and in general run its own affairs without interference. In addition, and of no less importance, are those deferential privileges that are normally embraced under the term "academic freedom." They include "tenure" and a degree of freedom to teach, work, write, think, speak, and act independently that is not accorded members of any other profession or institution in our society.

All of these special academic exemptions, privileges, immunities, and indulgencies have suffered some measure of erosion during the last decade or more. Some of this erosion has been the consequence of neglect or indifference and in a few cases the result of betrayal within the walls of the academy. Some assaults have been initiated by uncomprehending or antagonistic forces in the surrounding society. For the most part, however, the attrition has come about by interaction between elements within and elements outside the academic walls that have cooperated or connived in the breach of tradition for what they conceive to be ends of mutual advantage. Such cooperation and interaction have been facilitated to the degree that life within the university has come to assume the style, attitudes, and values of life in the surrounding society and traditional distinctions have become blurred and confused. If attitudes and values and ends and means of life within the academic community have indeed lost the distinctiveness that once justified the privileges and immunities the university enjoyed, it becomes increasingly difficult to insist on their defense and to justify their preservation.

Tax exemptions are among the oldest and most practical of special privileges traditionally enjoyed by colleges and universities. They are among the few immunities grounded upon law. Since their immediate practical significance—a life-or-death matter for many institutions—is obvious to the most powerful elements in the academic community, alertness and concern over this right may be assumed as a matter of course. In spite of the vital concern and uncommon alertness over this issue, tax exemptions have not proved immune from erosion. Attrition has been mainly, though not entirely, the work of forces outside the academic community. Hungry for tax income, local governments have been jealous of the expansion of university holdings that removed increasing amounts of tax-yielding property from the rolls. In the case of some academic establishments of marginal or dubious standing, critics of tax exemption have been able to make the point that the distinction between such institutions and business enterprises is not very clear. Even within universities of high standing, critics have sometimes found components and motives not readily distinguishable from commercial establishments that bear the burden of taxes as a matter of course. The solidarity of the academic community in defense of traditional tax exemptions cannot be taken for granted. Within the university are to be found members of faculty, student body, or administration whose concern for social welfare and minority needs outside their walls overcomes their concern for the protection of university privileges. Others see no persuasive answer to the argument that enclaves of business-oriented society have found lodgement within the walls and cannot legitimately be covered by traditional exemption from taxation. Concessions have already been made on this front, and breaches have been opened in defenses. Law suits of momentous consequence are in court and could have profound effect on the future of higher education.

Privileges accruing from an ill-defined autonomy of status by means of which universities have been accustomed to running their own affairs have come under at-

tack from various quarters. They have not invariably had the benefit of resolute defense from within the walls. In repeated instances of recent years, universities have seen fit to call for intervention of city police or the National Guard to quell student disturbances. These instances have been deemed extraordinary and exceptional, but they have set unfortunate precedents, and the initiative may not be assumed to remain exclusively in university hands in future cases. The old traditional right of self-policing has suffered a serious breach, and the university itself is not without blame for this setback.

As the beneficiary of substantial grants from the federal government, the university has jeopardized other defenses of its traditional autonomy in several quarters. These include the exclusive right to determine the composition of its student body by admission and exclusion of applicants, and also its right to determine the membership of its faculties according to its own standards. By responding to federal requirements under threat of withdrawal of financial support, the university has doubtless made some progress in redressing a few long-standing inequities and neglects of certain selected minorities and the female population in general. Need for some of these readjustments and concern for inequities they seek to correct were felt within the academic community itself, and part of the initiative for change has come from within. The significance for the subject under discussion, however, is that in complying under financial compulsion with federal regulations concerning admission of students and election of faculty, the university has jeopardized two more vital bulwarks of traditional academic autonomy. In so doing, it has, in addition, too often compromised its own standards of student admission and faculty election.

It might be assumed that, of all the traditional privileges and immunities surrounding university life, those usually described as "academic freedoms" would find their most alert and jealous defenders among faculty members. The assumption is all the more reasonable because these particular indulgencies bear most directly upon the status, authority, and self-esteem of the professoriate and their claim of the right to teach, do research, write, publish, and speak according to the dictates of their own conscience. These extraordinary freedoms have taken for granted that faculty members are not "employees" in the usual sense, but "members," that they are not "hired" but "elected," and that after a period of apprenticeship, they enjoy "tenure."

Defense of these faculty rights and freedoms has owed much in the past to the principal organization of the American professoriate, the American Association of University Professors. Founded in 1915, the AAUP made academic freedom its primary concern and has done much over the years to expose violations of tenure and to uphold standards of academic ethics as well as high standards of professional status and freedom. It is of special significance, therefore, to find in this organization recent innovations of policy that call into question some of the fundamental assumptions on which faculty status rests. In advocating resort to collective bargaining by faculty members, the AAUP would seem to have abandoned the traditional concept of status in favor of contract, the status of "member" in favor of that of "employee," to have thought of the university in terms of a corporation rather than a community, and to have cast the faculty into an adversary relationship with "employer."

Perhaps the AAUP was only reflecting changes in values and attitudes that had already taken place in much of the professoriate and responding to objective realities in university life. No observant participant who joined that life before

World War II can have failed to note in later years tell-tale alterations in the traditional vocabulary of the academy and the intrusion of a vocabulary of the government and corporate bureaucracy. One heard increasingly of "staff" and "personnel," of "administration" and "directives," of "hiring" and "firing," of "contracts" and "projects," of "business-like" organization, of "doing business" with government and corporations.

Within the university the concept of tenure itself, its inviolability and usefulness, was called into question. At least one institution has abandoned the status entirely and substituted contracts of specific duration for all faculty members—if, indeed, the word "members" may any longer be legitimately employed in that connection. Elsewhere the proposal of "periodic review" of tenured members has been entertained. The composition of faculties has been diluted by infusions of "research personnel" and "institute staff." The teaching "staff" has been augmented by non-academic figures of distinction from the arts, from public life, and from the higher corporation and foundation world—people often not bred in the university tradition or committed to its values. The pedagogical justification for such appointments is the old American myth that anybody who can "really do" something can teach it—and these appointments have inevitably involved professional teachers in the endorsement of (or the acquiescence in) a myth abhorrent to their creed and their experience. To attract celebrities from the outside world, or to fill "quotas" under government "guidelines," the status of tenure has been abused and extended to uses for which traditional justification is lacking. The indulgencies and privileges once claimed for tenure are accordingly more difficult to defend and preserve.

If modern academicians are content to abandon the ancient institutional ways and values of the university and are happy to live and think and speak in the manner of the nonacademic society, there is really little that can be done about it. It is obvious that numerous members of the university community are already reconciled to this metamorphosis and that some are eager for the institutional or personal advantages they expect to derive from it. Others find in the transformation or "modernization" of the university the means of realizing humanitarian or political, though non-academic, goals—that is, the traditional goals of scholarship and teaching. Some advocates of modernization see the emergence of the university as a secular church promising self-discovery and "identity" or group therapy for distraught or alienated postadolescents; others see the university becoming a new melting-pot for assimilating alienated minorities into a middle-class meritocracy; still others would foster super-research institutes available for crash programs to solve "crises" of welfare, environment, energy, health, birth control, or nuclear-arms control. Directing and administering these programs, projects, contracts, and institutes for the promotion of humanitarian goals and social salvation may be found individuals whose values, goals, attitudes, income, and "life style" differ little from those of their counterparts in business and corporate life.

It remains only to remind our colleagues of the old chestnut that there is no such thing as a free lunch. There is a price to be paid for the metamorphosis that is overtaking the university and for all the personal and institutional gratifications and aggrandizements derived from it. The price will seem prohibitive to those who still cling to the traditional mission of the university. That mission has been aptly phrased by Robert Nisbet as "a unique fusion of the quest for knowledge through scholarship and the dissemination of this knowledge through teaching." The price of the metamorphosis of the university is the forfeiting of those privileges, immunities,

indulgencies, exemptions, and autonomies that have made possible the stout defense of the freedoms by means of which we have fulfilled our traditional mission.

It is a late hour to speak of withholding payment of the price, while we are still so eagerly receiving with both hands what it has bought. Any reversal of the transaction at this late date would call for an austerity that is difficult to imagine in a time of self-indulgence. Among other things, but first of all, it would demand a rededication to the traditional university mission of scholarship and teaching—a single-minded dedication that would not appeal to many who now wear our cloth and raise their voices in our councils. Were it conceivable, however, that such a rededication could be brought about, then other essentials of restoration would more readily follow. Among these essentials are a renewed respect for our cloth, a vigilant concern over who shall wear it, a sense of pride in what we are doing, a sense of community and a solidarity on essentials within the community, a renewed meaning of the word “member,” and a revival of the concept of honor, the code of academic honor, and the authority it confers.

Of course, all these things have a quaint and aristocratic sound—pride, honor, authority, and the like. Their chances of reviving and flourishing in the atmosphere that now surrounds and pervades the university would admittedly appear to be slim indeed. The fact remains, however, that it is only on the basis of such quaint dedications and values and concepts that the university can properly base its claim to those increasingly quaint privileges, immunities, indulgencies, and exemptions that are undergoing the rapid erosion we deplore.

As implied earlier, this whole discussion may now be entirely “academic.” It is interesting, incidentally, that the derogatory usage of that word just employed is not listed in the old *Oxford English Dictionary*, which has a column devoted to the adjective with usages (all honorable) dating back to the sixteenth century. The present usage, however, turns up in *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (1955): “Not leading to a decision; unpractical.” Unlike the many other usages of the word, this one is not dated, but is followed only by the abbreviation, “*mod.*”

WILLARD QUINE

Paradoxes of Plenty

IN THE DEPRESSION of forty years ago a Harvard doctorate brought only even chances of appointment to a college faculty. One of my contemporaries won the degree in philosophy with flying colors and turned at once to train for the civil service, rather than court frustration in the field of his choice. If a man did get a teaching job, his struggles continued. He would prepare nine to fifteen hours of lectures a week, besides grading papers and serving on committees. He would do his professional writing in the evenings and on Sundays and during such weeks of vacation as were not taken up with summer teaching. He would type it himself and buy the eventual reprints out of a meager salary.

If more money were diverted into academic channels, one thought, how Academia might bloom! Talent would be attracted and relieved of burdens, and a renaissance would be assured. Fat chance, in our profit-oriented society, but a man could dream.

The chance proved fatter than one's dreams. War came, and the government launched research programs related to defense. Scientific advisers noted the value, in a long view, of basic research for which no present military use could be claimed. Support was gained under this head for work in pure mathematics for which no military relevance, early or late, could be imagined. Soon there ceased to be lip service to military ends; the National Science Foundation undertook to support good science simply as such. By sharing the overhead expenses of the university, moreover, the defense contracts and the NSF grants indirectly helped also the departments that were not engaged in the programs. Eventually these departments came in for direct support as well, through the National Endowment for the Humanities. Funds were found also for indigent students, who were thus spared the handicap of having to work their way through college and so were enabled to compete on an equal footing with their rich classmates. Intellectual promise came to be the only requirement for entering college, and intellectual performance the only requirement for graduating. And there was little insistence on these.

Not a few scientists were lured from their frugal old projects by the glitter of grants. It was not avarice, for the money was not for their pockets. It was selfless admiration of the unaccustomed flow of gold. Also it was lust for power. Imaginations were taxed for projects requiring substantial staff, equipment, and computer time. Scientists thus seduced probably gave up inspired projects, in some cases, for contrived ones. Certainly they sacrificed much of their prized research time to their new administrative responsibilities, and much of their scientific writing to the writing of proposals and reports to foundations. Men who in their youth had chosen the austerities of science over the material rewards of a business career were now in business after all, though without those rewards.

Expensive projects became possible. Science is the better for the vast sums that have been poured into it. To deny this would be more than paradoxical; it would be wrong. The paradox is just that such largesse sometimes works adversely.

Universities prospered, and faculty salaries rose a good deal faster than the dollar fell. Teaching loads were lightened with the expanding of faculties. Secretarial aid was provided and reprints were subsidized. Men whose passion for the things of the mind drove them into an academic career were now spared the old penalties. This is good in itself. It has worked also for the progress of science and scholarship, by allowing scientists and scholars more time in which to be creative.

It may be supposed to have worked for the progress of science and scholarship also in another way: by attracting talent. But here we must look out again for paradox. The trouble is that vocation and amenity vary inversely. When academic life is hard, only the dedicated will put up with it. Allay the rigors and you draw men away from other occupations. The academic life, when eased of hardship, has other attractions besides pursuit of truth. It is clean and somewhat prestigious work in pleasant surroundings, and the vacations are long. It is a continuation, even, of one's glorious collegiate youth. Thus it is that the recruitment effected by improved conditions must depress the average level of dedication to science and scholarship. The dedicated are still there, true, undiminished in absolute number; but a sag in the wider average does little for their morale.

Learned journals throve and multiplied. Existing journals thickened, and new ones were subsidized almost as soon as they were said to be needed. Productive scholars had grown more productive, thanks to the lightened teaching load and the provision of secretaries. This accounts for the thickening of existing journals. The new ones, however, are a locus again of paradox. There are other motives for publication besides that of furnishing the profession with needed truths. There is vanity, and there is the widespread notion, sometimes founded, that academic invitations and promotions depend on publication. Certainly, then, new journals were needed: They were needed by authors of articles too poor to be accepted by existing journals. The journals that were thus called into existence met the need to a degree, but they in turn preserved, curiously, certain minimal standards; and so a need was felt for further journals still, to help to accommodate the double rejects. The series invites extrapolation and has had it.

What now of the paradox? Granted the uselessness of the added journals, what harm do they do? Mere waste of money is unparadoxical and beside the point; my paradoxes have to do not with unproductivity but with counterproductivity. Regrettably, however, the counterproductivity is there. The mass of professional journals is so indigestible and so little worth digesting that the good papers, though more numerous than ever, are increasingly in danger of being overlooked. We cope with the problem partly by ignoring the worst journals and partly by scanning tables of contents for respected names. Since the stratification of the journals from good to bad is imperfect, this procedure will miss an occasional good paper by an unknown author. Even if we can afford the miss, it is rough on the author.

It was in the increased admittance and financial support of students that the new prodigality came its most resounding cropper. Marginal students came on in force, many of them with an eye on the draft, and they soon were as bored with college as they had been with school. In their confusion and restlessness they were easy marks for demagogues, who soon contrived a modest but viable terror. A rather sketchy terror sufficed, in the event, to bring universities to their knees.

This turn of affairs is explained only in part by increased enrollments, and still only in part by a slackening of entrance requirements. There was a third factor, more obscure, and here it is that paradox again intrudes. If in former times a student went through college on highly competitive scholarships, mere pride of achievement would tend to make him prize the college education that he thus achieved. If, again, a student put himself through college on his earnings, he must have been prizing the education for which he was working so hard. And even if a student sailed through on his father's largesse, still he saw himself as privileged and was ready enough to ascribe failures good-humoredly to his own blitheness of spirit. Mass subsidy, on the other hand, soon loses its lustre and comes to be looked upon as each man's due, his return for serving society by attending class and learning what society wants him to know.

Good students are perhaps as numerous as ever, in among the bad. But the atmosphere in which they work is the worse for the hostilities and so are the standards of education. The department that I know best has freed its graduate students of the requirement of general examinations, because these were said by student activists to induce anxiety. It has also ceased to require any history of philosophy for the Ph.D. in philosophy.

It's an ill wind that blows no good. The Arab oil embargo spared us thousands of highway fatalities and decelerated the pollution of our air. I shall not venture to say, in a similarly cheerful spirit, that recent curtailments of funds for higher education are apt to hasten the renaissance that prodigality failed to bring. I offer more modest cheer: Affluence was in some paradoxical ways counter-productive, and, as we mourn its passing, we may console ourselves somewhat with that reflection.

BARNABY C. KEENEY

Credibility, Will, and Response

Here was a long series of repetitious occurrences which, I confess, I regarded with disbelief. I could never thoroughly persuade myself that anything so precious as a university could be sold so cheaply. I looked upon events as they occurred not so much with anger as with frustration. It seemed to me unreal that the places where disciplined intelligence is presumably respected should be inhabited by large numbers of grown men trying to conduct dialogues with the primitive. It was a matter for derision and contempt. And yet it happened, and it took on a kind of specious dignity in the academic and the public mind. What is most serious and most disillusioning is not that young men and women behave in this way, for very few of them, relatively speaking, did and even fewer of them do now, but that so many of us adults should have lost our bearings, and, as Plato said of certain teachers in his own day, condescend to the young, aping them in manner and dress lest one be thought authoritarian.¹

I WAS OUTSIDE higher education during most of the period in question, and consequently escaped direct participation in the troubles. Perhaps I may claim the dispassion that comes from lack of direct experience. I did, however, participate fully in some events that I think contributed to the difficulties, and from which my successors suffered.

We have a long tradition and a well-established practice in American higher education of saying one thing and doing another. This practice was particularly virulent in the 1960s for a number of reasons, and it contributed to the loss of credibility of college and university presidents and their institutions. We stated our lofty aims and described our virtuous practices, and then sometimes acted sordidly. The most obvious example of such action is in the usual description of the purity of amateur athletics, of which the practices of recruiting with little restraint and unscrupulously giving scholarships to athletes who cannot graduate are part. We inherited and made strict rules for student conduct and enforced them unevenly, more so than was made necessary by the need for flexibility. We described our institutions as open to all qualified students, and then made only token attempts to recruit students from outside the middle class. These were all old practices. The situation changed for the worse when Sputnik went up, and the greatest opportunity for fund-raising of recent times occurred. Sputnik was seen as a threat to national security, which it may have been, and as a demonstration of the superiority of the Russian educational system over ours, which it probably was not. The result was crash programs to improve our colleges and universities on the part of government, foundations, and private donors. Great campaigns were launched by major private institutions, and then by almost all private institutions. In the campaigns, the practice was to assert eminence in full-blown rhetoric, or at the very least to assert that

the institution in question needed only a few more millions of dollars to become excellent. The assertions were in sharp contrast to observable fact. Students and some of the faculty heard the rhetoric, observed the facts, and marveled. Presidents, in particular, spoke like preachers and acted like hustlers. Deans, faculty, and students heard, read, and some of them said things they knew were not true to help raise funds. The result was the same loss of credibility from which recent Presidents of the United States have suffered, but I do not think that this was realized by many of the protagonists.

When students began to participate, even if only rhetorically, in the wars for equal rights and against poverty, ambiguities appeared. Most difficult of all to answer was the charge that the colleges and universities discriminated through their recruiting practices, however open their admissions policies might be. Very few colleges made serious efforts to recruit students from minority groups and among the poor in general. Students generally were more concerned and active in the fights against poverty and discrimination than their elders. The split widened between students and administrators.

Meanwhile, the war in Vietnam was approaching its height. To an extent usually exaggerated, major universities had since World War II engaged in research for the military agencies which might contribute to our capacity to wage war. Students in the research universities began to accuse the institutions of war guilt. The charges spread to institutions that were innocent of research. Many of the universities and colleges were training officers to serve in a war that many faculty and students felt was wrong. Colleges and universities might have handled the effects of the military situation had it stood alone, but the war on discrimination and the war on poverty were still being waged simultaneously.

When students began to agitate against the Vietnam war, the administrations of many institutions knew that they were against the war, too, as individuals and could not very well reply with any great conviction. When students began to assert that the universities must take their share of the guilt for the war because of their implication in research, it was difficult for those who had taken the federal research dollar to reply.

The three wars—Vietnam war, the war against discrimination, and the war against poverty, left administrations with a feeling of guilt and sin, admitted only to themselves. The unease consequent on all these circumstances contributed to what may be called a failure of will and an inability to act decisively (always difficult when one suspects that he is wrong). The tradition of civility, one of the things that the best colleges and universities are proudest of, led to a misapprehension of the nature of the opposition, which did not really wish to be civil. The tradition of immunity from external authority enjoyed by college and university students led likewise to an unwillingness to call on external force in case of extreme disorder, a failure which was sometimes fatal because of the lack of adequate internal force. Most college security forces were trained to try to keep students out of trouble, rather than to prevent illegality. The very organization of the colleges and universities led to a division of leadership. There was no clear policy to deal with situations of the sort that arose, and no well-defined chain of command to carry out whatever policy there may have been. Deans or vice presidents said one thing; presidents another. Probably the loss of credibility reduced the strong support that might have been expected from the mass of students and faculty. At any rate, it did not appear.

The traditional procedure in an academic institution is characterized by an unwillingness to force an issue. The search for peace through compromise led to the occasional accident of some officers agreeing to most demands and forgetting to tell anyone to carry out the agreement. All these things undermined the power to make strong decisions or to act strongly. Most academic administrators are liberals, and as liberals they feel guilty of responsibility for the undesirable aspects of the human condition they and their predecessors have been unable to change. As liberals and civil persons, they found it easy to dismiss ten students for blatant social behavior. They found it impossible to enforce regulations against five hundred who were behaving in a way they regarded as improper and even illegal in order to advocate beliefs shared or partly shared by the administrators. As always, students tested authority. This time, the response encouraged them to even more forceful acts.

Thus, a third characteristic of the late 1960s was a deterioration in the ability to act forcefully. Perhaps the presidents of the mid-nineteenth century might have been able to deal with the situation, though I doubt it. But by the second half of the twentieth century, authority in colleges and universities had been distributed so widely that there was no one left who could or would act prerogatively. Both sides further weakened powerful response by discovering the law courts, so that the simplest actions were conducted elaborately, slowly, and with great dispersion of time and effort, and in a way that was better designed to stand up in court than to solve an urgent problem. Almost all elements in academic institutions had been advocating due process for years without learning how to use it.

I am well aware that I have asserted more than I have proved, and have made statements that are too sharp, but I believe that loss of credibility explains much of the attack, and the failure of will and the loss of the ability to act prerogatively shaped much of the response.

REFERENCE

1. Charles Frankel, "What Is the Crisis in the Universities?" *ACLS Newsletter*, vol. 25, no. 1 (1974), p. 11.

ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON

The Legacies of Evil

Corruptio optimi pessima

THE EDITOR'S LETTER raised the question "how the last ten years have altered American colleges and universities and how events that once claimed the attention of mass media appear today, when, in theory, a somewhat more dispassionate perspective is possible." In addition, also questions about the present *and* the future of higher education in America were asked. I must entirely ignore the latter questions. And even with regard to the first question I must confess my inability even to consider the broad generality with which it has been so light-heartedly formulated.

American colleges and universities? But all I know something about is Harvard. And even as far as Harvard is concerned, the limits to my knowledge are great indeed. To be sure, I have followed what has been going on in my University. But what I really do know from personal observation is first of all my own Department, that is to say, my colleagues and my students. I do know something about the Faculty of Arts and Sciences to the extent that I have attended its meetings and have been having conversations with its members. I might add that a quinquennium ago my knowledge of Harvard was considerably increased and broadened by the large number of long conversations with both undergraduate and graduate students which I had almost nightly in the two dismal years 1969/70 and 1970/71. Subsequently, when the turmoil was over, I sat down and wrote a longish manuscript in which I described those conversations. One day, I may wish to publish it as a remembrance of what I thought at the time was a good clean fight and of what now in retrospect appears more likely to have been a prodigious waste of time.

At any rate, what I believe to know about Harvard relates to a very narrow segment of a huge institution. And despite what I shall have to report later on, I am still quite allergic to talking about things I know nothing about. Accordingly, the purpose of the following is modest. All I wish to do is to discuss two or three effects of the years of unrest, which I believe have remained despite the change in atmosphere, climate, and behavior.

The change, of course, has been enormous. Deans are no longer thrown down the steps of University Hall. Documents are no longer purloined from the files and published in filthy sheets. Students no longer invade classrooms to disrupt the lectures and to put the phallic symbol of a banana into the mouth of an instructor who tried with a sheepish grin to look as unconcerned as possible. As one heroine of the Divine Aretino said afterwards: I did not realize he was raping me; I thought he was just measuring. The catalogue of the Widener Library is no longer under the threat of being burned, as were the books themselves. Faculty members no longer have to spend nights guarding this monument of American civilization, this symbol and

emanation of the freedom of a great American university. Professors working in their offices no longer think of readying physical (and chemical) means of defending their liberty and their dignity, their books and their manuscripts against a gang of rowdies—the sons and daughters of the petty bourgeoisie (it is a shame that there are no proper equivalents in English to the Russian *meshchane* or the German *Spiesser*) who were desperately trying to impersonate what they emphatically were not—the penurious, exploited, and oppressed laboring men of the 1840s—and did not even have the horse sense not to cry out against “elitism,” being a privileged group, an elite *kat'exochen* themselves.

Rowdies is a harsh word, but I cannot retract it. There are no weaker words (although there are stronger) that would fittingly describe some of the actions they engaged in and the language they used. As far as the language goes, I must confess, though, that this was the least thing that impressed me. Since in my previously mentioned conversations with the students we touched on everything under the sun from the value of examinations and grades to the problems of sex, alienation, and dictatorship, I also had to explain patiently why English obscenities left me cold. I have the greatest possible admiration for the English language. As Walt Whitman once said, English has been a “universal absorber, combiner, and conqueror”; it augmented its treasure by drawing freely upon the languages of the world and so, again in the words of Walt Whitman, “the scope of its etymologies is the scope of man and civilization.” And yet, as far as obscenities go, to a man who like myself was born and bred in Russia, the poverty of the English language can evoke nothing but compassion and contempt. True, in English as in Russian you may charge your opponent with incestuous impulses and practices and even suggest that his mother be subject to forcible sexual intercourse. But any Russian peasant would scorn confining himself to so primitive an invective. He would naturally go on and in sentences of fair syntactic complexity would also describe what should happen to the genitals of the mother in the process, moving freely from the physical to the spiritual (soul, faith), always increasing imaginatively the obscenity content of his speech. I also had to tell them how in my experience, when I worked as shipfitter and flanger in the shipyards or a grinder in the factory, the workers started watching their language very strictly as soon as women joined the labor force. Some of my listeners—the young men and women who pretended to belong to the working class but never had had the guts or the gumption to take a job in a factory or on a construction site and had to confine themselves to simulating holes in their pants—were impressed. Others were not and said so freely, expressing their point of view with a fair admixture of profanity, though not of obscenity. Thus, never mind the language. The actions were actions of rowdies.

Nevertheless, there was no rowdyism at all in our conversations. They seemed to be as anxious to talk to me as I was to talk to them. In fact, the tone of the conversations was often impassionate, but always courteous. They never, for instance, referred to the fact that I was somewhat past thirty. It was I who referred to the subject telling them of their predecessors regarding that business of “thirty,” in particular of Goethe's *Baccalaureus* who explained to Mephisto:

Hat einer dreissig Jahr' vorueber,
So ist er schon so gut wie tot.
Am besten waers euch zeitig totzuschlagen.

(When one is over thirty, he is already as good

as dead. The best thing would be to slaughter you [the teachers] at an early point.)

Mephisto who, disguised as a professor, listens to this pronouncement, remarks drily: "The devil has nothing to add to this." My listeners were astonished by having been so much anticipated; for, like the self-same Baccalaureus, they also tended to believe at times that the world had not existed before their arrival, except, of course, that there had been one Karl Marx who wrote some very notable things before *he* became thirty; and again it was I who had to express my satisfaction that unlike Xenophon's Socrates no one forbade me to talk to people *under* thirty. I remember that it was a source of some wonder to me how completely some of these courteous and articulate students were transformed into violent and inarticulate rowdies whenever they were engaged in their criminal escapades. Perhaps I should not have wondered; for

When a felon is not engaged in his employment,
Or maturing his felonious little plans,
His capacity for innocent enjoyment,
Is just as great as any honest man's.

At any rate, at present all these conversations, and the violence, and the rowdism are a thing of the past. The past is gone as befits the past. But this does not mean that it is gone entirely. The wounds have healed, but some aches have remained.

First of all, it is my impression that with a number of faculty members the events of those unsubtle years of confusion and turmoil have produced a subtle change. In what I believe to be many cases their attitude toward the students is not quite what it used to be. Those who had been enthusiastic teachers, taking deep interest in the individual student, reacting warmly to every expression of the student's interest in the subject, eagerly watching a young man's or woman's intellectual development, feel that some change has come over them. To be sure, the change most of the time is not perceptible from the outside. The lectures are prepared and given as they always were. The tone in the office hours and class discussion is unchanged. In fact, there is an amount of lip service to the importance of teaching that was not noticeable before. *Ex abundantia cordis os loquitur*? I presume to doubt it, when the hearts were truly full, there was no need to talk about it. It seems to me more correct to believe that in many cases the previous devotion is just no longer there to the same extent. Subcutaneously, the old humiliations, insults, and threats still rankle. Unless I am badly mistaken, professors are anxious to go on all sorts of leaves away from the university on a scale that was altogether unknown a quarter of a century ago. When not on leave, duties are properly discharged. Naturally: There is a job to be done, for which one is paid. As a faculty colleague once told me: "I feel now more like a bureaucrat than a free academic teacher." The effect is curious. This is the old discrepancy between intention and achievement. This after all is the stuff social science is made of. The result was entirely unexpected by those who provoked it. The students liked to talk about the bureaucratic nature of Harvard. They never understood that to tell free professors how to teach and what to teach and above all what not to teach, to order and to regulate would be to bureaucratize the university. Unwittingly, they managed to inject some elements of bureaucracy into the daily

life of the university, a bureaucracy of which they themselves now are the principal victims. The instructor-student relation is much too tender a plant to be trampled upon and to be brutalized by threats and nonnegotiable demands.

How important is this effect? I could not tell. People do not like to talk about it. No questionnaire would reveal the true sentiments. Few make the explicit statements of the kind just quoted. But much is told by hint and indirection, by self-ironic remarks. I never talk about these matters myself. I never try to lead the conversation and to evoke reactions. I just listen and observe. And my impression is that I hear and observe too much for the effect to be negligible. That the memories will fade away is likely. That in the absence of recurrences the effect eventually will wear off altogether is even more likely. But this has not happened yet.

Something else, too, has changed and even more obviously. The faculty conversations at lunches and dinners, at various informal gatherings, are not quite what they used to be. The scope of the conversations has greatly widened. There used to be a great deal of professional talk and little else. People spoke about the things they knew something about and were quite reluctant to touch on areas that lay beyond their knowledge. This is quite patently no longer true, and I for one regard this as another effect of the restless years.

In those years students spoke about everything. What mattered were questions of morals. The brain became much less important than other organs. "I know it must be so," a student used to say, "I feel it in my guts." Those attitudes were deplorable, but perhaps not surprising. As Karl Marx, the scholar, used to say, "It is peculiar to petty bourgeoisie to see every problem as a moral problem." And there was, of course, G. B. Shaw's Stephen Undershaft, the unsmart son of the smart Andrew Undershaft, the youngster who knew nothing of, and was not interested in, any field of study, but being an English gentleman knew one thing extremely well: the difference between right and wrong. The students in those unhappy years also were great specialists in knowing the difference between right and wrong.

It is truly astonishing and at times quite shocking to me how much of conversations among professors nowadays deals with subjects that require neither previous study nor any real knowledge. The feeling of difference between what is and what is not a scholarly statement has been considerably eroded. The elusive and ambiguous thing called "judgment" has tended to replace scientific inference. It is an integral part of the same phenomenon that ever so often subjective values are presented as though they were the result of scientific cogitations. "Is absence of hunger preferable to absence of freedom?" The question is not only freely raised in conversations, but just as freely answered. It is no longer felt that the answer is primarily significant for the biography of the answerer. Conversations of this type are heard all the time. True, sometimes attempt is made to probe into the consistency of the man's value system: "You speak of China," it is said, "but Hitler, too, abolished mass unemployment and much hunger in Germany and Austria while destroying freedom and denaturalizing and distorting the concept of freedom—in the best Holy Alliance tradition—from the freedom of Germans into the freedom of Germany." But such a probing is idle. For only scholarship requires consistency. When it comes to values, as has been experienced many times, people do not mind inconsistencies. The white South in the United States (as has been impressively shown by Gunnar Myrdal) has managed to live with the inconsistency in its value system for a very long time indeed.

The deterioration in the teacher-student relationship is accompanied or

paralleled by a weakening of scholarly instincts which, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, once determined the basic article in a scholar's code: "What I do not know, I must remain silent about." There is no doubt in my mind that these changes are the result of the years of unrest. The students probably do not realize how much they have taught the faculty. Is this a permanent effect? Again, who knows? All I can do here is to report my impressions. And my own personal "proof" for the truth of what I have been talking about in the preceding paragraphs is this very paper of mine. Never should I have ventured years ago to criticize things because they ran counter to my own value system, according to which scholars should act and talk like scholars; and to support my criticism by observations which can be neither proved nor disproved in any scholarly acceptable manner.

One final point may be worth making with regard not to individual scholars, but to the body of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. As I recall the long series of those unhappy meetings of the late sixties and early seventies what stood out in my mind then and still stands out in my memory now is the Le Bon effect. Le Bon's book *La psychologie des foules* on which Freud drew so much in his analysis of *Massenseele*, although trying to avoid as best he could Le Bon's hypostatization of a "collective soul," was certainly the work of a genius. Incidentally, as far as hypostatizations go, the students in those years used them with the greatest freedom, making abstract entities (system, culture, society, capitalism, imperialism) think and act as though they were men. I am mentioning this because I believe that traces of that dishearteningly fallacious usage still can be discerned in faculty conversations; these traces, too, may be regarded as yet another effect upon the faculty. But to return to Le Bon. Time and again in my life, involved in highly excited crowds in Russia and in Austria, I saw vividly displayed before my eyes some of the specific features of crowd behavior which Le Bon had registered so well. Yet never before had I witnessed such a truly Le Bonesque transformation of a large number of highly intelligent, highly skilled people, professionally inured to deliberate rational cogitations, into a crowd ruled by low intelligence and base emotions.

No one is without predecessors. A century before Le Bon, Friedrich Schiller wrote:

Jeder, sieht man ihn einzeln, ist leidlich klug und verstaendig,
Sind sie *in corpore*, gleich wird euch ein Dummkopf daraus.

But to say that the Faculty acted in strict accordance to Le Bon's prose and Schiller's distichon does not in itself explain the reasons. I believed then and believe now that the reasons were many. I wondered about them once in public and do not wish to repeat myself. But I do believe that the main reason was fear, which gripped the members of the group and made them forget all dignity, caused them to succumb to an explicit threat, and to vote against their own inclination and judgment. What was in evidence then, what was built up in those years was a tradition of cowardice. Is this tradition still with us? Is it still a part of the *unbewaeltigte Vergangenheit*? The two fatal words might have formed the title of this paper. But terms of this kind must not be torn out of their momentous historical and geographical context. *Unbewaeltigte Vergangenheit*! A past that has not yet been resolved, overcome, overwhelmed, that is still lingering in minds and memories as guilt, as a bad dream, the problem of getting past history out of men's systems. No silly comparisons of incomparables are intended. But whatever the formidable differ-

ences both in quantity and quality, the problems of dealing with the legacy of evil on all scales and of all forms have some basic similarity. The legacy must be *bewaeltigt*. Will it? Is the evil itself gone? For ever, or just for the time being? Once more: Who knows?

This is a volatile country. When I returned from a visit to England in 1939 after the outbreak of the war, the boys in Berkeley proudly displayed the badge proclaiming: "The Yanks aren't coming." For England was clearly engaged in an imperialist war against Hitler's Germany. This did not prevent them not so terribly much later from doing their sacrificial bit on flying missions over Germany, on the beaches of Normandy, and in the forest of the Ardennes. Things can change fast in any direction—for good and evil, for better and for worse. And evil it was that Harvard experienced in her years of turmoil. The great American universities and Harvard, still leading among them, are the finest flower of American civilization. Only someone who was put through the mill of a continental university in Europe can fully appreciate the freedoms of Harvard: The free access to one of the very great libraries in the world, the habit of class discussion, the tutorials, the generous office hours, the great care taken to give graduate students an early experience in teaching. All this is as downright un-continental as can be. To have attacked and to have sought to wreck this University, including its library, was evil, and nothing is so evil as corruption of the best. *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

JAMES A. PERKINS

The University—Old Ghosts and New

THE TURBULENT SIXTIES have been followed by the more peaceful seventies—and it makes us nervous. The baying of the wolves has been followed by an eerie silence. But we ask ourselves: Have the wolves really gone away or are they taking advantage of the darkness to draw even nearer to the campfire? Are various searchlights in the form of commission studies and scholarly articles leaving us dissatisfied and discontent with our analysis of the past or our prognosis of the future?

But to the possible return of the wolves we must now add the heavy and hardly muffled tread of larger and possibly even more dangerous animals whose presence makes our earlier concerns seem less pressing. We live in a time of ghosts, some sleeping and others, though “indistinct and at twilight,” already assuming shape and form. None of them seems particularly friendly.

Higher education lives in a time of concern and downright fear. It is said that an optimist these days is one who feels the future is uncertain. But we must face our fears, and the first step is to put on our positive and constructive eyeglasses and look at the world with a more healthy attitude. Naïveté may be the charge, but it is a charge that must be risked if we are not to guarantee a dismal future by our own dismal outlook. This brief essay is written with a positive and admittedly personal bias. So be it.

Now to the immediate past. The real reason for the current quiet is that the sixties had a successful, not an unsuccessful, outcome. We must look beyond the laments of the academic mandarins who find that their circumstances have changed. Student protest *did* help to extricate us from Vietnam. Black militancy *did* kick open the locked doors of racial prejudice. Younger faculty *did* force our academic mandarins to come out of their towers and defend their views in the intellectual marketplace. Undergraduate teaching *did* become a more important institutional concern. Hitherto excluded members of the academic community *did* find it possible to participate in decisions that affected both their jobs and their careers. Academic privilege *did* become distinguishable from academic freedom, and those who wrapped themselves in the banner of freedom to protect their robes of privilege became a proper target for public concern.

In short, I assert that it was the success of the reformers that accounts for the quiet. The moderates were unwilling to discipline the militant so long as injustice could be effectively identified. Once the ponderous machinery of our public and private establishments moved to examine the war in Vietnam and racial prejudice at home, the neglective instruction, the authoritarian notions of discipline, and the moralizing that so frequently covered reaction, the moderates then left the militants and returned to their books and laboratories and their more normal pursuits. They will return to the fray, not just because new militants will blow the bugle, but when great social injustice is ignored by those in charge of our institutions.

While the ghosts raised by Vietnam and racial prejudice may seem to sleep, it would be the foolish man who thinks they will sleep to a neglect of the progress that must still be made. On close inspection one can see that, like good campaigners, the ghosts of war and prejudice of the sixties sleep with one eye open. It is said that generals are prepared to fight only the last war, and economists to cure the last depression. Perhaps, then, it is also true that academic institutions are prepared only for the most recent crisis. While vigilance about injustice—whether military or racial—must not be far from our minds, and while moderates are prepared to give our social managers the benefit of the doubt that they are doing their best on these two fronts, we can already perceive that new pressures bear on the university. These must be identified and dealt with in one way or another. Let me in the brief compass of this essay mention four that will, in all probability, be on the agenda of higher education for the rest of the decade and possibly for the rest of the century.

The first is the great egalitarian thrust that is felt in every corner of the globe. It is one of the interesting consequences of our industrial and scientific revolution that it has produced at the same time a meritocratic need for high talent and an egalitarian expectation for entrance into our industrialized society. The revolution of rising expectations, so graphically announced by Harlan Cleveland, has flattened all the barriers of an equal treatment—at least where unequal treatment is not justified by any generally acceptable terms. It is not surprising that higher education has felt the double push of meritocratic requirements and egalitarian demands. Apparently entry into our universities will be more and more determined by egalitarian considerations, while exit from the university will be determined more and more by meritocratic considerations. The university will have the task of resolving these twin children of the industrial revolution. It will not be easy. It will not be easy because both principles have deep roots in our social requirements and our social aspirations. And it will not be easy because there will be those who would like a clean choice between one or the other in the design and management of our affairs. But life is never that simple, and higher education must learn to devise formulas that satisfy individual expectation and social requirement. We have only begun to think about ways in which this can be done. Those who think that both matters can be resolved by reference to the magic words of academic standards are living in a fool's paradise.

The second great pressure faced by higher education is an increased demand for the public accountability of its purpose, programs, and management. Accountability comes not because of blind forces at large that would wreck higher education; this is far too simplistic a view. Accountability arises because education has become an increasingly important part of the public purpose and the public budget. Furthermore, it is because higher education is so important that accountability for its actions is demanded.

But higher education has, of course, thrived under deep-seated notions of autonomy that have a thousand years of history to support them. The very process of intellectual development has always required a certain detachment on the part of those who would learn and who would teach and who would add to the store of knowledge. This detachment has become so traditional that the university has come to think of its autonomy as an inherent right rather than a social requirement.

This produces difficulties in dealing with the balancing concept of accountability, which is on the rise. Too frequently we academics have been inclined to deal with the public demand for accountability by asserting the opposite right of

autonomy. It is a losing game because autonomy will be granted only by a demonstration that it is a necessary if not indispensable principle that makes it possible for the university to perform the tasks for which it is being held accountable. As in the case of the balance between meritocracy and egalitarianism, it is also necessary to talk about the interconnections and the balance between institutional autonomy and public accountability. Higher education must develop new doctrines and new explanations in order to develop and ensure the consensus necessary to make it possible to live in our new world.

A third substantial pressure has to do with what is widely believed to be an increasing isolationism. There are many signs that in the public sphere a retreat from the world position of the United States, as far as military and foreign aid is concerned, is in process. It is also clear that cultural differences and individuality have become increasingly important and have replaced older notions of one world which so frequently meant the extension of our world. The emphasis on native language, the militant nationalism of former colonial dependencies, the economic pressure applied by those with a monopoly of vital raw materials, the rise of domestic concerns in developing as well as developed countries, all exercise a disturbing influence on the university that by its very name is concerned with universal, not national, preoccupations. And all of this comes at a time when activity on a larger scale becomes a precondition for intellectual advance. International intellectual communities can flourish only in a genuine atmosphere of international collaboration. Cultural pluralism, while of enormous inherent value, cannot be an end in itself or an overriding criterion without exercising its quiet damage to the delicate threads of international understanding and cooperation in the fields of intellectual pursuit.

So a rising political and military nationalism, combined with an increasing cultural pluralism, represents pressures on the universality of the academy that will take extraordinary skill and understanding to handle. Fortunately there are counterbalancing forces in the fields of finance, commerce, travel, the media, science, and in the intellectual enterprise itself that work in contrary fashion. These counterpressures have their place in the university in the same way that pluralistic concerns are also reflected on the university campus. Here again it will be necessary to balance off values, and the university that neglects this balance and feels it can operate in response to one of these values alone will be in grave difficulty.

Finally, there is, of course, the brooding giant of limited resources of food, fuel, and space that are under pressure from an expanding population geared to rising expectations for world productivity. It would seem that an irresistible force is pressing against an increasingly immovable object. And the trouble is that both are fueled by factors of great value. The limitations on growth have on their side matters of pollution, the environment, and the quality of life. The expectations have on their side the desire on the part of the deprived to live a minimally healthy and satisfactory life. How these two great desires can be balanced and resolved may well be the overriding preoccupation of this planet as long as it endures.

Higher education is, of course, caught in these pincers and will come under increasing pressure as the pincers inexorably are closed. This is not merely a matter of survivability. It is also a matter of the university making its appropriate contribution to resolving or balancing these forces as well as making its contribution by the projection of policies that will ease our social burdens. The university is better equipped to make these contributions than many believe. However, this will require ever greater attention to its organization, procedures, and purposes.

What has the university going for it that would lead one to believe that it will be able to deal with new pressures at least as successfully as it has dealt with the old ones?

First of all, the university has turned out to be a tough and leathery institution that bends but does not easily break. It has survived the twin pressures of an unpopular war and a devastating adjustment of internal racial conflict. And to repeat, it has survived because it eventually came to terms with both, although there are some who would believe that it survived only when it ignored both. The university has more capacity for self-education than was thought possible. Its turnover of students, infusion of new faculty, and appropriate replacement of administrators made it possible to deal with new issues in new ways without disturbing the fundamental features that have made it strong but adaptable. Its economic demise has been widely predicted, but the death notices have been astonishingly premature. The destruction of academic freedom has been widely predicted, but most professors do not use the freedom they already have. And quite apart from internal adjustments that have been made, adjustments that have reflected the new priorities, administrative inventiveness has not come to an end. New institutions have evolved to meet the new needs that arose under the pressure of the egalitarian push. Systems of higher education have evolved to see to it that these differentiated institutions remain in some harmony with one another. The relationship between political and academic authority is in the state of exploration, and there is no sign that the two sides have refused to explore further ways of constructive collaboration.

It is not naïve to assert that in most countries of the world, and perhaps particularly in the United States, it has been a miracle of major proportions that a doubling and trebling of students in higher education have been accomplished during a period of intense division over both foreign and domestic policy and have been done with as little damage to the system as one can now see. Of course all this has not been done without abrasion and bloodshed and without damage and personal tragedy, but it was also made possible by the great understanding and indeed heroic sacrifice on the part of many. In general the public has been tolerant and supportive during the difficulties faced by our institutions of higher education, as they were trying to cope with large problems. Most indices would show that the public support for higher education is still high, which leads one to believe that the new pressures will be dealt with not with speed and finality, but with attention and compassion. The leaders in higher education who are in the forefront of exploring and assuring these adjustments will need all the support they can get, both internally and externally. If they show enough courageous imagination, and if the public lends a supporting hand, higher education will continue to make its contribution toward the resolution of some of our social contradictions, with the university surviving, changed, but very much intact.

JOSEPH ADELSON

Looking Back

IN PREPARING TO write this essay, I thought to reread as much as I could of the vast literature on the university written during the last fifteen years. In one way, that proved to be a terrible mistake because the hope of saying something new simply shrivels. All positions have been occupied and all explanatory strategies explored, or so it seems; to strive for novelty is to court eccentricity. In another way, however, the exercise, though hardly inspiring, was at least instructive, demonstrating the short half-life of rhetorical fashion. Much of the writing now seems mawkish beyond belief; one watches the life cycle of a genre—what someone has termed “The Beatification of The Young”—one watches it germinate, grow, thrive, flower, and, then, relentlessly, wither and die. One reads this journalism in a state of numb amazement. How could there have been so widespread a belief, only five or six or seven years ago, that the young were the builders of a New Jerusalem? And what do the believers believe now? Are they disenchanted, or have they moved to new enthusiasms, or have they simply forgotten?

It is certainly tempting to forget, if only because remembering reminds us of our continuing failure in prophecy. There are some notable exceptions, but by and large informed commentary has been spectacularly wrong in its apprehension of the future. I have in my possession a letter, dated 1959, from a most distinguished educator, in which he laments the death of student idealism, suggesting that it is a permanent casualty of the technocratic state. I also have in my possession a manuscript of my own, written in 1965, happily never completed and thus happily never published, wherein I argue that the recent troubles at Berkeley are purely a response to local conditions, and tell us nothing of the future of the university. I do not have in my possession, though I wish I did, transcripts of a number of conversations, circa 1969-70, in which some of my colleagues were imagining (rather zestfully, I thought) an imminent political revolution which would begin on the campuses.

The published literature is, of course, rather more circumspect, but no more prescient. At the threshold of the 1960s, all we heard about was a future given over to apathy, conformity, suburbanization, and the like. The mid-1960s celebrated idealism regained; few discerned the totalitarian spirit which would soon become evident. The late 1960s were apocalyptic, both pro and con; only a few writers sensed that the era was coming to an end, and no one quite foresaw the peculiar mood of the moment, made up of careerism, artificial nostalgia, determined sensuality, and diffuse self-righteousness.

These remarks are an oblique way of resisting the Editor's invitation to speculate on the future of the university; it may be useful, however, to look to the writing of the immediate past to see why our collective record of analysis and (often tacit) prophecy was so often mistaken. The following observations are by no means ex-

haustive, nor are they meant to be original, far from it. They are, I hope, offered without the condescension allowed by hindsight; indeed, given my own indifferent success in understanding and forecasting the events of the sixties, they are written in the spirit of a chastened self-instruction.

The sad examples I began with point to what is perhaps the most common error, which is to see the future as a mere extension or exacerbation of the present. The tendencies of the moment are predicted to persist, though they may gain in force, or may weaken; but it is the categories of the present which command attention. The present dominates our consciousness in part because we can so easily find its apparent precursors; thus, the momentary tendency seems to have the sweep of history behind it: It was, it is, and therefore it will most certainly continue to be. The dialectical mode, the idea that the existent generates its opposition, seems to be difficult to put into practice, whatever lip service we may occasionally give it. Hence, social forecasting tends to be conservative, in that it is based upon the extrapolation and generalization of current analytic frameworks. It may well be that we have here an implacable habit of the mind as it dwells upon the future, perhaps not. In either case, the writing of the sixties, much of it, now seems to have been possessed by an almost reckless self-confidence in the validity of current categories.

In many cases, commentary on the university and on the college young was a displaced or disguised mode of commentary on American life in general. The part was taken for the whole; the university became a surrogate for the quality of American institutions; the college student came to be seen as the vessel of this or that side of the American spirit. The tendency was most visible in that abundant critical literature animated by the adversary temper, but it was evident elsewhere as well. In all such instances, there was a significant loss in particularity, and with it a loss in precision, and in the complexity of analysis. Let me grant that the matter is complicated because the university and the national polity are so interpenetrated as to be mutually influential at all times. In particular, the mood and morale of national life are quickly felt in the mood and morale of the university—thus, the brief euphoria of the Kennedy Presidency corresponded to a sense of potency and purpose on the campuses. Despite these (and many other) common reverberations, the two systems are best held apart analytically, as was not the case in the grander writing of the sixties.

Some of the decade's best writing, and some of the worst, concentrates upon the university as an institution—its structure, governance, curriculum, and the like; and most of that writing is dominated by a single assumption. In Kenneth Burke's terminology, it imputes to the scene of action motives which belong properly to the agents of action. To be concrete: the hurly-burly of the 1960s inspired a great many studies of putative academic malfeasance, informed by the conviction that trouble *in* the universities was somehow caused *by* the universities. There ensued a flurry of reform, in curriculum, in governance, and so on, some of which has since fallen by the wayside, some of which hangs on. Both the writing and the reform it initiated are now to be seen, I would argue, as forms of propitiatory magic, for, as the decade ended, it had begun to seem suspect that there was any clear articulation between a university's structure and spirit and the difficulties it contained. The troubles began to seem like a plague, which capriciously strikes innocent and guilty alike. By the end of the decade, there was a general but often silent recognition that the troubles had had their origins elsewhere—in the times, in the war, in the demographic bulge,

in the upper-middle-class sensibility—but not necessarily in the university itself. Neither the most stubborn complacency nor the most zealous reform had, it seemed, much to do with either the onset or the termination of student uproar.

Only belatedly, and even then fitfully, did we give attention to the force of the nonrational. I include in that category such phenomena as the following: the religious and spiritual hungers which were at work, often in distorted form, behind the youth movements of the sixties; the yearning for communalism; the violence, irrationalism, and anti-intellectualism that were so conspicuous through the period; and what may be the most important, though the least visible, the struggle for moral purity which, having become secularized, expressed itself in political moralism and indignation. Somehow our categories were out of touch. Had we been Jungian enough we would have anticipated some of these developments; had we been Freudian enough we would have sensed others. Perhaps it would be more precise to say that, though some writers recognized the presence of the nonrational, very few imagined it would not be contained by the stabilizing structures of the personality, or expressed adequately through prevailing social institutions. The psychodynamic theory of the early sixties emphasized the integrating, conflict-mediating sides of the personality; the sociology of the time stressed the integrating, tension-reducing functions of social institutions. Both were subtle and powerful theories, far more so to my mind than the vulgar, ideologized doctrines since risen to prominence, yet they now seem to have shown a certain fatal innocence.

Until fairly recently, and even today, there was a tendency to treat both the college student and the university as homogeneous. The extraordinary diversity within both groups was ignored to allow large, oracular statements about *the* university and *the* young. What was meant, almost all of the time, were liberal arts students in the elite universities. This bias, when recognized, was sometimes justified on the grounds that these students were, in their values and outlooks, the heralds of things to come; but that assumption was itself unexamined and simple-minded. Thus, an initial failure to make appropriate differentiations was rationalized by a leap into instant futurology. One obvious source of this constant error was the specialization of knowledge, wherein commentary on the university was drawn almost exclusively from scholars in the social sciences and humanities, and rarely from the ranks of natural scientists, engineers, and the professional faculties. One obvious result was that certain vital disciplines, and the teachers and students who occupy them, remained nearly invisible; it produced considerable skew in the common view of the young, their teachers, and the colleges at large. For example, the symptoms of malaise and self-doubt presumably prepotent among the students in the sixties were, I suspect, felt far less strongly in the scientific, technical, and professional departments and schools, where we found, and continue to find, an emphasis upon merit and achievement, a more complete immersion in work, and a more highly focused sense of vocation.

Finally, many writers were simply too close to the subject matter, and thus too identified, too involved. There was a loss of scholarly distance, at first largely unwitting. An example: the extensive though highly redundant body of scholarship on the young activists tended toward a single discovery, that these students were oriented toward “modernist” against “traditionalist” values and attitudes. Since the investigators themselves shared those perspectives, the writing on the topic was tacitly partisan. Nonetheless, much of this writing *intends* toward detached scholarship; its

errors lay in the failure to scrutinize unconscious bias. But as the decade wore on there was an increasing, willful abandonment of scholarly distance. The ideals of disinterestedness, of restraint, were set aside, the argument being that all knowledge is, in its origins and function, political. That attitude is now respectable and widespread; research and theory in social sciences have become increasingly tendentious, and deliberately so. For the university, that may yet turn out to be the most sorrowful legacy of the sixties.

ALLAN BLOOM

The Failure of the University

If Pascal had envisaged only some great profit, or if he had even been moved by the desire for glory alone, I cannot believe that he would have been able to marshal, as he did, all the powers of his intelligence in order better to discover the most hidden secrets of the Creator. When I see him tear his soul, as it were, from the midst of life's cares in order to attach it exclusively to this study and, prematurely breaking the bonds which keep it in the body, die of old age before forty, I am struck dumb, and I understand that it is no ordinary cause which can produce such extraordinary efforts.

The future will prove if these passions, so rare and so fecund, are born and develop so easily in the midst of democratic societies as in the bosom of aristocracies. I, for my part, avow that I find it hard to believe.

Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, II, i, 10.

TOCQUEVILLE, democracy's great friend and admirer, reminds us in this passage of the Platonic tripartite division of the soul—desire, spiritedness, and reason. According to that understanding of human psychology, each of these parts provides its specific motivation to action and has its own proper end. Desire seeks preservation and comfort; spiritedness, honor, particularly in politics; and reason, knowledge for its own sake, or the contemplation of being. The educated man is the one in whom each of these three elements has developed properly and fully and in whom they are most harmoniously balanced, particularly with respect to their self-evident order of rank. Now in Tocqueville's analysis, as in Plato's, different regimes tend to encourage the flourishing of one part of the soul at the expense of the others. They do so by giving power to men whose dominant motive derives from one of those parts and who by their authoritative position determine public education and the respectable objects of aspiration. The character of public life thus established reinforces, in turn, the tendencies of the citizens on whom the regime is based. A world is constituted with horizons that exclude or distort the other alternatives in such a way that they no longer come to sight as real alternatives. Higher education, to the extent that its intention is to cultivate man simply and not to make the man suitable to this time or place, must counterpoise the prevailing intellectual vice of the regime and preserve what it tends to neglect.

Democracy, or the egalitarian regime, must, according to Tocqueville, perforce have utility as its primary motive: it is founded on the rule of all, and the vital desires and the fear of death are shared by all—as opposed to the desires for glory and pure knowledge which are rare. This devotion to utility is particularly true of modern democracies, the theory of which was precisely to encourage the self-regarding passions as a sure means to political consensus. Disinterested love of the

truth is particularly threatened in democracy. The motives of honor and glory which usually characterize aristocracy are not in themselves any more akin to the love of truth than is utility, but they free men from the concern for preservation and hence from the necessary attachment to a mercenary use of the mind. Aristocrats are more inclined to admire—perhaps in a frivolous way, but one which can be used to the profit of the theoretical—beautiful and useless things. A Pascal is, therefore, more a product of such a society and more likely to find a home within it. Thus, in addition to the other reasons adduced, the intellectual life in a democracy is profoundly influenced by the absence of a truly leisured class which would patronize and protect it from the demands of the market.

In modern democracies the universities have taken the place of such a class and attempted to provide a basis for the cultivation of the theoretical life which finds only thin soil elsewhere in the society. Their success would have enabled democracy to combine the advantages of equal justice with the advantages of the peaks of speculation. For the sake of the regime, it had to resist the regime's tendency to use everything for its immediate ends. And the regime has powerful weapons in money, public opinion and, above all, the appearance of moral principle.

In the last years we have witnessed the failure of the university. It has become incorporated into the system of ideas and goals of the society around it. The multiversity, with its dedication to the useful as defined by society's demands, has joined hands with what appeared to be its enemy, the passion for commitment and sweeping social change which was the child of the late sixties. Now quietly they work together, not because the flood tide has receded, but because it has swept away what obstructed it. The university, to the extent it represented the theoretical life, is more a memory than a reality.

Very simply put, young Americans no longer like to read, and they do not do so. There are no fundamental books which form them, through which they see the world and educate their vision. To the extent they use books, it is because school requires them to do so, or it is for the sake of information. Books are not a source of pleasure, nor would many students imagine that old books could contain the answers to the problems that most concern them. The university does not represent a community the bonds of which are constituted by a shared literary heritage, and friendships are not formed by the common study of the important issues.

Professors Werner J. Dannhauser and L. Pearce Williams at Cornell University posed this question to that institution's president:

If we prove to you that an Arts and Sciences student can now receive a B.A. degree at Cornell, and thus be presumed to have acquired a liberal education, without having been required to read a line of Plato, the Bible, Shakespeare, Marx or Einstein, would you consider this to be evidence that there is a crisis in education at Cornell?

An answer was never received. It is not known whether this president, or other university presidents, would regard this situation as an educational problem. But that such university careers are possible, and even common, is a fact. No longer does the university have a content or a focus. It has accommodated itself to all demands and tastes for too long. This is the legacy of a decade of academic upheaval. What promised to be a great new openness, a liberation from artificial constraints, has resulted in emptiness.

To say the same thing in a different way, the window which opened out onto Europe has been closed. American intellectual life was always in tutelage to that of Europe. There was not much here to inspire the best minds. To the extent that we

had spiritual substance, it was derivative from the great tradition which had its origins in Europe and which was still in some measure alive there. The longing to experience the heights and depths of the soul always led toward Europe—its art, its music, its literature, its science, and its philosophy. It was a priceless advantage to have in our midst institutions which could provide us access to a beauty and a freedom of the mind which our immediate surroundings did not inspire. One of America's greatest virtues was its openness to the cultivation of disciplines which were in some measure alien to its way of life and which could help to enrich or correct it. In this way we could hope to have the best of both worlds.

But isolationism has always been one of our instincts. Going a-whoring after foreign gods was not a thing to be easily tolerated when America had its problems to be looked after. Moreover, there seemed to be a whiff of disloyalty to egalitarian principles about the man whose tastes were so different from those of the ruling majority. The schools and universities, however, more or less successfully resisted the pressure to conform, because almost their entire curriculum consisted of European things and there would have been little left to their domain if they assimilated to the public taste, and because the teachers and professors had a profound inner conviction of the importance of what they taught. Now neither of these motives for resistance has anything like the same force it once exerted.

Philosophy and liberal studies, in general, require the most careful attention to what are frequently called the great books. This is because they are expressions of teachers such as we are not likely to encounter in person, because in them we find the arguments for what we take for granted without reflection, and because they are the sources for forgotten alternatives. They make it possible for us to carry on our discussion on a high level. Thus, liberal education consists largely in the painstaking study of these books. This study requires long and arduous training, for these books are not immediately accessible to us. Without such a training, an impoverishment of our intellectual discourse necessarily results. One need only look at academic philosophy and the social sciences to see how irrelevant the tradition has become to them. They suppose they have found new methods in the light of which the older teachings appear primitive.

Formerly certain fundamental books—most notably, but not only, the Bible—provided a spiritual common ground for society at large. The universities were dedicated to profounder reflection on that spiritual common ground. That profounder reflection, while separating the universities from the society, also linked them to it. Most recently the Bible, Shakespeare, and the Declaration of Independence (and, along with it, the *Federalist*) have disappeared from public life, and a parallel development has taken place within the university. The university, if it is to play a public role, can no longer do so as the guardian and sublimator of the common concerns or as the thoughtful conscience of public practice. Its link to society appears to consist only in serving its wishes.

This loss of the tradition was explained by Tocqueville as a result of what he called the philosophic method of the Americans. Such a method consists primarily in the rejection of all authority. Every man's reason is taken to be sufficient to determine all questions. Whatever the advantages of this method—and they are many—it is fatal to tradition. As Tocqueville put it, tradition is nothing more than information for the democratic man. It is not of the essence of the classic tradition to be authoritative, but a certain authoritative status guarantees its perpetuation with men who do not see its rational merits and in times when it is untimely. Scholastics took

Aristotle too much as writ rather than as question or problem, but he was read and studied. Our age, in agreement with Aristotle that reason is the ultimate test, no longer reads Aristotle because we do not see his reasons. Hardly any thought of the past has any continuing public significance in our country, so that if the universities were to act as the preservers of the tradition, they would have to resist the tide, insist on studies which go against the grain, appear to be troglodytic and irrelevant. This they no longer have the will to do.

Young Americans surely still want to visit Europe, but the desire is no longer powerful, nor is its object the discovery of unknown worlds, the initiation into the mysteries. Going to Europe, just as going to college, is not anticipated as a transforming experience, an education, a new casting of heart and mind. The end of our inner subservience to Europe is, undoubtedly, partly just the belated coming to awareness that Europe is no longer what it was either politically or intellectually, that its present cannot make particular claims to be anything different or admirable beyond what is available here. Locke, in describing the precivilized condition of man, compares it to America prior to European settlement. "Thus in the beginning all the world was America." And that is also the case in the end. What Europe offers is only reminiscences of another world. Our situation is not unlike Madame Bovary's when, wide eyed and full of foolish awe, she was invited to a ball at the castle of decayed, postrevolutionary aristocrats.

[At the dinner] at the head of the table, alone among all of these women, bent over his full plate with his napkin knotted around his neck like a child, an old man ate, letting drops of gravy trickle from his mouth. He had bloodshot eyes and wore a little pigtail fastened with a black ribbon. It was the Marquis' father-in-law, the old Duc de Laverdière, the former favorite of the Comte d'Artois at the time of the hunts at the Vaudreuil home of the Marquis de Conflans, and who had been, it was said, the lover of Queen Marie-Antoinette between M. de Coigny and M. de Lauzun. He had led a wild life of debauch, full of duels, wagers, abducted women, had devoured his fortune and terrified his whole family. A domestic, behind his chair, speaking loudly into his ear, named the dishes for him to which he pointed while stuttering. And constantly Emma's eyes, of their own accord, returned to this old man with drooping lips as to something extraordinary and august. He had lived at court and slept in the bed of queens.

Flaubert by means of this old man gives us a double perspective on the *ancien régime*—its present reality and what it can mean to someone with a bit of imagination. The former perspective does not exhaust the significance of the object. We could perhaps do with a bit of Emma's imagination in our view of Europe.

It is, however, not only the factual state of Europe which is the cause of our disenchantment with its books. There is also much positive doctrinairism behind it. The new egalitarianism, the defection of the intellectuals to populism or know-nothingism, found itself in harmony with the multiversity. Both believe that each student should express his unique self and find his own interests. All disciplines are equal as are all ways of life. "Doing one's own thing" is today still the motto, with the proviso that one must reluctantly also learn a trade in order to make a living (now that students have been reminded that survival is an imperative for them, too). So far as the "liberal" side of the university is concerned, it is still anything goes, without anyone's having much of an idea about what one might do. There is much lamentation about the prevailing conservatism and the abandonment of the innovative programs of the late sixties. But those programs never had any content. They were just structures for the expression of freedom or intense efforts to provide a ground for relaxation. They enjoyed a momentary vogue, for few intelligent students could

resist the promises of liberation from meaningless and irrelevant requirements and the opportunity to relate knowledge to life. Aside from the programs which were intended to answer specific political demands, however, the rest was a wasteland. Disappointment and boredom were the predictable consequences of the wave of university reforms which swept the nation, for they were demagogic and full of empty rhetoric. The rhetoric is still around, and disappointment has not led to return, but to apathy. Until the middle fifties, there was, in a conventional and perhaps formulaic way, agreement about the disciplines that constituted the core of the university. The immense growth of the university which then occurred effaced its visage. The addition of new disciplines and within the old disciplines the addition of new subdisciplines destroyed all agreement about the common end. Also, what it meant to be a professor altered radically. But this was not at the time perceived as a problem because growth offered something for everyone, and there was no thought about what would happen if that growth were to cease. The academic disorders of the sixties evoked reforms intended to conciliate student wishes rather than to serve their needs. And it also became evident that many professors had come to doubt the value of what they taught. These developments led to a further erosion of agreement about the university's vocation.

Now, with money in short supply, there is retrenchment without an "order of priorities" or any view of what should be cut out—just drift and random choice as circumstance dictates. Above all, there are the doldrums. Students are nostalgic for the excitement of the late sixties when something was really going on. The only thing they can find to look up to is the memory of the most anti-intellectual moment in the history of universities, one at which, however, there was a great deal of publicity and the universities were in the vanguard of popular culture. It is true that quiet now prevails and that students are studying again. But it is not the liberal studies that they are studying. We have nothing to offer them on that score. In order to do so, we would have to agree on the most important questions for a human life and the ways to ask them.

But it is in the nature of man to desire clarity about the highest ends, no matter how great the effort to obscure the fact that there are such ends, that they are problems, and that there is a way to study them. In my teaching I have found that the segment of *Tocqueville* devoted to the intellectual life of the Americans, from which my beginning quote on Pascal is drawn, is particularly moving for students—if their attention is forcibly drawn to it. At first they pass over it lightly, for *Tocqueville* seems to be describing a primitive America which is strictly a thing of the past. The effect of these passages is not unlike that of *Swift's* account of his first encounter with the Yahoos. He gives a description of them akin to a scientist's observation of a nasty creature he is the first to discover. Then, suddenly it dawns on us that the nasty creature is us as we look to an outsider. Once *Tocqueville's* account has pierced the deceptive veneer of contemporary culture, the student has a painful yet exhilarating moment of self-awareness. No one wishes to be unaware of the good things one could possibly enjoy. Although *Tocqueville* engenders a certain self-contempt, he also opens a prospect of self-improvement. The student realizes that *Tocqueville's* account is not a window but a mirror and that all the tendencies *Tocqueville* describes have been exacerbated in recent years. Tradition has decayed; the enslavement to public opinion has increased; forms have disappeared; literature has difficulty finding elevating subject matters in our lives and a discriminating audience; there is a literary mercantilism; our penchant for general ideas has in-

creased because our experience and study do not provide us with a rich concrete consciousness; our social sciences tend ever more to see deterministic explanations of human action, for we have little faith in the power of individual freedom in a mass egalitarian society; there is little or no inspiring political rhetoric, so we must be led by force or interest. And, above all, philosophy is not only not practiced, its very possibility is denied. It just has no place in our life, in the way, for example, chemistry has. Because we no longer have the European university as the standard against which to judge ourselves, we can delude ourselves about our condition, and we give way more and more to our fundamental inclinations.

Reading Tocqueville serves not only the function of self-awareness, but also that of making students realize that an old book can be of use, thereby giving them the habit of reading. Moreover, they see in Tocqueville an example of a kind of man they do not know, and some are charmed by his grace, his delicacy, and his love of justice. He not only poses the problem of our intellectual life, he himself as a model is part of a solution. They are intrigued by trying to figure out how he attained a standpoint from which he could see us so clearly, and they are aware that they must do something similar. The problem of liberal education is far from being an insuperable one. It is just that universities are not inclined to do anything about it. One can perhaps see this best when one reads that Tocqueville believed that the most efficacious way to compensate for the intellectual failings of democratic man was to study the Greek and Roman authors. Where are they now?

Up to now I have been discussing what has not been going on in universities. Now I must turn to what has been going on. It can all perhaps be summed up in an anecdote. Recently I visited a highly respected liberal arts college in New England. In order to get to my room at the faculty club I had to pass through a conference chamber in which the president, deans, and department chairmen were meeting. I hurried by, but could not help hearing one sentence uttered by the president: "History, on the other hand, might appear to be male chauvinist." These men—or persons—were doing what most university administrators are doing. They were engaged in rectifying unequal treatment, real or alleged, of equal persons—an endeavor which has exhausted the moral and intellectual energies of the university. Although the university may have nothing to teach, it is going to be taught by faculties recruited equally to all students equally admitted. The universities are quiet. The frenzy which upset us all so much has passed. But it was not a passing fad as was swallowing goldfish or streaking. The old world was overthrown by it, and the essential thrust of the movement has become incorporated into the life-giving principles of the university. What we are witnessing is the routinization or bureaucratization of the radical egalitarianism which was the essence of the student demands of the sixties. Our current calm is at least in part due to the fact that the former dissidents now really constitute the establishment.

The egalitarian effervescence of which I am speaking was, whatever the particular causes espoused, the only motive and the only goal of what took place in the last years. It had, in part, the intention of extending prevailing principles of egalitarian justice to areas where their application had been hindered, particularly in relation to blacks and women. This was perfectly in keeping with both the spirit of the regime and what is proper to the university. But there was also a new and powerful element of thought which insisted on movement from equality of opportunity to factual equality—either by way of denying that there are any relevant in-

equalities or by way of using government, the university, or genetics to overcome them. Connected with this new radical egalitarianism in the university were the abandonment of requirements, the demand for student participation in all functions of the university, the evaluation of professors by students, sex-counseling, the renouncing of standards because they encourage discrimination and unhealthy competition, a continuing inflation of grades, concentration on teaching rather than scholarship, open admissions, the introduction of new programs to fit every wish, and quotas in the admission of students and the hiring of faculty. It is questionable whether a university can pursue its proper end if it must be engaged in the fight against social inequality. But much more was being demanded of it. There was, and is, an opinion abroad that natural inequalities are as offensive as social or conventional ones, and that it is the business of the university to correct the former as well as the latter. Thus the university must declare a war on nature as well as society in the name of equality.

The intellectual effects of this determination on the part of universities are overwhelming. In the first place, equality has to become a kind of religion, doubts about which in thought, not to speak of deeds, cause pangs of conscience. It becomes impossible to reflect on the possibility that there might be a hierarchy of human types and pursuits and that it is part of the university's task and a duty of justice to encourage and cultivate some of these types and pursuits more than others. Any research, however dispassionate, which might tend to reveal differences among nations, races, or sexes which are counter to the prevailing dogma is risky indeed to the scholar. One must be circumspect in order not to appear to dissent on these great issues. Thus a whole range of thought about the alternatives for man has vanished. Timidity about fundamental issues is the order of the day.

One can see where the power lies by the things of which men most fear being accused. The charges that carry weight with the tribunal of university public opinion today are racism, sexism, and elitism, taking the place of older charges like atheism or Communism. That these are, in varying degrees, nasty dispositions cannot be doubted. But they are difficult to define. And it is as difficult to prove that a man possesses them as it is to prove that a man does not believe in God. Almost no one these days would admit to any one of them. But the air is rife with accusations. Most want to be considered in the vanguard of the fight against racism, sexism, and elitism; all wish to avoid being suspected of favoring them. Therefore, there is a fertile field for the flourishing of *tartuferie* and McCarthyism of the left. Racial, feminist, and egalitarian extremists can claim to represent the orthodoxy and promote unreasonable policies.

Take the case of women's liberation, for example. How many professors would dare to make serious investigations concerning psychic differentiations between men and women or to suggest different ways of life and education as appropriate to them? All to the contrary, there is a witch-hunt going on to root out sexism in science, philosophy, and the literary tradition. Since it is now accepted that male chauvinism dominated most of the past, it is impossible to take, for example, Rousseau's *Nouvelle Héloïse* as anything better than a particularly prejudiced perspective on men and women and their relations. It must either be expunged, held up to ridicule, or treated as a historical curiosity. Since almost none of the classic works of any kind can be taken to support the women's liberation movement, we have one more reason for abandoning the study of the tradition, for we are now on a higher moral and intellectual plateau. The new principles do not find support

in the old literature so it cannot be a source of inspiration. And, for the moment, the movement has not generated a literature of a comparable quality. In the name of new truths one must, temporarily at least, accept thinner souls. And the university resounds with unceasing propaganda in order to do away with prejudices. Our horizons, in universities of all places, are purposely narrowed in order to avoid possibilities unpalatable to a party. A similar story can be told about the intellectual effects of the war against racism and elitism. It is hardly an atmosphere which promotes serious discussion or contemplation of the only available examples of greatness which we possess. Our heritage is made both dangerous and contemptible. There is an utter disproportion between our intellectual substance and the political and moral reality which engages the students.

With these forces at work, university administrators, partly prodded by HEW, spend their time responding to them. There is no academic reason for what they propose, although feeble justifications are attempted. In reality the concentration is not on the quality of the professor or the student, but on the category he comes from; it follows that the immanent demands of the subject matter must be sacrificed to what this kind of teacher can teach and this kind of learner can learn. Affirmative action is but one example among many of what has absorbed university life. University administrations are not ashamed to announce that almost all of their appointments will be made from minorities or women. Without discussing what such policies do to real equality of opportunity and fairness, their effect on the intellectual standards of the disciplines is evident. And worst of all, such policies engender a hypocrisy which is rotting the moral core of the university, the place where truth is supposed to be the first of all concerns. We are treated to assertions that appointments are made on merit, when everyone knows that a member of a minority or a woman is a hot academic commodity and that quality is of secondary importance. Departments just must have them—to show them off to HEW, to radical constituencies, to the press. We are told that open admissions have not damaged academic standards, without being provided with the criteria for such judgments and when there are good reasons to think the opposite is the case. We are assured that the black and women's studies programs are great successes, whereas one finds that they are actually neither clear about what they are doing nor satisfying the very constituencies for which they were established. We are told that reverse discrimination is not practiced (for example, whites excluded from university-owned housing units), when it is clear to all the world this is not the case. We are told that old testing methods were not adequate—which is probably true—but it is also evident that this is asserted only to remove exclusive standards and that no alternative standards are sought. And in all this, to repeat, not a serious thought is given to education.

The students are bored—bored because they have already in high school enjoyed the freedoms young people used to look forward to in college, bored because they have been filled with the ideology which denigrates the university as a tool of the establishment and a passport to success, bored because the old, silly, but exciting snobbism has disappeared, bored because they must prepare for careers which they know to be necessary but which they despise, and, above all, bored because the university offers them no inspiration, no vision of a higher motive for life or of vast new worlds.

This is not a happy time for the university, nor one of which we university men can be very proud. Liberal arts is a decaying rump of the university with no projects

for the future. There are too many students who do not care and too many professors with too little scholarship. The next step for the latter is unionization, which will add another hypocrisy about standards while covering the real concern for job security. This unionization will be just a further step in reducing the professor to the level of the high-school teacher. Liberal arts education would today have a hard time defending its *raison d'être* before a tribunal of the wise. In one way the solution is simple. The students are starving for spiritual nourishment, and it is right under our noses, where it always was. But no one who has any power will look to it, and the special interests would oppose it with might and main. The achievement of a liberal education by a student will, for the time being at least, be a mere piece of good luck—the coincidence of the students who long for learning meeting with the teachers who know something about the simple old things. As institutions, universities now do a great injustice to human nature.

THEODORE M. HESBURGH

The "Events": A Retrospective View

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED to American universities in the sixties? What happened, happened suddenly and without warning. Even in retrospect, it is not easy to describe, much less to analyze or diagnose. There was, most obviously, a student eruption which began with the usual revolutionary rhetoric and progressed to massive demonstrations, the take-over of buildings, mainly the centers of administration, and trashing, with ROTC buildings, computers, and laboratories suspected of doing defense research work being the favorite targets. Once the student mass movement and destruction began, the whole affair was magnified by immediate and simultaneous television and news coverage. Some immediately cried conspiracy and looked for Communists as the movement spread like a grass fire out of control. There was no need for a national or Communist conspiracy; immediate national news coverage kept everyone informed of the latest developments, which were then imitated by many who shared the general rationale of dissent, dissatisfaction, and even disillusionment with the university at hand, a most convenient, unprotected, and open target.

There was, of course, instant analysis of the causes of dissent: civil rights, the movement in which the new techniques of civil disobedience were pioneered throughout the South, poverty in the midst of affluence, the war, and especially the draft which cut close to the student bone, even though most students had deferments, the environment, consumerism, and increasingly what came to be called the total irrelevance of what passed as American higher education. It was quite a shopping list.

Some problems were much more vital than others. Ultimately, the war became most central to almost everyone and was, in fact, at once the most present and the most distant target about which the universities could do very little. The war ground on despite all the protests. It brought down a President who had begun a most promising domestic program and had given great leadership in federal civil rights legislation. The war also helped to elect another President who promised to end the war soon, but then escalated it over four years, adding more and more fuel to the student dissenters' fires. The culmination came with the May invasion of Cambodia, the student deaths at Kent State and Jackson State, the massive outpouring of anti-war sentiment during the most hectic week in American university history.

Unfortunately, it seemed all in vain as the war continued and the President reversed the forward flow of the civil rights movement, forgetting as well that poverty exists in America and canceling the programs that President Johnson had inaugurated to eliminate it. Curiously, the reason given for discontinuing the poverty program was inefficiency. When the Lockheed Corporation was inefficient, it was bailed out at a cost of over 200 million dollars, as were the railroads later on. The

poor who were trying for the first time to run something were given no second chance.

The public at large had been told that the university could solve all the nation's and the world's problems. But when they came to solving their own new problem of student unrest, most university administrators appeared helpless. The faculty stood by, sometimes voicing encouragement, while expensive academic facilities were destroyed. University presidents, the font of all wisdom, were treated to student contempt, insult, intimidation. Their offices were occupied and ruined; their authority, unexercised or disregarded. Most became scapegoats for the total failure of the university to cope with disruption. The exodus of distinguished presidents was unprecedented in the history of American universities. From Berkeley to Harvard, from Chicago to Stanford, the presidential offices were emptied and all efforts were made to find new men versed in crisis management. Often they stayed less than two years, as at Indiana, Columbia, and Stanford; those that lasted kept a low profile. There was no conventional wisdom for the traditional presidents to fall back on. One week one president was fired for calling the police and another was fired for not calling the police.

As one who lived through that whole period, I would like to assure one and all that it was a most unpleasant experience. Everything became unhinged at once. Support was nowhere. The unheard of and unprecedented happened daily. Nothing seemed right and everything wrong. Moreover, almost nothing one tried worked, and one had the feeling in the pit of one's stomach of being perpetually the small boy with his finger in the dike, holding back the flood, precariously. The great university virtues of civility and rationality were replaced overnight by boorishness and unthinking emotion. In the name of putative student rights, the rights of real students were flaunted by nonstudents. Into the peaceful atmosphere of universities, violence and even killing entered. Overnight universities passed from one of the most respected of American institutions to an institution in which few had any faith at all. Violence became the order of the day and had to be encountered and instantly managed by presidents who were essentially peaceful people, dedicated to quiet learning in halcyon ivy-walled institutions. The ivy soon came down, and graffiti took its place.

During this period I wrote to the students of Notre Dame a letter which, while recognizing the causes that excited them, counseled reason, civility, respect for the rights of others, and the futility of shaking an already shaken society. Somehow, certainly not by my doing, the letter was published nationwide. But unfortunately the press covered only the middle pages which said that any student given to the violent denial of the rights of other students would have fifteen minutes to meditate and repent before being dismissed. The press completely missed the earlier pages justifying the right to dissent and also the later pages warning students that unwarranted violence and incivility always bring a rebirth of fascism.

The students of Notre Dame had read the letter better than the general public and asked to meet with me. They realized the necessity of rationality, civility, and respect for the rights of others. They told me that they all agreed on one key suggestion: that our academic program provide for a seminar in nonviolence as the best approach to the vindication of human rights and peace. They all agreed to this—from the YAF to the SDS, which then represented the extremities of the student spectrum on our campus. I was delighted with their suggestion and told them they should enlist the aid of the faculty in formulating a new academic

program on nonviolence, while I would try to find financial support for the new program.

Within a year, over two thousand students had voluntarily taken a course in nonviolence and adopted nonviolence as a life-style. When the great Cambodian invasion week came in May, about a year and a half later, Notre Dame was spared the burnings and the destruction that took place at other academic institutions. The students deserve full credit for this. They insisted that one did not protest violence in Vietnam by practicing violence in Indiana.

One must ask in retrospect whether anything really happened during these days to change the course of the university for the better. Are there any palpable fruits of the student revolution? Obviously, I believe that the introduction of an academic experience in nonviolence in the midst of revolution was a positive gain. But were there other gains? Were there real losses? No easy answer is possible.

One gain that I can easily defend is the new role of students in university policy-making. In one way, this resulted from faculties and students coming together in time of internal university crisis. In my own university, students are now present on practically all departmental committees, except appointments, promotion, and tenure (although they also have a positive input in these latter decisions). Students are also present by university law on the councils of each college and school. In our highest legislative body, the academic council, students represent slightly more than 10 percent of the voting body, and they have improved our level of discussion and decision in the council.

Apart from the presence of students in academic decision-making bodies and on other university-wide committees, there are few other obvious and permanent results of the student revolution. Most of the black studies programs introduced during the student revolution are either dead or moribund; their number has decreased from five hundred to two hundred. The exception is in universities like my own where black studies became part of a double major that required economics, history, politics, art, music, or something else, as well as black studies, which straddles all of these other disciplines.

Many other movements of the moment, such as constituent assemblies, have mainly proved useless. Students generally were not accepted on boards of trustees, and I agree with this decision since students tend to promote their special interests, whereas trustees must be committed to the common good of the whole university community. Many other arrangements for student participation grew out of this period, and most are dead today. The students themselves are now more interested in receiving a good education and have begun to recognize their own inadequacies.

On the positive side, it should be noted that students generally turned the nation around on the war. When the student revolution began, most adults had unthinkingly gone along with the Vietnam misadventure, since it cost them little personal sacrifice. It was not many years before these students—who were, after all, sons and daughters as well—began to confront their parents with the moral issues to a point where the great majority of adult Americans turned against the war and joined the young in pushing for its early conclusion. This was possibly the first time in the history of the republic when the young educated their elders so convincingly in an essentially moral national concern. On another moral front, that of educational social justice, I would credit student participation in the civil rights movement for some of the progress that was made throughout higher education during the sixties in opening the universities to members of minority groups in significant numbers.

Progress in social justice is always uphill, difficult, often grudging. Student support in this instance helped universities move more quickly in the late sixties, although I discern another slowdown in the seventies.

Adding it all up, one must ask whether so much travail and adrenalin were worth so few results? Perhaps the moral resolution of the war problem was of such great importance in the total evolution of our nation that it would have justified any cost. As mentioned above, greater student participation in the academic life of the university has generally been helpful and useful, for them and for us. Special courses created in the name of relevance have generally not survived, nor has over-involvement of students in university administration. Students did get the vote at eighteen years of age, largely, I believe, as a result of the student revolution, but here, too, one must admit that they have not voted either in greater numbers or in different fashion than their parents.

There is another area that I believe represents a step backward for the university as a residential community. In the name of scrapping the age-old attitude of *in loco parentis*, most universities not only gave up all and every measure of adult supervision of student mores, but also gave students the impression that they do not care how students live, what their real values are as regards drugs, sexual activity, drinking, and the disciplined life in general. Peer pressure by a few made the bohemian life in student residence halls the absolute norm for all, whether they wanted it or not. Younger students, especially some girls, who wanted and needed the support of a few regulations, found themselves facing, without any help or support, problems that were difficult to handle. One should be able to eliminate petty *in loco parentis* discipline without abandoning *in loco parentis* caring for students and their inner-life values. This is not easy. It does require dedication, imagination, skill, and patience on the part of nonacademic educators in the whole area of student life, but it can and is being done in some quarters. One would hope that student anomie or moral rootlessness will not be another permanent result of the student revolution.

The worst results of the happenings of the sixties were the crisis of confidence and loss of nerve they produced in the universities, coupled with a growing disdain and even contempt for universities on the part of those who had loved them most: parents, alumni, benefactors, legislators, students, too. Maybe it was a case of *corruptio optimi pessima*, or falling hardest from the highest position, and too much had been expected of universities. In any event, a university could take no pleasure or satisfaction in going from the most loved to the least loved overnight. But after much soul-searching within the university community, it appears that the university is not so fragile as many had believed when they saw it in turmoil and, apparently, helpless. Too many good and dedicated people account for the greatness of the university. While they can all be badly bruised and shaken, as they were, they are essentially a strong and resilient group. They did emerge, chastened somewhat, certainly wiser, but, I believe, on balance, stronger and better still. There is much more emphasis on good teaching by the faculty in the university today, less gadding about and appearing to solve all the problems of the world.

Moreover, financial support is hardly so lavish as it was in the two decades following World War II, and universities today are looking to their own best priorities rather than to unbridled growth in all directions at once. Values are being discussed again. The real purposes of the university, what it can and cannot do, what it can and should do best—these questions are again central, as they should be.

While the sixties were difficult for everyone in the university, they were not in

vain. One should not exaggerate either the good or the bad results of the student revolution, but on some presently quiet evenings—when the library fills up as students study and seek security for the future and are not greatly concerned, as they once were, about festering world problems—one might ask whether it would not be helpful to have a touch of continuing revolution in the educational process. We have learned that universities can certainly be too noisy. But they can also be too quiet.

VIVIAN W. HENDERSON

Blacks and Change in Higher Education

IN MANY RESPECTS, crises are like apple pie to Americans. We thrive on them. During the last quarter of the century, many programs and policies came into being directly in response to various crises—some natural and others contrived: the energy crisis; the urban crisis; the racial crisis; the crisis of confidence in our national government; the financial crisis in higher education, and so on. The crisis involving campus radicalism in higher education that permeated the 1960s was part of a continuing pursuit of change in the nation as well as the result of what various crises had produced as gains in other parts of the society. My purpose here is to provide a partial analysis of what black involvement in campus radicalism has meant for higher education.

That radical approaches to campus affairs would come to higher education was inevitable. The nation had undergone significant alteration in its demographic structure. Not only had there been a large-scale urbanization of the population and a development of a city mentality in large parts of the population, the society's age structure had also changed markedly. More youth were on hand, and they were full of anxiety regarding their roles in the society, its politics, its economy, its education, and its institutions.

But more important than these demographic changes were the kinds of movements that employed direct-action techniques. Confrontation strategies had worked well in the civil rights movement, and one of the lessons learned was that institutional change can be effected through creative conflict or crisis. White college students who came South to work in the civil rights movement realized that they themselves were not full participants in the affairs of the campuses from which they came. They discovered that they were the "niggers in higher education." Students for a Democratic Society, the Berkeley Movement, and the Free Speech Movement, among others, followed the direct-action techniques that had been successfully applied by black college students in revolutionizing patterns of race relations in the South. Even the Vietnam war protests were patterned after the direct-action approaches employed in the civil rights movement.

It is not difficult to understand at least partially why crisis and revolt, after having manifested themselves as instruments of social change in the larger society, would reach the campuses of higher education. Colleges and universities have always been among the most rigid and tradition-bound of our institutions. They have been places where ideas for change have been developed and promulgated and only occasionally thrust into action. Indeed, college and university pronouncements have often espoused the campus as the seed-bed for ideas and change. More often than not, these pronouncements have neither been read nor believed by trustees, administrators, faculty, or students. With its rigidity and conventional wisdom, the campus was a natural place for students and faculty to turn in the pursuit of institutional change.

Radicalism on campus was not of one mold. Some of the issues overlapped, but differences abounded. For example, black students on black college campuses pursued objectives substantially different from those of black students on white campuses. Black studies were never an overriding issue on black college campuses for the simple reason that courses and instruction relating to the black experience had been part of their curriculum, philosophy, and extracurricular activities for many years. Carl Holman, now president of the National Urban Coalition, taught courses on black literature at Clark College twenty-five years before black studies became a national issue. Moreover, black colleges, by the very nature of their locations, constituencies, alumni involvement in community affairs, and institutional services to blacks, were inescapably involved with black communities. White campuses, on the other hand, treated anything pertaining to blacks solely as subjects for doctoral theses. At a few places, such as the University of Chicago and the University of Iowa, a Robert Park or an E. B. Reuter would emerge; but, by and large, white campuses ignored the black experience in their curricula and instruction. Park and Reuter both ended their careers at Fisk University, where systematic inquiry into race problems was carried out at a very high level.

At the same time, black students on the campuses of black and white schools were uniform in their demand for "relevance" in higher education, and this demand produced new concerns and recognition regarding new kinds of services to blacks. Black colleges, as a set of institutions which did not enjoy the comparative advantages in education that most white colleges enjoyed, provided an institutional framework different from that of white campuses, and students on black campuses therefore found different issues and sought different kinds of response. On black campuses, they sought new curriculum options in relation to changes in the opportunity structures for blacks. They had to be concerned with the politics of the South and the extension of black colleges to serve better the black ghettos. They were concerned with city, county, and state governments, the administration of affairs in those institutions, and how communities and governments could be made more effective in seeking and delivering services and benefits. Blacks on white campuses were concerned with these matters; but the traditional black colleges, with their far greater concentration of black students and a history of sensitivity to black experiences, provided a different framework for radicalism than did the white campuses.

Blacks, regardless of where they receive their education, encounter one persistent "problem." They are black, and they must survive in the two worlds best described by W. E. B. DuBois: "One feels his twoness, an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder."¹ Paul Wisdom and Kenneth Shaw, applying the DuBois thought to the white college campus, pointed out:

The problem is that only when they arrive on campus and realize how totally white it is [do] black students become reformers or revolutionaries. The problem is that black students found whites with control over every element of the university to the total exclusion of blacks; the blacks had nothing of their own. The inequity of the system, paired with the irrelevancy to them of the education it offers, sows the seeds of reform or revolution. The result of this combination—the white establishment, the white curriculum, the white social environment, the white cultural standards, plus the discovery of hostility, apathy, misunderstanding, and experience in the other world in which they find themselves—is dissatisfaction, bitterness, and the determination to change the system.²

This pressure, best articulated by DuBois, has always been upon black people, regardless of their station in life. Every strategy, objective, goal, and philosophy had to consider this "twoness" in trying to make it in the white man's world or in attempting to rationalize realities associated with needs in and among black people in their communities. This "twoness" had to have a prominent place in the minds of black radicals. No doubt it had much to do with the goal of "institution and nation building" espoused by some and the question of racial separatism as a strategy and goal vis-à-vis racial integration.

Black students on white campuses usually focused their objectives and demands on the elimination of institutional racism, the recruitment of more black students and black faculty, the need for black studies programs, and separate facilities for living, and cultural and social affairs. Perhaps the most critical issue on the black college campus was the kind of institution the college would be—a black college serving only the needs of black people and preparing blacks for service to blacks and the black community only; or a black college open to all races, but with the clear purpose of meeting the needs of blacks in a racially integrated society.

The radical black separatists would have the black colleges serve as a training ground for building a separatist society. In their view, the black colleges should have all-black students, all-black faculties, and all-black trustees, and use all "black money." Racial separatists, in other words, would have the black college serve as an enclave training cadres for the implementation of a philosophy of social, political, and economic development and the launching of an all-black society.

Responses to black radicalism on campuses were as varied as the demands and for rather clear reasons. Institutions did not know what to do, and they responded with a great degree of frustration. Some demands were met; others were tried. At Clark College, we did not view student actions or radicalism as a threat to authority, but as legitimate demands from a new generation for a new day.

When trustees around the country were being locked up and administrators barricaded behind student walls, Clark placed students on the board of trustees and on policy-making committees of the college with the clear understanding that these were not short-term responses to the national campus crisis, but ideas whose time had come. Clark opted for redefinition of the curriculum to meet new opportunities for youth, particularly black youth. Public policy studies had been initiated with a grant from the Field Foundation. When student pressure built, we moved to strengthen the focus on urban and rural problems in our academic program. In cooperation with the Voter Education Project, Talladega, Miles, Southern University, and Clark established instructional and technical assistance centers for black elected officials. Students and professors became more systematically involved in the voting, political, and policy processes and in providing technical assistance to public officials. Steps were taken to involve students in policy-making concerned with curriculum, instruction, and campus affairs; but we did *not* accede to pressing demands for adoption of principles that would have made Clark a racially separatist institution.

Administrative responses to demands by black students on white campuses, on the other hand, were somewhat frantic, and crisis management prevailed. When black students took over the student union building at Cornell, for example, they put demands to the administration for separate cultural and social facilities and black dormitories as well as an autonomous black studies department. The ad-

ministration agreed to fulfill the demands after it was reported that persons intending to oust the black students had armed themselves, and in response to this, the black students inside Willard Straight Hall armed themselves. The black students were presented in the media leaving the building with rifles and other arms. The agreement was later rescinded by the faculty. White students then joined together to support the black student demands, and the faculty reversed itself.

At Antioch, when the administration yielded to demands for separate dormitories and facilities, Dr. Kenneth Clark resigned from the board of trustees. Other schools set up Afro-American studies programs with a high degree of racial separatism built into them since they were designed to serve black students and to be staffed totally by black faculty members. Most schools set about to recruit more black students as well as faculty and administrative officers. Special funds were sought and set aside to provide financial aid to black students, and special programs were established to meet the needs of the so-called disadvantaged black student. Many of these programs straight-jacketed blacks in curriculum tracts with low comparative advantage. Once the pressure was off, funds were withdrawn in many instances. One result is that enrollment of black freshman students declined from a high of about 13 percent of all freshmen in 1972, to about 9 percent in September, 1973.

When one attempts to judge the impact of the demands by black students and their effectiveness in bringing about change in higher education, one must conclude that most of the accomplishments by black students were short-lived. Decisions involving separate dormitories and facilities and support for racially separate socio-cultural, curriculum, and instruction arrangements have been largely reversed. All-black dormitories at Antioch are no longer offered; the Ujamaa Residential College at Cornell, an almost exclusively black dormitory, is under attack by the board of regents for violating its ban on segregated facilities. Cornell says that the dormitory is not organized by race, and that the overwhelming proportion, six out of seven, of the black students at Cornell live in integrated settings elsewhere on campus. The demand by black students for separate facilities has largely diminished at Cornell. This decline is attributed, in part, to the larger and more diverse character of the black student body.

What is more difficult to assess is the damage that resulted from black student radicalism on the campuses. Older faculty members often express the view that higher education will never be the same; that the damage will be felt for some time. They also argue that frills and gadgetry have replaced content and substance. Some faculty members feel that their authority in campus affairs has been diluted and, indeed, that their power has been significantly weakened. Administrators feel the impact of the redistribution of power to students and younger faculty. Black colleges are concerned with programmatic questions regarding racial integration and restoring a climate and mood that encourage the black colleges to be truly multiracial in all aspects of their character. Then, finally, there is the question of how permanent is the politicization of higher education.

If there has not been reform of higher education, at least some affirmative results have derived from the short-lived period of black campus radicalism. Affirmative results can be acknowledged without condoning the violence, loss of life, injury to individuals, and destruction of property. There is sufficient evidence that governance structures are more democratic and representative in terms of minority participation and involvement of students and faculty. Likewise, decision-making in campus administration and policy development is more inclusive of students.

Blacks, while still grossly underrepresented on faculties of white institutions, are more visible than they were before the pressure of protests. Unfortunately, only a few hold regular appointments, and even fewer are in tenured positions. Disproportionate numbers are in special programs and projects and serve in adjunct capacities, including appointments in black studies. Black protests resulted in more black students being admitted to white institutions. There is a larger presence of blacks on white campuses. Here again, however, too many are in special projects, and there is no evidence that significant proportions are completing the undergraduate degree.

Most significantly, perhaps, protests by black students put curriculum, instruction, research, and public service regarding blacks at a new level in the academic community. I do not argue here the question of quantity or quality. Nor do I question observations that black studies are on the wane and are of less concern to black students at this time. I only make the observation that studies about blacks in America and in the world appear to have won a foot in the door as a respectable area for instruction, research, and public service. The historic problems of race relations in America have not received the remotest kind of systematic treatment at the vast majority of colleges and universities. Fisk University, Howard University, and Atlanta University were among the few places where instruction and research on blacks and race relations took place. A tremendous void existed, and the black radicals moved to nudge American higher education to fill that void.

While black studies as originally developed have been on the decline, there has evolved a sense of legitimacy about Afro-American studies, particularly where programs are built around the traditional and respected disciplines. Black studies as conceived in the beginning of black radicalism did not have much chance for success. They were founded on weak premises. Black students had the gall to formulate the programs and administrators had the even greater gall not only to let them do it, but also to let them select and appoint personnel to teach the courses. Moreover, the students often developed the programs with the objective of easing blacks through higher education and of preparing them solely for service in the black community. They promulgated black studies as a curriculum only for blacks, to be taught by blacks, and for the purpose of building black pride and identity. But black studies alone could not prepare blacks to fulfill their rights and responsibilities in the total society nor for major contributions to the black community.

To be of optimum value, black studies had to reach white people. After all, whites made the race problem and have done a good job of nurturing and perpetuating it. They also provide the major impediments to racial understanding. Failure of white institutions to teach and educate about blacks and race relations is one of the major voids in American higher education. White folks need black studies as much as, or more than, black folks. Afro-American studies are emerging as a more viable approach to the stimulating study of the black experience. While blacks may bring certain perspectives and instincts to bear upon Afro-American studies as students, teachers, and researchers, there is also the understanding that perspectives and instincts of whites are important.

Graduates of black colleges and universities historically oriented themselves toward black ghettos and the black community for the simple reason that society would not allow too many blacks to deploy their talents outside the black community. Certainly this was the case with blacks who achieved professional and white-collar status. Black physicians, teachers, dentists, preachers, and businessmen overwhelmingly served black communities and clienteles. Strangely, black youths in

the campus radical movement failed to recognize this fact. In their call for service to the black community, they acted as though this orientation was a new thing. On the other hand, with desegregation in the society and the prospect for a significant "brain drain" from the black community, one must acknowledge that the call for a renewal of commitment of blacks to serve blacks embodied a useful purpose.

Black colleges successfully resisted demands by blacks to eliminate white students, faculty, and trustees from their institutions. Black colleges also refused to become enclaves, havens, and teaching bases espousing black separatism and black nationalism. The Atlanta University Center (Atlanta University, Clark, Morehouse, Morris Brown, Spelman, and the Interdenominational Theological Center) turned away from a prospective relationship with the Institute of the Black World because of the failure of the IBW to delineate clearly a nonviolent, nonracist philosophy and format.

When the IBW was first presented, we saw a real opportunity to launch and develop a first-class research center oriented toward the black experience. It was a natural for the Atlanta institutions. History, as far back as the days of W. E. B. DuBois at Atlanta University, was on our side. We are located in a major educational center and have the critical mass of black students and professors. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change was being implemented, of which the IBW was to be a component. Documentation of many aspects of the civil rights movement was not, and still is not, being systematically developed in a southern university and very little was being done elsewhere except for law reports and legal documentaries.

Officials in the Atlanta University Center institutions were disturbed because the IBW, as it appeared to be developing, espoused a view and orientation distinctly opposite to what the institutions had stood for throughout their history—racial desegregation of the society as a key approach to achieving full opportunity for black people. Racial separatism as a goal, philosophy, and strategy was not acceptable to the institutions. It also appeared that violence as a means of achieving social change was not foreign to what some persons identified with the institute believed and were willing to propagate. The posture of the institute regarding black separatism and violence also led to severance of relationships between the Martin Luther King Center and the IBW.

Thus what, in all probability, could have been a good thing—an independent research and policy-oriented institute, with working relationships with a major educational complex as well as the King Center for Nonviolent Social Change—did not materialize insofar as the Atlanta University Center was concerned. There was much pressure from students and some faculty for the Atlanta University Center to tie in with the IBW; and there were forceful, but constructive, exchanges within the Atlanta University Center Council of Presidents. I personally wanted a research institute on the black world and so did my colleagues; but after careful scrutiny, I concluded that the IBW, as it was developing, would not help the Atlanta University Center achieve its objectives. Despite the pressure and demands on the Atlanta University Center institutions as black institutions, they refused, for better or worse, to accede to demands they felt would compromise their integrity.

Our hope in the Atlanta University Center today is that a relationship with the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change will develop and provide a base for meaningful inquiry into problems of social change, especially as they involve poor people, blacks, and other minorities.

The movement of campus radicalism was short-lived and failed to develop into a genuine youth movement. Yet it reached a high point of visibility and appeared destined for longer life. Why did it disappear? Its abortive nature resulted, in part, because of wide variations in the character of its operation, demands, and objectives. It was difficult to establish long-range goals and strategems. Most goals were limited in scope and direction; strategems were projected and oriented toward short-term aims. The chief strategy was confrontation politics directed toward rather specific and particular objectives at particular places and at particular times. Campus radicalism was oriented toward winning battles, but not the war.

Secondly, administrators of colleges and universities were relatively quick to adjust to campus radicalism (at least those who survived). In exchange for time, administrators posed short-term solutions to the problems and issues raised by the radicals. In contrast to the radicals, the administrators were willing to lose one or two battles in order to win the war. Then, too, campus generations come and go within a relatively short period of time, and it is difficult for them to sustain long-term movements. On the other hand, faculty members stay much longer. They know the ways and means of the campus bureaucracy and politics, and are not about to turn over to students certain of their prerogatives, such as hiring and firing professors, or to let students have too much voice in policy-making. Faculties in general did respond affirmatively to some involvement of students, and some faculties did assist students in their confrontations with campus establishments. On the whole, faculties have learned to live with student participation, but that participation tends to be on the faculties' terms.

Some argue that youth softened and got fat with a few short-term successes; others contend that this is a period of student apathy and regressive defeatism. I suspect, however, that students are trading activism for developing themselves and acquiring the tools with which to bring about change "within" the system. On black college campuses, for example, such areas as policy studies, political analysis, economic development, planning, and preparation for law school are high on the interest spectrum. This contention is supported in general by a recent Gallup Poll that found that, although the mood on college campuses is calmer than in the turbulent sixties, many students, about 40 percent, continue to believe that violence is sometimes justified in order to bring about change in the society. The poll also showed that concerns about political morality have replaced concerns about the Vietnam war. According to the poll, college students are much more determined to bring about societal change by being involved in the helping professions, such as teaching and social work, and by working among poor and underprivileged groups. Moreover, for blacks, the opportunity structure within the city and nation and in areas around the campuses has realigned itself to accommodate students and their concerns at levels beyond those that existed during the decade of radicalism. Opportunities in politics, public administration, and the decision-making arenas reveal themselves very early in the minds of the black youth of today. I am impressed with the rather large response of students in the Atlanta University Center to opportunities for service as fellows and interns in city, county, state, and federal governments as well as in public interest agencies and firms that monitor public and private policy and programs.

Perhaps more important than the disappearance of campus radicalism itself is the meaning of that disappearance. I am particularly concerned with its significance for blacks, and I am not alone in this respect among college and university

presidents. While they suffered the pains of radicalism, many administrators, faculties, and trustees found in the short-lived radical movement seeds of benefit for the society. Youth exerting itself is healthy, particularly if the thrust is oriented toward fundamental problems and issues, as were the sit-in demonstrations and aspects of the demands for participatory democracy on campus. The major concern is with violence vis-à-vis nonviolence as an approach to change. Black students and black colleges have special roles to play in nonviolent social change. Again, my colleagues in the black colleges would agree with this assertion. Quite frankly, we want to continue our historic role of providing a base for challenging the status quo in race relations and social behavior.

In other words, the meaning of the disappearance of campus radicalism is still to be discovered, but it would be tragic if the decline in campus radicalism were accompanied by a return to the status quo on campus. At a time when confidence in national leadership has all but disappeared, it is good that higher education has recovered some of the respect and confidence it must have. This, however, should not become a signal for a return to the "good old days," allowing the careers of student generations to become lost in a sea of conventional wisdom.

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ADAM B. ULAM

Where Do We Go from Here?

WHAT HAS BEEN the most important thing about the American university during the past decade? Asked in private and assured that they would not be quoted, most college administrators would paraphrase with a sigh Abbé Sieyès: "It has survived." Public responses will range from confident assertions that the university, now that it has been reconstructed, is ready to tackle its main function of promoting equality and social justice, to the more vague and prudent answers that there are still challenges to be met. Well, perhaps it pays to be prudent about the future of our educational system: one has to keep a wary eye on all conceivable (after 1967-70 few must appear as inconceivable) sources of dissatisfaction—or, as the more sophisticated call it, alienation—among the young. True, those newspapermen and sociologists who carry out surveys of student opinion inform us that apathy has now replaced activism. What remains of the student protest, we are also told, has again become constructive—that is, directed against persons and institutions other than professors or deans or the grading system. And indeed, if one listens to the sounds of campus life, that of a loudspeaker or a police siren has become rather infrequent; the main noise is the clicking of typewriters grinding out those memoranda, minutes, and recommendations of joint faculty-administration-student committees; admonitions by and constructive answers to the circulars of HEW; or the college presidents' pleas for increased federal funding. Committees and conferences have replaced confrontations. The great American cultural revolution *appears* to be a thing of the past. But who knows? Who in 1963 would have thought . . . ?

Yet quite apart from those vague apprehensions, it is fair to say that there is among the vast majority of people connected with our schools, whether students or teachers, a great if puzzled uneasiness about not only what happened but about what is happening now to the American university. A few, proportionately more among the faculty than the students, I suspect, miss or yearn for the excitement and impassioned oratory of the late sixties, for the attention of newspapers and television to their campuses and themselves, and bewail that the flame of idealism which once burned so brightly among young men and women of college age has been replaced by the prosaic aspirations for a job, for a legal or medical career. Still fewer would consider the pre-1964 university as a model of virtue and everything which has been happening since then as an irretrievable catastrophe.

But quite apart from the seekers of excitement and educational bourbons there is among the academic community a widespread if not often articulated feeling that the events of the past decade demonstrated that something was wrong with the university and that that something, far from having disappeared, still bedevils us as we try to go about our business on the now admittedly more tranquil campus.

What is it? Well, the great crisis demonstrated a crucial flaw in the attitude of our society toward our universities and schools in general: a lack of understanding

and of respect for intellectual values. This flaw still persists, and as long as it does, not only our schools are in trouble.

A convincing demonstration of this proposition is found not so much in what *some* students did and thought during the crisis, but in what their elders did and thought about what those students did. It was understandable, if not excusable, that a small proportion of young men, out of a mixture of revulsion, fear, and guilt over Vietnam, should have been pushed into violent actions and that a more sizable number of students, whether out of sympathy for those feelings or because of boredom and bewilderment (again alienation!), should have viewed "activism" as proper under the circumstances. But how can one account for the attitude of educated Americans, beginning with college administrators, faculties, and boards of trustees, toward this assault upon higher education? True, most, condemned violence, some called for sanctions and expulsions. But after the initial shock, there was in the case of practically every campus a weary acknowledgment that the assault had been prompted by idealism of the young and hence had to be combated by a complex strategy of appeasement: assurances that "we" shared "their" moral and political indignation; the abolition of all rules on students' deportment, sometimes of the grading system; coeducational housing; the firing of old and the hiring of new administrators (in much greater numbers; most revolutions result in a proliferation of bureaucracies); promises that the university in its curriculum would probe much more diligently than before into iniquitous aspects of the American social and economic system, and so forth. To be sure, some of those steps might have been overdue or might have had considerable merit on their own. But they were adopted—let us be honest about it—out of fear, often in a mood of panic rather than after a rational discussion of pros and cons. True, the main source of this intimidation was not physical fear but something which for the intellectual fiber of a democracy is almost equally harmful: moral and intellectual confusion. Had the American university *before* 1964 done its work properly—instilled those values and that respect of which we spoke—the reaction to the crisis of most educated Americans, whether anarchists or conservatives in their politics, would have been uniform: a reassertion of the university's true function and a message to those concerned that it is not only outrageous but ridiculous to transform it into a theater of existentialist drama. Such a message, I believe, would have been more effective in stilling the disorders than all expulsions and other sanctions or those stratagems to which the beleaguered university then had to resort. And, of course, I am begging the question; had the proper attitude toward the university's purpose existed within the intellectual, indeed academic community, in the first place, most of the troubles would not have occurred.

Isn't this argument elitist and unrealistic, in view of what has been happening in the world lately? Can you neatly isolate the campus from the traumas of society? Isn't student, youth unrest a worldwide phenomenon ranging from Germany to Thailand?

Well, as to elitism, the argument really cuts the other way. Strong political feelings are presumably found not only among students and professors; they affect also such variegated groups as doctors, nurses, workers, farmers. Yet, few among those, including even radicals, would think of demonstrating their political dissent or alienation by seizing or harassing hospitals, factories, or farms. The great mass of the American people evidently believes that the proper place for politics is politics, and even those who have political passions which call for a more dramatic outlet express

them by demonstrating in public parks or streets rather than by giving vent to their emotions through interfering with the operations of institutions which perform important work. And here precisely is the rub: in the mind of those who participated in that educational St. Vitus dance or who sought an excuse or rationalization for it, the American university, or rather what happens in its classrooms, libraries, and laboratories, was evidently not very important.

A worldwide phenomenon? This, I suspect, has been the main cliché which intimidates the great mass of the middle-aged middle class into a despairing acquiescence in student troubles at any level and for whatever cause, convinced that they are like rising taxes and the increasing flood of pornography, something which you cannot do anything about and which, after you read the right kind of book or watch an appropriate TV program, begin to have some logic to them or at least some redeeming social value. But we have had a world- or nationwide "third consciousness" or, as it used to be called, "wave of the future" before. Certainly in the thirties a lot of European students, and not only in Germany or Italy, sympathized with fascism. In the fifties Senator McCarthy persuaded a lot of Americans (yes, some young people, too—at least I do not recall many *students'* protests against him) that the Eastern Establishment, whether governmental or educational, was crawling with Communists. And yet despite all that impressive evidence that fascism and then McCarthyism had been ordained by the grim forces of history, many people persisted in thinking of them as not only immoral but silly. Perhaps, though we did not have a firmer attachment to intellectual values than now, the educated American then had more of a sense of the preposterous.

This brings us to the present. The college dean or professor, who, after clearing his throat, begins his talk to the alumni with the now almost liturgical on such occasions "We may or may not approve our students' life-style," epitomizes one side of the present trouble. In the first place, why don't we say whether we do or not, instead of leaving the college generation with a dark suspicion that indeed we don't, but are afraid to say so? It is far from unimportant that *esthetically* so many outward aspects of our campus life should be in a mess. In itself the length of one's hair, the state of one's dress or undress are very properly a matter for individual taste. But it is disturbing that the young person who, while in college, scorns a coat and tie, or a skirt, as the uniform of the middle class will as often as not don them for a job interview or for other appearances in the real world. That grossness which pervades so many aspects of today's campus life is as much a testimony to the low esteem for what the university is supposed to represent as was the exaggerated stress on the social amenities of clubs, fraternities, and sororities, as well as athletics, in the colleges of the twenties. Now as then college is considered by some a place to which one goes because it helps in the job market (and it does not matter that his job market is now defined in terms of professional training or working for some governmental agency rather than of business as before) and not because it is expected to provide the individual with skills and hence pleasures which will endure a lifetime. To be sure, many students now as then do become ensnared in the enjoyment of learning. But many more could be so if the prevailing ethos—what they read in their own and national press, hear from university officials, political leaders, and so forth—did not present the enjoyment of learning for its own sake as anachronistic if, indeed, not antisocial.

This attrition in the national sense of values has had some very concrete and disturbing results. The university has become less free and tends to become, quite

apart from the effects of the current recession and inflation, poorer. Less free because administrators and teachers, whether collectively or individually, have to work under constraints which interfere with rational decisions or sound educational practices. It is not so much what the students want that has become the determining criterion for many policies, but, as a wary administrator knows, what *some* students, the critical mass being at times smaller than one percent of the total, might *do* or even shout if you displease them or fail to meet their demands. Thus our educational institutions still are, and presumably will be for a long time to come, burdened with programs and practices which in no sense are or even were desired by the majority of students or faculty, but were or still are being exacted by a tiny but vocal or threatening minority within the campus.

What is incorrectly described as politicization of the campus (had the impulses of those students and teachers who were "activists" been truly political, they would have found their expression in politics and not in the metapolitics of university confrontations) has undoubtedly had and will continue to have deleterious material consequences. Relevance and restructuring, those two long-term strategies adopted by the university as the most cunning ways of appeasing "the students'" wrath, have been extremely costly. To demonstrate its claim that it is a bastion of virtue within the generally sinful society, the university has felt constrained to perform a number of functions which until fifteen or ten years ago nobody, conservative or radical, would have thought were in its proper province. It is undoubtedly most desirable that there be more housing for lower and middle-income groups, but if it is an educational institution which is called upon to provide it, the net result, one suspects, will be less money for scholarships for the underprivileged and a rise in tuition which will put private college education out of the reach of middle-income families. One would be surprised to hear of a single American college where the proportion of revenue spent on administration has not increased much more rapidly within the last ten years than that expended on salaries, libraries, and laboratories. One may readily grant that if one sets up a new university today it should be coeducational, with equal admissions, and so forth. But the frantic rush to join together what the founders of all-male and all-female colleges had decreed, undoubtedly out of bias and prejudice, should be separate, certainly hurts finances and hence the educational quality of those would-be hermaphroditic institutions. Thus it is a mistake to blame the fall in the real income of professors or the rise in tuition, which in the last fifteen years has been climbing much more rapidly than could be justified by inflation, entirely or even mainly on economic factors over which we have no control. The student's education has become more expensive and the teacher's real income has been falling largely because the university is bent upon appeasing those two shapeless but gluttonous monsters, "relevance" and "restructuring."

In the true meaning of the term, all *good* education is relevant because it imparts to the student new skills and information, furthers his intellectual and hence spiritual and civic growth. In that sense, a course on Greek literature may be more relevant than one on international affairs or racial problems where the class is given nothing but what it already could glean from newspapers, magazines, and a few books. But the harm done through an incorrect interpretation of what is educationally relevant is not only limited to the undue proliferation of this kind of course or program, often with a platitudinous and intellectually unexciting content. What has been even more debilitating has been the assumption that it is in

classrooms and seminars that *solutions* are to be sought and devised to our most pressing social and economic problems. No one has given the American university the mandate to lay down the law for American society or to prescribe which national policies are moral and which are not. As experts, scholars can and ought to contribute their technical expertise to the national debate; as citizens they may and perhaps should pronounce political and moral judgments; but does one have to spell out how often this distinction has not been observed? And if there is a powerful current of opinion trying to persuade students that it is immoral to become absorbed, say, in Spanish literature rather than to exude idealism and to reform an iniquitous society, is it surprising that many of them are seized by boredom, which they call alienation? (No, Hitler did not come to power because most German professors strove to keep their universities apolitical; he came to power primarily because a lot of Germans of all ages voted for him.)

To many, this assessment of today's college scene will appear bleakly pessimistic and hence un-American. Yet, it is not so in fact. Much public thinking and writing on the subject projects cosmic despair or rather that peculiarly Manichaeian attitude on the relationship of the university to society. Foundations or governmental commissions and "in depth" newspaper or television studies tell us that the university is growing ever more democratic, more relevant, more capable of dealing with social injustice; in fact, all it needs is more taxpayers' money. But those reports and surveys immediately add—the triumphant restructuring of higher education is being outpaced by the growing insolubility of social problems: pollution, overpopulation, inflation will surely get us even if a nuclear holocaust doesn't.

What is suggested here is a more hopeful view. If, instead of being expected to be the producer of relevance and cosmic gloom, the American university functions as the producer of knowledge and enjoyment, then it will be capable of training people who would have the intellectual skills and moral resources to cope with the most difficult social problems. How can this come about? I think in dealing with problems of higher education we must apply two criteria. One is democracy: it will not be challenged. I hope that the great majority of students and professors want simply to be allowed to go about their business: the students to learn, professors to teach and study. (And wasn't this true even at the height of the crisis, even in the most beleaguered university?)

The other is common sense. The American university will have to continue to struggle as it always has with the forces of ignorance and philistinism that would deflect it from its proper function and make it subordinate to some particular political philosophy, religious creed, or notion of civic virtue. The struggle against these forces was so ineffective during the past decade because the means of defense have been sought in distracting or appeasing pressures of all kinds rather than through restating the only proposition which is both honest and convincing to the great majority within and outside the academic community: the university exists for things of the mind, and nothing must interfere with this purpose. A simplistic conclusion, but what George Orwell wrote in 1939 is even more true today: "We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men."

DAVID E. APTER

An Epitaph for Two Revolutions That Failed

I

PERHAPS THE DESIRE to universalize personal predicaments is caused by the burden of guilty knowledge we each carry around with us. To hold it inside is unsupportable. Therapy deals precisely with this unloading of the personal and its transformation from the private or unique into an acceptable commonality. We all do this to one extent or another, and for the most part quietly, even unthinkingly. However, there are always some individuals who, for one reason or another, need to convert the process of universalization into a grand principle and to translate intimate burdens into obligations that others must fulfill. Freedom for such individuals establishes a condition appropriate to the submission of followers, a political condition. The more elevated the principle, the more passionate the ideal, or explicit the standard, the more punitive the consequences are likely to be. Such a condition requires us to be suspicious no matter how interesting or intrinsically important the ideas or convincing the individual who manipulates issues with such transfiguring propensities. Where suspicion is lacking, any foolishness is possible since any act can be made to self-serve when cast in the form of high principle.

Historical moments arise when exceptional men overcome prevailing suspicion by virtue of their qualities of mind or character, as well as of a certain shrewdness about what needs to be done, and hitch the wagon of a capable intelligence to the star of a transforming passion. Despite their obvious dangers such moments are interesting because they open up possibilities for change and reform that hitherto seemed impossible. When personal passion is translated into social action, then the private act can help satisfy the general need and, even more important, stimulate a sensible review. A nice example of this mixture, the private converted to the public, the personal into something more general (and the effects of guilty knowledge upon the ideals), is portrayed by Martin Malia in his book on Herzen. Herzen, very much under the spell of Hegel, is deeply concerned with how best to liberate the human spirit. His thoughts are interrupted by the illness of his wife, Natalie, a trusting creature, tortured by problems of purity and love. Herzen, although preoccupied with the need for honesty in marriage, sleeps with his wife's chambermaid. For Herzen this could hardly remain a simple indiscretion. How to unite guilt with honesty? He wrote in his diary, "I was carried away, could not stop myself—and afterwards cried out my repentance. But, in repentance itself is something which defends me in my own eyes. Is it not only those who lack strong passions who hold back? And, why was my passion full of rapture, of frenzied *bien-être*, which, when I think of it I cannot curse? A rigoristic morality cannot give me absolution, and indeed I am far from giving it to myself, but a humane judgement must be silent, show forbearance, rehabilitate. In this is the great mission of our century."¹

Quite a jump! This wrestling with personal guilt is somehow connected with the mission of the century. Such jumps come quite easily to some. When the persons

who do this are like Herzen, we are all indebted. Unfortunately, the need to fashion public moral imperatives out of private trivia is for the most part shallow, pretentious, and stupid. For the rest of us to be victimized by it is absurd or dangerous. The last decade is a good testimonial. There were plenty of individuals prepared to confide their private infidelities to the multitudes in the form of a reforming need. Notably missing were the men of Herzen's caliber. A vague existential spirit justified new pieties imposed upon society rather than self. Missing was humane judgment, silence, forbearance, rehabilitation. There were many candidates for self-immolation. But such burnt offerings should not be mistaken for the temptations of St. Anthony.

At its best the student movement stood somewhere between Herzen and a corrupting piety. We want to trace out the implications of this harsh judgment because it contains a political argument. In a tough and demanding age, when an accessible ruthlessness is built into all social instruments of the community as never before, private guilt is easily transformed into public anguish as a cheap substitute for a cultural and a political revolution. Moreover, the phenomenon, once begun, is contagious. It spreads like medieval chiliastic movements. Intellectuals, artists and writers, reformers, publicists and journalists abdicate their suspicions and are eager to jump in. There is a need to become transformed, to achieve a moment of popular glory. This is what occurred during the course of the last decade. In retrospect it is embarrassing.

The main points we want to stress are these. First, the issues were real and important enough. About this there is little debate. If anything, there were too many issues which succeeded one another in rapid-fire succession. Yet, many of these were built into the character of modern life in a way not remedial by public action. Second, the reactions to these various issues were themselves too diverse for any meaningful "revolution." Third, those who proclaimed themselves revolutionaries were primarily of two opposing types, political and cultural revolutionaries whose objectives were different. Finally, we will argue that anxiety and *Angst* are built into university life as a prototype of an evolving universe which cannot be exorcised. The revolutionaries, therefore, reached out for the wrong targets. Indeed, solutions to modern life will necessarily be resolved only by a better intelligence, a more sophisticated learning. To attack the universities (or knowledge) as the cause of the problem eliminates the possibility of a solution.

What occurred was not a genuine revolutionary effort in the sense of a planned, disciplined, organized assault on power. There was no dearth of revolutionaries who wanted to do that, but they did not get very far. Instead, a general disgruntlement with the way in which societies have composed themselves stimulated multiple assaults, vague in purpose. They were directed less against regimes or even men, than against the entire ensemble of roles which organize and predispose individuals to act in accordance with prevailing rules and opportunities. A contagion of reforming zeal, harsh public life, and intensified individual anguish induced random attacks on the particulars of society, as well as on the greater chain of its organization. For some the object was political. The goal was a more universal equity, for blacks, for the poor, for the third world, for the marginals in society.² Others, expressing a vaguer disaffection, wanted to alter the values we live by. Confrontation, indeed almost any action or event, was the means. Most vulnerable to attack were the accepted parts of modern life such as the place of knowledge and education, the significance of work, and the character of organizational discipline. All the givens were to be taken away. This, a

cultural revolution more than a political one, was anarchic. To muddle up the rationality of the organized world was to randomize it.

The political revolutionaries and the cultural revolutionaries could at best be uneasy partners. But there were plenty of opportunities for marriages of convenience. The political revolutionaries were rationalistic and ideological where the cultural revolutionaries were antirationalistic and expressive, and representatives of both were available in great quantities on modern university campuses. These differences could be composed when the university exploded on the common battlefield. And why the university? The reason is simple enough. The modern university is perhaps the most sensitive and critical instrumentality of contemporary life. It has power based on a near monopoly of new knowledge or, more accurately, knowledge creation. The fruits of its investigations, transformed into technological means, from weapons to outer space, are vital to governments. And, more generally speaking, the university controls opportunity. Education, no longer a series of phased adjustments rotating according to a childhood-to-adulthood cycle of maturation, is engaged in an ever extending process of matching ability based on knowledge with potential working roles. A hierarchy or ensemble of these derives from the functional requirements of technological society.

To randomize such roles begins, therefore, with the downgrading of the values of knowledge and its utilities. The political form of such an attack included a redesign of the uses and objects of knowledge to make its works serve some higher moral purposes.

This is by no means to argue that the conflicts and issues themselves were unimportant. Far from it. But these ends served a purpose. The large context of the two revolutions was to break the link between a functional universe based on knowledge, technology, and the appropriate social values, and a society which gives these high priorities. The university was the sensitive connection between these and provided the necessary elites to pursue such ends. As these became suspect so did the universities.

There were, then, two revolutions. One was cultural. Its object was to change the values we live by. The other was political. It was to accomplish a more universal equity. The university was the battlefield. Both revolutions failed and the university has survived, although in a weakened condition. Why was it the appropriate venue for struggle rather than factories? Why were there no general strikes by the working class, or mass revolts in the cities? Why did armies not mutiny or the police refuse to serve? There was the war in Vietnam, painful and symbolic. Why did the universities have such a particular connection to it, more than other institutions? There is no single answer to these questions. The period from 1964 to 1970 witnessed a variety of issues no one of which was most fundamental. Continuously changing in style and meaning, the two revolutions kept turning into each other. What was political at one stage became cultural at another.

II

Within the universities themselves contradictions were intensified by more specific problems of academic life. As universities both expanded and modernized, a relatively fierce competition occurred. The university principle that brilliance is best exaggerated some of the most unsupportable tendencies of modern life, affecting both students and faculties. The more meritocratic the institution, the more conflict,

anxiety, tension, unrest, and guilt. Intellectual work is intrinsically abrasive and wearing. Its practitioners are perpetually vulnerable as they engage in the process of locating the profound and important and transforming it into the obvious and the merely useful. Modern universities value knowledge. They also abhor obsolescence, proclaiming this as a virtue to students. The result establishes the critical quality of anguish in modern society, often expressed in the form of conflict between what should be salvaged or retained as knowledge, or thrown away as rubbish. These private difficulties become transformed into arguments over responsibility versus innovation, balance versus transformation, and encompass all the values and characteristics of society both within the tense limits of the universities and outside in industrial life, especially at the top. More and more in government, business, scientific establishments, the same conditions apply. To explode these conditions is to reject the authority of knowledge. To exorcise what is endemic in university life is to prevent its extension outward to society, a process continuously speeded up and intensified. We are accustomed to the view that the anxieties of modern life invade the ivory tower of the university. In truth, it is the other way around. In the modern university the dynamic and transforming properties of new knowledge make everything problematic in the working world. Obsolescence lurks in every act to control uncertainty. Technique outstrips systematic theory. Theory creates new complexities, a process which now affects all social processes as never before. Hence, the university is a cause of some of the worst problems of modern life. On the one hand its promise lies in the ability of knowledge to make the unmanageable manageable. On the other hand, because of the inherent dangers in this, there is the need to stand back from its implications. Such a universe may be too fearful to contemplate. It is the sudden awareness of this predicament which produced conditions for political and cultural revolutionaries. The cultural revolutionaries preferred to reject the manageable universe and return to the simple life. The political revolutionaries wanted to do the managing.

In short, the university in modern society—and this is true for developing countries as much as industrial ones—is uniquely political and cultural. It is a microcosm of the meritocratic world of innovation and technical application. It establishes relationships of knowledge to power. The consequences are manifested in products, technology, and the determination of social priorities. It caters to roles which fit these requirements. By doing so it controls possibilities, distributes access or the means of access to the roles of society. Meanwhile, as if to back away from its own consequences, the universities are also places of culture. The language of its knowledge is not limited to scientific things, but extends to wider meanings, including style, esthetics, moral purpose. Here it maximizes the contradiction of modern life in the specific context of learning. Knowledge is perception, intuition, a thing in itself, a network of associations, civilities, personalized excitements. Culture is a rejection of the functional meritocracy. But it substitutes for it an even more elite one, more demanding, disciplined, and unattainable by those unwilling to devote themselves to its study. For this reason, rejection of the functional universe by the cultural revolutionaries was extended to culture itself, to its eliteness. The unforeseen result was a lack of fineness, discrimination, and the capacity for judgment that cultural revolutionaries, if they had nothing else to offer, should have been able to provide. The political revolutionaries, wanting to use society for moral ends and apply its rationality for a greater benefit, were corrupted by the requirements of action and fooled by the illusion of possibilities. They believed that power could lead to

projective planning, a higher political intelligence, and more purposeful equity. But they had few solutions that made sense. The cultural revolutionaries were hoist on the petard of a rejecting piety. The attack on knowledge and rationality came to include culture itself. They believed, sometimes mystically, in some generalized urge to creativity. Their naturalism was anti-intellectual, physical, and unstructured.

If the political and the cultural revolutionaries were products of the university, they used it as symbol and object. The political revolutionaries sought to discredit the university as a preface to dominating it. Hence, knowledge that served society was suspect. Basically, the argument was that student virtue, manipulated by second-rate professors, resulted in the exploitation of innocents who, newly enlightened, were to become the big battalions of the revolution. This would stop those establishment professors who added a cynical ignorance to every bit of knowledge they passed on, and for whom the object of university education was mystification, i.e., the destruction of men's capacities clearly to understand their political conditions. Knowledge thus perverted made men subservient, reducing their capacity for action, the reverse of what it trumpeted.

Both cultural and political revolutionaries agreed on this. Their attack was against those connections between self, knowledge, and society hitherto taken for granted. And the situation, as Smelser and others have pointed out, was exacerbated by sheer numbers. New Ph.D.s in the sixties, bred like fruit flies, were particularly vulnerable.

This brings us to the main point of our discussion. The significance of knowledge and its purveyors has taken a quantum jump in the past decades. But universities, as instruments of change, are increasingly controversial. No single standard or appropriate set of rules by which such institutions can be judged prevails. Universities no longer occupy an enclave position in society.

Traditionally, universities have been accorded special exemption because most people, no matter how much they dislike particular institutions or administrators, or academics and their ideas, believe that the accumulation of knowledge, scientific or artistic, critical or exegetical, constitutes a self-legitimizing measure of human progress. Man's self-consciousness and his capacity to act on his own behalf are related to his cultural mastery over nature, the environment, and himself. Indeed, democracy implies rationalism, civility, and a culture which allows man to redeem himself from his various predicaments by exercising his natural intelligence in a trained or cultivated way. To the extent that the university is central to this purpose it is an object of value in society. To the extent that it sits foursquare in the midst of other institutions and claims a special virtue, it is an object of suspicion.

The two revolutions were against such a monopoly of virtue. The cultural revolution, accordingly, tried to redefine moral qualities. That was its essential character. The problem of virtue in its classic sense is a condition achieved through education. The cultural revolutionaries said no to the tradition of human society which, since the Greeks, embodied virtue in representative rule for the benefit of the rest. To upset such rule is not merely to displace an individual ruler or a class but to change the meaning of virtue in society.³

The academic's ideal is the "republic of scholars." But how supportable is that? Inherent in the thinking of Michael Polanyi (and others) are norms of science generalized as knowledge:

Any attempt to define the body of science more closely comes up against the fact that the knowledge comprised by science is not known to any single person. Indeed, nobody knows

more than a tiny fragment of science well enough to judge its validity and value at first hand. For the rest he has to rely on views accepted at second hand on the authority of a community of people accredited as scientists. But, this accrediting depends in its turn on a complex organization. For each member of the community can judge at first hand only a small number of his fellow members, and yet eventually each is accredited by all. What happens is that each recognizes as scientists a number of others by whom he is recognized as such in return, and these relations form chains which transmit these mutual recognitions at second hand throughout the whole community. This is how each member becomes directly or indirectly accredited by all. The system extends into the past. Its members recognize the same set of persons as their masters and derive from this allegiance a common tradition, each of which carries on a particular strand.⁴

But, as de Jouvenal points out, to be a citizen of such a republic, one must work diligently and be selected. It is necessarily restricted. Moreover, the "Republic of Science is not subject to a supreme central authority. But, it is subject to a system of control which is of quite an oligarchic hue. If freedom of opinion is meant to imply the opportunity to express publicly whatever one would like to say, then there is no such freedom in the Republic of Science."⁵ Knowledge implies authority. As knowledge grows, so does authority. As authority legitimizes the recruitment, selection, and allocation of roles related to knowledge, its generation, distribution, and application, so does the republic of science.

The political revolution, in its various forms, challenged all this on grounds of equity. Equity refers to the ordered relations of men, which are in balance when the distributed benefits of society accord with accepted principle. The university controlled access to such distribution. Some political revolutionaries wanted to change principles, i.e., the meaning of equity. Others wanted fairer shares within the prevailing principles. The university was placed in a double jeopardy—as carrier of prevailing ideas of virtue and as instrument of inequality.

The rebellions of the sixties failed politically because their leaders sought too radical a redistribution of opportunities and benefits everywhere. The cultural revolution failed because it devalued precisely the benefits which the political wanted to achieve and provided no powerful substitute. Together in what they were against, they worked against each other in what they were for. Both were fundamentally antibourgeois. Society was bourgeois. The university was bourgeois; it both acted for the bourgeoisie and provided a bourgeoisie. The "bourgeoisie" was a common object of hostility. To be bourgeois was to be instrumentalistic, money-grubbing, opportunistic, manipulative, and, above all, destructive of human values by inequality of gain. To be bourgeois was to be dull, leaden, unthinking, materialistic and brutalized, subversive of man's potentiality, foreshortening, and, above all, totally uncreative. So much for the republic of scholars.

Of course, the rebels themselves were overwhelmingly *of* the bourgeoisie, its sons and daughters. The more political became Maoists, Fidelists, Leninists, Trotskyites, etc. The less political, vague about such doctrines, cared more for drugs, happenings, color, dress, and communes. The so-called hippies cultivated the irrational.

The political and cultural revolution attacked the university as a surrogate for society, i.e., the absurdity and wrongness of its values and principles of equity. It tried to "demystify" knowledge and its authority and reveal its connection to a hegemonic class which, without practicing them, embodied the virtues of the best of society as a cultural value, and used these as a political claim to hierarchy or rule. Both revolutions had as their object the exposure of the bourgeoisie as false to values

proclaimed. They also sought to transform the meaning of the values themselves. What they revealed was the thinness of the alternatives. The political revolution was destroyed by a cultural one which elevated irrationality to the point of denying culture itself. At its most extreme it was pure demotic Dada.

If the attack was well timed, the responses were necessarily confused. The self-evident quality of academic life had been so taken for granted that when it became dubious, not only students but significant numbers of faculty went scurrying for new criteria. And apologetics were mixed with heavy-handedness. Missing was the one real line of defense—threats to creativity and mind, whether from the pious or the philistines, require a raising rather than a lowering of standards. Such a position, rarely articulated, would have been totally unpopular. Instead, the self-criticism of the university in the face of the twin attack, by political revolutionaries and by cultural ones, lent credence to the claims of the detractors. The replies of faculty and administrators were essentially therapeutic rather than principled.

What the sixties teach is how gratuitous we were about knowledge. If expansion is not followed by more demanding standards imposed by faculties themselves, others will do it for them, using financial rather than scholarly criteria.

The revolutionaries' challenge exposed the vulnerability of the institution itself, and the fragility of such self-legitimizing virtues. The place of knowledge may in the abstract be estimable. In the particular it is always an object of hostility. The very group which had the most to gain from the university (and by the same token the greatest obligation to learn and affect society through the exercise of knowledge and judgment) was precisely the group that attacked it. And who saved the universities? It was the "bourgeoisie" and their representatives in state legislatures, boards of trustees and alumni. These became the ultimate defenders. The regents, trustees, governmental officials, ministries of education, and the university bureaucracies, far more than the faculty, were the ones who prevented the political revolutionaries from "taking over," and drove out the proponents of the cultural revolution who wanted to abolish the privileged place of conventional knowledge.

Now the university is vulnerable to its saviors. The revolutionaries failed in their purposes, but succeeded in weakening the university not the society. Appearing together in tandem in the *situs* of culture and power—the university—the common revolutionary objective was the downfall of the old order. But the old order is, if anything, more powerful than ever. For a political movement, endowing all student actions with special meanings, rituals of solidarity, individualized, but standing for a group, a class, establishing the heroic is a good source of nostalgia. The special inscriptions, secret affiliations, the clandestine, and larger ideologies embodying the future, the moments of glory punctuated by martyrdom are now the treasured memories of the new bourgeoisie. Heightened consciousness of that forum of public power to be seized, and of the praxis from which consciousness was to derive, is an education in itself, but an expensive one.

III

In theory, at least, a political revolution should bring about a flowering of high culture, renaissance. Culture, enlisted directly in the service of the revolution itself, expresses these rituals of solidarity in order to unite individualized actions. The heroic is symbolic, surrogate for the mass. Artistic devices are a modern heraldry for a propaedeutic ideology. The art which expresses those ideologies provides an appropriately funereal quality to the

present. The forum for artistic power, then, is an extension of revolutionary praxis. The link is political consciousness.

Such a cultural revolution, in the sense we have described it, could serve a revolution as a creative and romantic event. The trouble is that cultural revolutionaries are expressive, privatizing, individualistic, and experimental. This poses a political problem. To the extent that they randomize the ensemble of roles, positions, hierarchies, and the mobilities these modulate, public or private, they offer only the most simplistic group solutions and prefer highly idiosyncratic ones.

Hence, the cultural revolutionaries impose impossible demands on the political. Together only in opposition, they would prevent any negotiation because each could make commitments not binding upon the other. Each creates opportunities for mischief which the other can exploit. As a basis for a political strategy the two in tandem are a formula for chaos. Society is dependent on the university for new knowledge, the expansion of opportunity, the training of people to take their place in the ensemble of roles in society. If one rejects the roles and, by this rejection, prevailing notions of civility, taste, and virtue, then one also destroys the past as an inheritance. Potentiality is then no longer defined within the prevailing cultural norms of society. Where does it lie? In the hands of half-baked political or cultural revolutionaries who have not the foggiest notion of what they want, aside from their candidacy for privileged positions? Hardly.

Yet a cultural revolution itself is a uniquely important set of events. A germane cultural revolution involves a breaking up of conventional imagery in literature, art, and music. An avant-garde emerges. It is met by the hostility of the authorities. A more general antagonism is aroused. The avant-garde creates new natural symbols designed to violate those fundamental and essentially personal or familial labors and metaphors which pattern ordinary social life, especially those which appear to be inviolate to ordinary persons. Social habits, thus threatened with change, engender a sense of unease in society. Intellectuals and artists give voice to new ideas and challenge conventional responsibilities.

Such good ferment may open up the way to politicization. Just as an artistic avant-garde needs to fight for its existence against "society" (which wants to control its deviance) so with a political vanguard. Political violence can stimulate literary or artistic expressions of specific outrage, such as Picasso's *Guernica*. After World War I, for example, painful political conditions translated into ravaged human forms by such expressionist artists as Nolde, Soutine, Grosz, and Kokoschka were blended with revolutionary activism. In the thirties, "successive political crises, attacks on human freedom and the menace of Fascism tended to propagate the phenomenon into all departments of culture, and this explains the importance of the role of expressionism in the history of modern civilization. An essentially demotic movement, it had little appeal for the bourgeoisie whose guilt is proclaimed in no uncertain voice."⁶

As political action the combination is intrinsically dramatic. The Théâtre Libre was founded in Paris expressly to combine the political with the creative in an arena of action. The Théâtre de l'Art Social at its opening performance in March, 1893, composed its program entirely of revolutionary poems and short plays.⁷ The stage may be the street. In Weimar, Germany, theater was mixed with political demonstrations in grim and bizarre combinations, staged in massive amphitheatres, irrational, primordial. In Paris politics was mixed with the absurd. Listen to the "sound" of the birth of Dada.

At a matinee on January 23 [1920] Tzara was introduced to the public. He read aloud a

newspaper article, while an electric bell kept ringing so that nobody could hear what he said. A meeting was held at the Grand Palace of the Champs Elysees; several thousand people attended it. Tzara afterward wrote in an article for *Vanity Fair* that "they manifested uproariously it is impossible to say exactly what, their joy or their disapproval, by unexpected cries and general laughter, which constituted a very pretty accompaniment to the manifestoes read by six people at once. The newspapers said that an old man in the audience gave himself up to behavior of a more or less intimate nature, that somebody set off some flashlight powder and that a pregnant woman had to be taken out."⁸

The cultural side of the student mobilization represented just such a theatrical relationship between the political and the creative. It was reminiscent of the twenties and thirties. It engaged in strikes, demonstrations, and other "happenings" which politicized intellectuals, artists, and writers, bringing them into political organizations. But there was no genuine harnessing of the two revolutions in a coherent movement, nor could there be. Once upon a time Jean Grave, editor of the anarchist journal *Le Revolte*, refused to publish Mallarmé's work on the ground that it was too esoteric. His action was prophetic. What is good for the masses, and how it fits the requirements of the political, downgrades the more austere creative. As long as a cultural emphasis is on simplicity and directness there is no problem. But when it strips away the brilliant to serve the purposeful, it is another matter. Creativity, no matter how formalistic or logical, is in the end not amenable to politics.

A dialectic between the political and the creative is capable of many permutations, but only for a while. The street only appears to make all things possible. Political art is more demonic. It is also vulnerable to manipulation behind the scenes. To give voice to political horrors is the essence of expressionism, but to give form to a revolutionary future is artistically crippling. Antagonism to society is a common point of perspective to both the political radical and the creative radical, especially when the university provides a common repository for joint actions. Stage and public forum blur the line between performers and audience, insiders and outsiders, but it remains playacting.

Hence the revolutionary contradiction. The political and cultural revolutionaries must, in the end, divide. There were in the sixties too many factions and subgroups as well. Each developed a kind of classificatory boundary, as in primitive tribes, using a condensed symbolic system. The virtually magical efficacy attributed to some symbolic acts, in confrontation, standing at the head of a crowd, or any other act designed to go the distance between sin and sacrament, failed to provide sustenance. No army of Jesuits appeared with the Cross, no army of Communists with sickle and hammer. The tough preferences of the political revolutionaries effervesced among the creative randomizers. Creativity produced diffuse forms of symbolism. The result was a temporary, even lazy, acceptance of ritual. The key revolutionary ingredient, discipline, was entirely lacking. There was instead plenty of opportunism, a cheapness. The conditions for a revolutionary movement could not produce revolutionary purpose. The unifying elements became the thing itself. The symbols of protest became the issues of protest: tables in public places, naturalistic clothing expressing bodily freedom, the use of drugs to express moral freedom, hair style indicating generational identity. These issues of conflict, trivial in themselves, became loaded with seriousness.⁹

The narcotic image, as Aragon called Surrealism, applies. The cultural revolution helped to provide recruits for the political, but it undermined the movement as well. The two penetrated each other, were coiled around each other. In attempting to

take the whole of mankind in their embrace in one giant encadrement the revolutionaries succeeded in coupling only with themselves.¹⁰

IV

The revolutionaries found plenty of exploitable stupidity within the universities. Keepers of reason, some university curates required to be raped, and were eager to have their sacraments dishonored. Penetrating to the heart of the university, "demystifying" science, technology, research, produced co-conspirators within each workplace eager to help take over the university, the first act of a larger drama. Transform the university into the strongpoint in the continuing revolution. Prevent it from being a weapon for the bourgeoisie. Put the university in the service of the new collective. Then the radicalized academics could go back to work.¹¹

Slogans aside, the idea itself is foolish. It is easy to take over a university. Or, to put it another way, it is not difficult to occupy it, to close down its intellectual life and with it end all its normal functions. But, then nothing is left. The university is a dead cluster of buildings. Universities exist only when they are alive, that is, in relationship to society and knowledge. The revolutionaries wanted to kill both ends of the relationship. The point is that then there can be no intrinsically important terrain. There cannot be strongpoints. Moreover, universities do not stay dead. They have many lives. They are not exclusive to a campus, any more than society is denied its recruits simply because universities are occupied. Universities are thus poor strongpoints for political revolutions. Confrontations yes; theaters, rallies, places for noise, they can withstand the endorsement of contempt without being destroyed by it. But they provide no intrinsic facilities for their opponents. Attempts to produce alternatives, people's universities, without exception failed.

The revolution, attacking the hierarchical concept of culture in its modern form and intellectuals and the middle class, was more successful in limiting the power of certain intellectuals.

The relative impartiality and availability of the materialized sediment of intellect—knowledge—was instrumental in the rapid elevation of the new influential, prestigious, and well-to-do class of intellectuals. The elevation of this class, however, meant inevitably the parallel elevation of symbols which supposedly discriminate against the elevated class. Indeed, they have been hallowed and sacralized as the modern standard of hierarchical culture. . . . Nobody, except a few solitary geniuses, can be possibly earmarked as a possessor of knowledge by any other sign than the knowledge itself. As a result, the way we speak and think about the modern version of the hierarchical culture ideal conceals the way this ideal functions in the social reality. We not only substitute the "right type of school" for the "right type of family." Forgetful of the role the "right family" plays as the "right schools'" gatekeeper (or, perhaps, of this gatekeeper's role in turning the given school into a "right" one), we believe that people become members of the institutionalized "knowledgeable-communities" because they are learned scholars in their own right—while in practice we assume that X is a learned scholar when told that he is a member of the above-mentioned community. Moreover, we meticulously observe a complicated procedure of apprenticeship, whose real function consists in decisions by the institutionalized communities themselves on who does and who does not deserve to become one of their number.¹²

The unthinking orthodoxy of this certainly required intervention. Insofar as the attack on the university was against its "bobility," i.e., the institutionalization of validating cultural norms in a class which no longer observed them, knowledge and universities, the instruments of hierarchy in their own right, were appropriate targets but only as they raised key and important issues.

It was precisely this which was unimportant to political revolutionaries. They

wanted no reformation, no discussion, no amendment. Indeed, most preferred the police response. Their sallies on the universities, using fists and sticks, flags and placards, jeans and headbands, the chosen populisms, were designated objects of official anger. The buildings, daubed with the symbolic wounds of the people, were calculated to unleash the gas masks of public order. The result was not discussion but ritual violence, not reason but episode, not organization but mass, and consequently the outrageous and multiple rape of reason. For those militant students whose overgenerous and self-regarding virtue swelled too large for the society which was to receive them, populism came and civility went, in the hallways, the streets, and the libraries. Intellectuality, surrogate of power, the enemy, trapped in its traditional centers, was made to fight back. But there could be no victories.

In such moments men do not follow their natural inclinations. Caught in conflicting loyalties, reviled in the dock of public view, those most desirous of integrity are in danger of being lynched. Rituals under passion transfigure ordinary events into powerful sociological moments. Normalcy is itself a visible target. Paranoia is disguised as excitation. Faculty in universities do not want to be outsiders to their students. They want to stand at the hot gates with them, to be betrayed or soon betraying. Old radicals rediscover youthful enthusiasms. But it is false. Bonds renew between the generationally estranged, but only for a while. The solidarity of mutual attacks on preferred institutions turns into recrimination. High level career failures, venting their spleen against "the system," find surcease from self-blame, but not for long.

There is no victory, only casualties. A sociological moment enjoys a political and creative comprehensiveness only by means of a simplistic logic—from power structure to military industrial complex, to bureaucracy, to capitalism, to research, to curricula, to grades, to selection. Conspiracy lurks behind each aspect of system as an evil cause, justifying revolutionary explanations, grievance, and action. The universities, caught between an old public hostility and a new student antagonism (together in their common dislike for institutions of higher learning), act in turn as high concentrates of hypocrisy. For society it is an old resentment against the previous hypocrisy of privileged knowledge. For the students it is a new resentment against the privilege that knowledge will endow. Hence, the form. Screamed vituperation, obliterating language, elevated the incoherent to the level of revelation. For everyone who foamed with an articulate anger there were a dozen who preferred to be dumb, to express their contempt in body language. The universities' reaction to ritual and randomization, theater and confrontation, the danger, daring, purification and penance that went with them as objects in themselves could not help but be confused and stupid. They provided superb opportunities for a few skilled revolutionaries whose sense for the social jugular was highly refined.

The real question is not whether the university could have responded more appropriately. I think not. Divided within, hostage to both its internal enemies and external defenders, it did the only thing which made sense. This was to ride out various and unpredictable storms. It could not repress without destroying its own freedom. It could not expel without increasing its dependence on the police. It was artful, hypocritical, and patient. These were its weapons.

V

An intelligentsia is always divided or pulled between its critique of society and its ambivalence to the university. Nevertheless no matter how ambiguous its

feelings, the university remains its spiritual home.¹³ The paradox is that the most politically rebellious intellectuals are those most closely identified to the universities of highest standing. Critical intelligence and scientific knowledge breed intense pressures. Knowledge, increasingly abstract, generates new information at an ever increasing rate.¹⁴ It also affects the prevailing distribution of roles outside the university. Daniel Bell speaks of "post-industrial" society in which the key is the "matrix of innovation" accompanied by the growing significance of the scientific intelligentsia.¹⁵ From Schumpeter to Touraine, the characteristics of a new intelligentsia, troubled, confused, and vulnerable to itself, are being more and more studied as a distinguishing feature of modern life.¹⁶ Obviously, the university, as the critically sensitive instrument of this process, takes on a new role. Not simply responding to the needs of highly complex society, or catering to it, it defines a pattern of life for those outside. The radical intellectuals, creating the very functional expertise and technical power they oppose, have attacked an exclusivity of talent based on such grounds. They promote the view that the university is the modern equivalent for the corporation or economic enterprise in Marx's day, i.e., a defining, prefiguring, structural instrument of both change in society and the need to change society. Or, as Clark Kerr put it, the "multiversity" is inherently a conservative institution but with radical functions.¹⁷

Radical intellectuals, in a quite different position from students, have defended virtually any excess as a natural, even necessary, outcome of the meritocratic society. But the link between them, between radical intellectuals and militant students, whether of the political or cultural variety, has never been sturdy. They could join together on particular issues, but their interests remained fundamentally different. Just as the political and cultural revolutionary groups could make common cause for only certain purposes, dividing on other grounds, so the radical intelligentsia could oppose university administrations, inspire temporary coalitions, and punctuate demands for reform with the threat of mass demonstrations. But, on the whole, they remained vulnerable to the fickleness of the student groups. They were made to feel an uncertain generational gap which could be made large or small quite suddenly. The students, perhaps without thinking about it, had in their power a gift of generational grace which they could remove at a moment's notice.

Above all, the radical intelligentsia had a different stake in the various movements which, in the long run, precluded a permanent or solid relationship. They did not need what students needed most, the episodic, or patternless. They could not stand uncertainty whereas the students, or some of them at least, craved it. John Searle described the situation well:

People in general, but young people in particular, have a need to work for and believe in goals that they can regard as somehow sacred or important or noble. There is no a priori limit on the number of different kinds of things that under the right circumstances may be sanctified in this way: one can make a sacred activity out of making money, collecting stamps, skiing, working for General Motors, jumping around chanting "Hare Krishna," or being in the army. In its most extreme forms, the sacred activity is in service of the supernatural, as in supernatural religions. Nevertheless, at any given period in history, the climate of rhetoric—what seems natural to people to approve and disapprove of—will close off large numbers of options. In the United States in the middle of the 1960's and to a lesser extent in other advanced Western democracies . . . , for a surprisingly large number of young middle class educated white people, the official institutions of the societies, the corporations, the governments, and the universities ceased to provide avenues for these sanctifying urges. . . . For many young people these urges found an outlet in radical political activity, and the urges were so intense as to give it many of the characteristics of a religious movement.

This account is not inconsistent with the obvious explanation that the young people in question were motivated genuinely by hatred of the war, and horror at racial injustice. The characterization of student radicalism as a quasi-religious movement is not intended to imply that the radical views are either false or insincerely held; on the contrary it is intended to explain much of the peculiar intensity and fanaticism of radical attitudes.

In Berkeley at the beginning of the FSM, a routine sociological survey showed that over 80 percent of the students surveyed were satisfied with the university and with the education they had been receiving. In the FSM they did not so much become dissatisfied, as they discovered or became convinced of a dissatisfaction of which they had previously been unaware. What happened in the FSM was a kind of shock of recognition as people became aware that they no longer believed in the official beliefs they had thought they believed in; and most surprisingly they found that thousands of others shared their new beliefs. People suddenly discovered that they no longer had to go on repeating the same old social lie: they found a new social lie. In the year 1848 this same phenomenon occurred all over Europe.¹⁸

Within the academy and outside in society, intellectuals could provide protection for student militants. Radical lawyers defended them. Intellectuals, interpreting what was wrong, also used students to further their own interests. The contradiction was obvious. The cost was considerable. These temporary alliances outraged many, and on all sides, because the radical intelligentsia seemed to have rejected fundamental values of reason and responsibility, essential to any community.

To be reasonable means to share and understand each other's needs. It presumes continuous rather than confrontational relationships. The intellectuals, products of complexity, ran away from it. Radicalization obliterates levels of meaning, reducing everything to the elemental. Demands become unreal. Participation, the key demand, requires the accommodation of one's views to others, compromises, the exercise of discretion. Unless one accepts these values, participation, even when won, cannot be followed up. The student movement, to remain alive, tried to reduce those connections between understanding and responsibility. Hence the episodic and fluctuating quality of the conflicts. Theirs was a revolution for the topsy-turvy. And, the radical intelligentsia were their willing accomplices.

VI

Most major universities have experienced a major reshuffling of staff. The most intensely involved have gone elsewhere. Among senior faculty some fear—but not much—remains that the right combination of issues could trigger a new round. Berkeley, where it all began, is quiet. The Harvard Yard bustles. Columbia has other problems. The “Red Squares” are graced by strolling students, not militants. The recollection of violence is still implanted on the retinas of the survivors. But, whatever the symposium of memories, everyone knows that the revolution has ended. Budgetary attrition is the problem. University survival has taken a hardnosed turn.

Academia is safer and shabbier. No one thinks today that the universities are the strongpoints of society as in Paris, 1968, or Tokyo, 1969. To destroy university pluralism as a way to prepare for a campaign against pluralism in society is not even a bad joke. Intellectuality is greater but also duller. The heat of battles that at times resembled religious wars, when ideas were part defensive therapy and part offensive weapon, is dissipated. There was a liturgical quality to the debates and confrontations. Now there is a survival mentality. Those who suffered most, the keepers of university custom, the intellectual trustees of knowledge and curators of research, who were stripped and exposed to the jeering crowds, have regained their poise. The prescriptive analyses of the situation promoted at the time seem out of date. Proposals for a “social contract for the ideal university,” inviting the participation

by all in the decisions of the university, were not only quixotic but foolish.¹⁹ There is a marked disinterest in participation on the part of students. Who wants the bureaucratic time-serving of involvement?

In hindsight, it has become clear that radical solutions were either too simple or too complex, requiring too much change in all the institutions of modern life. The arguments fell to the ground of their own weight, and quickly. Barrington Moore put it very well: "Because the ideal is an impossible one to realize in a pure form within society as it exists, or in any form of society that seems likely to emerge for a long time to come, the whole enterprise does, of course, display considerable make-believe and even hypocrisy which readily corrupts the objectives."²⁰

Looked at from the perspective of today, student militancy is both nostalgic and quaint. Those who did not face head on those jeering crowds, the punitive self-righteousness of the deliverers, may wonder what the fuss was about. Nor can one charge cowardice against faculties and administrators. Reason is too democratic. Moreover, to fight students was to destroy the *raison d'être* of university life. Violence and threat were hardly the best climate in which to innovate or review the social purposes and intellectual obligations of modern knowledge.

No doubt there will be continuous reinterpretation of the events. Reasons will be sought in size, range of activities, effects of bureaucracy, expansion of the curriculum, the enlarged social role of the university, the sensitive relation between education and work, freedom and obligation, and how knowledge redefines the relation between elite and mass, vocationalism versus knowledge. No doubt, too, we will have a better perspective when the findings of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education are more widely distributed and the assessments of the International Council on the Future of the University have been made. Studies will be needed in both the round and the small.

Scholars ought not de-emphasize the political side of the student crisis. Limited to a tiny minority, this fringe was not of minor importance except in size.²¹ Revolutions are always the preserve of a minority capable of locating particular but generalizable issues. What was lacking was an effectively organized revolutionary elite to orchestrate the confrontations, modulate the pace and tempo, and regulate the character of the events. A Lenin would certainly have despaired. The political side was more like uprisings and protorevolutionary movements in Europe. A radical space became vacant to be filled by the modern equivalents of Babeuf or Buonarroti, DeLeon or Durruti. In fact, the political side never advanced much beyond the stage of agitation. "Time and time again," Robert Short said of the politics of surrealism, "they took a political cause with fire and enthusiasm, pursued it for a while and then let it drop, leaving to others the spadework which could alone lead to any real achievement. The very diversity of the action which they defended as serving the revolution makes one suspect its relative importance. They frequently maintained that, under the existing regime, all kinds of behavior—interrupting meetings, raiding newspaper offices, insulting priests and soldiers—was of revolutionary value. They never showed satisfactorily, however, that this kind of action possessed an effectiveness equal to that of the militants whom they refused to join. It seems that they committed themselves to little tasks in order to avoid commitment to bigger ones."²² So it was with the student revolution.

VII

This brings us to the question of explanation. The theories used to explain these

events show an astonishing confusion. Interest theories, strain theories, structural theories, all have been used to describe the causes and explain the sequences of events. Yet all are weak. We know much more about a savage tribe than we know about our sons and daughters. How do tables for the distribution of literature become matters of whole principle? When does conflict like the People's Park become an issue of public versus private property or the private use of public property? When does a minority discrimination blossom into dependency? When does a reforming university president become more hated than his more conservative peers?

Why was there so much randomness in the activities? Why did those most privileged so often initiate the action? The students who, at the University of Ghana, pelted their vice-chancellor with rolls as he walked to high table at a college dining hall, attacked "privilege." Yet they themselves were among the most privileged people in their country. How could there be so much inconsistency? The students at the University of Nairobi, when prevented by a government order from hearing Oginga Odinga, an opposition leader, speak, turned against their principal, an African from Sierra Leone, shouting that he should go back where he came from. Some explanations are simply therapeutic. The effects of the "technocratic" or "programmed" society will destroy the humanity of society. Marcuse is a folk hero because he "uncovers" the repressiveness in every one of us. Every liberation is a repression, every repression needs a liberation. In an overcrowded universe every boundary is a raw wound. The fusion of technology and domination constitutes the new power elite. The university is matrix. But salvation will not lie in a return to Marx, or to Walter Benjamin, or Theodore Adorno, or Max Horkheimer.

Some explanations deal with the rejection of social boundaries. Flaxen-haired and blue-eyed Protestants combine with revolutionary Jews and blacks (whose hair styles have become attractive to militant whites); the links: the new music, a drug or drinking commonality, a new primordialism, and a conspiracy to minimize language. But can anarchism precede the new order, or does it preclude it? If the place to begin is with those oppressed, does not renovation begin with common sense rather than with noncooperation, nonconformity, and anti-intellectualism? Radical intellectuals, Habermas, Touraine, Marcuse, elaborate attitudes into theories—but their explanations are part of the problem, not steps toward its resolution. Like the ex-radical professor who explains that when he harangued the mob and exhorted people to close the university down he was really trying to protect it, there is too much that remains unconvincing.

We still do not know why the police were so delighted to line up with their clubs, their apparatuses, helmets, and weapons, or the National Guard pleased to have a job to do, or governors and mayors delighted with the public demonstrations of the irresponsibility of students and faculties. Perhaps, as in war, people enjoyed a heightened sense of importance in a tensing of muscles. Even more astonishing, why were there so many available demagogues, little Lenins who came rushing out of libraries and dormitories in all parts of the globe?

Theories that tell us that crises arise out of perceived injustices, inequities that need to be set right, are no more informative than the idea that inequities arise as the need to define injustice becomes heightened. But if ideals become too tamed, the civilized banal, the recognizable niceties ritualized, the commonplace threatening, where are we in society? Does the goal become the predicament? Perhaps what the university explosions demonstrated above all is the poverty of our needs.

Our opening theme was politics as a morality play, dramatic, part theater and show. But if the symbolic, the ideological is to prefigure a moral orderliness, it must be cognitive, even didactic (witness Marx or Lenin). The point is that an expressive moment, an intellectual seizure which produces both symbolic immediacy and mass action, is not what revolutions are made of. It may not look like that when one is in the middle of it, when something sacred is directly attacked, sending waves of anxiety through a population. But aggression against the power structure is not enough to define a revolutionary purpose. Touraine and others saw the resistance of the state as "uncoiling" the movement which might otherwise have remained utopian. He was absolutely wrong.²³

The symbolic moments, the storming of the Sorbonne, the occupation of Sproul Hall, the all-night vigils, destruction of campus records, all the symbolic actions of the *enragés*, have faded away. Faculty committees, administrators, comptroller's offices, and alumni associations have moved back over the landscape, like tree surgeons after a terrible storm, to prune, clean up, and bind. Even the spiritual debris seems to have vanished. Moral symbolism, that is to say political symbolism, is episodic and erratic, even when it deals with universal themes. The need for it, and the intense emotionality it can generate, is a temporary phenomenon. The business of smashing orthodoxies and rigidities has come to an end as the need for order asserts itself. Partial change becomes a token of earnestness and intent where previously it was regarded as hypocrisy. Were these events simply part of the national cycle of change, or were they pathological conditions, pustules and sores, fermenting abscesses in the bodies politic? Were they symptoms of some larger disease or were they the disease itself? Were such events designed to remind us of the limits and terms of our humanity, a cleansing period? Or, were they, as Touraine said of the May movement, "not a vision of society, but a historical agent"?²⁴

Perhaps the question is not what is the agent of history but who is in the line of vision. The need to articulate issues clearly emphasizes the need for more austere standards of knowledge as modern life proceeds. Even ordinary rationality and learning are insufficient. The elaboration of ideas, the presentation of new meanings, the job of cognitive refreshment, these are the important requirements. One seeks an orderliness of mind rather than external authority. Bureaucracy, the feeling of being lost, competitiveness, the soul-destroying character of work, these are important but shallow truths. What is critical is how man, the symbol-using animal, awakens to his capacities.

The languages of moral, scientific, and creative life are diverse, but they need to be learned. Otherwise we remain clods and brutes penalized by potentiality. To locate symbolic refreshment in the rose that blooms in the prison of Genêt's mind, or in the venereal fantasies of a Baudelaire, is not sufficient. Testing the limits of mind leads to an understanding of it, but not in silly ways.

VIII

It is over. In some societies, such as Italy, radicalization has penetrated downward into the secondary schools. Anarchosyndicalism in its various forms has declined. In both France and Italy more young intellectuals join the Communist party. Germany and Japan remain troubled, but violence has declined. Gains have been made.²⁵

Now other problems crowd in, such as chronic inflation. The middle class is pressed. Its period of buoyance is over. Just as Futurism, Constructivism, Dadaism,

Surrealism all disappeared under the grinding realities of the Great Depression, so the entire student generation is disappearing in the Great Inflation.²⁶ There will no doubt be plenty of opportunities for conflict and violence, and no doubt student activism will continue to be of significance. But the moral sweep, the fresh anger, the desire to transform the world, the creative element that sometimes triumphed over the vast sludge of banalities which accompanied the movement as a whole are gone.

We can sum up our arguments as follows: Students attempted to destroy the ensemble of roles available to them through the educational process, and for which society extends its largesse. To attack the university was to attack society. This meant that to succeed, the student movement had to depend on "the bourgeoisie" even while attacking it. Moreover, they had to make common cause as a class with the disadvantaged as a class. The alliance failed. Radicalization at the top ran afoul of embourgeoisement from below. The bourgeoisie began to withdraw its largesse. In some societies it did a good deal more, and liberalism was attacked by violence, terrorism with repression, as in Chile.

In turn, to disqualify the ensemble of roles and make it absurd required, as with the Surrealists in the thirties in France, a randomization of social life. This was certainly as important an object of confrontation as the more ostensible issues. But political organization and randomization do not sit well with each other. The movement could not be effectively transformed into a more durable political force.

The embattled university reveals a more general predicament—intellectuality as a culture of potentiality. We have witnessed our first encounter with it, and the experience has been not only unstructured, but unstructuring. Efforts of social science to examine it reveal only the inadequacies of social science. Explanatory variables, such as growth rates and size of faculties, upgrading curricula, the stratification of enrollments which created student classes, a hierarchy of institutions miss the point. The issue is the impact of knowledge itself.

That is why we stress the cognitive. Like the "Wanderers" in Tsarist Russia in the 1880s, who believed "that art should be an active force in the cause of social reform," so with all knowledge.²⁷ What the expansion of universities accomplished was a universalization of a creative sensibility, shocking at times, indeed purposefully shocking, broadened to a more massive extent. Such a sensibility, without genius and lacking real individuality and turned political, was socially threatening. It lashed out against all organized life. But its targets were epiphenomenal. It was not interested in solutions. The underlying rationale was precisely antagonistic to rationality, which is one reason why the key institution of rationality was the perfect place for its appearance.

And there were doctrines. There was the Bauhaus puritanism of the Maoists and the Trotskyites, laying out principles, constructing new social edifices. There was the madcap politics of Cohn-Bendit or Jerry Rubin, jesters at the courts of the authorities, the equivalents of the Bretons and Cocteau. Each group, presenting its "statement," sounded Futurist, Dadaist, Surrealist. The artistic explosions were profoundly optimistic. The revolutionaries believed they could wipe the slate clean. But it was difficult to begin all over again. It was not a matter of exploding society as in a display of fireworks to which everyone would be invited to watch and be enthralled and renovated. What is Leninism-sans-doctrine?

Now that the sound and the fury have died down, how shall we look back on it all? Certainly, it was an extraordinary period. What was most appealing and evocative was the reaching out for something new in the midst of rebellion. There

was always anguish in the outcry. Many knew what they were against. Few knew what they were for. In any case, they could not, except in moments of confrontation, agree. The greatest contrast to earlier generations of militants—the artists, Bohemians, Dadaists, Constructivists, Rayonists, Futurists, the writers on the left as Aaron called them, the Fabians, and even the sons of Bloomsbury who went off to fight in the Spanish Civil War, the Vietnam of the thirties—was that at least some of these had an exquisite and at times chaste sense of standards.²⁸ They were intensely aware of the need to create as well as destroy. Nor did they allow too much compromise of standards. It is precisely these qualities of mind which anti-intellectualism, for all its advantages in politics, in the end destroys.²⁹ The movement lacked not leaders but minds. There was plenty of intelligence, but it became diluted and populist. Despite a heightened moral sensibility, those who succeeded one another in the front ranks with episodic rapidity often became corrupt and cynical. They wanted too much. They gave too little that could last.

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26. In a most perceptive article, Samuel Huntington challenged the usual forecasts made about "post-industrial" society: "Deductions from the socio-economic model of post-industrial society plus projections of current trends in the United States suggest, on a first glance, an overall movement toward a more rationalized, bureaucratic pattern of politics in which basic cleavages over who gets what are muted or sublimated and politics and political conflict, particularly class conflict as it has been known in the past, do not occupy the center of the stage. The analogy with the agrarian-to-the-industrial transition, however, suggests a very different pattern: one of increasing conflicts, disorder and violence." Samuel P. Huntington, "Post-industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" *Comparative Politics* (January, 1974), p. 189.
27. See Camilla Gray, *The Russian Experiment in Art, 1863-1922* (New York: Abrams, 1970).
28. See Daniel Aaron, *Writers on the Left* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961); Peter Shansky and William Abrahams, *Journey to the Frontier* (New York: Norton, 1966); Cowley, *Exile's Return*.
29. Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1965).

MARTIN E. MARTY

Knowledge Elites and Counter-Elites

THE YEARS BETWEEN the Free Speech Movement incident at Berkeley, California, in 1964 and the death of four students in a demonstration at Kent State, Ohio, in 1970 form a distinct period in American academic life. Higher education then came under attack from left and right, from dissenters and backslashers. The psychosocial roots of the dissent are complex and the effects of the protests myriad. But at heart the assaults amounted to what Norman Birnbaum has called "a campaign directed against an intellectual elite."¹

Academic leadership had grown increasingly vulnerable by 1964. The college and university system had profited from the G.I. Bill, the baby boom, international competition after Sputnik, and federal favor during a period of expanding economy. Spokesmen for higher education were thus caught off guard when criticism came. They often responded as if the university revolt were truly populist in character, authentically representative of the interests of masses of people. The passage of time, however, has made evident what ought to have been recognized all along: the critics were not true deputies for the masses. In Vilfredo Pareto's terms, they were simply counter-elites, bidding for their turn in the circulation of elites.²

The first counter-elite was made up of minorities who would gain access to what they perceived to be a largely white male domain. The masses for which they spoke were various racial groups and women—a national majority that was and is vastly underrepresented in the academy. Their complaints were plausible and durable. While their movements were sometimes militant, few of them wished to destroy universities. They wanted to become a part of them and transform them. Some simply wanted to be "cut in on the pie," while others tried, along the way, to alter the consciousness of educational leaders and the character of higher education itself.

Even critics admit that the population bases out of which participants in higher education derive are broader and more varied in America than almost anywhere else. But inequalities based on other than purely intellectual grounds did and do remain. Inequities are indeed built into a system that, among other things, taxes the poor to educate the affluent and then excludes even the able poor. But these poor were not a seething and articulate mass. Some campuses were disrupted by young revolutionaries who insisted that a certain percentage of the students must come from very poor homes in the white community. Only thus could there be a campus proletariat. They did not know, or pretended not to know, that in the 1960s that part of the white community was the home of the most reactionary political forces in the society.

In the 1970s the protests of this first counter-elite have become somewhat gentler, but their demands remain. Women represent few inherent problems to the idea of a knowledge elite, since most of them have gone to the same precollegiate

schools as have the men. Where ethnic and racial minorities have had inferior elementary and secondary education, they bring special political, curricular, and funding problems, but they have effectively shown that these are not by definition intellectual in character. It is possible to work for the enlargement of programs that will increase minority opportunities without calling for the compromise of scholarship.

The second counter-elite was smaller, more vocal, and more violent. It ranged across a spectrum from the New Left to Maoism. With fewer grounds but with more bravado, this flank advertised itself as the true vicariate of the masses. It was sometimes successful at reaching the conscience of university liberals who felt guilty about being part of "the establishment" and who were more aware than was the general American public of the deprived status of the world's masses.

That the radicals were a counter-elite is apparent from their failure, despite numerous programmatic attempts, to link up with workers, blacks, or other proletariats. "Power to the People" remained only a slogan. Their activities exemplified the characteristics described by Robert Nisbet, who recalls that "no revolutionary community or revolutionary philosophy is without a sense of being or espousing an elite."³ The writings of Herbert Marcuse, Frantz Fanon, Ché Guevara, and Mao Tse-tung took on a canonical character in this counter-elite. These dissenters were by no means wholly wrong in their diagnoses of the ills of the establishment, but they miscalculated the low degree of American readiness for revolution. They were soon discredited, became fragmented, and remained hardly visible.

Not all revolutionaries were militant, violent, or even doctrinaire. A third set of critics were of a mildly anarchic, gentler bent; they made up what some have called a "soft" revolution. This counter-elite was often referred to as a "counter culture." Gifted educational critics like Paul Goodman or Ivan Illich—with his programs for de-schooling society—were accompanied by romantics like Theodore Roszak and Charles Reich. They believed that they had access to masses of people who were awaiting their avant-garde leadership. The counter-cultural route would provide freedom from the nexus of power elites that now included the university.

If the radicals' alternatives were free universities, the soft revolutionaries offered "counter education" in communes or at the margins of the academy. Much of their polemic was directed against rationalized and technocratic knowledge elites. They saw themselves as a kind of new "elect," a chosen people who first and best foresaw the delights of unrepressed and academically undisciplined life. Their contributions to American cultural change may often have been positive, but they were neither part of the masses nor envisagers of permanent alternatives to existing patterns of higher education.

Only the first of these three counter-elites still effectively states its case, and at least militates against knowledge elites. But many college and university leaders, preoccupied with new sets of problems associated with retrenchment in the 1970s, have not adjusted to the new situation. Today few effective revolutionaries continue to urge them to disassociate themselves from other elites. Many students show signs of having become vocationally and professionally safe and security-minded. If there is to be future reform of the knowledge elites, it will have to be largely self-generated by their own leaders. But many educators continue their apologies as if it were a matter of the highest priority for them to deny their elite character. As a result they then bid for public support in such a way as to advertise the virtues of mediocrity under the guise of populism.

Higher education at all times tends inevitably toward elite character. And its advertised alternatives, if they are educational, will always take on the character of counter-elites, although the counter-elites are less focal and vocal than they were several years ago. At some point people in higher education must realize that if the masses are aware of them at all, they are aware of their elite character. It cannot be hidden or bluffed away.⁴

Knowledge elites, if they are fundamentally intellectual, represent human goods. Their members savor and delight in inquiry and the transmission of knowledge and culture. When they do so, they cannot help but separate themselves provisionally and functionally from people with other delights or intentions. The elite concept and its reality, smuggled in under some term or other, are part of the human condition. The counter-elites of the 1960s ought to have taught us that in the realm of education the reform, not the abolition, of the elite is the only course. For the rest, the academy would be well advised *pecca fortiter*, to sin boldly and come happily to terms with the burden of its elite status.

Knowledge elites do not stand alone. They are tainted not only from within but also by contact with other elites. Because of the sponsorship, funding, and products of knowledge elites, they are linked in a complex society to aristocracies of power and wealth. But competition within the plurality of elites helps knowledge elites define themselves. Knowledge elites are characterized first by intellectual aristocracy, and the university has to strive to be relatively free to set its own agenda. It will not be integrated as medieval ones were supposed to have been by theology as queen of sciences or by any other single organizing vision. But it can stimulate discourses and activities that promote its search for its own center or core. "Inner-directedness" is not wholly out of range as an ideal. The counter-elites wanted the university's "spiritual power" to be expressed through the politicization of the institution.⁵ Knowledge elites, never realizing the goal, can at least see that it inheres in the academy's ceaseless effort to keep discourse free and open, though not unfocused.

Intellectual aristocracy need not imply social conservatism, though it has some regard for academic tradition. Touraine, anything but a conservative, grants that "universities, to a much greater extent than business enterprises and to almost the same extent as churches, are organizations possessing a vast memory. With all their modernism, they never completely escape from their task of transmitting the cultural heritage."⁶ As critics from the right regularly remind the public, that heritage includes agents of change, misfits, radicals, revolutionaries, populists, movers of the masses. Intellectuality can be directed to intention and to the pull of expectation as much as to the preservation of retarding elements from the past.

Higher education can often appear patronizing as it sets its own agenda and still professes to be of service to larger clienteles. But such condescension is itself a denial of intellectuality because it does not allow into its range of appreciations the insight of nonmembers of the academy. There has to be, in Ortega's words, "a clear intuition of the reciprocal action between the masses and select minorities."⁷ Only if they constantly challenge each other can those in the "exemplary" situations of the knowledge elites be kept from smugness and sterility. Plurality of elites within elites helps guarantee vitality. Knowledge elites do not inhabit only certain kinds of institutions, though they are often associated with excellence-minded colleges and graduate schools. Many cities have an elite ghetto high school; the community college system or the vocational schools, properly led, often develop elites. Tension

among knowledge elites within the academy can give publics a creative vision of the vulnerability and internal variety of universities.

Knowledge elites remain both aristocratic and capable of outreach when they recognize that they are not confined to conventional educational institutions at all. There are nonacademic knowledge elites. Some of them may be more captive of other power elites than are universities. Others, especially those led by people at the margins of the academy, allow for other avenues of transit and transaction between intellectuals and publics. One thinks, for example, of the dissemination of elite ideas that occurred through the career of the founder of modern work camps, a marvellous misfit named Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. He possessed all the credentials for university accomplishment and from time to time taught in the academy. But he built his first *universitas* in the wilderness at Löwenberg in Silesia and, after the Nazi takeover, also inspired alternative models of education in America.⁸

If publics can benefit tangentially from the plurality of elites and from subcommunities within elites, they can also have direct connections with knowledge elites. Intellectual aristocracy eventually serves the masses that educational populists professed to represent. The case for the democratic impact of elites does not begin with arguments for their immediate democratic utility. Much in the educational process is at least temporarily and penultimately bracketed from merely functional questions. But despite the charges of counter-elitists in the 1960s, not all who make up knowledge elites are inhumane or lacking in social and public purposes. Many of them have served far more durably to effect social and political change than did the protestors who were so briefly on the scene. The academy includes people of great catholicity, not all of whom are completely tainted by their associations. Custodians as they are of such a broad range of elements in the human culture, now and then one or another of them stumbles on to something that transcends the simple interests of knowledge elites. Such, at least, is the perception of the rest of society that characteristically sees the educational establishment as the one most likely to be subversive of other establishments.

The mixed benefits of modern technology have issued in no small measure from the university. American radicals have properly attacked the academy for its participations in weapons research or in developing chemicals for warfare, and the like. They often included in their sweep a dismissal of the benefits of technology. The people for whom they professed to speak, from Chilean peasants through American slumdweller, would not have joined them in such protests were they aware of them. The poor want and need the products of chemical fertilization, water purification, health care, basic education—all of which grow out of basic research by people who did not necessarily always begin by asking questions about the immediate social utility of their probes.

Sometimes by determining not to have immediate public popularity, knowledge elites can serve the public over the longer pull. Let me illustrate from the field with which I am most at home, the academic study of religion. However popular such study may be within the colleges and universities, it is out of step with what the larger public wants religion to be in the mid-1970s. The national mood is one that seeks authoritarianism, ecstasy, and apocalypticism in the spiritual sphere. Some academics have done what they could to cater to these tastes. But in the classrooms of hundreds of campuses the religious heritages are inquired into and transmitted in ways that keep alive much of what popular religious establishments neglect and despise. Religion in the hands of academicians is not always holy or whole. But it is

less likely to issue in *jihads* or holy wars. Much of the religious dissent against the Vietnam war, a dissent welcomed by most counter-elitists of the 1960s, derived from knowledge elites and not from broad masses in religious organizations. Recent years have seen the rise of disciplined academic moral reflection, ethical inquiry, and devotion to meaning and values, sometimes through the expansion of religion departments and more often through the reawakening of other humanistic disciplines.

For all its evident compromises and faults, the knowledge elite stands the best chance of keeping democratic ties. Karl Mannheim spoke of the reduced distance between it and masses:

We assume that democracy is characterized, not by the absence of all elite strata, but rather by a new mode of elite selection and a new self-interpretation of the elite. . . . What changes most of all in the course of democratization is the distance between the elite and the rank-and-file. The democratic elite has a mass background; that is why it can mean something for the mass.⁹

While all elites may tend toward simple social conservatism, in the university there are reasons for keeping tense the ties between knowledge elites and the often intransigent social groups surrounding the academy.

Better public relations about better academic mousetraps will not begin to solve all the problems of the universities in the 1970s. The public will not come running to support reformist knowledge elites. It will not be easy to place Ph.D.s or to help universities recapture their own genius. Self-understanding by knowledge elites will not overcome the academic equivalents of original sin and self-seeking, hubris, and moral blindness. "Elite" is a relative term, and much false advertising can accompany its use. But the projection of an image can have social utility. And seeing oneself as a knowledge elite will force new tasks upon the seer.

The future of intellectual aristocracy includes projections far beyond existing university clienteles. Adult education continuing through life is becoming a means for broader diffusion of the effects of knowledge elites' endeavors. But even extension of this kind will not assure a future for the elites we now know. In future decades other and possibly more effective counter-elites may effect a revolution that these could not produce. Pareto was correct: "History is the graveyard of aristocracies."¹⁰ Nothing lasts. Elites are transformed and they circulate. In the meantime, using the institutions we now have, knowledge elites serve best when they recognize that their alternatives in education are themselves counter-elites. And they will be most likely to convince publics of the validity of scholarship when they come to terms with their own genius, the elite character to which they are doomed and in whose ethos they are free to inquire and teach.

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1. Norman Birnbaum, *Toward a Critical Sociology* (New York: Oxford, 1971), pp. 416-417.
2. Quoted in T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1966), p. 12.
3. Robert Nisbet, *The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought* (New York: Crowell, 1973), p. 255.
4. In this essay "elite" is posed over against "mass," even though there are many reasons for uneasiness over both traditional terms. As for the former, Harold Lasswell's comments on its value-free character are to the point: "The concept of the elite is classificatory and descriptive, designating the holders of

high positions in a given society. There are as many elites as there are values. Besides an elite of power (the political elite) there are elites of wealth, respect, and knowledge (to name but a few)." The term elite became unpopular because of its use in Fascist and other undemocratic societies, where it was used to apply to persons with superior fitness to rule. They then will and *ought* to rule. However, reminds Lasswell, no *ought* has scientific standing, since science is entirely concerned with *is*.

5. José Ortega y Gasset, *Mission of the University* (New York: Norton, 1944), p. 91, for his concept of the university as a "major spiritual power."
6. Alain Touraine, *The Academic System in American Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), p. 23.
7. "Exemplarity and Aptness" is the title of a chapter omitted from the American version of Ortega's *Invertebrate Spain*; see Robert McClintock, *Man and His Circumstances: Ortega as Educator* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1971), p. 244.
8. See Harold Stahmer, *Speak That I May See Thee: The Religious Significance of Language* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 106-147. ✓
9. Quoted by Bottomore, *Elites and Societies*, p. 113.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

ROBERT N. BELLAH

The New Religious Consciousness and the Secular University

ONE WAY OF getting at the ethos of the secular university today is to characterize its central value as "cognitive rationality," the concept developed by Talcott Parsons in his recent work. Parsons is probably right in saying that this is the central value around which the university is organized. But I am not quite so happy about that fact as Parsons tends to be. It is not, as I think will be evident, that I don't respect cognitive rationality, but that I think there are other things in the world with which the university might be concerned as well. At its best, "cognitive rationality" means "disciplined knowing," not simply the acquisition of knowledge, the sheer intake of the finished product. Disciplined knowing is not just learning what has already been discovered, but learning to learn, the process of inquiry itself. This statement of the normative commitment, the basic value system of the secular university, obviously has a link to traditional, philosophical, and religious commitments and to traditions of education that stretch back far before the emergence of the secular university. The pursuit of truth for its own sake can become, and has become, a kind of supreme rationality, like that which Spinoza expresses in the notion of the intellectual love of God. In its more traditional, philosophical, and religious forms, there is a point at which rationality transcends itself, merges with nonrational ways of knowing, and becomes one way of attaining the vision of divine truth, of ultimate reality. Even when that particular chain of connections is not made in traditional ways of thinking about the pursuit of knowledge, the quest of reason has been seen as involved in a complex of human activities that includes feeling, moral evaluation, and action in the world.

For most of what the secular university does, however, cognitive rationality or disciplined knowing does not go beyond a simple desire to understand things—how they operate, why they came to be, and what they may do next. But even in that relatively mundane form, cognitive rationality exists precariously in the university. It exists on sufferance, so to speak, in relation to a pervasive notion in our culture that, after all, knowing is not an end in itself. It is simply a means. Knowledge is a tool for the manipulation of the world. The pervasive emphasis on the manipulative, instrumental use of knowledge has tended to make of the university a kind of universal filling station where students tank up on knowledge they will "need" later. The idea of the university which Clark Kerr presented not many years ago, the so-called "multiversity" catering to the numerous knowledge needs of a diverse clientele, is perilously close to that image. In this image, all university education becomes professional education, and there is great pressure in that direction, particularly perhaps in state universities. The ethos behind this conception of education is very general in the culture. It is rooted in the deep American value of pragmatism and is intense at the moment partly because of a resurgence of old ways of thinking in the society, and partly because of a curious convergence in this matter

between the Old Right and the New Left. Both of them tend to adopt an extremely pragmatic, manipulative idea of education.

The Old Right and the New Left agree that education is useless unless it is related to rather immediate ends in "the real world." The implication is that the university is *not* the "real world," that the "real world" is somehow outside the university, and that work within the university can be justified only insofar as it is a means to an end in the "real world." According to this conception, the university is composed of atomized, individualistic students with certain fixed impermeable goals. The university's only purpose is to help students attain their goals by communicating to them certain discrete skills and certain discrete bodies of fact about the external world which they can then "use."

Education in the great traditional societies as well as in primitive and archaic societies is by and large as different from this picture as one could imagine. Communication of discrete skills and facts is not missing in more traditional modes of education—a respect for "disciplined knowing" is sometimes highly developed—but it is never seen as the sole end of education. As Plato said, "All education is initiation." And Whitehead, though a modern philosopher, was speaking for an ancient conception of education when he said, "All education is religious." Education traditionally is initiation in the sense of initiation into reality with a capital "R." It involves heart, and soul, and body. Initiation is not just a process in which "secrets of the tribe" are transmitted. Initiation is a process in which the individual is transformed and takes on a new status, a change that is frequently symbolized in various parts of the world as being born anew. It is a radical process involving the whole person in relation to his whole environment; it differs sharply from the idea of a closed, atomized individual manipulating an equally closed, objective world. Traditionally, education was involved in the formation of a new person ideally more perceptive than when he began, one more aware of the whole of existence, including its tragic dimension, and more responsive as a human being. Such education involved not only cognitive skills but a discipline of body, of feeling, of imagination, as well as of mind. Its aim was to eventuate in a morally and religiously transformed person.

In the Confucian tradition in both China and Japan, for example, the relationship with the teacher was one of the most central in a person's life, comparable to that with parents or the ruler. It was highly ceremonious, including rigorous forms of discipline. In the traditional schools of Japan, the way one sat when one studied, the way one behaved in the presence of one's teacher were subject to strict rules. There are cases in which a Japanese teacher would simply terminate a lesson when the student moved his body carelessly, saying, "Apparently you are not interested in learning today." Obviously such an idea of education has its own mode of corruption, its own formalism and emptiness, but the basic motive involved in such an event is profoundly serious. The student and teacher were engulfed not simply in the transmission of knowledge or facts, but in the transmission of the Way, of what reality in its fullest extent is all about. The traditional notion of "learning" or "study" (in Chinese *hsueh*, in Japanese *gaku*) had a richness of implication that transcended a purely cognitive concern. It was frequently said in the Confucian tradition, for example, that one could have "learning" without ever having read a book at all. The great sages of ancient China, the great mythical figures that stand at the head of the Confucian tradition, Yao and Shun, of course, had no books, yet they embodied "learning." They embodied Tao. Their whole

lives were an expression of the right relationship between man and the cosmos, the focus of all "study." Books, of course, became desperately important in the Confucian tradition. Through particular books, the Tao could with great difficulty, yet in part, be transmitted. That was what made the whole enterprise worthwhile.

One feature of the Confucian tradition characteristic of all traditional religious forms of education was a special attitude toward texts. Some degree of philological sophistication in textual criticism long existed in China and Japan, but the basic interest was the inner message that the texts imparted, not philological knowledge about the texts. The fundamental problem for the student was how to internalize, how to embody, the message of the text. Many of these texts were poetic or highly symbolic. In many instances, ways of learning texts involved more than silent reading. They involved chanting, or sometimes special ritual motions that were virtually a dance form, so that one related to the tradition as a complete physical being and not simply as a disembodied intellect. In the first two books of the *Laws*, Plato bases the ideal state on a mode of education which also has this encompassing, totally human characteristic common in traditional forms of education.

Traditionally education was not a relationship between a closed subject and an alien object, but the development of a transformed person in relation to an organic whole which included his society, the natural world, the whole cosmos. If that description has any validity, it will be apparent how sharp the contrast is with the kind of education typical of the contemporary, secular university. Even though there is perhaps no word used more often today than "experience," the experiential dimension is extraordinarily weak in the kind of education that we purvey.

The wholeness of culture that stood behind traditional modes of education began to crack in the West at least by the seventeenth century. Thus, one might imagine that the kind of education we know today dates back several centuries to the beginning of secular scientific culture in the West. That is not the case. A much more traditional pattern of educational experience survived far into the period of so-called modern, secular culture. Even the state university not so long ago found words like religion and morality at the heart of its enterprise. The denominational college through the nineteenth century was the main mode of higher education in the United States and offered an educational situation concerned with the whole human being, with building character. However phony those words may sound to us, there was a totality of moral concern that links those forms of education to much more ancient ones.

The victory of cognitive rationality as the central value in higher education had its roots in the rise of the graduate school in the late nineteenth century, was advanced by the emergence of mass-educational institutions in the twentieth century, and was not complete until after World War II. Only recently have the remnants of a fuller conception of education been finally washed out of the American university. At the same time that higher education was becoming secularized and narrow in focus, far larger percentages of the population sought entrance. The combination of "alienating education" and a mass audience not surprisingly produced grave strains in the decade of the sixties, strains that are by no means gone from the American university.

Thus far, I have painted the traditional form of consciousness in its brightest hue. The other side is a narrow dogmatism, a repressive authoritarianism, and an absolute lack of openness. During the seventeenth century the growing empirical consciousness challenged all established powers. In the name of rationality, it under-

mined every status quo, every doctrinaire assertion of social and religious institutions. It helped in the immense release of those human energies that David Landes has called "the unbound Prometheus" of the modern age. The secular consciousness had a genuine transcendent element especially where it challenged established tyrannies. In the religious field, it led to the undermining of established authorities, both clerical and textual, and the rise of higher criticism. It unmasked all assertions about religious man, ending in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with Marx, and Nietzsche, and Freud, the three great unmaskers of the pretensions of *Homo religiosus*. And that, too, was a liberation, a liberation that plays into the possibilities of our present situation in a way that would have been surprising to those masters of suspicion themselves.

Modern secularism, while releasing human beings from one kind of tyranny, often imposed a new, more terrible tyranny, however—the tyranny of the pragmatic world of every day, of the givenness of immediate reality with all its constraints. It has resulted in the rise of the bureaucratic, technological, and manipulative man, who rejects all transcendence, who has what Blake called "single vision." There is something deeply demonic in the single vision of modern secular consciousness with the vast range of human experience that it tends to shut out.

From its beginning, the modern secular culture has faced critical opposition and, eventually, movements from inside that cautioned: "Beware! What kind of human being will this liberating revolution finally produce?" I do not refer here to the survival of more traditional forms of criticism, an important feature of all modernizing societies and one that takes the form of peasant rebellions, religious movements, and revivals of various sorts. I think of those questionings that came not from those under attack from the new culture, the remnants of an old world receiving its mortal blows, but from the children of the new enlightened culture itself, from men like Pascal, Rousseau, Fourier, and Marx as well as Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard.

The rise of modern culture from the seventeenth century can be characterized at a simple level by the word "criticism," a criticism of everything taken for granted in the traditional world view, a total undermining of what Paul Ricoeur has called "primary naïveté." Ricoeur also suggests a possibility only indistinctly perceived at present—that of a second naïveté, not through the rejection of criticism, but through the full exposure to its fires. It is the possibility that once again the symbols may speak, and we may be able to live in their grasp.

This possibility, this second naïveté, I want to refer to by the notion of "new religious consciousness." It should be quite clear that this notion does not include everything novel on the religious scene today. Much of what looks new on the surface—the Jesus Movement, the Neo-Pentecostals—is probably a more or less genuine expression of primary naïveté or an effort to recapture a primary naïveté that has been lost. In the Hare Krishna movement, for example, the absolute prohibition on any serious criticism of the system from those who have accepted it appears to be an effort to regain that lost world of perfect wholeness characterized as primary naïveté. Even a religion like Zen Buddhism, which seems extraordinarily sophisticated, which does not commit itself to any particular symbols, and which in theory is radically open to human experience, can become completely encapsulating, closing adherents off from exposure to anything outside a relatively narrow range of experience.

Second naïveté is hard to define, hard to get a handle on. Clearly it does not rest on hostility to primary naïveté. Indeed it often includes a great nostalgia for primary

naïveté, but also recognizes that it is no longer possible. The person who experiences new religious consciousness has passed through criticism, not avoided it. He has gone to school with the masters of suspicion, he has subjected every one of his childhood beliefs to the most radical undermining. He knows the vulnerability of every text in every sacred tradition. Above all, and here is the crux of the difference with primary naïveté, he knows that every interpretation of reality is finally only an interpretation, and not reality itself. And he cannot confuse his own words or the words of some creed or doctrine with ultimate reality. Second naïveté could be characterized in fairly traditional words as the final fulfillment of Biblical iconoclasm, which accepts nothing as a substitute for the Divine itself. It is aware that every religion is as much a defense against divine reality as it is a channel of transmission of divine reality. And a great many religions a great deal of the time are more defenses than they are transmissions.

Consequently, the person in this situation denies the ultimacy of any interpretation. But he differs from the skeptic and the critical intellectual because he believes that purely religious symbols themselves have inexhaustible meaning, that no interpretation will ever fathom their depths. By opening oneself up to every possible mode of interpretation, however, it is possible to be grasped by the symbols—as Ricoeur says, “to hear again.” Through iconoclasm of the most radical sort, there may come not nihilism but a new way of grasping religious meaning. Such de-mystification may lead to a new possibility of living in a mythical world, in the profound, not the pejorative, meaning of that term. The person who has this new religious consciousness can give himself to the symbols, or symbols can grasp him, because he does not place his interpretation above the symbols. Here is the crux of the issue of changing interpretations. Only if one makes the interpretations more finally real than the text itself is that problem posed. The person with new religious consciousness takes the religious symbols as revelatory of Being, but always as in part hidden. He is not disturbed by changes in interpretation and wants to remain open to every possible new interpretation. Finally, he can see that Buddhist or Hindu or Navajo or Hopi symbols can be as revelatory as Christian or Jewish symbols. This does not mean that he cannot take a stand and commit himself to certain symbols as being the most profound of his experience, knowing all the while that one can never fully understand even those symbols which come out of “one’s own tradition.” But there is a profound openness to the radical experiential dimension of the entire religious heritage of mankind.

Of importance in this context is a normal aspect of growing up which can be referred to as “youth fundamentalism.” The transition from childhood to adulthood is a very upsetting one, and intense commitment of a religious or ideological sort to a relatively closed system provides an important way of moving from childhood to adulthood. Thus, rather than idolizing youth, I would say that chronological age is not a key to what is new culturally and what is the long-run direction of cultural change. Everything that young people do is not, in the way I use the terms, necessarily new religious consciousness.

I do not intend to identify the new religious consciousness with the so-called counter-culture. Second naïveté begins much earlier than the counter-culture and is not co-terminous with it, though to some extent its popular dissemination has not been wholly unrelated to the counter-culture. Above all, it is a new way of being religious within modern culture and is not simple rejection of that culture. As a form of consciousness, it is not clearly institutionalized, although there is more in the

churches than perhaps is realized. But just because it is the child of the critical intellect and the product of modern culture at its best, its terrain, if it has any, is the contemporary university, and even more specifically, in some places at least, the Department of Religion. Here there is an institutional support for precisely that combination of seriousness and openness with respect to the whole of the human religious heritage that characterizes this mode of religious consciousness.

In one sense, this development is encouraging and in another rather upsetting. After all, many people thought we finally had this whole question settled: the secular university was one thing, religion and all that nonsense was something else. What on earth is happening if within the heart of the secular university a new understanding of human beings is emerging, an understanding that takes seriously the preconceptual, nonrational aspect? What do we do when such a perception emerges in the midst of our rational enlightenment enterprise? Some may be tempted to reach for their guns, so to speak, and to start talking about the separation of church and state. I frankly am not concerned. For one thing, these possibilities are at the moment only incipient. We have a long way to go before their full implications will be clear. But here at least is one small point where the profound schism in our culture, the schism between the disembodied intellect and our whole humanity, might possibly begin to be overcome, where the initiatory element of education might begin to be regained. I certainly do not have any highly utopian or eschatological hopes as to what the Department of Religion per se can do about it. The problems of the contemporary university go very deep, to the whole structure and ideology of the university. In the long run, these problems will have to be solved at a much more radical level. Yet, in the present cultural situation, a Department of Religion may be a small beachhead in that process of change which could lead again in a new way to a whole human being.

FRANK E. MANUEL

Clio Vanishes from New York City

THE 85 THESES published by the Assembly on University Goals and Governance were only ten shy of the number Luther required to start a revolution in both the organization and teachings of the Church. Of necessity, the Assembly addressed itself more urgently to reforming the structure of American universities, our secular *ecclesiae*, than to altering the specific content of their educational programs. We may now have, as the new jargon would have it, more faculty input, greater student participation, a broadening of the educational base, extension of education to later stages in the life-cycle—all worthy recommendations of the Assembly report. But not much consideration is being given to the general character of the culture transmitted in higher education. Long-term transformations in substance are extremely difficult to chart; yet they may lie closer to the definition of our civilization than the external forms that command attention. In setting forth reflections on the role of the historical in higher education in New York City—and I believe that the same bell tolls for you in the hinterland—I am attempting to raise questions that only infrequently preoccupy university administrators, harassed as they are by problems of household economy. New York is singled out only because it is within the orbit of my experience. I have been a part of the process I describe and, absorbed in my own concerns, have done nothing to alter the general movement of events. *Mea culpa*. Perhaps a future Assembly report will find here provocation for supplying the ten missing theses needed to effect a complete reformation.

Analysis of conditions in New York City by a Regents Advisory Council might serve as an example of current educational thought. In June 1972, the Council presented a "Regional Plan for Higher Education," a workmanlike study replete with graphs, statistical documentation, and conclusions about the economic plight of the private universities and the lack of adequate square footage in public universities for the expanding open admissions program, along with a plea for cooperative action on library facilities. But nary a word about the quality of the study programs or their changing content. Such an evaluation would have stirred up a hornet's nest in many academic fields. It would be a hazardous and presumptuous undertaking involving subjective judgment and assertions that could not be reduced to numerical values, those bulwarks of the educational establishment.

For all that, let me begin with a few numbers.

The higher education industry of New York City is a colossus that consumes a billion and a half dollars each year, give or take a few hundred million, and affords direct employment to more than 100,000 persons, only about a fourth of whom are instructional. Teachers are clothed with dignities and bear titles such as distinguished professor, professor, associate professor, assistant professor, not to mention adjunct professor, lecturer, instructor, teaching assistant—though a sizable number of them earn less than the city's sanitation workers, a reversal of the

traditional order of rewards for mental and physical labor. There is of late a thickening stratum of presidents, vice-presidents, chancellors, vice-chancellors, deputy-chancellors, assistant deputy-chancellors, provosts, divers deans, and a multitude of chairmen (latterly called chairpersons). They have adopted the organizational style of business and government and the military, accumulating mounds of memoranda in terminology that would have made Charles William Eliot or Abraham Flexner wince. Institutions with separate identities granting state-approved academic degrees number eighty-one—twenty-four public and fifty-seven private bodies with a great variety of methods of governance—enrolling some 340,000 full- and part-time students in 1972.¹ The public sector accounts for between a third and a half of the overall budget for higher education and its portion is not likely to diminish. With private benefactions to public universities and public (federal and state) subsidies to private institutions, the structural distinctions are apt to become blurred, and the same spirit may ultimately dominate all of them. But in the present transition period differences still have to be recognized. One can accept it as a sign of the times that the State's data bank already eschews the word "private" in favor of "nonpublic" as a statistical category for educational institutions.

The early 1970s have witnessed realignments in the city's educational system and an altered tone in its academic life. A policy of open enrollment was inaugurated in the municipal colleges—five years ahead of schedule—and a vast building program was undertaken, while the two major private universities, Columbia and New York University, grappled desperately with problems of economic survival. The gates of municipal undergraduate colleges were thrown wide to admit any resident presenting a diploma from a secondary school, and two-year community colleges were distributed throughout the five boroughs. Despite financial stringencies that required the sale of its uptown campus, New York University constructed at Washington Square the Elmer Holmes Bobst Library and Study Center, twelve stories high and two deep, covering a whole square city block. Subsidized by the Federal Dormitory Authority (*ave biblioteca, dormituri te salutamus*) and designed by an architect of theatrical structures, it has a dramatic atrium, Piranesi-like stairways, and a marble floor inspired by a Venetian church. New construction for the City University of New York is exceeding a billion dollars. There is at present some overcrowding in the municipal colleges, but it is envisaged that there will soon be a sufficient number of classrooms, offices for professors, and impressive suites for administrators. The physical plant of all of New York's universities is well protected by special police and the latest mechanical security devices; but the intellectual atmosphere is remarkably free: sexual, political, and moral expression is uninhibited (an avowed homosexual can now hold a professorship, and a university president can speak out for birth control in a Catholic borough); conduct in and out of the classroom is easy. The days of student wrath seem to have passed, though visiting Nobel laureates Murray Gell-Mann and William Shockley still occasioned minor disturbances this year on the part of students who disapproved of them. Patently, sexual tolerance has outstripped political tolerance.

Much of the expansion of recent years has been frenzied. Its accelerated pace had something to do both with rising birth rates in the post-World War II period and the spread of a conviction that higher education is the right of everyman. There has been a pervasive institutional feeling—only now beginning to lose strength—that unless there was continuous growth, measured primarily in numerical terms, decline was inescapable. Free education in the municipal colleges

and low tuition in the City University Graduate Division—a third of that in private graduate schools—threaten to siphon prospective students away from the private institutions, whose appeal has been further diminished by adverse publicity about crime in New York, by recession and inflation, and by general loss of esteem for “the university” following in the wake of the riots. Where the pressure of applicants has begun to lighten, there has been a certain amount of body-snatching in the name of free enterprise. On March 31 of this year, a page of the local newspaper, *The New York Times*, was devoted to a patchwork of paid advertisements from every private institution of any standing in the Greater New York area—Fordham, Columbia, New York University, Adelphi, the New School for Social Research, St. John’s—all hawking their special wares: “The Leading Edge: Art and Education. Emphasis: Art—Society—World”; “Join the wave of the future. Plan cities—Design rockets—Get into DNA—Help clean up the environment”; “Early Admission for students of acting, dancing, design, film-making & tv, and cinema studies”; “How soon could you graduate from college? Probably sooner than you think”; “Reduced tuition for husbands and wives who enroll in the same course.”

Institutions of higher learning in the city are under the aegis of that over-arching body known as The University of the State of New York, governed by a Board of Regents, and one must distinguish between this State agency, which is no university at all, and three other bodies—the State University of New York with its various colleges, called SUNY (which does not operate significantly within the city limits), the City University of New York with its colleges and graduate schools (CUNY), and the private nineteenth-century foundation named New York University. If in the end of the days they are all taken over by the government, federal or state, they will doubtless be designated by multiple-digit numbers; but in the interim, we must live with this tricky nomenclature, so baffling to innocent foreigners and not a few natives.

The University of the State of New York is said to exert more power over higher education than any similar state body in the country. It is difficult to measure the degree of truth in this affirmation; but it does not require long tenure on university committees to feel the authority of the State. In addition to supplying a large share of the budget of the City University and assisting private colleges with scholarship aid for undergraduates, the state awards each private university \$3,000 a head for the capture of a doctor of philosophy and \$600 for a master of arts or sciences. This subsidy, named after McGeorge Bundy, is commonly known as Bundy money.

With one exception, institutions of higher learning in New York draw their students from the city and its environs; and even at Columbia, nearly half the student body comes from within a fifty-mile radius. New York University had a heady moment when it hoped to become an international institution, but the tide turned before it could achieve that status, and presently its students are overwhelmingly from the Greater New York area. The universities of New York are primarily engaged in turning these young men and women into doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, dentists, scientists and technicians of various sorts, teachers for lower and higher schools, priests, ministers, and rabbis, business specialists and administrators—in fact, everything that the society currently needs to perpetuate itself and to increase its scientific and technological knowledge as well as to amuse itself and heal its self-inflicted wounds. Aspiring clergymen are introduced to the latest innovations in pastoral care, derived from an atheistic Viennese Jew, as budding surgeons are instructed in the use of equipment and methods for protracting life

beyond its Biblical span. Farmers and soldiers are not significantly represented in New York City, but all manner of entertainers and performing artists are included in a lavish array of programs.²

The shades of Condorcet would exult at the opulent spectacle of educational possibilities in the city. For he once calculated that the incidence of genius was in direct proportion to the totality of enlightened, educated men. Providing free access to a college degree to any high-school graduate of the city was a revolutionary act whose consequences cannot be judged solely on the basis of what transpires in classrooms today. Opportunities for New York blacks have perhaps been overstressed in public presentations of the rationale for this innovation, to the neglect of a realization that thousands of sons and daughters of recent immigrants—Italians, Greeks, Poles, Chinese, Puerto Ricans—who would not otherwise have dreamed of a higher education, now also have that chance. Blacks and new ethnic groups are just beginning to penetrate the upper strata of the society in large numbers, and it is far too early to assess the effects of the massive influx into the colleges. One does not have to be committed to doctrines of national or racial characteristics to believe that each of these groups as presently constituted and with its own nexus of social relationships can contribute unique excellence to many areas of a pluralist American civilization—along with much standard mediocrity, to be sure, such as we are accustomed to in Western education ever since it became the norm to consign a portion of the upper economic classes to colleges and universities. *Anybody* can now sport a “gentleman’s C.” The suddenness of the new wave has been unsettling in many respects; but it is false sentimentality to overlay the universal diligence and talent of previous generations of students.

Some of the difficulties entrained by open enrollment are evident. New rhetorics had to be devised extolling the challenge to the professor in teaching a body of students whose preparation ranged widely. Not all of the faculty are persuaded that they can or should rise to that challenge. A City College history professor recently declared in a television broadcast that it was impossible to address himself in the same course to students who read anywhere from two to two hundred pages an hour, perhaps a bit of alliterative hyperbole. The party of stability in the faculty bewail the depression of an exalted educational level that may never have been widely attained, and some professors feel declassed when they have to come before language-impooverished blacks and Puerto Ricans, forgetting that the English of non-ghetto-dwellers today is not that elegant. It must nevertheless be admitted that a valid official position justifying open admissions on democratic grounds has been partly vitiated by the pretense that instant uniform excellence can be, or has already been, reached. Inflated claims are motivated by a desire to allay any nasty suspicion that the new popular education is of inferior quality, a suggestion that would be politically untenable.

Some dilution of standards—temporary, it may be hoped—is apparent in many colleges of the city today. In public institutions thousands of students cannot be assimilated overnight without abandoning the stereotyped fantasy of a “cultivated” man or woman. In private institutions, the competitive needs of attracting students in arts and sciences in order to survive without accumulating stupendous deficits inevitably militates in the same direction. Perhaps the absolute number of potentially outstanding students remains the same (Condorcet to the contrary notwithstanding); but they are simply not so visible as the total student population increases. It is hard for merit to assert itself, for gifted students to find equals with whom to sharpen

their wits. But whatever the immediate consequences, a retreat from the adopted position of open enrollment is not readily conceivable in the near future. The disaster signal must of course be flashed at some point—which is ill-defined—when relaxed standards turn a college into a diploma mill. The Chancellor of the City University has issued such a *monitum* to one community college; the prevalence of the same danger in other units remains a subject of debate.

In the whirl of social and economic forces which no institution in the city can escape, what is happening to the preservation and enhancement of the historical culture that was once the heart of academic life?

Pondering the question, one is straightway confronted by a paradox. The past is present in New York City in some of the world's most impressive collections of books and objects of art: the great New York Public Library (which is a private endowment), recently revived with an infusion of funds; the Pierpont Morgan Library, with its illuminated manuscripts, incunabula, and Renaissance drawings; two Christian theological seminaries renowned for their rare books; a famous medical library rich with historical documentation; a Hispanic library; collections of Judaic and Yiddish books and manuscripts; university libraries at Columbia and NYU; Americana at the New York State Historical Society; museums of modern, ancient, primitive, and ethnic art; libraries of the performing arts; archives of old films. Staten Island even shelters a Tibetan Museum. Ptolemaic Alexandria, medieval Paris, Renaissance Florence, nineteenth-century Oxford, turn-of-the-century Vienna, Wilhelmine Berlin were intellectually deprived by comparison with New York in 1974, its repositories stocked with the world's accumulated learning in arts and sciences and crafts, in philosophies and religions. Yet in the midst of this wealth, generally accessible, there is a poverty of historical culture in the university.

Nietzsche once brilliantly mocked the educational practices of his German contemporaries, who overstuffed students with the historical and loaded their bellies with an enormous heap of indigestible knowledge. "The young man is kicked through all the centuries. . . . The crowd of influences streaming on the young soul is so great . . . that an assumed stupidity is his only refuge."³ Young New Yorkers suffer no such burden. The past is not likely to be progressively eliminated to point zero; but in popular education within the colleges of the city, the part devoted to serious attempts to make the dead living in their own right and not merely as a facile analogy to current events grows steadily smaller. First, general historical requirements are canceled; soon it is discovered that there is a natural gravitation toward courses dealing with the twentieth century in history, literature, politics, society, and philosophy.

In New York one form of recovery of the past is still very much alive and thriving—the study of art history and music. The Metropolitan and the Frick are among the richest museums in the world, and our two opera houses are still devoted predominantly to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century music. The past in these objective forms can be immediately apprehended by the senses and is directly assimilable. In many respects art objects and music are almost the only broad avenues to the past still open, while the written part of the culture tends to atrophy. In its religious or philosophical or political forms it has no real presence at all comparable to the visual and the auditory.

In the golden age of academic life, the exploration of the verbal past of the West was the main effort of the university. We all know how hard it was for experimental sciences to establish themselves, and there was a long resistance to the intermingling

of current events of a political and social nature with academic studies. Now the order has been turned topsy-turvy; the past is going under in a maelstrom of immediacy. We have been repeatedly warned about this prospect, from the Romantics through Paul Valéry, who in 1931 foretold a future epoch in which there would be no "recognizable habit of mind" to relate men to the past. "History will offer them strange, almost incomprehensible tales, because nothing in their age will have had an example in the past and nothing of the past will survive into their present."⁴ That future is here.

The past has become a luxury in our civilization, and it may be that any hope to preserve it is vain. In the popular mind, why should the past be any more visible in higher education than it is in architecture? Buildings are torn down every thirty years or so. The authentic verbal culture of the past plays a dwindling role in our academic society. When philosophy and religious texts of other centuries enter the curriculum, they are almost always expounded in English. For the most part they are not read and explicated in their original languages outside theological seminaries, and often not there either. Foreign literatures, too, are more and more frequently taught in translation. English departments come closest to the act of historical re-creation because they do not have to surmount a language barrier.

There are, of course, islands of historical culture in New York City, skillfully tended. The Jewish Theological Seminary can hold its own with anybody in the academic study of rabbinics, and the New York University Institute of Fine Arts is preëminent in art history. But havens such as these enjoy rare esteem in a general devaluation of historical culture in the city. It is not the study of the Occidental world past that is prospering, but that of our own country in its twentieth-century raiment or of the embellished and mythologized past of individual ethnic groups—both manifestations of a revived tribalism. It is not proposed that Tudor and Stuart English history be substituted for Yiddish and black studies; but one can bemoan the blocking of access to the riches of Occidental culture as a whole and view the new stress on "particularism" in the name of identity as a regressive phenomenon.

The idea of general education has had a long history in the Western world. Early in the nineteenth century Wilhelm von Humboldt in the name of a new humanism introduced into German education the concept of a *Bildungsideal* in contrast to a *Berufsideal*. The Saint-Simonians of the 1830s, who stressed the importance of each individual's unique technical "capacities," nevertheless proclaimed the worth of a general education for all. Over the last half-century American college professors have engaged in protracted controversies about the definition and merits, if any, of the *Bildungsideal*, and in the spirit of sectarian independence newly-founded institutions devoted many soul-searching hours to the working out of their own salvation, usually arriving at solutions not too unlike their neighbors', formulas whose origins could easily be traced back to the latest deliberations at one of the style-setting universities. In most of New York undergraduate education, we have now reached the end of the line in this respect; I have heard administrators speak with condescension about those who still cling to the general education "bit." The society has no *Bildungsideal*, and the university is accepting the vacuum without abhorrence.

Reflection on models from the past has been the major method of inculcating moral ideas into each new generation and aiding the actualization of that secret seed called the self. We have thus far found no replacement for such historical models

and have yet to face the question of what happens to human beings cut loose from ties to the past. May not the obliteration of the past dehumanize the present?

In a society without fixed cultural principles and strong ties to a commonly recognized historical tradition, problems of choice and direction become particularly vexing during the amorphous, preprofessional interval, the gap, now four years long, between secondary and professional school. This being a society that believes in freedom for adolescents before the heavy clout of earning a living lands on their heads, there is a period during which the elders literally do not know how to accommodate them. In their perplexity the venerables approach the seventeen-year-olds and ask them what they want. *Vox adolescentis vox dei*. The adolescents, just as baffled, at least know what they do not want—they do not want to be told what to want.

The Humpty Dumpty of General Education has had a great fall and is unlikely to be put in his place again. No important segment in academic society really mourns its demise, except of course those professional historians whose appanage is contracting. Students in the city now entering college are interested principally in training for careers. The universities in New York are responding to this demand. And neither those who pay for the preliminary college education nor the young persons who submit to it are particularly concerned about the cultural level of the studies. That has become a peripheral matter. A public university would not dare reimpose restrictions on the free choice of students who patronize the university department store, any more than Macy's or Gimbel's would enforce the purchase of a particular commodity. And private institutions are hesitant to risk further incursions into their enrollment by setting up such psychological impediments to the free spirit.

Without requirements, university specialties become like erratic stocks on the Wall Street exchange. Demand fluctuates abruptly, and university administrators are hard put to adjust swiftly to the kaleidoscope of shifting tastes, fads, and fashions. In one private university, departmental enrollments have zoomed and crashed wildly during the last two years: biology, up 41 percent; geology, down 73 percent (wiped out); Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, down 25 percent; Psychology, up 20 percent; Slavic Languages and Literatures, down 35 percent. In a moment of crisis, a whole department can find itself virtually studentless almost overnight. Some maneuverability may be gained by lopping off the sixty-five-year-olds and hiring nontenured personnel. But what happens when a whole department is tenured and dead on its feet, when student interest has passed it by? A report circulated within one of the city colleges states the problem in tautological phraseology:

In the last several years student academic and career goals have changed with relatively significant impacts in some areas and with lesser impact in others. For example, a comparative analysis of undergraduate-student declared major preferences indicates that from Fall 1968 to Fall 1972 six majors—Biology, Early Childhood Education, Economics, Elementary Education, English, and Psychology—have consistently ranked among the top ten in terms of popularity. Conversely, History, Mathematics, and Romance Languages dropped from that category in Fall 1972 and were replaced by Accounting, Art, and Communication Arts and Sciences. These trends have also had an effect upon the desirability of various electives and therefore on general student choice patterns.

Unable to forecast student preferences, an administrator must nevertheless allocate positions and budget lines among departmental fiefs. The cost accountant is summoned. How many customers are needed per professor in order to break even? How many constitute a fair work load? If a department has a good sales record, it is

ultimately awarded a greater number of professors. The economic pinch is felt by both the private and the public universities today. How does one cut the pie into reasonably unequal segments? The consequence is antagonism, not always subterranean, between one university and another, between schools within the university, between departments within a school, and between specializations within a department. There are times when the Hobbesian state of nature seems convincingly descriptive of academic life in megalopolis. A measure of departmental rivalry has been endemic in the American university, but the competitiveness that becomes blatant in bad times makes one long for a bit of gentlemanly camouflage.

In undergraduate education throughout the country in recent years there had been a general trend away from requiring an overall course in Western European history, which used to be a mainstay of the four-year liberal arts college. For a long time this development was proceeding rather sluggishly in New York City, and curricula re-examinations were infrequent in the large, unwieldy urban complexes—until the student uprisings and their demands for “relevance.” Now this has radically changed. In faculty committee hearings held individually in the various institutions over the past six years, nobody could make out a convincing case for insisting on the study of one subject rather than another. In defense of an antiquated tradition of memorizing a certain number of names and dates, historians mumbled words about preserving the cultural heritage of the West. But why was history more vital than anthropology, or psychology, or sociology? others asked. Only Columbia has preserved a “Contemporary Civilization” course with its enduring James Harvey Robinson flavor, though it is hardly acclaimed with enthusiasm by the student body.

In those colleges where a distribution requirement modeled after a Chinese-American menu was instituted, students in massive numbers have shied away from history, whether it called itself a humanity or a social science. Many established colleges—for example, the private Washington Square College of New York University and the public Queens College of CUNY (manifestly among the “elitist” of the municipal colleges in terms of the high-school scores of its students)—have today no requirements at all outside the field of concentration and few within it, except for a course in English composition. It is thus theoretically possible to be graduated from either place without exposure to the historical dimension of existence in any form. Some two-year community colleges offer the option of an ethnic study or a semester of Western civilization. Since most of the students, public and private, come from the New York area, where in public high schools the past in the form of history is submerged in “social studies” that deal only with “real live current issues,” the emancipation of the new college generation in New York from Western culture is virtually complete, despite the hundreds of millions of dollars devoted to higher education.

For their part, history departments have exhibited a marked tendency toward the sclerotic, and only under the violent impact of precipitous drops in comparative enrollment have they manifested any interest in rejuvenation, in withdrawing courses, revamping them, or adding new fields. In their travail some are struggling at least to give an appearance of renewal. But since their behavior is often mere expedient response to an external stimulus, the results can be faddish and ill-conceived. It is debatable whether history course offerings have changed intrinsically over the years, even since the 1968 upheavals. There have been few, if any, startling or successful innovations; the students attracted by them have by no means compen-

sated for those liberated by the abolition of requirements; and, in sum, history has been demoted from its former position as number-two boy (a place it still holds at Columbia, however) to number-six, -eight, even -ten. History-teaching in the high schools has stifled any nascent interest in the subject and left the student feeling surfeited with a meaningless jumble of names and dates. He has "had" history and wants to try something new like psychology. Perhaps a society fixated on the dynamism of change is in any case fundamentally hostile to absorption with historical culture.

In a few of the municipal institutions, bitter strife has been the outcome of attempts to introduce new courses in an effort to maintain a viable competitive position vis-à-vis other departments. In some of the more staid private institutions, departments *in extremis* have belatedly begun to cosmeticize their programs. The word "social" now appears in catalogues quite indiscriminately; ethnicity is emphasized to curry favor; the role of women and the words "revolution" and "working classes" are paraded as enticements, even as physics departments confronted by catastrophic losses have resorted to "physics and astrology" and similar appeals to current fads. Madison Avenue triumphs. It is not a sin to prettify your course, to enhance and advertise its charms, they say. And a superannuated dame like Clio may have to lay on the make-up with a trowel.

Behind the façade of novelty, most of the actual teaching and the examinations are as stereotyped as ever. A chronological segment of some national history is "covered" in a semester. Much of the dreary tranquility in history department faculties during prosperous times was insured by the tidy, if stultifying, way in which the territorial and chronological turf was parceled out. It also encouraged methodological isolation and superficiality in historical studies. In a time of troubles, historians become painfully aware of one another's activities. Whose territory should be submerged first?

Though desiccated political history epitomized in textbooks is in obvious and imminent peril, it is difficult for old dogs to learn new tricks, and ensconced aging professors may try to vote down anything that overturns established routines. In one municipal college department a recent attempt at a drastic revision of the history catalogue was defeated in a generational division—the under-fifties were for it, the over-fifties, who were in a majority, against. Open admissions had brought large numbers of students who were constrained to acquire elementary skills in reading and writing through remedial courses and to go through intermediate courses that would provide them with basic knowledge in a subject before they could be admitted to the normal undergraduate curriculum. The history department is reputed to have lagged behind other major areas, such as English, in devising the needed educational forms. It was hampered by dissension between radicals and conservatives, politically and educationally, but the more fundamental bifurcation was between old and young. The old hands had developed courses on the basis of a chronological chunk of a Western country (big chunk for European nations, smaller chunks for the homeland because there was less to divide) and were reluctant to adopt newfangled notions.

If there is any discernible real change in the curriculum it is one that has been imposed from the outside: the drift to contemporaneity and provincialism. The most recent period, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and American history have snowed under all other offerings. In its zeal to become a more or less advanced form of newspaper reading, history will not be outdone by social studies or politics. But in

no department in the city is a student offered an imaginative introduction to new historical ways and a genuine taste of the variety of new subject matter such as presented in the *Dædalus* volume devoted to *Historical Studies Today*. There is no excitement in the profession—that is the reluctant conclusion of one aging historian.

If we turn to the subject of graduate education in history, we are bedeviled with a different set of problems, though what happens to the professional training of teaching-writing historians is closely intertwined with changes in the nature of the undergraduate curriculum.

In the past, Bundy money has hardly discouraged the production of doctorates in history, which became almost rabbit-like in New York City. In 1971-1972, 101 Ph.D.s were granted in history, a number that increased by about 30 percent in 1972-1973. One would shrink from extrapolating this figure to the year 2000. We are not likely to be confronted by this eventuality, however, because the national job market in the field has collapsed. As of the academic year 1972-1973, 685 students were still enrolled in nonpublic doctoral degree programs in history and 182 in public programs.⁵ This large number of persons recruited for a professional activity with extremely limited possibilities raises in an acute form questions that should have been considered long ago. How many of these students have the capability of becoming creative scholars who in the course of their lives will make important contributions to the recovery and understanding of our cultural past? And how many of them are merely going through the exercise of preparing doctoral dissertations when they are highly unlikely to devote themselves to anything other than teaching in community colleges or secondary schools? Even those who add a bit of research now and then will not be advancing beyond the antiquarian activity of previous societies. A more embarrassing question: Are all the persons presently engaged in directing doctoral dissertations necessarily equipped for the task by virtue of the fact that they have survived a similar doctoral initiation? Many of these titled historians have neither published nor perished.

The state, of course, has not dispensed its munificence to universities without exercising due vigilance. During the current academic year, it deputed small groups of respected historians from other parts of the country to spend two days visiting graduate departments in the several universities. All will be graded and found wanting, as they should be—though there was probably no opportunity to sample the crowning achievements of the Lower Hudson Historical School, the 130 doctoral dissertations prepared in New York City last year. Perhaps in some future age, evaluating the content of these dissertations will be assigned to a Reader (a mechanical one will by then have been invented), and the state will deduct a dollar from the applicable Bundy Bounty every time the machine balks.

There is no reason why the schooling of a historian should be less arduous and demanding than that of a ballet dancer, a trombone player, or a general practitioner in medicine. Nothing is amiss with educating competent history teachers through the master's degree and even some form of further certification. But if this perfectly laudable purpose is confused with that of rigorously training scholars who are to become historians engaged in a life-work of active research and publication, the few promising students are short-changed, their enthusiasm turned to tedium as they suffer through the uninspired reports of the plodders and those who might better spend their time learning to be ingenious interpreters of the past to youngsters in high schools, junior colleges, and even four-year colleges. In a graduate history seminar the handicaps of numbers are obvious. Neither the gifted students nor their

professors are strained to the limits of their capacities. And so it ends with bad scholarship driving out the good.

It may be objected that there is no harm in including in a doctoral program those destined exclusively to teaching, in introducing them to refined historical methods and in sharpening their critical perceptions. But the harm lies in dilution and distraction. Virtual open enrollment of paying customers for the Ph.D. in history should be rejected even by an ardent advocate of open admissions at the undergraduate level. Complete open enrollment for graduate degrees does not yet exist. But for how long will private institutions be able to turn away a student with a B.A. who comes bearing the \$7,000 to \$8,000 it costs him to get the doctorate—to say nothing of Bundy money? Without a large number of paying customers, graduate departments as they are now constituted in private universities can rarely hope to pass the scrutiny of the budgetary Cerberus who speaks the language of economic survival. If entrance and exit standards are too lofty, customers will be repelled.

Today graduate education in history, as in many other fields, is trying to serve wholly different ends with one comprehensive program. But serious graduate training of professional scholars cannot be integrated with that of high-school teachers whose principal aim is continuing education, personal adornment, or promotion in the city school system (through the acquisition of graduate credits). The need for an educational division between those who will be teachers alone and those who will become teacher-scholars has been raised often enough before. Now the problem has been brought to a head by the uncritical acceptance of doctoral candidates and a sudden evaporation of posts of any kind for historians. The only justification for pushing so many half-educated, half-capable students through the graduate mill to the doctorate seems to be to keep institutional wheels grinding. Instead of granting bounties for all doctorates, public bodies should invest in a group that will either produce work of significance or be disbanded. The plaudits should be reserved for those departments that deny degrees, not those that proliferate them. Perhaps a Triple H payment patterned after the agricultural Triple A program would induce underploughing. But a far more sweeping reformation is required than mere self-restraint on the part of our institutions of higher learning.

In some graduate fields in arts and sciences initial steps have already been taken by universities in the area to form consortia—a wretched label coming into vogue that is odiously suggestive of international cartel arrangements—providing for exchange of professors and permitting students to take occasional courses at fellow institutions. While this may fill lacunae and avoid replication in present programs, it ignores the fundamental issue of the quality and objectives of higher education in the city, both for teachers and for teacher-scholars. There does not exist a critical mass of historical excellence at upper faculty levels, nor a critical mass of potential teacher-scholars, in any single university in New York. Graduate history departments in the universities of our city should bite the bullet. Let them accept a small number of first-rate students for the doctorate; let the state authorities support them with fellowships (it would be less costly than Bundy money); and let the students spend their time in an advanced research institute to which all the universities of New York would contribute. For the other students, programs leading to certificates of higher teacher training would be in order. No matter how painful the loss of illusions and pretensions and how awkward the adjustments to a new system, it is time to get out of the business of producing shoddy degrees under duress.

One scholarly center or institute for history, financed by private and public funds, would suffice for the whole area. A faculty could be marshaled from the best historians in New York's colleges and universities, and a group of carefully screened students could be associated with them. Such a center would be a far cry from the traditional research institute, which can become an old men's home that breeds animosities. This institute would be a place where groups of faculty members and students might pose for themselves broad questions for a given period of time, where they might work together on common subjects, where the isolation of much graduate teaching would be counteracted. Graduate study in history should be a lively apprenticeship, as it is in the most creative branches of science. And if Clio is banished from undergraduate education in New York City, she would find sanctuary in the institute of higher learning.

Clearly the bureaucratic problems entailed in such a utopian plan would make the establishment of the Common Market a cinch by contrast. Who would determine which professors should participate in the new program? How much of their time and of the students' time should be allocated to it? What subjects would be taught? What would be the criteria for selecting students? And what would be the fate of the historians who were left behind? At the present moment, as Thomas More would have put it, proposals such as these are easier to wish for than to have any hope of seeing realized.

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MORTON W. BLOOMFIELD

Elitism in the Humanities

THE STRONG SURGE for equality in our society over the past ten years, transforming a small wave almost into a *tsunami*, has had a powerful impact on education and, in particular, the humanities. It has manifested itself in various ways: in demands for open admissions, for no grades, for more courses in non-Western cultures, and in attacks against elitism. The opposition in society between freedom and equality, always in uneasy equilibrium, seems to be undergoing a major shift in both education and society. It is important, if one is concerned about the future of education, to try to come to grips with one of the crucial issues involved in this shift—the matter of elitism.

Although the word *elite*¹ goes back to Middle English, its present sense as “the choice part or flower (of society, or of any body or class of persons)” is not found before the early nineteenth century. The Italian social theorist Pareto in the early part of our century helped to popularize the term in intellectual circles with his theory of elites, and it has been used in the social sciences increasingly since the 1950s. C. Wright Mills in the 1950s gave the term wide currency. The *Oxford English Dictionary* does not even list the generic noun *elitism* or the corresponding adjective *elitist*; nor does the *American Heritage Dictionary*, which appeared in 1969. The first time I believe I heard these terms used was in December 1968 at the Modern Language Association convention in New York. Their present popularity is due to their adoption by the “New Left” movement, but they have burst their confines and are widely employed at present. These words are so used because they fit a need—the sudden awareness and consciousness of what had previously been taken for granted: the existence of groups with privileges not available to everyone and of superior or specialized frames of mind. *Elitism* came into English as a pejorative term, and it still continues to bear that aura. In some circles, it is strongly pejorative as when *elitism* is used to contrast unfavorably with *participatory democracy*; in others, a less unfavorable sense of the word prevails.

Elitism is also the attitude of mind that believes in the necessity of specialization and hierarchy—of specialists and experts. It is opposed to that frame of mind that stresses the equality of all men in all respects and the necessity of the equal distribution of all goods and political power as a goal. The economic and political side of the notion, I shall not be concerned with here. I am here pondering whether some kind of specialization or expertise is necessary in American universities and, above all, whether elitism in some sense is inevitable in the humanities.

The emphasis on and criticism of “elitism” are important cultural facts of our time. Equality is not a new notion. The effects of political “equality” on other forms of inequality were a concern of Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. Suddenly, however, it has become a major concern of social thinking, and in this country the importance Christopher Jencks and John Rawls give it in their recent books only in-

dicates the way the wind is blowing. The current criticism of elitism stems from the sudden awareness of the inequalities in our society and their possible incompatibility with our professed commitment to political equality.

This country was built on the idea that equality in political matters was possible even given the natural inequality of men because all normal men, regardless of their special expertise, were considered capable of making moral judgments. Jefferson wrote: "State a moral case to a ploughman & a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules."² But Jefferson said a "moral" case; he would not have thought that the ploughman would have the right or even ability to settle all issues. The problem is that the humanities are connected with the moral element in mankind, and hence it is more difficult to justify elitism there, if it is indeed necessary, than it is in other less general matters.

The protests against elitism in our time reflect the breakdown of certain values in our society and a refusal to accept as necessary certain kinds of hierarchy. A society which does not question its elites or most of its elites is a society which more or less accepts its dominant values. Values and beliefs are most firmly accepted when it is not realized that they are being accepted.

Two of the continuing influences of the failed student and New Left movements of the 1964-71 period have been their notion of equality and their attacks on elitism. These attacks have been tempered somewhat in their intensity, but they have certainly persisted in the general consciousness—above all, in the university. The academic profession and the "elite" schools have been attacked generally, even by such establishment papers as *The New York Times*. I have little doubt that these notions will continue to be with us for some time, for the more romantic anarchist left and men of good liberal will can unite on this issue. Although the humanities have borne the brunt of the attack, I believe that some form of elitism in the humanities is inevitable.

The critique of elitism will continue to be with us because it fits in with other long-standing aspects of American life and certain other developments in our time. Aristocratic manners and virtues have long been suspect in America. The humanities in the eighteenth century were in great measure the handmaidens of the aristocracy, who felt, perhaps weakly, that they must support the arts. To an expanding and upwardly mobile society still hierarchically organized, the arts were useful. They enabled one to carry on witty conversations, to write a letter, to know one's own and others' places, to have appropriate aphorisms and quotations at one's command. Science, as we know it, was then the work of eccentrics and had no social value at all. The humanities served a useful function. The overthrow or absence of an aristocracy, however, weakened the practical value of the humanities. From the Renaissance on, the humanities had also meant the classics, and admiration for Latin and Greek culture was widespread until fairly recent times. The Romantic Movement led to a new stress on the artist and poet, and the nineteenth century found a new substitute for religion in art. This romantic ideal helped to support the humanities as art which counteracted, to some extent, the general suspicion of the subject.

A country like the United States was established by a revolution with all that it implies. In individual terms, it is the killing of the father, the father who stands for the past—its history and tradition. Inasmuch as history is or at least has been the core of the humanities, the overthrow of the father is partially the overthrow of

history. In some cases, it means the overthrow of recent history and the return to the original, the pure, the real history which has been corrupted. In others, it means looking only toward the future. B. F. Skinner, who is committed to progress, once said to me that when one is on the branches of a tree, one must look upward. Why worry how you got there? This attitude sums up the classic antihistorical point of view. In periods of change or hoped-for change, history becomes a burden. It is not accidental that in the past ten years futurology has become a discipline, for it is the antithesis of history and tradition. Built into the revolutionary stance is a suspicion of history, either in part or completely, and hence of the humanities.

Some men, on the other hand, hoped to justify history and did. The nineteenth century began to turn to history and the idea of progress, and to some extent history was justified by its self-transcendence. Some, too, like Jefferson wished to capture the past for the Revolution. Yet the bias against history was strong in our country and in recent years has increased.³

Furthermore, it was also generally felt that culture was for snobs, lotharios, and women; that it was useless for real men who had real tasks. The teachers and professors spoke a strange language, not like that of the folk. The school marm was both parochial and feared. Her ferule taught us to know, but her knowledge was bookish. It was not like knowledge of farming or craftsmanship. Its results—once reading, writing, and arithmetic were acquired—were dubious and only created “uppishness.” Clergymen needed Latin and perhaps some Greek or Hebrew, but who else did?

Earlier the humanities in America, following Scottish habit, meant basically the classics. In the twenties, however, the word came to indicate other disciplines like literature, art history, languages, philosophy, and to some extent history.⁴ The awareness of their distinctiveness was created by the rise of behaviorism and the social sciences. They came into existence as a separate branch of learning to defend themselves against another branch, and in this country they have borne the marks of an inferiority complex. The widespread literacy and increase in education both encouraged the humanities because they consisted of accessible subjects and at the same time vulgarized them. The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of education, and Jakob Burckhardt saw “the demand for education as a right of man” as “the greatest innovation in the world.”⁵ Like most successes, however, it helped to lower standards and made accommodation inevitable.⁶ Equal grades for all came to be felt in some centers as a right along with the right to attend institutes of higher education.

The technological innovations of the twentieth century made the spread of education possible and at the same time created a large semieducated class who took the past for granted and sought only a superficial and vocationally oriented education. The rise of mass education, with the attendant equation of a college degree with a higher income, created difficulties for the non-vocationally oriented humanities. The virtues of learning, of a knowledge of tradition, of the value of reasoned argument, and of word-oriented study could no longer be taken for granted and had to be reargued and rethought, not necessarily a bad thing. The mass movement toward higher education has only recently begun to peak, and the rate of population growth as well as general disillusionment will probably reduce in the future the numbers of youth seeking an “education.” This prospect makes the necessity of adult and extramural education even more attractive. After all, the great books of the world were not written only for young people. The humanities and

humanity-oriented sciences have, however, taken the brunt of this mass movement, making them more open to attacks of elitism.

The scientific disciplines, to use an adjective which is not intended to imply that science is necessarily unhumanistic, began to produce visible results. The mystique of science could be accepted because it enabled man to possess more and to control more. Although the motives of the scientists were often the same as those of the humanists—to learn about the universe—science could be accepted because of its spectacular results, such as television, lasers, X-rays, and atom bombs. But what did the mystique of the humanities produce? Only a supposed awareness of the significance of culture which could not be simply expressed and which created useless as opposed to useful elites.

The expansion of knowledge has contributed to making scholarship arcane. Societies always have elites with supposed or real arcane learning, but in the past the populace was generally willing to accept the inaccessibility of such learning. Now the many do not. More people are literate; the hieroglyphs in the books can be read. The enormous increase in knowledge has recreated a mystical elite, but many will no longer accept these elites. The easy accessibility of knowledge has combined with the visual imagery of television, movies and journalism to dilute affection for the word. One does not have to read much to keep up to date or to entertain oneself. The book is certainly not on its way out, but there is no doubt that our culture is less book-oriented than it once was. Thus, although the culture has become more oral and visual and less verbal, the humanities remain word-oriented and largely use exegesis as their method. Any diminution of interest in words implies a diminution in the interest in the humanities and a closer elite of participants. The orality of our culture with its more natural openness increases suspicion of the elite.

The humanities superficially seem easy to understand, and in some ways they are. Any difficulty on this point seems to be especially irritating because of the feeling that the humanities are open to all. In the mind of the general public, the arts and humanities are confused. The humanities are great painting and music and hence are accessible at least on some level to everyone. The humanist talks about understanding, but the general populace is willing to accept this argument only up to a point. It is obvious to them that talking about something that does not need to be talked about is especially unnecessary and even infuriating. The language of the humanists is not always easy to understand, and they seem to many to be high priests of the obvious and keepers of open gates.

Although the humanities have not been subjected to jargon to the same extent as the social sciences, nonetheless the papers and speeches of humanists are often hard to read. Their jargon, insofar as it is a jargon, seems especially useless. The attack on a subject is often an attack on its language.⁷

The humanists were the modern monks who did not provide either material or spiritual bread. If the "intellectual's work—at the least the work which he regards as his true or real work—is different in fundamental ways from that of most of the rest of the human species,"⁸ he becomes a magic, secretive figure. He is withdrawn from the rest of humanity without any real justification so far as one can see. Moreover, although the humanistic faculty usually did not cut itself off from undergraduate teaching as much as did the science faculties, nonetheless there was in the larger research-oriented universities a tendency to concentrate overmuch on graduate teaching and research at the cost of undergraduate instruction.

The root subject of the humanities is history. The nineteenth century in general did have some faith in history and in progress, a faith now widely lost. Attempts to substitute a universal human nature as the basis for the human sciences and the humanities are now well under way—in anthropology, linguistics, religion, law, literary study, philosophy, and so forth. The deep structure of the human mind is replacing history as the unifying factor in human studies. No longer do we have a belief in progress in history; no longer the concept of the hero. It is not possible for a modern Hegel to say “no man is a hero to his valet . . . not because the hero is not a hero, but because the valet is a valet.” Marx built his revolutionary philosophy on a philosophy of history. Today leftist ideologists are trying to build a revolutionary Marxism on deep structure and universal human nature. Formerly in classic Marxism, formalism and deep psychology were considered fascistic.⁹ Now they are the basis of the future.

The replacement of the end by means, by the tools or instruments, so characteristic of our time can be seen in the rise of semiotics, communication theory, the speech-act approach to linguistics, McLuhanism, the spread of literary theory, textology, and analytic philosophy. An old-time Marxist like Henri Lefebvre writes: “*Les idéologies de la fonction (fonctionnalisme), de la forme (formalisme), de la structure (structuralisme) ont ceci de commun avec le scientisme et le positivisme, qu’elles se donnent pour non-idéologiques. Le processus d’idéologisation est pourtant assez clair; il consiste en une extrapolation—reduction. L’idéologie transforme en absolu un concept partiel et une vérité relative.*”¹⁰ Many of these “*idéologies de la fonction*” are now Marxist and revolutionary.

The new revolt against history, which began in the late nineteenth century with Nietzsche, has become a veritable stream. This repudiation of the past as past is not only a sign of revolutionary change, but will also create new elites. The rising elites use the charge of elitism to replace what they consider to be an outworn elite. Yet the past can be both used and abused. It can be used for the future and life as Nietzsche said, as well as for the past and death. History does, as Lord Acton has written, emancipate us from the past, but it can also emancipate us from the present. History is needed as both prod and pacifier. History viewed by the Daughters of the American Revolution does not reveal the same picture as history viewed by academic historians, for history can be used both to mythologize and to demythologize.¹¹ With the intensification of antihistoricism and the greater emphasis on structure and universals, elitism and the sense of elitism in the humanities will increase. History and progress were at least open to everyone. Deep structure needs probing and cannot get automatic acceptance. Quarrels over the content of this structure and of the psyche will increase. The facts of history are one thing; the “facts” of universal psychology another. Even if the “facts” of history are tainted with ideologies and difficult to establish, there is some court of appeal.

Furthermore, there is an increasing pessimism about the future of the world that is linked to the revolt against history. Modern pessimism can be traced at least back to Swift and Voltaire, and in Germany, the home of modern pessimism, there is a line of despair running through Hegel, Schopenhauer, Burckhardt, Nietzsche, Spengler, Döblin, Musil, Herman Hesse, and Gottfried Benn to Gunter Grass.¹² But the stream has become a torrent in our time, assailing even countries like the United States, which, in the past, had been relatively insulated against such gloomy thoughts.¹³ Today the American intellectual and part of the American public are, like their European counterparts, basically pessimistic about the future.¹⁴

Pessimism as well as economic troubles, fear for the environment, food and raw material shortages are excellent breeding grounds for despair. And despair leads to the questioning of current values as well as current elites.

History, however, creates ambiguities in man's mind. Man wishes both to repudiate and to embrace the past. The tide at present is running against history, perhaps only because we follow a very historically conscious age. The eighteenth century detached history from the tradition in which it served both to support claims on the past and to provide examples and exemplars. The nineteenth century developed a "science" of history which attempted to be value free and to discover the facts—"wie es eigentlich war." The genetic approach became the normal method of understanding man and his works and to some extent, as in evolution and geology, nature. We are riding a wave of reaction to pan-historicism.

Yet even in an age like ours, which largely repudiates the historical approach, history is by no means dead. It is true that literature is now much more than the study of the history of literature, music more than musicology, religion more than religious history, and linguistics more than comparative philology. Even history is no longer historical (that is, narrative), what with cliometrics and psycho-history. Yet a new and exciting journal in the literary field is called *New Literary History*, and Indo-European studies is no longer moribund, but flourishing as never before. Chomsky finds his ancestors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His defense of the tradition is noteworthy; only his immediate predecessors in linguistic theory are the enemy.

Thus, history is by no means dead, although certain forms of it are undergoing great difficulties. Man cannot repudiate his past, because he would thereby repudiate himself and all he stands for. Support is welcome to him, and when history affords that support, he can rejoice. The passing of a historicist age is not the passing of history.

The humanities suffer especially from the charge of elitism for various reasons—some internal and some external. The internal are due to the nature of the humanities and the external to the dominant forces of our age, as far as they can be isolated. The charge is not due to the nature of the humanists who are surely no more wicked, selfish, and greedy than other men. But the humanities *qua* humanities can produce no "practical" results at present. Moreover, because their subject-matter seems easy, abstruse reasoning concerning it seems especially heinous. And, too, the public mind confuses the humanities with the arts. In a non-verbal and oral age, the humanities rely heavily on history and depend primarily on words, especially printed words. The humanities are so situated intellectually as to suffer most from the decline of the historical point of view, from the move to orality and visuality. Their investment is in illumination and understanding rather than in problem-solving and technological solutions.

With the rise of protests against elitism, the problem the humanities pose for humanists has changed its emphasis. In the period from say 1919 to about 1965, the humanists saw the sciences as their main enemy. Men like I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and John Crowe Ransom worried about the spread of scientism and the scientific point of view. It was to them and many others a question of the sciences versus the humanities. Today the issue looks different. Now science itself is also under attack. It is clear that learning in all its forms can be the enemy to those who believe that humanists and scientists have forsaken their proper goals to such an extent that no specialization is justified.

Today it is not only the humanists who feel they are being attacked, but also scientists in the natural and social fields. For practically the first time since the 1880s, the AAAS and other comparable groups are on the defensive and are much concerned with the public image of science. The humanities, however, are in a special situation and are more vulnerable than the sciences to a charge of elitism because of their subject matter and their lack of concrete results.

There are several possible reactions to this situation, and all have been adopted at various times by various institutions. The humanists can resolutely open their gates to everyone and make courses as easy as possible. They can retire into their cocoons and maintain standards in the face of obloquy and declining enrollments. They can cut down on scholarship and research and adopt Frank Manuel's proposed solution for the New York City area universities.¹⁵ Or they can maintain standards, but take the initiative to defend learning and attempt to impress on our culture a true understanding of the various attitudes and solutions embedded in the humanities. Perhaps some kind of division should be made between community colleges, undergraduate institutions, and graduate schools. I cannot pretend to give the correct answers here, but I think all students should be instructed to some extent in the humanities and the methods proper to them. That there may have to be differences and difficulties, I do not deny. But the details can be worked out. Furthermore, more emphasis must be put on teaching, but teaching without a serious grounding in scholarship is bound to fail. Standards must be maintained, although with some awareness of different demands. If the goal of the humanities is a reasoned approach to the world of man, then reason itself must not be dethroned.

The real question is not whether we have elites, but how we can understand and control this feature of modern society. We must ponder what we can do about elites rather than ask whether we need them.

If we are to continue to do research and to educate rather than train our students, elites of some sort are necessary. In fact, in a complex society some kind of distribution of labor is inevitable in all activities. A man has one life; he cannot do everything in forty productive years. Nor can we produce what we want to produce for an enormous population unless we divide the labor efficiently. A division of labor makes, in some sense, an elite necessary. Even a "primitive" society has a ruling elite. Participatory democracy can only work in small units, and our technology makes small units impracticable. Furthermore, "participatory" democracy is not necessarily more just than elitist democracy. Participatory democracy can be the rule of lynch law as well as a New England town meeting.

In an insightful article, Peter Kapitza has revealed how the U.S.S.R. trains its scientific elite.¹⁶ Kapitza does not worry at all about creating an elite, nor does he believe that those chosen for a scientific career need a broad general education. He assumes that an elite is necessary for the progress of science. In the home of socialism, he does feel obliged to explain or defend the notion that a proper and specialized elite will carry on basic scientific work.

What is likely to occur in America, above all in the universities, in the late twentieth century? It is clear that various forces will continue to transform the universities—the increasing number and influence of women, the broadening of educational opportunity (in spite of some setbacks), the larger numbers of non-Western students (a reflex of the great period of immigration¹⁷ now going on), the decline in the birth rate. These as well as other forces, both seeable and unseeable, will transform the university and, indeed, the whole educational process.

The world has never before really seen bisexual universities, nor has it ever seen such an attempt at mass education, elementary and advanced, as will soon be evident. This environment and the natural growth of specializations and knowledge will make the problem of elitism in the humanities in America more, not less, acute. The nature of the questions the humanists can or will pose will be changed. Humanist investigation will become more complex and intricate,¹⁸ assuming, of course, that no exclusive ideology will be imposed on the West.

The answer is not to pretend that elitism and its related specialization do not exist. It is rather to ask what can be done about them. Shutting our eyes to the problem of elitism will only exacerbate it and create the destruction we seek to avoid. The fragmentation of learning with its attendant elitism is upon us and will remain unless we deliberately impose a false order created by an ideology of truth.

The humanities should be the closest of the disciplines to humanity, and yet in some ways they are the farthest and most elite. They cannot support their mystique by immediate results; they cannot, for example, come up with insulin or a way to increase food production. But they can tell us that these "answers" will only produce more problems.

Humanists are in general concerned with solving certain questions about the texts they study or with illuminating the human condition. It is the latter which most men can theoretically best understand and which comes closest to justifying the humanities for society. But the particular problems—the most "useless" activity of the humanists—must also be defended. Just as pure science is necessary for applied science (and to some extent vice versa), the illumination and explanations J. L. Austin, Erwin Panofsky, C. Vann Woodward, Northrop Frye, Henry Nash Smith, W. J. Bate, and Meyer H. Abrams can bring must rest on exact scholarship. Although they only bring us wisdom, the generalists in the humanities are easiest to defend. But it is also necessary to defend the specialists.

With a declining birth rate and an old man's world facing us in forty years' time, these problems will be seen in a different perspective. An age of scarcity will pose problems different from those presented by an age of abundance. But America is still attracting immigrants and is still idealistic enough to see that elitism is not the enemy of progress and democracy; elitism will be, for both democracy and progress, the very condition of their being in the years to come—if it is the proper elitism which is open to those who are willing to join it and if it keeps its human goals in mind.

The understanding and exegesis of texts, the study of language and style, the awareness of the tradition and of wisdom, the recognition of values and complexity, the need to understand through knowledge, memory, and reason so as to alleviate the human condition in its most general form—these are the goals that can make elitism in its proper sense a blessing and not a curse. Education must be practical, but subjects must be practical in ways appropriate to them and practical only *in the last analysis*. The rush to practicality and the pretense of practicality only defeat the humanistic endeavor.

The emphasis on the contemporary and the recent leads to serious distortions. It is not merely that Chaucer and Donne are threatened when one neglects the past. Our sense of continuity and even of discontinuity is imperiled, and the long-range view—the distancing that comes from a knowledge of the tradition—is destroyed. Action becomes blind and meaningless unless it is backed by perspective and knowledge. Although perspective and knowledge can and often do lead to inaction,

they can also lead to action. What does being contemporary mean? It means knowing what alternatives are open to one and what can be done without destroying what is worthwhile. This knowledge comes only from reflection and from a knowledge of the tradition, or traditions, if you will.

If we are to have physics, we must accept with it a symbolical language of great difficulty. If we are to have history, philosophy, literature, and art as subjects, we must also have their symbolic languages and put up with some of their difficulties. We must strive to open the humanities to the public, but we must remember that some of their territory is difficult and requires a specialization that not all are ready to undertake. Research and scholarship also belong to knowledge and the humanities. Some institutions must exist for their sake. We cannot expect perfection, and bad scholarship and criticism will always be with us, as they are with all disciplines and study. We must judge by the best and by the attempt to broaden our knowledge.

The recognition that we cannot expect perfect elites or that humans do not always live up to their ideals is itself an insight that only the elitist humanities can give us. One must know something to change things. Karl Marx transformed the world more by sitting in the British Museum till the boils came than by going out and leading the various movements of the nineteenth century. Withdrawal for the sake of return must always be the goal. But the justification of an elite for the humanities must be that they are in the last analysis practical and supremely worthwhile in themselves. The elitism of the humanities is not the elitism of Fascism or Communism, nor the Kafkaesque elitism of bureaucrats and technologists, but the elitism of the human for the enrichment of mankind, even if not everyone reaches that goal.

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3. See C. Vann Woodward, "The Future of the Past," *American Historical Review*, vol. 75 (1969-70), pp. 711-726.
4. See John Higham, "The Schism in American Scholarship," *American Historical Review*, vol. 82 (1966-67), pp. 1-21.
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7. "Defiance of society includes defiance of its language," T. Adorno, *Prisms*, trans. 1965 (London: Spearman, 1967; original 1955), p. 225.
8. Charles Frankel, "The Humanist Intellectual at the Barricades," *Bulletin, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. 27, no. 3 (Dec. 1973), p. 21.
9. See, for example, G. Lukacs, "The Tragedy of Modern Art," *Essays on Thomas Mann*, trans. Stanley Mitchell (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), p. 70. The *Tel Quel* group in France provides a good example of structural (that is, nonhistorical) Marxism.
10. *La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 185.

11. J. H. Plumb distinguishes the past and history—the past supports authority and controls classes and elites. History, on the other hand, exists “to cleanse the story of mankind from the deceiving visions of a purposeful past.” See his *Death of the Past* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 50.
12. See Christoph Eykman, *Geschichtspessimismus in der deutschen Literatur des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Berne and Munich: Francke Verlag, 1970).
13. Yet note Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Henry Adams, and so on.
14. See the recent book by Roberto Vacca, *The Coming Dark Age*, trans. J. S. Whale (New York: Doubleday, 1973). (Original *Il Medioevo prossimo ventura*, 1971.) The root of modern pessimism is in the United States, Vacca argues. The last chapter deals with monastic communities which will save civilization for the future. Note the title of David Ormsby Gore, Lord Harlech's Radnor Lectures of 1965, *Must the West Decline?* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966).
15. See Frank E. Manuel's essay, “Clio Vanishes from New York City,” in this issue, pp. 126-27.
16. Peter Kapitza, “Basic Factors in the Organization of Science and How They Are Handled in the U.S.S.R.,” *Dædalus* (Spring 1973), pp. 167-176.
17. It is reported that there are more Thai doctors practicing or working in New York than in Thailand. Daniel P. Moynihan writes, “the United States is quietly but rapidly resuming its role as a nation of first- and second-generation immigrants, almost the only one of its kind in the world, incomparably the largest, and for the first time in our history, or any other, a nation drawn from the entire world,” *Commentary*, vol. 57, no. 5 (May, 1974), p. 30.
18. Hannah Arendt spoke of the complexities of the nineteenth century when she wrote, “The intellectual had come to live in a world in which his mind and his tradition of thought were not even capable of asking adequate meaningful questions let alone giving answers to its own perplexities,” in *Between Past and Future* (New York: Viking Press, 1961), p. 9.

GERALD F. ELSE

Some Ill-Tempered Reflections on the Present State of Higher Education in the United States

ALTHOUGH THE QUERULOUS tone of these remarks may be due to nothing more than advancing age, I notice that others younger than I have expressed dissatisfaction with our schools, even to the point of suggesting that they be abolished. There does seem to be something wrong; what is it?

So far as American higher education is concerned, I see three large things wrong (no time to talk about all the smaller ones):

1. Increasing uncertainty about the essential purpose of higher education—namely, to train our students to make better moral and political *choices*.
2. Increasing emphasis on passive study of *abstractions*, with corresponding neglect of arts (= skills) and affective and sensuous elements.
3. Increasing *monolingualism* = ethnocentrism = American *hybris*.

These three faults are interconnected, and all are related to the present domination of the college curriculum by the social sciences.¹

What is the function of education? According to the long-established American view, "to prepare for life." But what kind of life? Even in our technological society, scholars, intellectuals, and technicians bulk small in comparison with the masses of plain people. Hence "life" in the canonical phrase must mean some kind of practical rather than narrowly intellectual or technical activity; and the practical activity that particularly characterizes man² is that of moral and political choice. (I am naturally enough speaking Aristotelian language here.)

This cardinal point was, of course, well known to the founders of our republic. Their college curriculum, above and beyond the further study of certain "foreign" languages, was heavily devoted to training in the arts of argument, logic, and rhetoric; and the purpose of rhetoric was well understood: to persuade the hearer to make certain practical—that is, moral or political rather than metaphysical or technical—choices. To make them was, in any case, his natural duty and privilege as man and citizen.

We have changed all that. In the modern college curriculum most, sometimes practically all, of the student's time is spent not in active training for persuasion or expression, but in passive learning of abstract ideas. The aim is not doing but knowing; and that, to the modern mind, connotes knowing abstractions. (There is another quite different sense of knowing—namely, knowing how to do something, as the musician knows how to play the piano or the violin; but American higher education at present has little truck with such knowing except as a tolerated hobby for individual students.)

Not only is the drive mainly toward abstractions; it is reinforced by the increasing tendency of undergraduates to go on to graduate school. In part, this tendency springs simply from inertia: going on is the easiest course. In part, it springs from a justified feeling that "one can't do much with only an A.B." Whatever the motive, the structure of modern learning is rigidly departmentalized and rationalized, and graduate study is even more devoted to abstractions than collegiate study.

This trend is more marked in the undergraduate schools of major universities than in the old-established liberal arts colleges, but everywhere, I think, upperclass (that is, junior and senior) programs are increasingly cast in the graduate mold, culminating in the writing of a senior essay which is a kind of a junior Ph.D. dissertation. (It should be said in defense of both these kinds of essay that they do bring at least a partial release from the never-ending passivity of modern learning.)

Thus, to an increasing extent, undergraduate education is practical only in the limited sense that it prepares one for graduate work. But what about the larger idea, "preparation for life"? It is not dead among our students; on the contrary, it has supplied a good part of the motive power behind the recent clamor for "relevance" in education. Discounting some of the nonsense that has been talked under that slogan, there can be no doubt about the concerted rush of large numbers of college students, in the last ten years, into the social sciences, particularly sociology, political science, and psychology; and I think it cannot be denied that these students perceive the most serious questions of our time to be a mix of social, political, and personal problems. The actual choice of a field of concentration is governed by a combination of factors, not all of them very coherent, but all under the spell of certain equations: who says "social" says "sociology"; who says "political" says "political science"; who says "personal" says "psychology."

The young are not to be blamed for these equations. Under the modern, rationalistic parceling out of the intellectual domain, that is the way the direction signs point. He who has social, political, or personal concerns is *ipso facto* headed for the social sciences.

What he finds when he gets there is another matter. I am inclined to think that one reason for the explosion of violence on our campuses in the late 1960s, alongside Vietnam and other irritations, was the pent-up frustration of many students who had expected the social sciences to provide solutions to real problems—their problems—but found instead a new scholasticism, more interested in methods, models, statistical projections, test populations, and so forth, than the real world.

But do not the humanities, with their greater concreteness—steeped in the juices of literature and history—supply the needed alternative? Alas, not usually, or not in sufficient measure. For this default the humanities themselves are partly, but only partly, to blame.

Here we must point to a distinction which seems elementary, but is not always understood, between the ancient and the modern humanities. The latter³ are mere infants, none over a hundred years old, many of them not born until this century.⁴ And their late birth had a fateful consequence. These modern humanities began to appear just when the modern classificatory, segregationist spirit we spoke of above was beginning to dominate academic life. As a result, all that is left to them out of the full range of human concerns is language and literature, in the sense of *belles lettres*. Chénier, de Musset, Zola, Valéry are studied in French departments;

Lavoisier, Comte, Pasteur, Henri Poincaré are, in general, not (at least in the United States). *They* are science, not literature; *ergo*, not humanities.

This restriction of the modern humanities to language and literature has meant a corresponding intellectual impoverishment and loss of attractiveness to first-class student minds. Only special linguistic gifts or special childhood experiences can overcome this handicap.

"English" calls for a special note. Under current American conditions, the English department is residuary legatee for an indefinitely large number of young people who may or may not have literary temperaments, but in any case do not happen to like the social sciences or do not care for argumentation under artificial, tightly controlled conditions (philosophy) or have no particular interest in art (history of art) or the world before 1970 (history) or do not want the bother of learning a foreign language. Thus "English" is a residual area, not really definable or teachable as a whole.

The case of the classical humanities (which were *the* humanities until less than a hundred years ago) is different yet strangely similar. The genuine classical tradition was never simply belletristic; history, philosophy, political thought were always integral parts of it. But in the nineteenth century that older tradition fell prey—particularly in the United States—to an obsession with Greek and Latin grammar which effectively cost it its former central position in the curriculum. The old moral and political relevance of the Classics went glimmering, and they too threatened to decline into mere literature.⁵

Fortunately the real relevance of the Classics cannot be kept hidden for long. The spirit of the times calls for their content to be taught by specialists (ideological, not linguistic specialists), and so we find classical texts being expounded in half a dozen departments: philosophy, political science, English, speech, and so forth—and, of course, "everybody teaches Greek drama."

To return to the social sciences: The rush of students into them is an observable fact, and the motivation for it seems to me almost equally so. College students (and not only they⁶) tend to see the social sciences as possessing whatever wisdom we have about the things that matter, the great problems of man and society. But the great problems of man and society have to do with ends and means, goals and choices, moral and political principles and the things we must do in order to realize them. The social sciences (as such) not only have no store of wisdom on these matters, they are precluded by their own structure and methods from taking any real notice of them. Indeed, until very recently, even down to the present moment, a majority of social scientists would have indignantly rejected any suggestion that they should deal with "value-loaded" concepts. Science deals with facts, not values: so runs the prevailing wisdom.

All these phenomena are connected with the third major point I mentioned at the beginning: the growing monolingualism of American academia. And let it not be thought that I am referring only to our students. I am aware that few of them either can or ever do read anything in any foreign language; but I suspect that the same is true of the faculty. My own field is such a quaint survival that one cannot do serious work in it without reading at least two ancient and two modern languages—which is not to say that all classicists do so. How many scholars in English literature regularly read contributions from *Anglistik* or *Études anglaises*? How many philosophers are au courant in French or German or Italian or any other foreign language?

Foreign language: ah, there's the rub. For it has to be said that many Americans harbor, albeit unconsciously, a real aversion to studying foreign languages. Aside from the sheer labor involved (one cannot instantly master French irregular verbs or the intricacies of the subjunctive in Latin subordinate clauses on the basis of a few glorious general principles), there is a residual deep feeling that the problem would go away if these foreigners would just speak and write in English. This American prejudice is left over from the time a century or more ago when we had the task of teaching millions of immigrants, or their children, to speak English; when America did not mind being the Land of Opportunity, but could not and would not let itself become a Tower of Babel.

From that day to this the sense has persisted among us that knowing a foreign language is a sign of inferior status, the status of an immigrant. But observe how precisely this inverts the previous situation. Down to the nineteenth century, the only languages taught in schools or read in college (as distinguished from languages one picked up in travel or in business) were classical Greek and Latin; and classical Greek and Latin were not a mark of inferior status, they were the mark of an educated man and conferred superior social and intellectual prestige.

Aside from the snob values involved in this matter (and I doubt that snob values will ever be abolished from human society), Greek and Latin were the required ticket of admission to the higher world of literature and ideas. Moreover, not being languages spoken by any living people, they had the enduring power to remind the mighty of the earth that thoughts and insights had once been expressed in other tongues which were superior to their own. This sobering function was performed by Greek for the Roman Empire, by classical Latin for the Carolingian Empire, and by Greek and Latin for the British Empire in the nineteenth century. It was reserved for the American Empire of the twentieth century to have no such external point of reference, no higher instance, to correct its natural *hybris*.

This lack of a foreign corrective can be observed in every facet of American thought in our time; but nowhere is the deprivation more evident than in the social sciences. Our social scientists are apparently not aware that the categories and models they so confidently proclaim for most or all societies are those of mid-twentieth-century American society, uncorrected. No doubt few social scientists would go as far in public as a psychologist who once stated in my hearing that nothing worth reading in his field had been written in any foreign language in the past generation—"or, if it has, we can get it translated." But the underlying thought is still there.

It is not merely a matter of foreign languages. The essential *hybris* consists in thinking that American modes of thought, uncorrected by any reference to the broader experience of mankind, are the only right and viable ones; for thought is mediated by language and he who knows no language but his own is unaware that there *are* any other patterns than his own.

What can be done about this cluster of related trends? Very little, I am afraid, at least by any one individual. It is true that signs of hope are not altogether lacking. More and more young people are feeling their way toward a life-style that blends feeling with thought, concreteness with abstraction. But where this movement will lead is still anybody's guess. Will it end by joining forces with the academic humanities to rectify the overwhelming predominance of abstraction in higher education? Unlikely: the new trend seems too unorganized and idiosyncratic for that. As for American monolingualism, I see no real beacon of hope on the horizon.

Perhaps we shall have to play the game to the end before any change for the better can take place.

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1. In this essay, I am ignoring the natural sciences on the ground that they are not involved, at least not directly involved, in the crisis. For an argument bearing on the present essay, see the remarks by the author, "The Old and the New Humanities," *Dædalus*, vol. 98, no. 3 (Summer 1969), pp. 803-808.
2. The use of language among us is deteriorating so rapidly that I had better make one thing clear: in saying "man" I do not mean the male human being, but the human species. *Mensch*, not *Mann*, for those who happen to know German; *anthrōpos*, not *anēr*, for those who happen to know Greek. In short, I am not a male chauvinist.
3. English and other modern languages and literatures; philosophy; history of art; history (?); theater arts (?); speech (?); journalism (?).
4. The strict demarcation between humanities and social sciences (still unknown in many countries—for example, France) is even more recent. See John Higham, "The Schism in American Scholarship," *American Historical Review*, vol. 72 (1966), pp. 1-21.
5. Classical Studies in some of our major universities, with the ancillary disciplines of palaeography, archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, and so forth, has retained the encyclopaedic breadth of German *Altertumswissenschaft*, the scientific study of antiquity. But its breadth benefits scholarship, not life. Very damaging is the customary segregation of ancient history from Classics, in history departments.
6. It may or may not be significant that the first group of twelve journalists to be awarded National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowships at the University of Michigan, in 1973-74, showed relatively little interest in the humanities, sticking instead pretty closely to the social sciences, but six of the second group (for 1974-75) have opted for programs with substantial humanistic content. Could this reflect a Trend?

GORDON A. CRAIG

Green Stamp or Structured Undergraduate Education?

"WHAT WOULD YOU SAY about the University and Modern Life?" Horace Traubel asked Walt Whitman in 1914. "I wouldn't say anything," the poet replied, "I'd rather be excused."¹

One can sympathize with Whitman's attitude. So many people are speaking with such diverse voices about the plight and the dubious future of the university these days that anyone who is diffident about parroting conventional wisdom is inclined to stand aside. And yet, of course, the university's problems are real and cannot be ignored. On the financial side, they are so horrendous that some college administrators who worried a few years ago about the possibility of academic *enragés* burning the plant down may be wishing these days that they had actually done so, so that the institutions could have collected the insurance. And in their more essential aspect, in their function of providing liberal education for undergraduates, American colleges and universities are today increasingly threatened by the forces of incoherence, trendiness, and specialization.

A hundred years ago, in his Basel lectures on "The Future of Our Educational Institutions," Friedrich Nietzsche said gloomily, "Two tendencies, ostensibly opposed but in their effects equally destructive and finally conjoined in their results, are dominant in our present educational institutions, which were established on quite different foundations: on the one hand, the greatest possible expansion of education; on the other, the drive toward watering it down and weakening it."² At an earlier period, American educators who were confronted with that statement might have shrugged it aside as the remark of an atrabilious elitist who felt threatened by the growth of democracy. But only the other day, in a conference of academicians in New York, C. Vann Woodward came out on the same platform. In the last few years, he said, we have seen a progressive deterioration of standards in our centers of undergraduate education. The curriculum has "been trivialized and vulgarized and made relevant."³

If one takes a hard look at undergraduate programs, particularly in the larger universities, including those with the greatest prestige, it is difficult to deny the justice of this accusation. The process of decay had its roots in the proliferation of disciplines and the expansion of course offerings that took place in the years after 1945 and also, one supposes, in the disinclination of practitioners of some of the new disciplines to accept any system of priorities that might seem to cast doubt upon the importance of the subjects they were professing. I can remember an occasion some years ago when I tried to defend the old Western Civilization requirement against the attack of an angrily eloquent young psychologist who insisted that history had no more right to be a required subject for undergraduates than psychology. If I had had the wit, I might have answered him by citing a passage from Woodrow Wilson's

address on the occasion of Princeton University's one-hundred-fiftieth anniversary, in which the then professor of jurisprudence warned the new sciences against their tendency to be credulous of improvement and contemptuous of the past and reminded them that it was the duty of the university to bring an older wisdom to its charges. "The world's memory must be kept alive, or we shall never see an end of its old mistakes. We are in danger to lose our identity and become infantile in every generation."⁴ To have remembered this would have gratified me but otherwise served no useful purpose, for my antagonist was too outraged by the presumed slight to his discipline to tolerate preachments from the past. Nevertheless, I was convinced that his basic premise had no logical merit and that, were it accepted, it could only lead to the even faultier assumption that any learning experience is as valuable as any other.

Unfortunately, we have now come close to tacit acceptance of that second position. The insistence of the young, during the late 60s, that the university establishment did not understand them and their world found an all too eager agreement on the part of faculty members who should have known better. Suddenly the cry of relevance filled the land; curricular requirements were heedlessly jettisoned because someone said that they prevented the investigation of the real problems that confronted our society. We entered the age of the Green Stamp University, in which the student receives the same number of stamps for a course on Bay Area Pollution or Human Sexuality as he does for American History or The Greek Philosophers, sticks them happily into his book, and gets a diploma when it is filled. Whether he has received an education in the course of all this is doubtful.

In the last few years there has been growing concern about the results of this frenzy of permissiveness and an increasing disposition to reconsider the purpose of the enterprise in which we are all engaged. One of my colleagues wrote recently that if, on the undergraduate level, our mission is to influence the minds of our students in such a way as to prepare them to participate in and contribute to a liberal culture, the cafeteria style of miscellaneous education is not the way to fulfill it, and that we had better turn back to a more structured curriculum in which students are given the opportunity to pursue a coherent program in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities by studying their development and reciprocal relationships within chosen historical contexts—Classical Greece, for example, the Renaissance, and the period since the eighteenth century.⁵ The argument is persuasive, but any attempt to implement such a plan on a large scale would almost certainly encounter formidable difficulties, the most troubling caused by the pronounced tendency toward preprofessional specialization that has begun to affect undergraduate programs even in freshman and sophomore years.

That this state of affairs should have come to pass is an indication of how greatly the ideal of liberal education has been attenuated. The freshman advisers and reformers of curriculum who have encouraged this situation might profit from reading John Stuart Mill's inaugural address as Rector of the University of Saint Andrews in 1867. In what he later called a "discourse . . . respecting the various studies which belong to a liberal education, their uses and influences, and the mode in which they should be pursued to render their influences most beneficial,"⁶ Mill drew a distinction that they have ignored.

The proper function of a University in national education is tolerably well understood. At least there is a tolerably general agreement about what a University is not. It is not a place of professional education. Universities are not intended to teach the knowledge required to fit

men for some special mode of making their livelihood. Their object is not to make skillful lawyers, or physicians, or engineers, but capable and cultivated human beings. It is very right that there should be public facilities for the study of professions. It is well that there should be Schools of Law and of Medicine. . . . But these things are no part of what every generation owes to the next, as that on which its civilization and worth will principally depend. . . . Men are men before they are lawyers, or physicians, or merchants, or manufacturers; and if you make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians. What professional men should carry away with them from a University is not professional knowledge, but that which should direct the use of their professional knowledge, and bring the light of general culture to illuminate the technicalities of a special pursuit. Men may be competent lawyers without general education, but it depends on general education to make them philosophic lawyers—who demand, and are capable of apprehending, principles, instead of merely cramming their memory with details.⁷

The Watergate disgrace has gone a long way to prove Mill's point, making it embarrassingly clear that there are many young lawyers abroad in the land who might have benefited from a more philosophical preprofessional training. Specialization, if it begins too soon, has a narrowing effect not only upon vision, but also upon values. And that is why it is disturbing when an appreciable number of freshmen tell you that they cannot complete a three-quarter history sequence, much as they would like to, because they must begin their premed work immediately or jeopardize their chances of getting into medical school, three years later.

The curse of preprofessional specialization would be easier to exorcise, or at least control, were not many of our students so career-oriented when they arrive in the university that they are not open to argument. Speaking to Stanford undergraduates last January, President Richard W. Lyman noted that "many of you are voting with your feet for vocational and professional education, as you declare yourself premeds or otherwise emphasize preparation for a career in your choice of courses." He did not seem to think there was much he could do about it except to note that, in our kind of world, we need graduates with a perspective wider than the simple professional one.⁸ It is indeed difficult to think of ways of checking the trend. It is supported by parental pressure, for as the costs of a college education continue to mount, those who pay the bills are apt, quite understandably, to want to see their sons and daughters acquire practical skills that will justify the expenditure quickly. And it has been reinforced by the disenchantment engendered by the Vietnam war and the misadventures of the Nixon Administration. In a world in which it is not easy to find heroes or noble causes, why not, after all, take the safe utilitarian line and concentrate on preparing for a career in which one is reasonably sure to live comfortably? It is hard to persuade students who come to us thinking this way that it is precisely because we live in an age in which ideals seem to be in short supply and in which the *Hochstapler*—the Melmottes and the Merdles—threaten to take over, that we need a new generation of leaders of integrity, intelligence, and vision; and that they are the logical candidates.

It is a symptom of their resistance to this kind of argument that their interest in the great affairs of the world is not pronounced, a fact illustrated by the falling off of enrollments in programs of international relations. Of course, the programs themselves deserve much of the blame, for in the 50s and 60s many of them were so rapt in the ideology of the Cold War that their curricula acquired a distressing sameness, coming to resemble an endless seminar on counter-insurgency. The students, not unreasonably, began to suspect that their professors were obsessed with power and believed it was the key that would unlock all doors. The students knew better, and they went away.

There are some signs that this defection is not irreversible, if those who teach international relations have the imagination to recognize the new dimensions of international diplomacy that mark our age and to develop challenging courses on subjects capable of revitalizing interest in problems whose solution depends on international cooperation. In my own university, undergraduates who could not care less about the acrobatics of balance-of-power politics have shown themselves capable of becoming fascinated with the international aspects of environmental control, the problems of restraining the menacing thrust of international poverty, the difficulties that lie in the way of effective arms control, and, most recently, the vital but often neglected part that art and literature play in promoting or preventing international understanding.

And this is as it should be. In the address cited above (whose very title "Princeton in the Nation's Service" would probably be enough to dissuade a good many of our undergraduates from reading it), Woodrow Wilson said:

It has never been natural, it has seldom been possible, in this country for learning to seek a place apart and hold aloof from affairs. . . . I need not tell you that I believe in full and explicit instruction in history and in politics, in the experiences of peoples and the fortunes of governments, in the whole story of what men have attempted and what they have accomplished through all the changes both of form and purpose in the organization of their common life. . . . There is laid upon us the compulsion of the national life. We dare not keep aloof and closet ourselves while a nation comes to its maturity. The days of glad expansion are gone. Our life grows tense and difficult.⁹

There has been no significant change in these characteristics of our national condition since Wilson's day, and our growth in maturity, particularly as a member of the comity of nations, has perhaps been less steady and less consistent than he had hoped. But our progress will certainly not improve, nor will we succeed in coping with the dangerous problems of our world, if we cannot persuade our students that serious attention to those problems is required of them.

Jacob Burckhardt once said that the university was a "metaphysical necessity."¹⁰ A puzzling remark, and yet one sees what he meant. The university exists in order to provide successive generations of academic youth with the knowledge and the perspective and the ideals that will help the best of them to rise above the values of the marketplace and do the world's work ably and conscientiously. With the exception of those of our number who are instinctively repelled by anything smacking of elitism and who seem to believe that the cultivation of excellence is an affront to democracy, I would guess that most of us agree with him. But given the conditions that prevail, simple agreement is not enough. We need to become more disciplined in our thinking about the purposes of undergraduate education and about effective ways of achieving them. And at the same time, we must show more imagination in the teaching of those subjects that will prepare students to be useful citizens in a world that is changing so rapidly that it sometimes appears that we are hurtling forward into an age without precedents. Above all, we must not allow the fascination aroused, or the fatalism induced, by this acceleration of change to discourage us from teaching our students to find comfort and counsel in the record of human thought and experience. To do so would certainly enhance the danger of our becoming infantile in every generation.

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STEVEN MULLER

Higher Education or Higher Skilling?

THERE IS A profound crisis in American higher education that cuts far deeper than the economic difficulties that have been making headlines. It is a crisis of purpose. No enterprise can fare well without a well-developed and well-understood sense of purpose, and the whole of American higher education is a very large enterprise indeed.

Its scale, in fact, is a partial cause of the crisis. Since 1944 there has been an unprecedented expansion of higher education in the United States. In 1942, according to the United States Office of Education, there were just over 1.4 million students enrolled in nearly 1,800 colleges and universities in the United States. They represented just under 15 percent of the age group between eighteen and twenty-one. In 1972, over 9.3 million students were enrolled in nearly 3,000 colleges and universities, nearly 50 percent of the age group between eighteen and twenty-one. Statistics for 1974 are not yet available, but probably slightly more than 50 percent of the age group between eighteen and twenty-one is enrolled in colleges or universities this year. In these three decades, American higher education has passed from a privileged preserve of the few to an open opportunity for the majority. At great expense and with dedicated effort, barriers of sex, race, and economic circumstance have been removed or significantly lowered. A college or university degree is no longer within reach, for the most part, only of an elite of white males of relative affluence. The democratization of American higher education that was launched with the G.I. Bill after World War II is now largely an accomplished fact. To a great extent, opportunity now exists for individual talent to be trained to its full potential despite social obstacles. Equality of opportunity and access has been extended to higher education, and a huge victory won for equality of participation in a crucial social sector.

While the effort to complete democratization continues and the cheering wanes, a nagging question has begun to be raised. To what degree can the American society usefully absorb the mass of graduates now leaving the nation's campuses?

Warnings have been given that in certain fields there is an oversupply either already present or in sight—for example, in elementary and secondary education, and in some branches of engineering. In other fields, however, there is an undersupply. The health-care system is still short of medical doctors, and this country's capacity for employing lawyers seems exceptionally elastic. Those who have considered the question most seriously are arguing that better studies must be made of national manpower needs and that higher education must become responsive to these projected requirements. No one has yet said that the society cannot absorb all of the graduates of higher education; and, as we shall see, it probably can—under certain conditions.

What is already apparent, however, is that a college degree is no longer a passport to one of the society's better jobs. There are simply too many college graduates and not enough better jobs. Plain as this must be, it has not been much discussed. Thirty years is not a long period in human experience—social digestion may and usually does

take longer. As a result, much of the public still believes in the college degree as a passport to the better job, and colleges and universities have done almost nothing to correct this impression.

Indeed, the problem of what graduates can realistically expect in the job market has frightened universities and colleges. They have been proliferating and expanding in the past three decades—especially in the boom years between 1950 and 1965. Growth requires more students, and ambitious, enlarging institutions were afraid to discourage applicants. Now that growth has ended, they are even more frightened because they need applicants more than ever to sustain the standards to which they have become accustomed. More critically, colleges and universities have, for the most part, come to accept the role of training stations whose mission it is to turn out persons with marketable skills. *That* is the problem and the root of the crisis.

The nasty and frightening question nobody wants to ask or answer concerns the purpose of higher education. If the basic purpose of postsecondary education is vocational, then much of higher education in America today is wasteful irrelevance. If the basic purpose is something else, then it (whatever it is) is not being accomplished by American higher education. Even an accepted definition is lacking.

Once upon a time (when it was still an elite minority enterprise), American higher education served two primary purposes reasonably well. Colleges and universities transmitted knowledge and values. Their graduates were literate and civilized, in the sense that they had a command of the fundamental intellectual and cultural equipment of the society. They were what was called, in those days, well-grounded in the basic principles of knowledge. A good many graduates left the campus with only that grounding, but it was, after all, no mean equipment. Most persons then were not literate in the fullest sense, or civilized, or well-grounded, so a college graduate had an education instructive to him and potentially useful to society as well. Some graduates not only received this general education, but also acquired command of a special skill—increasingly at a postbaccalaureate second stage—in law, medicine, theology, and the like, which of course gave them special vocational advantages.

Then society became technologically complex at an accelerating pace in the twentieth century. The technological society developed an enormous demand for varieties of sophisticated and specialized skills. These were mostly too complex to be taught in schools and therefore became the charge of colleges and universities. Professional schools developed at the undergraduate and graduate levels, specialization proliferated, and what I call “higher skilling” to a large extent replaced what was still called “higher education.”

The comfortable center of knowledge disintegrated under the centrifugal forces of professionalization and specialization that were induced by the technological explosion. A hundred years ago, advanced knowledge could still be thought of as an orderly mansion. One could move from a foundation of literacy and elementary mathematics through the chambers of the arts and sciences and the learned professions, the whole roofed over by philosophy. The entirety was visible and comprehensible. Even those in only one corner of one small room were not unfamiliar with the entirety of the mansion. They might not be familiar with the contents of the other rooms, but they often spoke with the other inhabitants.

All this has changed drastically. Today advanced knowledge resembles a labyrinth still under construction. It lacks both wholeness and a center. Tunnels extend in all directions, crossing one another occasionally, and the best and the

brightest are at work extending them. Those at the cutting edge of each separate tunnel have no communication with those at the edges of other tunnels. Beginners crawl ahead only within one particular tunnel, except for the occasional intersection of tunnels or the decision to crawl all the way back out of one tunnel and into another. There is no longer a body of higher learning. Scholars master pieces of knowledge, no whole, and their judgments are exquisitely confined to fragments. They have little in common and do not even share common points of departure. Under these conditions, the graduates of colleges and universities may be highly skilled technologically, but they are no longer civilized or well-grounded in the traditional sense.

Moreover, to broaden access and opportunity in higher education, other barriers have come down beside those of sex, race, and economic circumstance. A price was paid for democratization that may have been worth paying; that was certainly inevitable in accomplishing the objectives, but that was never openly and honestly acknowledged. The elementary and secondary school systems did not automatically produce more students of the college entrance standard of fifty or more years ago. Instead, requirements were eliminated and standards lowered. A hierarchy developed among colleges and universities, ranging from those practicing unrestricted admissions to those that remain highly selective. In the process, common standards of verbal and quantitative literacy have disappeared. A person today with a college degree may with some probability command a skill, but there can be no general presumption that the person is in other ways educated.

The harsh reality of the present dilemma of American higher education is blurred by an abundance of hypocrisy. There is still widespread verbal allegiance to the traditional concepts of general education, but no real substance. Distribution requirements and a scattering of so-called basic or introductory courses make a farce of what remains of liberal education for most undergraduates; the graduate and professional schools have more honestly abandoned this sham.

Another pretense is that the collegiate and university experience is still uniform. It is considered invidious and undemocratic to point out that in reality institutions of higher education differ enormously in quality. Lack of candor obscures at least two very significant facts. One is that the more highly selective and professionalized institutions do a much superior job turning out highly skilled graduates, but are increasingly deficient in general education. The other is that liberal education still survives in much better condition in a variety of liberal arts colleges that still educate, but are less adept at higher skilling.

The maladjustment inherent in the present dilemma is not well articulated or analyzed publicly, but it is very commonly experienced emotionally. The universities' troubles of a few years ago did not necessarily derive from within higher education itself; but their general inability to cope did. These troubles also revealed the confusion, disorientation, and declining morale of an enterprise that has lost coherence and confidence in its mission. At present, higher education is beset with increasing financial troubles. These again do not originate within higher education, but their resolution depends on increased assistance from public and private funds. This assistance has not been rendered sufficiently, and that is surely in large part because of public uncertainty as to the purpose and importance of the enterprise—a public uncertainty that higher education has been largely unable to relieve.

Where, then, can we go from here? Three possibilities present themselves. We can abandon democratization and return to a society in which higher education is

reserved for only a small minority. We can abandon education and concentrate exclusively on higher skilling. Or we can attempt to restore the possibility of a general education, which would allow large numbers to benefit in full from what was once offered only to the few. The first possibility is the least attractive and least likely. The second is the most likely. The third is the most attractive and by far the most difficult.

It is not likely that contemporary American society would be willing to abandon wide and open access to higher education. Open access has too recently been attained, and too many resources have been invested in it. True, there is growing reluctance on the part of some people to seek higher education, but the large majority of secondary-school graduates will be driven to it if only because the marketable skills gained will assure them of jobs. Unless American society suffers a drastic collapse, postsecondary skilling for the majority of the population appears to be a certainty.

That is why a national system of postsecondary skilling alone is so likely. The technological economy requires these skills, and a polytechnic system could provide them. A polytechnic system would also be highly functional and cost-effective. Technology itself can be applied to calculate demand for skills, to measure and sort individual aptitudes, and to reduce substantially the expensive and variable human ingredient in instruction. The resulting system would be both democratic, in that nearly everyone would be instructed, and realistically hierarchical, in that everyone would be instructed according to his or her aptitude. The most complicated and most highly compensated skills would be bestowed on those with the greatest aptitude. Diversity and uneconomic smallness of scale could be eliminated as unnecessary luxuries. There would be no need for a costly and uncontrolled private sector. College and university physical plants would be used; and since skilling requires instruction, and instruction is a form of education, the whole system would still be called an educational system.

This, of course, is to an obvious extent the direction in which we are already moving. Recent innovations in the federal government have already produced the new label "postsecondary education." The rationale behind the label is that the nation needs trained manpower, and it is the task of postsecondary education to produce it. All institutions that train persons beyond secondary school are, therefore, perceived as basically alike and equal, whether they be proprietary secretarial schools or colleges of mortuary science or major research universities. To the bureaucracy of the Office of Education, these are already nothing more than varieties of training institutions. The current preoccupation is to resolve the disturbing and annoying discrepancies in costs. It seems only logical that if all institutions of postsecondary education are training institutions, then uniform criteria of cost-effectiveness should apply to them. No one will be simpleminded about this—obviously some kinds of training are more expensive than others—but these varieties can be quantified and grouped and rationalized; then the irrelevant will become apparent and can be eliminated.

The current trend toward polytechnic education is best illustrated by the character of the National Commission on the Financing of Postsecondary Education, established by Congress in the higher education legislation of 1972. In December, 1973, the Commission made its report on "Financing Postsecondary Education in the United States." Legislation mandated that the report should include "suggested national uniform standard procedures for determining the annual per student costs

of providing postsecondary education for students in attendance at various types and classes of institutions of higher education.”¹

The Commission decided that postsecondary education consists of four major sectors: “A collegiate sector, a non-collegiate sector, a third sector made up of all other postsecondary institutions, and a fourth sector encompassing the vast array of formal and informal learning opportunities offered by agencies and institutions that are not primarily engaged in providing standard educational programs.” Efforts closely parallel to those of the federal bureaucracy and the Commission, and actively supported by state governments, are being carried on by HEGIS (Higher Education General Information Survey) and NCHEMS (National Center for Higher Education Management Systems).

Within higher education itself the trend toward polytechnic skilling is also strong. During the past three decades, the mega-campus has emerged: a concentration of students in the tens of thousands to be channeled through the skilling process. The new campuses built for this purpose have the appearance of large industrial plants and are popularly referred to without embarrassment as “knowledge factories.” They house the personnel undergoing instruction, provide extensive recreational facilities, and offer a range of specialized instruction. They are mostly public institutions supported by the states. Students from within each state are charged at a deliberately low level so that the state and not the individual bears nearly the whole of the cost of instruction. Continued financial pressures on colleges and universities are extremely likely. If they persist without relief, the pressures alone may soon produce a situation in which private institutions will either close or become state-supported. The United States would then have a more coherent public system of formal postsecondary instruction that could and probably would concentrate entirely on producing manpower skills required by the national economy.

This will be the emerging shape of higher learning in America unless something is done soon. The one major question is whether such an enterprise can be called educational, which it will doubtless be labeled. The *Unabridged Random House Dictionary of the English Language* renders the primary definition of “education” as: “The act or process of imparting or acquiring general knowledge, developing the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally of preparing oneself or others intellectually for mature life.” Further on one finds that “education, culture are often used interchangeably,” and that “The level of culture in a country depends upon the education of its people.” For our present purposes, it can be as simple as that. Acquiring skills is part of education, but only a part. One may argue about the degree to which the acquisition of skills develops powers of reasoning, but what about powers of judgment? How will advanced skilling deal with “general knowledge” and “preparing intellectually for mature life”? My own conclusion is that training in marketable skills falls short of education, and that the purpose of education can include, but goes substantially beyond, the acquisition of such skills.

For that reason, of course, I find the attempt to restore the possibility of a general education the only attractive alternative. A purely polytechnic training or skilling process as the substance of higher education would degrade the nation’s culture. It would fail to develop individual powers of reasoning and judgment; it would fail to prepare persons intellectually for mature life. There is little need to belabor these conclusions because there is almost no disagreement with them on record. The real issue is not whether general education is desirable, but whether it is still even possible—and if so, how. A frank admission that general education is

rapidly dying is overdue, but acknowledgment of the problem alone does not help. Pieties deploring this demise and declaring that general education must be resurrected help as little. The future of higher learning in America turns on the issue of whether a rebirth of general education is possible at all, and that probably depends primarily on the presence of a determined will—within the institutions—to restore it. At the heart of the problem is the recognition that education is a process, that general education requires general knowledge, and that what does not exist is difficult to impart. Finally, we are at bedrock: Is the recovery of general knowledge possible in late twentieth-century America?

The prospects for such a recovery are discouragingly bleak in terms both of procedure and of substance. It is dismaying to recognize that the present inner workings of the American university tend to frustrate efforts to recover general knowledge. (I use “the American university” as a general term, on the assumption that a recovery of general knowledge must involve the participation of graduate and professional students and faculty. It cannot, therefore, be achieved effectively only at the collegiate level. Generalizations about universities in this context, it seems to me, are legitimate and possible.) Efforts to recover general knowledge must begin with the faculty (another general term). With that beginning, the magnitude of the difficulties at once appears.

Faculty at the contemporary American university may still constitute a social community in the recreational sense and in a loose and unstructured pattern. But it is not an intellectual community, and it is an awkward and inadequate political community. It is divided into divisional or collegiate, departmental, and sub-disciplinary specialties. The more pronounced the academic quality of a particular university, the more likely it is that individual members of the faculty will be dedicated to specialized scholarship in their own fields—or rather subfields and special areas of interest. The fragmentation of knowledge involved in specialization has gone so far that the most advanced scholars in different fields have little of academic substance to say to one another; they think and talk in mutually incomprehensible professional languages. As a matter of fact, a specialist in any area is apt to communicate better with fellow specialists outside his university than with faculty colleagues outside his field within his university. This has always been true to some extent, but the degree to which it is now true—the academic Tower of Babel phenomenon—is novel and caused by the proliferation of highly complex academic specialties.

The Tower of Babel phenomenon is hard to prove, but not difficult to discern. Put a dozen or more distinguished research professors from widely divergent fields together to talk about a piece of specialized research in a field not represented by all, and problems of comprehension and communication will surface. Different words have quite different meanings in different fields. (Just today I saw a paper on “Random Walks on Lattices” in the bibliography of a distinguished physicist, and I wondered whether a professor of literature or history could correctly guess the author’s field from the title—horticulture, perhaps?) The very thought of gathering members of the faculty together raises practical problems. Most university faculties are too large to be gathered in any closed space, and their collective numbers would be too great to permit discourse.

Furthermore, look at any university’s listing of courses. There is enormous range and deep intensity. All that is missing is a coherent central core. It is not academic hyperbole alone that leads universities and professors to speak so frequently about

standing at the frontiers of knowledge—that really is where everyone is. Who still stands at the center of knowledge? Who could, in fact, claim to be there when no center exists? The curriculum has been Balkanized into specialties. Departments cluster groups of allied specialties into departmental curricula and majors. Most universities still have vestigial so-called distribution requirements, or mandated minimal work outside the area of specialization. But these do not, in fact, produce a common general base of knowledge. They are resented by students and faculty alike—not only because they tend to be ineffective, but because they impede the rapid pace of specialized higher skilling. Vestigial efforts in the curriculum to require some sort of broadened foundation are disliked by most students and faculty. Professors do not appreciate students taking courses only because they have to fulfill a requirement. Students dislike being diverted from their specialized interest and having to undergo instruction in something they do not feel they need—need being judged by relevance to later marketable skills. On the other side of the coin, distribution requirements do sometimes produce new intellectual awakenings and mutual discoveries between faculty and students. It is still possible to kindle and develop students far beyond specialized skilling.

Hived off into departments, divisions, separate schools, and colleges, intellectually apart from most of their colleagues, scarcely acquainted with one another in considerable numbers, university faculties are unlikely to come together of their own accord to restore general knowledge. This conclusion is not intended to be condemnatory. Efforts from within the faculty even to address the problem are likely to fail on other than substantive grounds. A faculty can rarely be mobilized even in matters of immediate self-interest. There is no real sense of common interest except occasionally when that self-interest is directed against pressures coming from outside the faculty itself. It is not criticism of the faculty, but simple recognition of political reality to observe that large and extremely diverse assemblages can occasionally muster a negative majority, but are seldom capable of generating a positive majority on any real issue. A positive majority is usually possible only when the issue is no longer real, when overwhelming agreement exists before assemblage and discussion.

Nor does it appear that students can be effective agents for the recovery of general knowledge. Substantial numbers of students at all levels in the American university sense a lack of coherence in their education and are disturbed by the disorientation resulting from unintegrated specialization. But the difficulties students confront in organizing for effective action are even greater than those the faculty face. First, unlike the faculty, students cannot be the executors of an improved curriculum. They can only press the faculty for changes—a fact that represents a crucial initial disadvantage to student efforts. Second, the student's life-span in the university is relatively brief, so that student effort is hard to sustain over the prolonged period required to make durable and profound academic changes. Third, intensive efforts by students come at individual sacrifice of formal study, to the point where ultimate conflict with personal self-interest is unavoidable. Fourth, both because of their relative youth and the time-limit on their institutional participation, students tend to be impatient. Impatience then interferes with judiciousness in both substance and tactics and encourages a sharpness, even a shrillness, of tone. As a result, faculties tend to function as negative majorities against external pressure and to focus more on tone and tactics than on substance. Finally, consistency of student efforts over time is difficult to achieve because the cast of student participants is necessarily subject to constant replacement, and successive leaders and participants

have had no opportunity to absorb what their predecessors may have learned; they tend usually to differ from their predecessors on points of substance as well. It must be added briefly that the likelihood of effective action for restoration of general knowledge by graduate and professional students is infinitesimal. They are past the time when the matter is most relevant; they are heavily dependent on faculty goodwill; their free time is severely curtailed; and their preoccupation is with the final stage of higher skilling.

In view of the great difficulties facing university faculty and students, what are the prospects for university administration's providing constructive leadership in the restoration of general knowledge? Again, the answer must be that such prospects are dim. The principal reason is not that university administration lacks authority, but that its role has become predominantly managerial. University presidents, vice presidents, and deans in the contemporary American university function much less than in the past as intellectual and academic leaders, and much more as corporate managers. There are at least four causes for this shift. One is the increase in the size and diversity of the campus, and, concomitantly, a major increase in the scope and complexity of the housekeeping operation. There are more and heavier tasks, requiring more personnel and more supervision—in sum, a much larger and more extensive management.

A second cause derives from the hugely expanded responsibilities for sponsored research in the public interest that the American university undertook during World War II and has continued ever since. This expansion was an obvious corollary to the view of the university as a training station for the higher skills demanded by the technological economy. Highly skilled and specialized professionals are required to offer such training, and they constitute an exceptional reservoir of talent. It was natural for government and industry to turn to the university for research that required the most technically sophisticated talent, with the most sophisticated equipment and facilities to match. It was equally natural for the professionals, supported by the university as an institution, to respond: the nature of sponsored research allowed maximum use of the most highly developed competence, and the proffered financial inducements were in most cases overwhelmingly attractive.

These are well-known facts, and they are sketched here only to permit two observations. One is that the proliferation of sponsored research has greatly reinforced extreme specialization and fragmented general knowledge. The other is that university administrations acquired managerial responsibility for an enormous sponsored-research load. At what we call our leading universities, the sponsored-research budget annually is almost as large or in some cases larger than the academic budget. Consequently, the managerial function of university administration has spread and swollen.

A third cause of managerial growth is the financial problem confronting higher education. In part, scarcity of funds is a by-product of growing size and the looming bulk of sponsored research. Expansion creates its own scarcities, and the unpredictable character of changing needs and funding of sponsored research produces problems of at least temporary scarcity whenever significant shifts occur. Prolonged and accelerating inflation has hit higher education particularly hard, because it is a labor-intensive enterprise heavily dependent on expensive human talent. Its revenues, too, have proved to be relatively inelastic in comparison to the upward pressures of costs of supplies, services, construction, and maintenance. Efforts to increase efficiency through the application of sophisticated technology have generally

been successful in substance without achieving cost reduction, so that greater efficiency has been provided at higher cost.

Unexpected but unavoidable new demands have put constant new strains on resources. Increased library acquisitions saturated existing space and demanded new construction; greater numbers of people on campus and declining morals in society demanded expansion of security personnel and procedures; better use of physical facilities under conditions of technological innovation demanded new investments in air conditioning, lighting, sound-proofing, and so on; regiments of nonacademic personnel invited unionization and further drove up labor costs; huge concentrations of students created irresistible demands for recreational opportunities and programs that were not self-sustaining; the needs of supremely specialized professionals to create national and international communication networks among themselves demanded telephone and travel expenditures on an unprecedented scale—a list of such examples is almost inexhaustible. Again, the result has been, on the one hand, the need for tight control of budgets, combined with extensive planning and cost analysis, and, on the other, a preoccupation with efforts to increase revenues.

The fourth cause for the managerial character of university administration is public regulation. In part, the new size, resultant visibility, heightened cost, and public-service role of higher education created an inevitable demand for greater public accountability. In part, public regulation simply increased greatly throughout society and included higher education in the normal course of events. As a large employer, the American university is involved in public regulations as to wages and hours, job safety, Social Security, affirmative action, labor relations, and so forth. As a training and research enterprise maintained at enormous public expense—whether state supported or private—and constantly seeking new revenues, the American university has been an object of special attention on the part of the public, in general, and all levels and branches of government, in particular. The period of campus unrest heightened, but did not cause this phenomenon. Public accountability, in all its forms, and conformity to public regulations are managerial functions, and they, too, have become the responsibility of university administration.

Mindful of these considerations, I am pessimistic about the ability of university administration to do much to restore general knowledge. The suitability of administration for this effort is more questionable than it used to be. University presidents, vice presidents, and deans are loaded with corporate managerial burdens; they tend to be selected more for their ability to carry these burdens than for qualities of academic and intellectual leadership. Even when one does possess these qualities, he finds them difficult to apply. This difficulty stems only in part from the enormous managerial claims on his energies and talents. The primary constraint on the effective intellectual and academic leadership of university administration is due to the alienation it suffers from students and faculty.

To faculty and students, administration largely represents unwelcome and unacademic managerial authority, preoccupied with threatening and bothersome budgetary and procedural restraints. The sheer size of the administrative establishment on the campus is viewed with dislike and suspicion. The prevailing problems of communication are aggravated because faculty and students do not, whatever their own obstacles to discourse, speak the specialized language of administration, and vice versa. There is an inevitable clash of interests between the desire of faculty and students for greater expenditures and fewer restrictions, and the necessarily antithetical objectives of administration. Under these circumstances, there is also an

abundance of mutual suspicion and distrust. A university president committed to academic reform, for example, is more than apt to find himself opposed by faculty and students. There is suspicion that his motive is secretly fiscal or managerial, or his very effort per se is perceived as a managerial invasion of academic freedoms and prerogatives. And because student and faculty interests may not coincide, the president or dean may find himself either caught in the middle or taking sides. At the least, such a situation handicaps effective managerial performance, which is partly evaluated in terms of maintaining maximum harmony. The prospect is enough to induce caution in any experienced administrator—if not deterrence based on fear.

For sound reasons, therefore, none of the three major constituent elements of the American university is likely to be able to make an effective effort to restore general knowledge. The only remaining hope is that faculty, students, and administration might together succeed. This is not a bright hope. I have tried to show the full dimension of the problem of communication as well as the power of the centrifugal forces that drive the three apart. The erosion of general knowledge has done much to create the problems of all three. Their combining to respond would at least be logical. If they do not combine for a common purpose, the centrifugal forces that now prevail will either tear the university apart or produce to the full the skilling and knowledge factory whose emergence we have already noted. The hope of their joining forces, therefore, is also the only hope of salvaging higher education as an academic venture and the only hope of restoring a sense of purpose to the American university before it becomes a purely industrial corporation. There may just be enough desperate urgency in this realization to strengthen fragile hope into real effort.

An effort to restore the general foundation of education cannot avoid the prerequisite of general understanding. Therefore, it must begin with the problem of literacy, both verbal and quantitative. People in the university must be able to talk, read, and count together at a common minimal level of competence. This is not now the case. To make it possible, mandatory instruction in verbal and quantitative literacy must be provided in the university itself for those who continue to arrive there with deficiencies. And absolute standards of verbal and quantitative literate competence must be maintained through the entire curriculum, regardless of areas of special skills, and strictly enforced without exception. There would be costs. Brilliant musicians and artists might fail courses in music or painting for lack of literacy. Engineers might fail engineering courses for lack of verbal literacy, and historians might fail history courses for lack of quantitative literacy. There would be gain, however, in the recovery of general literacy.

In the absence of commonly accepted religious and philosophical absolutes—and this absence characterizes the contemporary society of the United States—a culture depends more than ever on command of history to provide at least minimal general cultural orientation. An effort to restore general education cannot avoid the imperative of a common minimal foundation in the basic history of the culture. Such a foundation does not now exist. To achieve it, mandatory instruction in basic history must be required of every student as a precondition for further study. It must be enforced by the strict application of minimum standards of competence.

As human beings, the limits of our biological tolerance are being tested by the technology we have developed. That technology itself is rooted in empirical inquiry that is seldom far from laboratory experimentation. On the one hand, we must be aware of ourselves as biological creatures; on the other, we must be sufficiently

literate in our technology to understand and deal with it as tool, not as master. For these reasons, the effort to restore general education must necessarily depart from a common minimum level of technological competence based on familiarity with empirical inquiry. In my view, the best common foundation rests in the study of human biology. To create such a foundation, a mandatory course in human biology should be required of every student, again governed strictly by absolute standards of minimum performance applied without exception.

Education is also, as we have seen, the training of the mind in reason and judgment. The restoration of general education must recreate such training, and again a start must be made on a common foundation. There are many ways to achieve this, but my own preference is for mandatory instruction for every student in a second language, to the level of full fluency. The complete acquisition of a second language is a powerful device to train the mind; it also civilizes and broadens the mind in other obvious ways.

These, then, are four quite modest suggested points of departure. They sound minimal, but they will provoke vigorous argument; and their adoption on the basis suggested would constitute a curricular revolution. The stark truth is that the restoration on a university-wide basis of absolute minimum standards, vigorously enforced, represents a potential revolution in its own right. Four such steps toward renewed unity and coherence of knowledge would be only a beginning, but a serviceable one. If we cannot achieve at least this much in some form, then we can make no start at all. To achieve only this confronts the American university with the most difficult problem it has faced in at least two generations. It is paradoxical that our crisis is so profound that the substance of its resolution is in fact simple. It is ironic that our past successes should have created the splintering of purpose and the tangle of procedures that may destroy our higher learning. It is frightening to be aware of how far we are along the road to a national system of noneducational training in skills alone. And it is encouraging that the American university may still be capable as a whole community of preserving its future as an institution of higher education by restoring education.

The future of America's higher learning will be determined not in Washington, nor in the capitals of our states, nor in the public information media, but only on the campuses. If we cannot help ourselves, no *deus ex machina* will preserve us. If we can help ourselves, others will help us also. The task we confront is set out by T. S. Eliot in *East Coker*:

There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.

REFERENCE

1. National Commission on the Financing of Postsecondary Education, "Financing Postsecondary Education in the United States," report made to the Congress, December, 1973, p. 7.

DEREK BOK

On the Purposes of Undergraduate Education

A. The Need to Articulate Purposes

SCHOLARS WHO STUDY the behavior of human organizations constantly stress the importance of defining institutional goals. Without clear objectives, it is said, an institution cannot evaluate how well it is performing, decide how to allocate its resources wisely, plan for future growth, motivate its members, or justify its existence to the larger public.

Despite these admonitions, our colleges seem to exist without making much of an effort to define their aims. In the thick reports on undergraduate education that many colleges have produced in recent years, there is little discussion of what it is that a liberal arts education should provide for the student. The prevailing sentiment is captured by the statement of a curriculum committee in one of our most distinguished universities: "The objective toward which curriculum planning should strive is, to the extent possible, to let the teacher teach what he wants to teach and the student learn what he wants to learn."¹

Course catalogues exhibit much the same tendency and in much more elaborate detail. Presumably, the catalogue contains what the faculty believes its students need to know in order to choose their academic programs. Yet seldom is there any attempt to describe the larger aims that a student might hope to achieve during his four years of study. The course descriptions themselves rarely do more than summarize the subject matter covered in each offering, as if to suggest that the principal point of a college education is to stock the students' heads with chunks of information.

The same deficiency occurs in the proposals universities have submitted for institutional grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities. For the most part, these weighty documents reveal a massive confusion between means and ends. Their emphasis is almost entirely on technique—interdisciplinary instruction, problem-oriented materials, courses built around a common theme. These devices may be useful in arousing greater interest among the students. And yet, to what ends will this enthusiasm be directed? Almost invariably, the proposals are silent on this issue.

It is not hard to understand why colleges have had difficulty in describing their purposes. Established graduate schools, such as Law, Business, and Medicine, have the obvious function of preparing students to fill specific roles in society; there is room for debate over teaching methods and curriculum, but almost everyone agrees that professional competence is the primary aim of the educational program. On the other hand, colleges have a much less certain compass. They can unite in asserting that their aim is *not* to provide professional training, but they cannot point to any

model comparable to the lawyer or the doctor. At best, they must make do with that elusive figure, the humane and broadly educated "whole man."

Over the past generation, several tendencies in higher education have made the problem even more difficult. The range of knowledge in the arts and sciences has expanded in so many directions that it is hard to identify a common core that can be generally accepted as fundamental to every educated person. Student bodies have become so diverse as to create a wide variety of special needs. The size of faculties has likewise grown to such an extent that it is difficult to conduct a collegial debate over educational issues. Specialization has proceeded to the point that professors cannot understand what their colleagues teach, let alone reach a consensus on common educational goals.

These problems are so great that one must ask whether it is useful even to aspire to a clearer formulation of objectives. I will concede that there may be differences of opinion and perspective sufficient to dim the prospect of reaching a genuine consensus in a large, diverse faculty. Nevertheless, I hope to show that much can be gained from a greater effort to think about the goals of undergraduate education even though complete agreement may never be achieved.

For presidents and deans, the formulation of purposes is important from several points of view. As spokesmen for their institutions, they cannot expect to win the understanding and support of a wider community unless they can explain with conviction what their colleges are supposed to accomplish. In deciding how to allocate new resources—or indeed how to distribute their own time and energy—they can hardly establish coherent priorities without some sense of the ultimate purposes which they hope their colleges will achieve. For these reasons, presidents and deans must formulate their own sense of the institution's goals even if their faculties are unable or unwilling to undertake the task.

Academic departments can also profit from giving greater thought to defining their aims. Consider the problem of developing a suitable undergraduate concentration. In the humanities and social sciences, few students have any intention of going on to graduate work to obtain a Ph.D. As a result, departments such as English, or History, or Government should presumably address the perplexing question of what they can offer of lasting educational value to the 90 percent of their concentrators who will go on to careers in law, business, public service, and the like. Most departments have not grappled seriously with this problem. Some avoid the issue entirely by simply allowing students to take any courses they choose to fulfill the concentration requirements. Others provide a more structured major, but the structure they impose is appropriate chiefly as a foundation for graduate study. In neither case is it clear that the concentration requirements will serve an important educational function for the majority of students who will go on to entirely different fields of endeavor.

In some of the science departments, the need is not quite so acute, for most of their concentrators aspire to graduate training in the same field. Under these circumstances, it is relatively easy to determine the basic knowledge and competence required as a foundation for further study. Yet even here, serious questions of purpose arise. Should the department offer courses for students who will not specialize in science, and how can such courses be designed to convey some understanding of lasting value? Should concentrations in Biology and Chemistry be consciously designed for premedical students as well as students who aspire to the Ph.D.? If so, how should the courses and requirements in these departments be adapted?

However diverse their educational philosophies, individual faculty members also need to ponder the ways in which their courses can have lasting value for the students. One would suppose that every instructor would give close attention to this question in preparing his lectures. In many fields, however, professors can easily fall into the habit of simply arranging a body of knowledge in a logical sequence in such a way as to convey a wealth of factual material, generalizations, and ideas, embroidered by the instructor's own interpretations and insights. Such courses may seem adequate enough; they may even be presented with great elegance and style. Nevertheless, they are likely to emphasize the communication of information and the discussion of problems of current scholarly concern to the neglect of other aims that might have greater value, especially for students who will never again have a serious interest in the field.

The articulation of purposes can likewise serve the needs of students. It is true that students today are a highly diverse group with widely varying interests and aspirations. For this reason, some educators may conclude that the best strategy for colleges to pursue is to provide a rich smorgasbord of opportunities and leave it to each student to pick and choose according to his or her particular interests. But undergraduates lack the experience to undertake this responsibility unaided; if they are to have such freedom, they might profit from the chance to learn what the instructors hope to accomplish in their courses instead of merely reading a brief description of the subject matter to be covered. In addition, they need help in thinking constructively about their entire undergraduate experience. This assistance is rarely available. Even with the best of advising, counselors can know only a small segment of the curriculum, and their advice is generally directed to the immediate problem of choosing courses for the ensuing term. As a result, students could benefit from an opportunity to ponder a variety of views from more experienced educators concerning the purposes toward which the entire four years might be directed. Without this opportunity, the ablest student may be unduly influenced by secondary goals, such as gaining admission to graduate school or maintaining a dean's list record. On the other hand, a motivated student with a clear sense of purpose can accomplish much even in a mediocre college.

B. The Purposes of the University College

Having pleaded my case in the abstract, I will briefly sketch the major purposes I ascribe to the undergraduate institution I know best—the liberal arts college set in the framework of a large university. In describing these purposes, I have put aside the important subject of how a college can provide an enjoyable experience for its students. Certainly, this is a significant aim in itself, for colleges do not merely offer preparation for the future; they also occupy four years of a student's life, and these years should be happy ones quite apart from anything the student does in later life and career. But this is a subject that could easily occupy an article in itself and must therefore await some future occasion. As a result, I will concentrate on describing the contributions of lasting value that a liberal arts education can provide for its students and, ultimately, for the society as well.

There are many qualities that one might admire in an ideal college graduate—qualities of intellect, imagination, moral character, and emotional maturity. Many graduates will possess several of these characteristics, and a few may even possess them all. Nevertheless, we have no way of knowing whether a college education

contributes significantly to a number of these qualities. For example, few educators would assert that it is possible to devise a college program which is likely to help significantly in fostering such important characteristics as honesty, integrity, generosity, or even creative imagination. Under present circumstances, therefore, it would be arrogant to claim the development of these qualities among the purposes of undergraduate education. Instead, I will seek to identify only those lasting values which we have some reason to hope can be enhanced for a substantial number of students by attending a liberal arts college.

1. ACQUIRING INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE

The most obvious function of a college education is to help students to acquire information and knowledge by acquainting them with a body of facts, theories, generalizations, and ideas of every sort. This purpose scarcely requires justification. Information provides the raw material for discourse, inquiry, choice, reflection—indeed, for almost every form of intellectual activity. For some students, especially in the sciences, the knowledge gained in college provides a necessary foundation for graduate study. For almost all students, a liberal arts education helps to create a web of knowledge that can illumine experience and enlighten judgment throughout life.

College faculties have long debated whether certain bodies of information are important enough to justify a requirement that all students be exposed to them. Some educators go so far as to argue that every student should have to take a prescribed block of courses, a common “core” curriculum. In prior generations, prescribed curricula were an established feature of many college programs. But time seems to be working against such requirements. As knowledge expands in every direction, it is hard to agree upon the composition of the common core or to resist the pressure to cover such a vast body of knowledge that the courses become superficial. In a university faculty composed of research specialists in many diverse fields of knowledge, it is difficult to find enough instructors to teach a single prescribed curriculum. As entering classes grow increasingly diverse in their backgrounds and interests, it is nearly impossible to devise a group of courses that will appeal to all students. For these reasons, the prescribed curriculum seems destined to survive only in a few small colleges that can recruit a faculty and a body of students who happen to share the same vision of the knowledge essential to educated human beings.*

A much more common phenomenon is the requirement that every student take some work in several different fields of knowledge—generally sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Such prescriptions are commonly justified in very general terms as a means of gaining breadth through exposing students to the three great areas of learning. On occasion, educators offer a somewhat more precise rationale. Every student should have some understanding of science in an age where civilization is permeated by the fruits of scientific endeavor. Every undergraduate, as a member of society, should be exposed to the study of some important aspect of

* In fact, the main advantage to be derived from a common curriculum may well have less to do with the importance of the subject matter than with the fact that all students share the same body of knowledge. Since most undergraduates believe that they learn more from each other than they do from their teachers, this shared background of knowledge can provide important educational benefits by enriching the quality of intellectual discourse among the students.

social affairs. Every educated person should gain some appreciation of our cultural heritage and the contribution it makes to a deeper understanding of individual values.

These aims seem attractive enough in principle; the problem lies in deciding what kinds of courses can actually achieve them. Scientists disagree profoundly on this point. Some argue that the only way to understand science is to do science in the laboratory; others favor an analysis of the scientific method or a study of the growth of scientific knowledge through a pattern of individual discoveries in some particular field; still others are quietly skeptical of any effort to make a meaningful contribution in the two or three courses allotted to the task. Similar disagreements abound in the social sciences and humanities. The result is often a pallid compromise that allows the student to choose among a dizzying variety of courses having very little in common. While this solution has the virtue of being relatively painless, one wonders whether students will gain much lasting value from a requirement to engage in such random encounters with the three vast domains of knowledge.

In short, there are many bodies of information and knowledge that can be considered of great importance in a complex society. It is unrealistic to expect that a student can absorb them all within four years or that a useful approximation can be achieved by requiring undergraduates to roam at large within broad, amorphous categories of courses. But colleges should provide opportunities to study these important areas of knowledge and make them as accessible as possible to their students. For this reason, departments—as well as General Education committees—should assume a clear responsibility to identify bodies of knowledge of wide importance and then to consider how these subjects can be presented effectively and without superficiality to students who do *not* plan to concentrate in the same field. Thus, economics departments should recognize an obligation not merely to provide an introductory offering for all undergraduates but to create courses for the students in other departments who are perennially interested in the application of economics to such broad fields as urban affairs, area studies, policy analysis, or political economy.

There are some final reservations that are worth emphasizing in considering the process of conveying information and knowledge as an aim of undergraduate education. Learning of this sort is highly perishable and quickly forgotten unless it is used by students in their later lives. As a result, the amount of knowledge that graduates actually retain from their college years is probably much smaller than many instructors would like to believe. The problem is compounded in many fields where information quickly grows stale or irrelevant and new knowledge steadily overtakes old theories and generalizations. For these reasons, to base a college education simply on the acquisition of information and knowledge is to settle for small stakes indeed.

2. ACQUIRING SKILLS AND HABITS OF THOUGHT

A more important aim, in my view, is the effort to impart a variety of basic intellectual habits and skills. Many college students have very little idea of what they will do with their lives after graduation; many more will eventually pursue careers very different from what they have anticipated. As a result, it would be difficult for colleges to orient their curricula along vocational lines even if they wished to do so. Nevertheless, there are certain intellectual skills and habits of thought that are so fundamental that they will serve students well in almost any problem or career in

which they happen to engage. These skills and habits of mind provide the college with a critical opportunity to offer something of lasting value in a changing, unpredictable world.

What are these intellectual skills? The most obvious is the ability to communicate orally and in writing with clarity and style. Equally important is the capacity for careful analysis—the ability to identify the issues in a complex problem, collect the relevant information, marshal the pertinent arguments on every side of the question, test every contention and eliminate those that rest on faulty reasoning, and arrive at conclusions soundly related to the available data and arguments. To these skills one can add the acquisition of certain quantitative methods—statistics, calculus, computer science, and the like. These “languages” of thought are becoming so basic to the sciences and social sciences that students who fail to master them will find themselves cut off from many of the most important issues of their time or reduced to relying on others to translate in diluted form the materials required to grapple effectively with these problems.

Another important skill involves the ability to speak and read a foreign language. Such competence can bring many rewards. For some, the knowledge of a foreign language can deepen the understanding of one's native tongue. Those who persevere to the point of truly mastering another language may appreciate its literature at a level of refinement unattainable by those who must rely upon translations. For a majority of students, however, the most obvious contribution that a foreign language can make is the ability it brings to live and work in a foreign land.* Such competence is likely to become increasingly important as insistent political and economic forces press the nations of the world closer together for their mutual self-interest and even survival. Under these circumstances, it will be vital for our society that larger numbers of people have the capacity to understand other cultures and work effectively in a wide variety of international activities. It will not be easy to achieve this goal, particularly when so many students have no way of knowing the areas of the world with which they will come in contact during their later lives. Nevertheless, colleges will surely have to meet the challenge as best they can, not only by offering their students instruction in foreign languages but by combining such training with opportunities to explore other cultures in depth through formal study supplemented by work and travel abroad.

Still another form of intellectual competence is the knowledge of an academic discipline. That familiar hallmark of the undergraduate program—the college major—is often justified as a way of encouraging students to obtain such competence. For students who plan to pursue graduate work in the same field, a basic grasp of the discipline will often provide a necessary foundation for their future careers. As I have indicated, however, serious questions arise concerning the value of the college major for students who will devote their lives to very different endeavors. How does one explain the requirement that future lawyers, stockbrokers, salesmen, and business executives devote so many of their college courses to learning a single academic discipline? Traditionally, colleges answered this question by claiming that

* To describe these advantages is not necessarily to concur in the decision requiring all students in college to acquire a language competence. Although most students may eventually have need of a foreign language, there is often no way of knowing what that language will be in college. Moreover, such requirements often reflect an awkward compromise that forces students into classes against their will but does not keep them there long enough to enable them to realize any of the significant advantages that true language competence might bring.

every student needed to gain the sense of mastering at least one subject in depth. But this rationale was vague to begin with. It is even less satisfactory today for colleges in which the overwhelming majority of students plan to enter professional school where they presumably will have adequate opportunities for highly intensive study.

One response to this problem is to attempt to acquaint the student with a variety of disciplines by developing a series of "mode of thought" courses. This approach may seem to offer something of greater use to students by giving them a larger arsenal of methods with which to attack a wide range of problems. But the effort is not without its difficulties. Certain established fields, such as political science, do not really have a distinctive mode of thought, while others, such as sociology and history, claim several competing methodologies. Many disciplines can no longer be grasped adequately in a single offering, and most are quickly forgotten if students do not have the opportunity to apply them in subsequent courses. Under these circumstances, efforts to expose students to several modes of thought can easily become superficial and confusing. A more realistic goal is to develop interdisciplinary concentrations where it is possible to combine a limited number of related methods and skills that complement each other in illuminating subjects of wide significance. An obvious illustration is the emerging field of public policy, where students can learn basic statistics, economics, decision theory, and political analysis and then apply these methods in considering a variety of contemporary problems.

But where does all this leave the typical college major? In many of the sciences, the traditional concentration probably works reasonably well since the majority of students will go on to do advanced work in the same or a related field. In the humanities and social sciences, however, I would argue that the concentration should probably be viewed less as a way of enabling students to "master a discipline" than as a useful means of pursuing other ends of undergraduate education. Concentration forces the student to acquire a body of related knowledge and technique and thus may afford a better framework for achieving certain educational goals than anything attainable through the taking of a random series of courses. For example, a concentration in one of the social sciences may provide, among other things, an apt vehicle for mastering certain quantitative techniques, since students can be asked to learn these methods and then have this learning reinforced in subsequent courses through application to a variety of problems in the field. In the humanities, real ability to understand and analyze a literary text may only result from the study of many works and many forms of criticism through a series of related courses. Since education is always an uncertain process, each concentration should be designed to achieve more than one objective. At the very least, a well-conceived concentration should provide the setting for a rigorous training in the careful analysis and exposition of complex problems and ideas. Yet the essential point is that a department may not accomplish this or any other serious objective if it fails to devote careful thought to the matter and merely obliges its students to take a required number of courses in the field.

In addition to the skills and habits of thought already mentioned, it is fashionable to lay great stress on encouraging students to "learn how to learn." (This point is always accompanied by the sobering thought that learning does not end with graduation but extends throughout one's lifetime.) To my knowledge, no one has yet described precisely what is meant by "learning how to learn," and audiences are doubtless reluctant to ask for fear of exposing their ignorance on a

point of cardinal importance. Presumably, however, a college education can help students to appreciate how to read systematically about a topic and comprehend more of what they read, how to arrange the knowledge they acquire in a coherent pattern, and how to evaluate what they have learned through the application of critical thought. In addition, a college can encourage students to learn for themselves by instilling the confidence that comes from having to master a body of complex and unfamiliar material through completing a rigorous concentration or writing a substantial senior thesis. In these ways, the ability to learn can be regarded as a necessary result of acquiring the basic habits of thought I have already described.

3. DEVELOPING QUALITIES OF MIND

Essential to the wise use of intellectual skills are certain qualities of mind. Although every reader may compile his private list, I would include the capacity for open-mindedness—a respect for other points of view and a tolerance for ambiguity arising from the realization that many problems produce a variety of respectable opinions rather than a set of right and wrong answers. Since tolerance carried to extremes can result in vacuity, I would add the capacity for commitment—a willingness to make tentative conclusions in the face of ambiguity, differing views, and inadequate information. I would also mention a respect for facts and a willingness to pursue them even to uncomfortable conclusions. I would certainly include an appetite for learning and continued independent study to expand one's knowledge and understanding.*

Such qualities cannot easily be developed in any systematic fashion. They flourish in an environment that embodies these values in the intellectual life of the faculty and in the choice of papers students must write, the classroom discussions in which they engage, and even the examinations which they must take. It is difficult to prove how successful colleges are in cultivating these qualities in their students. But a number of studies have produced encouraging evidence that students do develop significantly along these lines with results that seem to endure long after graduation.²

4. ACQUIRING UNDERSTANDING AND COMPETENCE IN THE ARTS

The undergraduate years provide abundant opportunities to nourish literary and aesthetic interests that will survive and grow in later life. A college education can

* The reader may interject at this point that there are many other qualities of mind that seem at least as important as those I have mentioned. Most of these can be grouped under one of two headings:

Qualities of Intellect: Creativity and imagination are examples of extremely important qualities not mentioned in the text. But there is no reliable evidence that a college education can foster these qualities in any unique fashion for a substantial number of students nor would many professors admit to making a conscious effort along these lines. As a result, it would be difficult to include the development of these characteristics among the purposes of a liberal arts education.

Emotional and Psychological Qualities: One may well hope that college students develop along a number of emotional and psychological lines—for example, an increased awareness and a greater understanding of interpersonal relations, greater emotional control and stability, etc. In fact, various studies indicate that students do develop in these respects. Nevertheless, it is not clear that college contributes uniquely to such development or that similar growth would not occur in a variety of other settings where young people can live and work with others during this formative period of their lives. Nor is there much understanding of the steps to take to promote development of this kind. As a result, I am not convinced that

foster the capacity to appreciate literature and to read a literary text with greater discrimination and understanding. Students may likewise come to understand music and art by developing greater acuteness of eye and ear and by appreciating the formal structure of art as well as the historical and cultural context from which it emerges. In addition, a college can provide a wealth of opportunities and encouragement for students wishing to develop a rudimentary competence as writers, painters, musicians, sculptors, or photographers. Many faculties have considered these opportunities as extracurricular—and hence separate—from the formal study of art, literature, and music. At a deeper level, however, study and performance are closely interrelated, for performance enhances the capacity to understand art just as performance is itself enriched by formal study and analysis. Hence, the most exciting prospects for the curriculum may lie in the integration of these two methods of aesthetic experience and understanding.

It would be superficial to conceive of literature and art merely as a source of fun and idle recreation for college graduates, just as it is an exaggeration to suppose that a serious involvement in the arts will necessarily make students better persons. As James Ackerman points out, although such involvement "can increase one's pleasure, perception, sensitivity, understanding, . . . people of great knowledge and acute aesthetic sensibility can be amoral and uncivilized."³ Yet one can hardly dispute the value of developing an understanding of literature and art. The pressures of vocation and career are particularly intense in our society. Individuals abound who have grown so immersed in their work that they become narrow human beings—unable to appreciate the culture around them, incapable of enjoying their leisure hours, and bereft of resources for the period late in life when they no longer have their careers to sustain them. These handicaps will become more important in the next generation when the number of college-educated persons begins to exceed the number of jobs traditionally associated with a college degree. Many graduates will be relegated to less interesting occupations with the result that their personal development and fulfillment will depend increasingly on the quality of their lives outside their work.*

5. DEVELOPING JUDGMENT AND VALUES

At a deeper level, it is possible that a continuing interest in literature and the arts will accomplish more than enriching the hours away from work, however important that may be. We are all aware that few important decisions in life can be made by logic or reason alone. They depend on the balancing of intangible, qualitative considerations that cannot be measured. The capacity to make such choices well is doubtless a result of native intelligence, family upbringing, and a host of other experiences that are but dimly understood. Yet it is the faith of the liberal arts that education can also play a part.

we can include such development among the major aims of undergraduate education (as that term is defined in this article), although I recognize that others may differ with this conclusion.

Of course, further research may disclose causal connections that are not now known between particular qualities and undergraduate education. As this occurs, it may then be possible to include the fostering of such qualities among the purposes of the liberal arts college.

* For somewhat similar reasons there is much to be said for encouraging students to develop competence in one or more lifetime sports during college. Although this may not represent a major aim of undergraduate education, it is clearly an opportunity that students should grasp and colleges should make available.

By and large, colleges do not seek to make their contribution in a direct, explicit fashion. The faith is rather that the liberal arts will exert a subtler influence on a student's judgment and values through a wide variety of undergraduate courses. Subjects as diverse as anthropology, fiction, economics, and psychology may help to overcome parochialism and awaken students to a clearer awareness of the interests and problems of others. A study of the social and behavioral sciences may develop greater understanding of the reasons that explain human conduct and organizational behavior. Literature, history, and biography can convey a wealth of vicarious experience about the trials and errors of other individuals and institutions and thus help develop a student's capacity to make judgments concerning a variety of recurring human problems. To be sure, knowledge of this kind is no substitute for intelligence or practical experience nor is it likely that values or judgment will develop in any significant fashion from courses that merely assemble quantities of information or concentrate on narrow questions of interest chiefly to specialists. But it is equally clear that native ability and personal experience will rarely guarantee a sufficient breadth of knowledge and understanding for the present world, and it is here that the liberal arts, properly taught, may make a distinctive contribution.

There is continuing debate, however, about the need to make a more deliberate attempt to deal with certain areas of value and choice. One possibility involves the development of greater sensitivity to ethical considerations and a capacity to make more discriminating moral choices. Over the past generation, such questions have made little headway in the curriculum. To be sure, professors may lecture on the history of moral philosophy in introductory courses on ethics. Teachers of literature will identify moral issues arising in the texts that they discuss, and students, especially in the social sciences, can often discern a professor's value premises and moral preferences. But students seldom have a chance to debate ethical questions extensively, and instructors rarely guide them to the philosophical literature that bears on the moral issues they encounter in their everyday lives.

This neglect has unfortunate consequences. It relegates the discussion of moral questions to the dining hall and the mass meeting. The result is to encourage ideological rigidity and loose thinking among some students and, among others, a flaccid ethical relativism that implies that every person's moral convictions are as valid as everyone else's. As a result, there is much to be said for an effort to develop courses that allow students to engage in a rigorous discussion of contemporary moral dilemmas. Such offerings will hardly produce "answers" to serious ethical questions. But they may serve a useful purpose by acquainting students with a rich moral literature, and they may also develop a greater sensitivity to the ethical issues that inhere in human situations, a greater respect for differing points of view on important moral issues, and a greater awareness that ethical problems can be clarified up to a point through careful debate and analysis.

Another area of choice that invites closer attention is the decision students must make about their future careers. These choices will become increasingly difficult over the next generation. As society grows more complex, the variety of possibilities becomes bewilderingly large. And as the number of college-educated students begins to outstrip the number of jobs traditionally associated with college training, more and more students will be unable to pursue their preferred career and must search anew for alternatives.

Conservative critics may dismiss these problems on the ground that the true concern of the college is academic learning and not the occupations of its students. But

I am persuaded that this is too narrow a view to take of undergraduate education. A residential college occupies most of the time and energy of students during a period of their lives in which they must make a vital, albeit tentative, decision about their future. Having assumed this position, the college must pay attention to these critical choices insofar as it is capable of doing so. This responsibility scarcely implies that colleges should add preprofessional courses to the curriculum or take other steps that might aggravate the vocational pressures that are already too prevalent among undergraduates. But colleges should seek to maintain an environment that will stimulate and assist their students in making enlightened choices about their future lives.

Such decisions require that students have a growing awareness of their values, capacities, limitations, and interests together with an understanding of the opportunities that are open to them for spending a useful and rewarding life. To some extent, such personal awareness may develop both through courses and readings that add to a student's store of vicarious experience and through the opportunity that college affords to experiment with a number of interests and life-styles. Career counseling may help to clarify the opportunities available after graduation and the likely matches that can be made between these opportunities and a student's interests and abilities. But colleges could do more to assist their students in making wise decisions. For example, courses may be devised which deal with the professions in America—their history and structure, their problems and opportunities. Properly conceived, such offerings could provide an understanding of important areas of society in a manner worthy of a liberal arts curriculum; at the same time, they would supply a useful background from which to make more discriminating choices of career. Outside the curriculum, more effort could be made to encourage undergraduates to take time away from college to live and work in environments that are neither academic nor similar to those in which the students have spent their lives. Though it is only a hope, the belief persists that a radically different experience can provide young people with a perspective on themselves and their lives that they may not achieve in other ways. In earlier times, a year or more at sea or abroad performed this function; more recently, military service may have served a similar purpose. As an antidote to many uninterrupted years of schooling, a time to live and work creatively among different kinds of people in an unfamiliar setting may contribute much toward the truest aims of a liberal arts education while helping to clarify the direction that a student will follow after leaving college.*

In principle, one could go beyond the problems of ethical choice and career decisions to include a long list of perennial human problems that students are likely to confront in later life. Each of these problems is the subject of a rich body of thought contained in literature, psychology, sociology and a variety of other fields. Many students might profit from an early exposure to these materials, and study of this kind could certainly be considered a fitting subject for liberal arts education. But there are severe practical limitations. Each of these human problems cuts across many disciplines, and few professors would consider themselves prepared to deal with materials of such variety and breadth. As a result, it may be difficult to find enough instructors who can teach such courses with appropriate rigor and depth.

* In a recent Harvard survey of students who had returned to the University after a semester or more away, 49% of the respondents indicated that their experience contributed to their choice of career. In addition 62% felt that they could make better use of the University and 70% found themselves more interested in their courses.

Thus, it is probably wise to begin by venturing into areas such as ethical choice, where there is a dominant underlying discipline, or the problem of choosing a career, where there is much to be done outside the formal curriculum.

C. A Critique of the Status Quo

To some readers, the purposes I have outlined will seem obvious. But the point of this essay is not to search for subtle, undiscovered aims but to encourage the renaissance of an all but vanished dialogue on our college campuses. For I would assert that there is very little discussion today about the purposes of a liberal arts education and that this neglect is likely to have unfortunate consequences for the quality of our undergraduate programs. If I am correct, one would expect to find academic requirements that bear no convincing relation to the principal aims of undergraduate education. Since colleges lack the guiding framework that most institutions derive from defining their purposes, one would also suspect that faculty debates on important educational questions would become superficial and that colleges would fail to make adequate efforts to evaluate their educational programs and assess their effects upon the student. Finally, one would expect that faculty members, left to their own individual inclinations, would fail to give adequate emphasis to all the purposes of a liberal arts education but would overemphasize some at the expense of others. I will argue that all of these consequences have in fact occurred.

To begin with, serious questions arise concerning the most basic requirements of the typical college curriculum. The concentration requirement, for example, has been accepted so widely over so many years that it no longer even provokes discussion in many of the recent reports on undergraduate education. But it is not enough to aver that every student needs to know one subject in depth or to assert that each undergraduate should master a discipline. In an age where most students in good university colleges go on to specialize in a professional school, these aims are no longer persuasive (if, indeed, they ever were). Concentration requirements must be shaped to achieve more compelling purposes, and it is far from clear that many departments have an adequate conception of just what these purposes should be. Requirements to insure breadth suffer from similar infirmities. Categories such as humanities, social science, and science do not guarantee distinctive educational values, and students who are simply obliged to sample a few courses in each field will not necessarily acquire much knowledge that is worth having.

The level of academic debate is likewise affected by the lack of attention paid to the purposes of undergraduate education, for no human activity can be meaningfully discussed for very long in isolation from the aims toward which it is directed. At times, a faculty can avoid this problem by devoting its attention to questions that are only indirectly related to the quality of education, such as admission policies, the size of the college, or the advising system. When faculties and administrators do turn to curricular matters, however, they are usually forced to arrive at conclusions by relying on second-order criteria, such as the need to adhere to budgetary constraints, respond to student desires, or avoid overburdening the faculty. While all these criteria are relevant, none speaks directly to the problem of improving the quality of education.

For similar reasons, college administrations have carried out very little serious research to help evaluate and improve the quality of undergraduate education.

Surveys are conducted from time to time but, once again, they usually concern themselves with second-order data, such as student opinions or examination grades. Information of this kind can be useful. But any serious attempt to use research in improving the quality of education must include an effort to identify the effects of educational programs on the student. Such research is difficult under the best of circumstances, but it will certainly fail to prosper when so few institutions have even made a careful effort to define the effects that they are seeking to promote. It is true that a large literature has accumulated on the subject of student growth during the college years. Almost invariably, however, these studies commence at the instance of psychologists or sociologists and proceed in substantial independence from the college administration. Members of the research team are rarely even faculty members of the institution they investigate. As a result, the studies tend to measure changes in attitude and personality that interest the authors rather than the administration. For this reason, the final results seldom bear directly on the options and decisions that confront the deans and faculties nor do the studies seem to have any effect on the work of most curriculum committees. All in all, therefore, it is fair to say that colleges devote much less attention to improving their programs through research and development than do most other institutions in the society.

It is also reasonably clear that the education offered by most colleges today places disproportionate weight on some objectives to the neglect of others. The dominant emphasis falls on transmitting information and ideas. In describing their offerings in the college catalogue, most professors convey the impression that the only point worth mentioning about their courses is a description of the subject matter to be covered. Moreover, experienced teachers in many colleges tend to devote almost all of their undergraduate teaching to the process of conveying information and knowledge through lecturing to students.

Much less attention is paid to the task of training students to think clearly and communicate with precision and style. A principal vice of the contemporary university college is the neglect of these habits of mind and the illusion that they can be passively acquired through reading and listening to lectures. In fact, they can be learned only through a process of carefully supervised discussion, repeated preparation of papers, and continuing evaluation by competent instructors. To the extent that this process occurs at all, it is left in most colleges to inexperienced and unsupervised teaching fellows who are responsible for grading papers and conducting discussion sections in large lecture courses.

Similar questions can be raised about the other purposes I have mentioned. In literature and the arts, departments in the humanities offer courses to enhance the student's understanding of painting, music, poetry and fiction, and arts programs have clearly made headway in the past decade. But many institutions do little to encourage large numbers of students to develop a competence in painting, sculpture, or other art forms, and few have made a serious effort to integrate analysis and performance in fields such as drama and music. Most colleges have likewise failed to give systematic attention to the task of helping their students deal with issues of moral choice.* Courses in ethics do exist, but for the most part they consist of in-

* Several reasons help to explain the absence of such courses. Most trained philosophers are not interested in contemporary moral problems but concern themselves with other, more technical, areas of the discipline. Some may feel that the study of moral problems is insufficiently analytical, objective and rigorous. Others may fear that they will seem to indoctrinate their students. None of these objections seems convincing. The absence of interested, trained philosophers is as much a result as a cause of the

truductory surveys of a passive variety or idiosyncratic offerings by professors, untrained in philosophy, who were originally hired to teach other subjects. As for the process of choosing a career, the prevailing view considers this a matter lying wholly outside the curriculum in the domain of the counseling and guidance specialists. As a result, the problem rarely commands more than fleeting attention on the part of those who shape the priorities of educational institutions.

These observations suggest some of the reasons for the apparent reluctance to grapple seriously with the purposes of undergraduate education. There are obvious risks in any serious attempt to define institutional goals more precisely. Priorities may have to shift; new programs may have to be created and old ones overhauled; new responsibilities may arise requiring faculty attention. Such prospects are scarcely inviting. Despite all of the publicity about the financial plight of our universities, any seasoned observer knows that the scarcest commodity on our campuses is not money but time, and this is particularly true of faculty members in our most distinguished institutions. Under these circumstances, it is small wonder that professors unconsciously put off a serious inquiry into the aims of undergraduate education.

Nevertheless, there are tendencies at work which suggest that we cannot continue indefinitely without a more searching discussion of our purposes. Financial austerity will force us to make institutional choices that cannot be satisfactorily resolved without a clearer sense of our objectives. As students encounter keener competition for careers, their interests are likely to become more vocational with the result that they may grow increasingly skeptical concerning the value of a liberal arts education. These doubts will be echoed by parents concerned over mounting tuitions and legislators wrestling with competing demands for public funds. In the end, however, it is the quality of liberal arts education that is most clearly at stake. University professors are increasingly pressed by the competing demands of their graduate students, their research and their professional careers. If they cannot articulate convincingly the ultimate aims of undergraduate teaching, they will fail not only in persuading students, parents, and legislators of the worth of what they do; they may fail even to persuade themselves, and once this occurs, there will be little left of a college education that is worth preserving.

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1. *The Study of Education at Stanford* (1968), vol. 2, p. 12.
2. For a review of the literature, see Withey et al., *A Degree and What Else? Correlates and Consequences of a College Education* (1972). See also Perry, *Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years* (1968).
3. See "The Arts in Education," in Kaysen (ed.), *Content and Context* (1973), pp. 219, 226.

lack of courses on the curriculum; moreover, other sources of faculty can be found, for example, among law professors with a background in philosophy. As for the danger of indoctrination, if moral philosophy is taught to undergraduates in the form of problem-oriented courses with the instructor guiding the discussion rather than expounding his preferred solutions, then the classes can be rigorous without becoming doctrinaire. See, generally, Kohlberg, "Moral Education, Psychological View of," *International Encyclopedia of Education*, (1972) p. 398.

MARTIN MEYERSON

Civilizing Education: Uniting Liberal and Professional Learning

UNIVERSITIES HAVE MOSTLY been centers of professional education. Early European universities (and for that matter the early American colleges as well) prepared young men for clerical careers. Some, such as Bologna, started as schools of law, while Salerno was founded as a school of medicine. Such concentration did not go unnoticed by contemporary observers; Sir Francis Bacon, for example, wondered about the ancient universities: "I find it strange that they are all dedicated to the professions, and none left free to arts and science at large."

By the time of the Civil War, secular influences had begun to displace theological ones in the United States. The Morrill Act of 1862—the product, in part, of a frontier society's penchant for the utilitarian—stimulated career studies in agriculture and technology throughout the country. At about the same time, in 1861, Yale awarded the first earned arts and sciences doctorate in America, a Ph.D. in classics. Thus, Edward Everett and George Ticknor, born in the eighteenth century and fellow students at Göttingen in the early nineteenth, lived to see the first steps in realizing their dream of transplanting German advanced education to America. The unwitting result was to further professionalism by encouraging aspiring researchers and professors to develop an intense specialization; once again little room was left for the intellectual breadth that had been the intention of studies termed liberal—that is, suited to free men—since medieval and Renaissance times.

By the twentieth century, most American undergraduates were in specific career programs ranging from engineering to business, from teaching to nursing. At universities such as Chicago, Columbia, and Harvard, those in arts and sciences undergraduate programs often experienced an education worthy of the term liberal, and various four-year college faculties pondered what the form and content of such an education ought to be. Today such efforts are in eclipse. Now as never before undergraduate arts and sciences students look toward graduate professional schools. Some wish to prove, as undergraduates, that they are specialists worthy of continuing on the Ph.D. course.

The majority of undergraduates are directly enrolled in professional programs such as engineering, while half of the entering male undergraduates in arts and sciences (and a large proportion of the female) at numerous colleges and universities are pre-medical students and very many of the remainder are pre-law students. The overkill phenomenon in certain pre-professional programs is virulent. When a medical school can fill ten classes with brilliant students, yet has but one, the statements about encouraging a broad pre-medical education often become platitudes. To a medical admissions officer, the student who has added a biochemistry course to his or her other scientific courses has shown an intention to go that extra margin. When graduate fellowships in arts and sciences are rarer than

ever, departments of economics seldom favor students who used their undergraduate years for breadth rather than for mastering econometrics.

The tendency to concentrate on career learning comes both from within the academy and from the students themselves. Currently students are prompted to the professions by practical and idealistic reasons. (Students in the late sixties, demanding so-called "relevancy" for their studies, differed in style and tone from today's students. The former were often angry and rebellious, strove to erase authority, and were influenced by a new romanticism that valued the emotional, the expressive, and the intuitive. Despite claims that such an ambience is over, many elements of it remain.) Students today are more drawn to the concrete than to the abstract, to the utilitarian than to the intellectual. Most of the role models among their professors are professionals in applied fields or professionals in arts and sciences fields who themselves are neither educated nor experienced in liberal studies. Alas, educated men and women are hardly more visible in our universities than elsewhere.

The case for liberal learning is beleaguered. Few voices call for an education which not only confronts students with the humanistic and scientific achievements of man's past and present, but also exposes them to the various methods through which truth is sought. The rhetoric of the case for liberal education seems tainted to a generation of students who frequently scorn learning for its own sake. They ask not for traditional liberal learning, but for a learning directed to action. Their platitudes may sometimes be naïve, and the consequences of their quest may even lead to a know-nothingness and an anti-intellectual posture. Yet the more sophisticated among them have made the conventional case for liberal learning seem like a caricature. Indeed, it has sometimes been a caricature. I am reminded of a clergyman in Oxford who, when queried a long time ago as to why his nephew should study classical languages, replied that it was in order to read Scripture in the original, have proper contempt for those who cannot, and eventually rise to a position of emolument in the Church.

Those of us in colleges and universities ought to help unite the profession or the calling with liberal learning. If we do not, we shall have failed the rightful aspirations of many of the young who seek a life of service. Moreover, unless we imbue vocation with a sense of liberal learning, we shall have failed to improve life as well.

Robert Frost recognized the significance of this unity when he wrote:

My object in living is to unite
My avocation and my vocation
As my two eyes make one in sight.
Only where love and need are one
And the work is play for mortal stakes
Is the deed ever really done
For Heaven and the future's sakes.

Like Frost, I emphasize the communion of love and need, avocation and vocation. I do so because the ideal of liberal learning ought to be bound to the ideal of the instrumental, the utilitarian, the professional. The vocation of which I speak, however, is vocation as summons or moral call rather than as job alone.

There is an opportunity for us to achieve a new synthesis of liberal and professional learning and to respond to a cultural spirit—partly humanitarian, partly careerist—in our students by doing so. It is time we realized that a sense of vocation can support our commitment to liberal learning. We can, for example, transform

professional education for undergraduates and graduates alike by making it more humane and intellectual. Similarly by adding to the intrinsically valuable academic studies that devotion to social purpose, which is so typically a part of the spirit of service of the professions, we might give those students who find the traditional studies empty of purpose a sense of their ultimate relevance. We might also open new paths to liberal education through some of the methods, insights, and research of transformed professional education.

Education would be improved by a creative tension between the concrete and the theoretical, the rationalistic and the empirical. Especially in the academic world matters of theory should not be distant from those of practice, nor the practical far from its source in theory. Seeing theoretical fields in juxtaposition with applied fields not only provides students and teachers with a laboratory in which to test theories, but also can put before them a constant reminder of the social and moral implications of their work. Professional education needs to be made more intellectual, reflective, and liberal, by increasing theoretical understanding, by sharpening research and methodology, by questioning accepted practices, and by educating men and women to be flexible, civilized, and responsible. If we enlarge a person's understanding of the nature and origin and purposes of his calling and of the society which he serves, not only can we help the engineer, the communication specialist, the teacher, to be prepared to function as a professional fifteen and more years from now, but we can help make him more responsive to the new tasks he is bound to be called upon to undertake. Only in this way can we provide for true utility.

Awareness of the meaning of a profession should not dawn upon a student in graduate school, law school, medical school, or advanced engineering school. Imaginative teaching that links the arts, sciences and professions can satisfy the inner hunger for moral commitment and self-expression, while answering the outer call for service by providing a vehicle for social regeneration. Liberal learning can recognize the validity and promise in the ferment of our time and suggest ways in which students may lose themselves in order to find themselves in the transformation of the world about them. Just as liberal learning can enlarge understanding of professions, so comprehension of professions illuminates liberal learning.

A profession is not only the trusteeship of a body of learning; it is a commitment to service. As Ruskin suggested, we can define a professional by his feeling that it is his duty—"on due occasion" as Ruskin put it—to die for the cause to which he is committed. Ruskin's list of due occasions for dying all imply an ethical imperative that makes the practitioner's role a purposeful one:

The Soldier, rather than leave his post in battle.
The Physician, rather than leave his post in plague.
The Pastor, rather than teach Falsehood.
The Lawyer, rather than countenance Injustice.

A man will be willing to die in a cause, says Ruskin, because "the man who does not know when to die, does not know how to live." This dramatic figure of speech proclaims that the professions are concerned with the most authoritative causes.

When our students were stressing the need for commitment, they were surely complaining in part that they were not learning how to live and work with purpose. The professions offer ways through which such commitment could be expressed. The students diligently at their books in our libraries do not signify the eradication of the recent spirit of commitment. Perhaps they seek now to give form to previous sen-

timents. Many are purposeful and attached to a calling. Some have this attachment because it is fashionable; some because it is a time of economic uncertainty; but some are seeking to serve.

Students are discouraged from liberal education by pressures to concentrate on career learning, but liberal education has also suffered from the splintering of knowledge into fragmented areas. Professors themselves helped splinter liberal education by acquiescing to the cafeteria mode of educational selection by students and, more recently, by often discarding altogether requirements for such subjects as language and science, once considered important to the educated man or woman. Humanistic and scientific learning have been divorced. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries science was seen as part of the humanistic achievements of man, a liberating force. Now science is confused with technology and is sometimes viewed by humanists as a threat to the values of our culture. Certainly those not concentrating in science are not encouraged to be curious about it.

It is not specialization or dedication to a discipline that is troubling. It is overspecialization. Many of the persons who are narrow experts today were more broadly cultivated than their present students. We live off this residue of broad knowledge now. The fields in which our eminent scholars work have expanded and been subdivided so much, and the literature has so proliferated, that there is a narrower and narrower academic path to follow. The student today is not so fortunate as his sixty-year-old professor was when he was a novice.

To reach the objectives for education I have in mind, the teaching of the professions in our institutions, both graduate and undergraduate, needs to be imbued with more of the recognition of the humane and of the analytic method that has been the ideal of the arts and sciences. This, in turn, could establish an interplay that would bring empirical concerns, a sense of social purpose, and some new theoretical insights to the arts and sciences. The utilitarian would be more tempered and civilized to the good of all. To be civilized means far more than its colloquial or precious sense of being able to quote Voltaire or recognize Giotto; it can mean the pursuit of a calling in the service of man that is also intimately linked to an understanding of man. The challenge is to achieve a better balance between our vocations or callings and the culture (or cultures) we inherit, recreate, and pass on to future generations. Human knowledge and human action are both complex.

The university must not remain content with merely raising questions. It is no accident that a more literate populace has more questions, for universities have—rightly—taught people to question. But universities have not helped teach them to feel responsible for answering those questions. This is not to say that we in universities must give the answers. On the contrary, we can best help in facing the problems of our world by providing knowledge to those charged with making decisions, by propounding alternative actions, and by analyzing the effects of those alternatives.

Pure and applied study need not be divorced. Universities must provide students with the means for acting on problems of the total human experience. To accomplish this, the liberal arts and the professions must interact; but they must also recreate in themselves a devotion to their imaginative responsibilities to man. Faculty in both the professions and the liberal arts ought now more than ever to devote themselves to exploring how their calling serves civilization rather than concentrating on how they can maintain their position within the academic system or how the academic system can train more academics. The academy must not only ex-

amine beliefs, but also serve as an example of how belief can be held and acted on.

In devoting ourselves to efforts that educate the student in the culture surrounding his chosen profession, discipline, or calling, we might insure that the undergraduate, as well as the graduate or professional student, has a sense of the total context of this intended career. I here present some examples of how the arts and sciences can relate to the professions and how professionalism can enrich the arts and sciences. Of course, there are many additional possibilities.

The Philosophy of Law

Although law students are trained in cases in torts, contracts, property, they are rarely educated in the history of matters surrounding the law. Law students do not usually study such social theorists as Voltaire, Hume, Locke, Berkeley, Burke, and Bentham, who influenced institutional and therefore legal life; nor do all read such legal theorists as Blackstone any more.

Our students frequently lack any study of the philosophy underlying law. Through such study, they could understand that their contemporary life as lawyers will be (or ought to be) grounded in a great Western tradition in which logic, ethics, politics, and economics are interrelated with one another and with the law. They could appreciate the theoretical framework that helps give understanding and order to the social system. When we speak of law and order, we should mean far more than restraint of an unruly populace. Our students should understand that Western concepts of order and politics derive from the rational ordering of the *polis*. Those who become lawyers ought to study Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*, Augustine's *City of God* and Machiavelli's *Prince*, Hooker's *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* and Hobbes' *Leviathan*, as well as Milton's *Areopagitica* and his tracts on divorce and on the tenure of magistrates, as well as contemporary materials. Such study might even have the added civilizing benefit of improving the student's legal prose style. And if it be objected that the student will not then have time to study the law, we should ask ourselves just what narrow definition of the law we have that it should cover hardly more than immediately applicable decisions of various governmental agencies and state and federal courts. The student should have had such learning whether or not he studied law. As citizens we cannot rise to changing circumstances if we have no knowledge of how the past has influenced our present.

The Social Psychology of Health

Similarly, pre-medical students and medical students ought to study the social and psychological setting of medicine. I do not mean merely such major contributions to the understanding of disease as the investigative work of Harvey, Jenner, or Lister. We ought to acquaint our students with these persons as *models* of those who practiced, observed, and taught.

Certainly medical students ought at least to know that Hippocrates did more than invent an oath. They ought also to know that doctors often drove midwives out of the "profession" as "old wives" and disdained their psychological understanding of women in labor. It took a Lister to pay attention to the old wives' tale that women who had their babies in hospitals were likely to die there and for him to wonder why. We ought to encourage our students to do more such wondering.

Our students, both in medical school and as undergraduates, are coming to recognize the influence that economics and class position have exerted on the incidence of disease. But they have not yet been sufficiently exposed to the influence that attitudes, personality, and expectations have on health. If the student does not comprehend that a soul and body inhabit the same space and that a patient is also a member of a community, then the student in the health professions cannot truly treat the whole person. Some of our most intelligent students go into the study of health, but—being intelligent—they often go into it as idealists and leave it as cynics, having decided that the important thing is to “get through.”

Studies in the social psychology of health could include contemporary empirical work on longevity in the cultures where the old are much admired; current research on the relation of work, play, community, and family patterns to various kinds of ailments; analyses of the patient-physician relations in our own and other societies; as well as anthropological studies such as those of the islanders who, during a blight on breadfruit, died from eating fish—which was taboo. Students might also comprehend such works as those of the Gestalt psychologists, and William James as well as Freud. They might be directed to demonstration projects like the Peckham Health Center, south of the Thames, which, in the years after World War II, attempted to deal with health as a phenomenon not only of the body and of the mind, but one related to job, to relatives, to recreation, to neighborhood ties.

The Aesthetics of Engineering

We ought to insure that our students see their fields within the context of human civilization. Engineering students ought to understand the aesthetics of their calling. Civil engineers ought to know that what they design affects the whole community because all of us see it. Persons work in, travel through, sit down in, and walk by objects and structures that civil engineers build. And if engineers have created something beautiful as well as functional, like the Golden Gate Bridge, then they have uplifted the whole community. I think also of the popular and more specialized impact that Eiffel's tower had on the city of Paris when it was erected in 1889. The pointillist Seurat, for example, experienced Eiffel's work as a major influence on his development. Engineers ought to understand that our environment includes what we live in and the machines around us. Man is certainly a part of nature, but it is man's particular nature to be artful.

The impact of engineering on life is so great that our engineering students ought to study the aesthetics and history of their discipline enough to realize that *pontifex maximus* is a title that engineers (as well as clerics) might aspire to themselves. If the Etruscans thought the building of the so-called Roman arch was the highest title to fame, if the Greeks could combine the crafts of stone-worker and temple-erector, if the Middle Ages could encourage its builders to ever more glorious flights into heaven, our own engineers ought to be similarly inspired into new technological and mechanical directions. If Pythagoras could evolve both geometry and a metaphysics out of his observations of Egyptian surveying and building techniques, our engineering or pre-engineering students ought to be taught to realize the impact their own work will have. I speak now mainly of aesthetics, but of course our students should be also at least as much aware of the relations between their work and the economic, political, and social world.

I am not saying it will be easy to alter the way we prepare our students for entry into professional life or to give the arts and sciences the sense of action and problem-solving that the professions and the professional schools have. In these last few years, however, at the University of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, professors in the professions are teaching increasingly in the arts and sciences, and those in the traditional disciplines are teaching in some of the professions. Similarly, there is a growing collaboration in research and other studies between professors in the liberal arts and sciences and in the learned professions (and also in evolving ones such as communications).

But lest my optimism be viewed as excessive, I should caution that we rarely reward our colleagues for their breadth as well as their specialization. I am in no way suggesting that so-called humanists or others within the arts and sciences have a more catholic range than their fellows in the professions. Often, it is to the contrary. But as it is now, we are creating a breed of specialists who have been so rewarded for specializing that they have become overspecialized, unable to humanize (and thus perfect) their own speciality because they receive no stimulus from outside it.

I am asking that every teacher aspire to be a Roscoe Pound, a William Osler, or a Lionel Trilling—to contribute significantly to the culture as he passes it on. We ought to reward the truly civilized teacher who is a model to his students of one who continuously interests himself in the ways his discipline bears on human life; who teaches his students such things as the history of technology, medicine, or law; who is interested in the social psychology of science, health, or literature; who investigates the politics of energy, nuclear science, or business administration; who pursues the aesthetics of engineering, technology, or languages; who understands the philosophy of law, medicine, education, or science. In short, we must reward those who, like Aristotle, think metaphysics is a natural sequel to physics.

Training in a profession should not only teach students methods of analysis and research, but also enable them to grow ethically and imaginatively by encouraging them to use these methods to develop reasoned positions of their own. The professor cannot lead the action or demand that the student act, but he or she can insist that the student think about how and when to act.

The professions, then, can become a prism that refracts the light for a more variegated and intense perception in the revaluation of liberal education itself. Indeed, liberalizing education for the professions can provide means for improving education in traditional academic fields as well. Certainly they can relearn the uses of the Socratic method from the law schools, and benefit from the modes of thought in all the professions. If the need for infusing the professions with the spirit of the arts and sciences appears greater at present than for transferring the insights of the professions to the arts and sciences, it is only because students are in a frenzied rush toward the learned professions.

One of the virtues of a university is that it can offer multiple options for a liberal and liberating education. To be effective, both liberal and professional education must strive to connect rather than separate the elements of knowledge. The ablest minds will be attracted to those environments in which all learn from one another, in which professional education becomes intellectual education and in which the humane and scientific are not regarded as ornaments, but are valued as socially useful and necessary.

CARL KAYSEN

What Should Undergraduate Education Do?

AT THE ABSTRACT level of desirable goals, there is wide agreement on what an ideal undergraduate education should do. The liberally educated man or woman who is the ideal college graduate should have a well-developed capacity and taste for critical thought, especially in relation to problems of value—what constitutes the good or virtuous or beautiful life, the model society. He should also command what might be called the techniques and habits of learning so that he is able to continue the educational process in a self-motivated and self-directed way. And, finally, he should master some defined body of knowledge: “the common culture of society.” In some formulations, the second and third of these desiderata are subservient to the first, and the whole might be characterized in the phrase “the formation of informed, inquiring, and critical minds.”

So much for agreed ends. There is less agreement among the relevant publics of academics and academic administrators on the extent to which this goal is presently being achieved or can be achieved. If we move further from the general description of desirable ends to a concrete consideration of the means for reaching them, consensus vanishes entirely. In its stead, we find a wide variety of practices interpreted in an even wider variety of rationalizations.

In practice, college education viewed over the whole spectrum of institutions that offer the four-year B.A. or B.S. degree today is a supermarket in which each student is expected to do his own thing by choosing from the enormously wide display. Within particular institutions, of course, the range is much narrower, although in the great universities it encompasses a large part of the whole. The supermarket is rarely justified as such in educational theory. Indeed, the most vocal comment on it from the academic world is hostile, cast in terms of the continuing centrality of liberal education.

The ruling concept of liberal education today is usually defined as serious involvement with the various kinds of intellectual experience represented by the humanities, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and, more recently, the (non-verbal) arts—combined with some degree of deeper entry into one of them. Degree requirements in the liberal arts colleges and the undergraduate colleges of the great universities still reflect this formula, though with increasingly frequent exceptions. And, to a degree, we all share a belief in it. Who does not wish to believe that every educated man should have a nontrivial grasp of the various modes of knowing and the diverse products which they yield? If traditional humanists are stubbornly—and properly—unwilling to yield to science a monopoly on claims to valid knowledge, and in particular to the social sciences’ claim to valid knowledge of mankind, they usually refrain from asserting publicly that they alone represent what every educated man should know. Natural and social scientists—for the most part, more

nearly in harmony with the concerns of the everyday world—are less embattled and, perhaps for this reason, more willing to concede the claims of literary and artistic culture as being indispensable to liberal education. Further, tradition persists in the academy, and even after a century the natural and social sciences are “new” fields, still deferential to the established classical and humanistic learning which dominated American higher education—such as it was—for the first two and a half centuries after the founding of Harvard College. Music, drama, dance, film, and the visual arts are barely beginning to reach academic respectability as disciplines to be practiced, as well as cultural activities to be studied historically.

This modern version of liberal education is itself relatively new. It represents the adaptation of the older classical and humanistic learning to the rise of the experimental sciences, as opposed to the older natural philosophy, and to the slightly later development of the social sciences as distinct from history and moral philosophy. These developments unfolded in the last quarter of the last century; the consequent changes in undergraduate curricula were largely achieved by the beginning of World War I and persisted till well after World War II.

This view of what constitutes a liberal education succeeded a quite different one that combined classical learning, mathematics, and Christian culture as its central elements. This earlier tradition has had a much longer history, especially in the English-speaking world. Its dominance coincided with the rise of the university or college as the characteristic training institution for most of society's elites. In its earliest history, of course, the university was more clearly devoted to professional training, in theology, law, and medicine, but nostalgia has not typically reached back so far for its objects. But even after the rise of science, the breakup of Christian culture, and the decline of classical learning and its partial supercession by the study of “modern” literatures and history, especially English literature and European and American history, the central function of the college as the characteristic institution for training or at least socializing most of society's elites persisted.

The last three to four decades have seen two profound sets of changes, one in the academy's relation to society, the other within the academy itself. Both were stimulated or crystalized by the events of World War II. Together, they call into question the viability of any shared notion of liberal education and particularly the notion, which constitutes today's orthodoxy, of breadth plus depth defined in terms of the three or four grand divisions of knowledge and calculated in units of courses. The first of these changes is that college education is no longer the training of an elite. Somewhat more than half of an age cohort currently enters the process; between a quarter and a third achieves a degree. The great growth in enrollments has been concentrated in institutions becoming newly important on the educational scene: publicly supported junior colleges, state colleges, and quasi-independent “branches” of the traditional state universities with a different range of activities than the parent centers. A large proportion of their students differ substantially in social background, educational attainments, and life plans from the representative students of the more traditional institutions—the liberal arts colleges and universities, which continue to be thought of as embodying “higher education” by both the general public and many of the faculty members of those universities and colleges. More than 60 percent of all undergraduate enrollments are now in these newer types of institutions, most of them publicly supported and controlled. Only 10 percent are in the great research universities, both public and private; and 8 percent in the overwhelmingly private liberal arts colleges.

These changes in the total context of higher education have affected the older "elite" institutions as well. They are recruiting new kinds of students, and even those from their more traditional geographic and social backgrounds are affected by the general changes. These differences are intensified by what appears to be an unusually rapid period of cultural change, so that the young in general differ even more sharply from their elders in fundamental matters of value than is usually the case. Thus, it is less and less likely that students want, or can be led to want, an education defined in terms of the traditional combination of the traditional divisions of knowledge, served up in the traditional mode.

Over the same period, the academic world itself changed from one in which the characteristic activity was the teaching of undergraduates. The representative faculty member was a teacher; he might or might not be a scholar or scientist contributing to the advancement of science and learning as well. If he was, it was in a certain sense incidental to his main activity, and he was almost certain to be on the faculty of one of the dozen or so universities where most of the country's research activity took place. Even in this small group, only a still smaller number of scholars and scientists were men of international standing in the realms of scholarship and science.

Now the scientist or scholar is the representative faculty member. Research and scholarship and the training of graduate students who will in turn carry on these tasks are his characteristic activities. The number of universities where serious work is done has multiplied at least fivefold, and a substantial proportion of this work stands at the highest level in the international world of learning. Statistically, of course, the picture has changed much less drastically: undergraduate teaching still bulks large in the total activity of the whole professoriat, and the proportion of the group that contributes significantly to the advance of science and scholarship remains small. But in terms of academic values, the change is overwhelming.

The representative professor typically has neither time nor inclination to teach those who are not on the way to becoming professionals in his subject, whether as committed graduate students, or undergraduate majors from among whom the graduate students will be recruited. This tendency is stronger in the sciences and the "harder" social sciences, but it is certainly not absent in the humanities, especially in the form of unwillingness to deal with literature or history in translation. The more a man is successful and celebrated as a scholar, the less willing and able is his institution or even his department to press him to teach what he is not inclined to. At the same time, specialties multiply, the materials and techniques to be mastered in each grow in volume and complexity, and the standards of specialist training advance accordingly. Still it is precisely the teaching of nonspecialists which constitutes the core of liberal education in the orthodox view. Yet as long as the demand for specialist training exists to any degree, it is precisely the teaching of nonspecialists that will be given second place.

All this, of course, is most characteristically true of the great universities devoted to research and graduate training, and less so of other institutions with different clienteles. But the influence of the universities as models, as centers of ideas, and especially as training grounds for the faculties of the major part of the whole academic enterprise means that the dominant attitudes and values of their faculties are widely diffused throughout the system.

The focus on specialized scholarship has also undermined the consensus on what constitutes a liberal education. The three- or four-division formula has at least as

much vitality as a political accommodation among competing interests claiming the resources of the university as it has validity as an intellectually coherent formulation that commands wide assent. The shallowness of agreement is revealed by any faculty discussion on changing requirements. Indeed, I think it no exaggeration to say that the faculty of any of our great universities could not now agree on what requirements for the B.A. should be, if that faculty had to determine them anew.

For all these reasons, I think an attempt to resuscitate either the official version of liberal education as described above or to revive an even earlier model is unlikely to succeed. In its stead, I think we should offer some kind of professional training as the central means toward securing the results that we seek: the creation of the critical, inquiring, and informed mind. While this should become the norm, it need not be the universal practice any more than the official version of liberal education is now.

The first, and perhaps most important, argument for this proposal is that some kind of professional training is likely to engage the serious efforts and interests of the majority of students in a way that the present conventional requirements for the B.A. do not. Economic and vocational motives are strong among those that lead students to college, especially among the newer streams of students in the more rapidly growing institutions, but not only there. An examination of the distribution by fields of study of bachelor's and other first degrees granted in recent years shows that slightly fewer than half were in the traditional fields of the arts and sciences: 18 percent in the arts and humanities, 20 percent in the social sciences, 10 percent in natural sciences and mathematics. Fields classifiable as falling within the "traditional" professions of architecture, engineering, law, medicine, theology, and arts account for 7 percent; those in such "newer" professions as business education, agriculture and forestry, the newer health professions, home economics, library science, and half a dozen smaller fields accounted for over 40 percent. The balance were unclassifiable. If we recognize that at least some of those studying under the rubric of the arts and sciences were pursuing professional training in teaching, the academic profession, or in some of the scientific fields, we see that professional training in one or another sense engages as much as 50 to 60 percent of the present undergraduates.

Many of those who teach or have taught in both undergraduate and professional programs (including those graduate programs that train for the academic profession) have, I am sure, found students who operated far below their capacities in college fully engaged in professional school—in my own experience, law school. College was for "fun"; law school was "serious." This kind of experience was complemented, of course, by that of teaching the bright, committed undergraduate, headed for a Ph.D. by the end of his sophomore year if not before, who as a graduating senior was already ahead of all but a handful of graduate students ready for their preliminary examinations for the doctorate. I have already argued that what is true of the students is even more true of their teachers. Their best teaching efforts are most likely to be evoked in just the context of serious commitment which I have been ascribing as more characteristic of professional than of liberal education.

Finally, such a definition of the primary purpose of a college education would do much to restore the connection between the culture of the academy and the culture of the larger community that it looks to for support, and increasingly through the processes of popular politics. The breaking of the connection between elite culture and mass higher education in substantial part accounts for the malaise of liberal

education. But the matter goes deeper than this, for the values of liberal humanism and traditional "high culture" find increasingly little sustenance as the culture of any elite outside the academy. But there is an elite culture in our society, one shared by the leaders of most of the institutions of business, government, the professions, and, for that matter, a good part of academia. It is the culture of rational problem-solving by the application of organized knowledge. In some cases, the organized knowledge is that of natural science, as in the practice of medicine or the design of aircraft, and the problem-solving itself is recognized as a field of applied science. In others—for example, law or many branches of public administration—the relevant knowledge cannot be said to correspond directly to any specific branch of science, but rather consists of a mixture of more or less applied social science and the traditional modes and procedures of the profession itself. But all embody the same spirit, which in turn is close to the spirit of experimental science itself. Is it unwarranted optimism to discern in the demand for more relevance an appeal to this same spirit? In every case, a full understanding of the nature of problem-solving activity engages social, political, and ethical considerations as well as purely technical ones. It is a mistake to think of this culture as inevitably dehumanized.

To suggest that professional education become the central purpose of college is not to say it should be the only one, and that nothing should be offered in terms of learning for its own sake. To begin with, the pursuit of learning and science as ends in themselves has also been institutionalized as a profession, the academic profession. The potential scholar and scientist would, like other potential professionals, pursue his chosen path from the first, as he now so frequently does already. More important, the taste for knowledge and understanding for their own sakes is more likely to follow than to precede an appreciation of their instrumental power. The present sequence which puts liberal education before professional training is more likely to be wrong than right. A real engagement with the intellectual effort that professional training demands is surer to stimulate the taste for learning in those in whom it has not developed than is a set of prescribed courses taken to meet the requirements for a degree. In concrete terms, this means that the exponents of pure science and scholarship, especially the less instrumentally applicable parts of it, would continue to have the opportunity to appeal to the nonspecialist, but without the protective effects of a quota of requirements. What survives as general education—that is, what the nonspecialist chooses to learn out of curiosity and interest—in these circumstances is likely to be of more permanent value.

What I have called the spirit of rational problem-solving is close to the spirit of science in some ways. In others, perhaps more fundamental, it is quite different. It lacks the concern with aesthetic elements of logical symmetry and generality of ideas at high levels of abstraction that characterize the deepest elements of science. Further, it is outwardly oriented, while the more fundamental part of the scientific enterprise shares with humanistic and other kinds of learning an inward orientation toward knowledge and ideas in themselves.

Is there not a danger that an emphasis on what I have called the broader culture of our society would diminish the capacity of higher education to keep alive the deeper spirit of science and learning? Would not the stimuli that now recruit the next generation of scholars and scientists dry up? Would not the public support for learning as such diminish?

As I have already said, scholarship and science have become professions in themselves, and their position would be institutionalized at the undergraduate level

along with those of the other professions. As far as recruitment goes, I venture the guess that the number of potential historians of literature and translators of Greek texts who will be lost because they were not required to take the freshman course in World Literature will be counterbalanced by the number of budding lawyers who will be seduced from law to letters after they have learned as lawyers what it means to read a text with care. At least one American Nobel laureate in physics began his academic life as an electrical engineer; and John von Neumann, whose extraordinary academic career reached from Budapest via Berlin to Princeton and included work of genius in mathematics, theoretical physics, and half-a-dozen more applied fields, received his first degree in chemical engineering. !!

It is more difficult to predict with confidence how such a change would affect the public support of science and learning. Our society has supported science on utilitarian grounds, and now appears to be moving to support the humanities in terms of cultural consumption. In both cases, there are wide gaps between the rationalizations directed toward legislators and their publics and the choice of specific work to receive support, a choice still made largely on the criteria of the academy. Both enterprises would be more safely supported if they were seen as necessary inputs to an output more comprehensible to the paying public and its legislators—an output of professional competence and applied knowledge for which there was a visible demand.

Such a change would not be without costs. One obvious one is a shrinkage in the scale of the activities now described and supported as research and scholarship. This cost might in any event be unavoidable, and the academic enterprise would do well to initiate the change. Ours should be the last institution in society to rely on false labeling and misleading advertising to market our wares.

This is a condensed version of a paper originally given at the American Council on Education, October 10, 1973, which will appear in Education in the State, American Council on Education, copyright American Council on Education, 1974. The substance of it was also presented at a University of Pennsylvania Conference on Higher Education, March 27, 1974.

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

Some Reflections on the Crisis of the University Curriculum

AS FACULTIES AND courses in American universities have proliferated over the last decade, there has been a steady attrition of breadth requirements, of course sequences, and of the synthesizing, codifying, interpretative, and evaluative parts of the academic disciplines. These trends reflect an abnegation of academic authority, though they are not usually recognized as such.

Students and faculty have conspired with one another in legitimating the attenuation of breadth and prescription. Students view curricular prescriptions, like parietal rules, as offenses against their adulthood. The academic version of our recent encounter with populism tends to equate the right to vote with an untrammelled right to elect courses and to make up one's own academic menu. For faculty, requirements of breadth conflict with the increasing specialization of knowledge. When the course offerings in a department of psychology increase from twenty or so in 1950 to almost one hundred in 1970, breadth and comprehensive sequence must yield to subdisciplinary depth or, worse, to self-constituted menus without regard to dietary rules.

Within departmental curricula the more specialized, technical, and reductionist courses have increased in proportion and prestige, and the codifying, interpreting, and holistic courses have declined. The old courses in political theory and philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, institutional economics, social theory and philosophy, and historical sociology may still be there, but now simply as tiny holistic islands among a larger number of newer offerings backed up by laboratories and tied in with computer terminals. When clumped together, the newer, more specialized courses do not add up to coherent wholes, and the old holistic courses have given up on trying to pull them together. Either the practitioners of these older disciplines have become luddite ideologues or apologetic obsolescents, or they seek out aspects of their subject matters which can be hardened, computerized, mathematically modeled.

This situation does not lend itself easily to change. If there were an inclination or even a will to re-establish a more appropriate balance between reductionism and holism in the academic curriculum, the academic culture of the faculties which have been trained in the last decades would lack the scholarly values and breadth of knowledge to do it. As the culture of science has diffused among the disciplines in the last decades, and new subspecialties have proliferated, graduate requirements have narrowed step by step in a Rake's Progress. The earlier expectation that a Ph.D. would have some mastery of all the subfields of his discipline has declined to the point where he may be required to show competence in less than half of these subfields and in any combination which suits his taste. The departments put together out of the products of our graduate schools lack a common professional culture for creative curricular revision. At best they are capable of a logrolling, porkbarrel academic politics, maintaining or accentuating the present curricular atomization and technicization.

This technocratic academic culture has produced some powerful discoveries and inventions, not least among them nuclear energy, genetic engineering, the pill, behavior modification, decision theory, game theory, and economic and electoral forecasting. It is hardly surprising that the older holistic scholarship in the university has become increasingly demoralized as each roman candle has hit the sky. This reductionist sweep across the curriculum has, in part, been imitative, a product of demonstration effect as social scientists and humanists have sought out aspects of their work which might be "hardened." And, in part, it has been manipulated by the harder disciplines through their control over research resources, in effect bribing the softer disciplines to act like the hard ones.

The net effect is that universities have lost their capacities to orient their students to a world which increasingly insists on being viewed whole with all of its interdependences and moral dilemmas. Those who argue that only more and better science will enable us to confront these problems miss the point that this by itself will not be enough and only higher order philosophical syntheses can spell out the big issues and formulate alternative solutions.

The specialized, reductionist university may well have had its day. It was a part of, and helped to produce, this world of extraordinary capabilities and terrifying prospects. Only if the basic assumptions of this cultural epoch were to continue to hold true—that man's destructive and manipulative capacities could be contained, and that material resources and amenities were indefinitely available at acceptable cost—could this kind of university survive. The enlightenment culture which produced the university, and sapped the vitality of family and church, now confronts the university with the challenge of making sense out of what it teaches, reaffirming academic responsibility regarding the nature of higher education and professional training. The disarticulated curricular structure will have to be arranged and ordered and given the connective tissue which can only be supplied by the synthesizing, codifying, speculative, and evaluative disciplines. The curriculum will have to provide leads as to the kinds of men we need to be if we are to behave well and know a virtuous course from a wicked one.

From this perspective the decade of the university disturbances was a kind of mini-crisis offering us an opportunity to learn. Most of the great outpouring of literature on the university crisis has avoided these substantive issues of what the university teaches and how it trains. It has concerned itself with structural questions, with governance questions, with the sociological and psychological characteristics of the troublemakers, and the like. The romantics and the antinomians among us have preempted the substantive issues, and have offered primitive and escapist solutions. The university has yet to respond in its strength, not turning away from its specialisms and reductionisms, but relating and interpreting them in a higher order of disciplined synthesis and speculation.

ELISABETH K. ALLISON

The Evaluation of Educational Experience

The purpose of a general education is to teach habits of mind—logical thinking, clearness of expression, and the habit of gathering and weighing evidence before forming a conclusion. For most departmental courses the development of these habits is only incidental to their aims. Even so, their contribution to general education has often been considerable, and we believe that courses specifically designed and taught for that purpose will be even more valuable [for] training in methodical thinking and . . . discrimination.

—General Education in a Free
Society

The students have shown us that the old forms of education are obsolete. The styles of academic learning and teaching are so structured that they exclude the relevance of emotion. . . . Effective education requires a new system. While there are no “cookbook” recipes for a meaningful educational experience the patterns below have some general validity:

1. *creation of problem-centered courses which combine the study of the problem with action to deal with it*
2. *elimination of the grading system, to get to the point where the critical indicator is the subjective view of the person about the value of the course*
3.

—Freedom in Education
Richard Theobald

Universities are for students and the students who need most attention are freshmen. Too often the underclassman's education consists of the large survey course and the graduate instructor. It is the freshman who needs the most help, and it is to him senior faculty time and energy should be devoted in greater measure.

—Eric Ashby, quoted in *Reform on Campus,*
Report and Recommendations by the
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education

These vignettes make three points of relevance:

1. All the estates—faculty, students, administration, and alumni—regard teaching as an important function of the university.
2. Educational issues are issues about which most members of the university—as well as most readers of *Dædalus*—have strong views. Let the reader consider

his or her views on the issues above, and ask how long he or she would be prepared to argue if these issues were put to him by a colleague or a friend, at a dinner party or an alumni meeting.

3. While views about educational issues are strongly held, these views are rarely grounded in any systematic evidence. Indeed, in the institution which subscribes in theory to the belief that "the unexamined life is not worth living," practice suggests a widespread belief that these issues are not susceptible to systematic investigation according to the canons of social science.

Is This Really the Case?

This third proposition is remarkable. So perhaps a short exercise in persuasion is in order. Since personal experience seems to be the touchstone of truth, at least in this realm, the reader should first consider his own views on whatever educational issues excite him most, and ponder the grounds on which he believes them. Is the evidence for them of the same nature as the grounds on which he believes the major propositions in his academic or professional field are based? If he has sat on a university committee, which produced a report recommending pass/fail, or independent study, or curriculum revision, let him recall the evidence for the educational efficacy of the proposal, and ask himself whether he would accept a journal article whose data were of similar quality.

The reader who cares to go beyond his own experience may find a second exercise instructive. Suppose we examine the history of the document quoted at the very beginning of this paper. How was this report compiled? How did the committee arrive at its conclusions regarding the superiority of the general education course in instilling proper habits of mind?

Perhaps it is best to let the report describe its own inception and methodology:

Whatever else the report may be it certainly is the result of joint effort. It is the product of twelve men living in close association for two years—periodically secluding themselves for sessions of several days' duration. . . . We sought advice both from our colleagues in the university and from various walks of life . . . all in all we tapped the rich and varied thinking of American education.

One could tell a similar story about the Carnegie Report, the Cox Report on Columbia University, and the hundreds of other reports and studies of recent times. The histories would differ in detail. Some flow primarily from reflection after a lifetime of teaching, others from extensive travel, and still others from a fear of barbarians at the gates. But conspicuously missing from all has been the collection of systematic evidence beforehand, an awareness of its absence during the deliberations, and a provision for collecting data afterwards to support or falsify the asserted opinions.

Given this paper's insistence on the importance of systematic evidence, the reader may find some survey results persuasive. A personal survey of the major social-science journals and convention proceedings uncovered forty-odd articles on pedagogy. Of those, about thirty-five were given over to rather polemic discussions of appropriate course goals and anecdotal accounts of teaching experience. Considerably more impressive, the major survey of research conducted by the American Educational Research Association, after examining the literature on teaching in higher education, concluded that "very little research on the educational process itself appears to have been done. . . . Apart from the area of programmed instruction, there is very little to add to the findings of the first edition of this work [1960]."¹

If the reader is not yet persuaded, he may wish to turn to the literature on educational innovation. One can imagine even an inquisitive institution prepared to let old truths be, but surely a minimum standard for an inquiring institution is to be systematic and scientific in the acceptance of new ones. Again, for brevity, we quote from the *Handbook of Research on Teaching*:

Because of the almost relentless demand for educational innovation, however, the common tendency was to equate innovation with improvement without rigorously evaluating the effectiveness of each new educational program. Indeed we find the literature on evaluation a spotty, scanty and generally disappointing one.

Finally, for those who might hope that real work is done but is sufficiently particularistic never to make its way into public print, we can only offer the observation of a long-time observer and participant on the academic scene, David Riesman:

In our own affairs, we academicians proceed by a guesswork that we criticize in other aspects of our national life; even many social scientists among us talk about "the students" when what we are actually relying on is anecdotal evidence about particular individuals or impressions from looking at the faces and figures in a classroom. A number of the institutions represented in this volume have offices of institutional research but my general observation is that the work of these offices is rarely studied by faculty members. . . .²

Why Should This Be the Case?

How is this state of affairs to be explained? To an economist it seems only appropriate to begin by examining the supply and demand for systematic educational evaluation—that is, by distinguishing the factors which have discouraged the production of systematic evidence about education and the factors which have reduced the number of people interested in and asking for such evidence.

The disinterest in the production of systematic evaluation—the supply side—is *a priori* puzzling. Evaluation, unlike teaching, is primarily an intellectual activity. Thus the university ought to provide a sympathetic environment. That so little is supplied seems to stem from three factors. First, there is some legitimate confusion about who is the rightful producer of such analyses. To the extent that an arts and sciences faculty ever thinks of the issue, they judge it to be (or judge that it ought to be) the domain of the school of education. Education schools, long considered an intellectual bog, have in turn set the task aside as a diversion from their primary mission—the training of schoolteachers and principals. It is moreover an enterprise for which they lacked the necessary conceptual or statistical competence.³

Second, producing a good evaluation is difficult. The design and evaluation of adequate educational experiments are much harder than they may seem. The minimal requirements include operational definitions of the educational objectives and of the outputs and inputs. Given the subtlety of the educational process, believable indicators are not easy to come by. These difficulties are not unique to the evaluation of educational programs; in principle, they arise in evaluating any social program, be it free daycare, manpower training, or prison rehabilitation. But in educational evaluation the researcher knows much more about the process than he does when investigating an outside organization. Thus his standards for credible indicators and reasonable objectives are likely to be much higher, and the difficulties appear much more formidable.

The third problem lies in the incentives of the potential producers. As frequently observed, the career structure of universities, elite and mass alike, offers few incen-

tives to teaching, and even fewer to the evaluation of teaching. Junior faculty in search of a career are well advised to confine themselves to the preparation and publication of articles for professional journals. Senior faculty understandably tend to be discipline-oriented, and educational research is not likely to draw applause from within the discipline.

The dearth of customers—the failure of demand—is less mysterious. Indeed, it is surprising that they exist at all. There is almost no reason for a faculty member who understands his self-interest, narrowly construed, to inquire into the results of his teaching. At best it would be a source of considerable inconvenience. Unless one is of a very Burkian temperament,⁴ there is no *a priori* reason to believe that our present methods are the best to be found. Indeed, what little research has been done suggests that much of our instruction has a fleeting effect. If one knew this with certainty, he might feel somewhat obliged to change his course or his method of instruction, a strenuous and unrewarding task that no one of good sense would seek out.

College administrators have more incentives for seeking such information. They appear to be kept out of the market by an unhappy twist of history. The McCarthy era left several unfortunate legacies. One is the confusion of the principle that no outsider has the right to judge the content of teaching with the proposition that only the faculty member has the right to judge the quality of his teaching. Thus suggestions that educational effectiveness be investigated invoke the worst specters of the 1950s. Given that most college administrators are chronically short on time and energy, they are understandably disinclined to press for studies certain to create friction between themselves and their faculty.

To explain the lack of interest in systematic educational experiments as narrow self-interest would be both inaccurate and unkind. If pressed on the issue, most faculty would offer other accounts. Some would profess a profound skepticism about the usefulness of systematic investigation in increasing our understanding of the educational process. One finds a belief, akin to a view often attributed to senior military officers, that in this particular realm understanding emerges from experience, not from investigation. There is a sense that the educational process is so subtle that the tools of scientific inquiry which have been so fruitful in other areas are insufficient to the task. Thus even careful academics whose professional writings convey the highest concern for scholarship and evidence are prepared unashamedly to present conclusions based on “classroom experience,” not as second-best, but as a superior product. It is somewhat ironic that this position is held by many who are most unsympathetic to a similar argument when advanced by their students.

Still other academics, initially less skeptical, who have taken the trouble to examine existing attempts at systematic investigation, would give an even harsher answer: the results of standard academic analyses of educational issues range from unpersuasive to incredible. The results, they would argue, are platitudes, or simplifications so drastic as to render the conclusion incredible, or descriptions that obviously have nothing to do with the reality they live in. Although there is some merit to this argument, it should not be a source of comfort. If asked why we should find these results so unpersuasive, one is tempted to answer that universities are much more difficult to analyze than other organizations. But this is not obvious. Rather, the principal difference may be that unlike most of the institutions and processes our colleagues study, we have sufficient firsthand knowledge of the university to recognize silliness when we see it. It makes one wonder. Is it possible that

our conceptual tools often turn up nonsense, but only in the academic sphere do we recognize it for what it is? Does this account for the usual scorn with which men of affairs treat the advice of academics? Undoubtedly such doubts are far-fetched and the true explanation lies in the inadequate training of most researchers in the field.

Will This State of Affairs Continue?

There is little reason to treat this dearth of educational evaluation as a passing phase. One hardly needs an economist to predict that when there is no profit in producing a product, and no customers waiting in the wings, the product will not be produced—at least in a competitive market. Nevertheless, the depressed state of the education market has created a few feeble forces for change. The majority of private colleges face declining enrollments and increasing competition for students. It is imaginable that a desperate college president would launch an inquiry into the effectiveness of alternative educational treatments in order to advertise his product as an educational experience systematically designed to meet the consumer's needs. While public institutions are in less trouble, they are increasingly required to justify budget increases. In such circumstances an argument that a new instructional method was "scientifically tested" might have some appeal.

The change in the market for faculty also offers some hope. One result of the industry's decline has been to improve the quality of faculty going into teaching positions: intellectually lively graduates are coming to perceive themselves as career teachers. Given that teaching will be their life's work, the payoffs to learning something about it are higher. Moreover, if they find themselves at institutions where education is the only game in town, instructional investigation may become an outlet for some of their excess intellectual energy.

Finally, the advent of open admissions may do a great deal to stimulate interest in the systematic study of education. Heretofore, universities have enjoyed the luxury of comparatively well-prepared students who have learned regardless of what was done to them, or who could be removed with impunity. The urban colleges now have a class of students who need teaching and who for political reasons cannot be flunked out. Something better than conventional wisdom is needed to respond to these students.

Thus there are forces—primarily on the demand side—disturbing the direction of the university. Nevertheless, in light of the incentives to inertia outlined previously, it is unrealistic to expect a significant increase in the production of educational evaluation.

Is This Necessarily the Case? Some Prescriptions

Suppose there were a college president of unusual tastes, quixotic temperament, and enormous stamina who chose to disregard the wisdom of the last section. How might he begin? First, he would need to establish a presumption within the academy which underlies scientific investigation and jurisprudence alike: that no man ought to sit in judgment on his own case. Academics have no right to be the sole judges of their adequacy as educators and, indeed, ought to be obliged to make it possible for others to pass judgment upon their performances. This presumption is not without difficulty. Where, for example, is the line between proper review and outside interference? If the academic himself should not sit in judgment, who

should—peers, colleagues, administrators, or students? In what proportions? How can such a judgment be applied without infringing on the necessities of academic freedom? Making these boundaries clear and convincing is an intellectual task of the first order.

If the presumption that others have a legitimate interest in instruction is accepted, the administration might try a number of “quick fixes.” One is the development of what is elsewhere called a management information system. It would be *comparatively* easy to develop a reporting and information system that provided the faculty and the departments with some rudimentary performance indicators: what percentage of their concentrators passed qualifying exams at graduate schools, how their students performed on re-examination two or three years later, and so forth. Accumulation and distribution of such information, while unlikely to work massive changes, would have some desirable marginal effects. The faculty would become less certain of their monopoly on wisdom in educational issues. Those who found the indicators annoyingly simplistic might be led to reflect on their educational objectives in the course of devising alternatives. The question of effective education would become more visible; indeed, an interest in educational matters might become fashionable. And shame might move some of the most exposed to begin investigating their educational activities.

Another possibility lies in the provision of better information about alternative instructional inputs. This is not a call for still another educational journal or weekly newsletter; those already exist in overabundance with demonstrably little effect on everyday academia. What is needed is not a publication which requires a substantial investment of time and patience to plow through, but a collection of well-targeted information, keyed to the needs of the academic consumer in much the same way industrial advertising is keyed to the position and specifications of the industrial buyer. This might be appropriately done by a small consortium, given the substantial economies of scale involved.

The longer run possibilities turn on the design and execution of educational experiments. “To be sure,” as Harvard’s President Derek Bok noted in his 1974 Presidential Report, “research of this kind is frustratingly difficult.” But it is not impossible, and it offers the best hope for giving education intellectual respectability.

An example may make more vivid both the possibilities of such experiments and their difficulties. Several years ago we began seriously considering the possibility of educational innovation in Harvard’s introductory economics course. Our interest in such matters was precipitated by a gradual recognition of a serious pedagogical problem—namely, that a substantial proportion of the students left the course without a deep (or, indeed, sometimes even without a superficial) understanding of the analytic core of the course.

At that point we were fundamentally ignorant about the causes of our students’ deficiencies. We had, however, identified some features of the instructional system which *a priori* we thought might be at fault. First, feedback to the student was scarce. Normally the student took two hour exams and a final exam each semester. Often it was not until after his first exam that he realized that he did not understand, but he then had to wait another two months to test his second hypothesis as to what the course was about.

Second, the feedback the exams did provide was often so threatening as to be of questionable educational value. Too many students collected C+ exams, tucked them into their jeans, and walked away without ever opening them.

Third, the conventional method did little to encourage better teaching. The time lag between the teaching and the testing made it too easy to attribute disappointing exam performances to psychological crises, pressures of other exams, poor examsmanship, and badly constructed exam questions.

Fourth, a substantial amount of student effort was misdirected. Some spent an immense amount of time reading the text, yet retained little of it, primarily because they had not learned how to teach themselves analytical material.

Given these assumptions as to what was wrong with the instructional process, the most promising alternative seemed to be an instructional mode referred to as self-paced instruction or the Keller Plan.⁵ Self-paced instruction (SPI) was slightly more expensive than conventional instruction; moreover, using a self-paced system precluded the use of still other instructional methods. Thus, in order to make a rational decision on the use of SPI we needed to know how much difference it made.

Thus we were led to design a simple experiment. Several sections of the course were designated as self-paced sections. Students assigned to those sections were matched with students in conventional sections with respect to characteristics we believed *a priori* might influence performance in introductory economics courses: previous mathematical training, SAT scores, year in college, and reasons for taking economics. Both groups were pretested on a standardized test of economic understanding. One group then received the self-paced treatment, while the other received conventional section instruction. In all other respects both groups received substantially similar treatment, with identical readings, problem sets, papers, lectures, and exams. At the semester's end, both groups took the final course exam and another standardized test of economic understanding. Both filled out an attitudinal questionnaire and were interviewed by the Office of Research and Evaluation to provide indicators of student attitudes.

With the exam and questionnaire results and the appropriate background data on each student we were ready to begin the evaluation,⁶ which consisted of estimating the coefficients of equations in which course grades and student attitudes were the dependent variables.

This analysis yielded several interesting results.

Self-paced instruction does improve the exam scores, *ceteris paribus*. But the effect is largest and most significant for certain identifiable groups of students. Students with lower SAT scores show more improvement than students with high SAT scores. Freshmen are helped more than upperclassmen. In conventional sections upperclassmen, *ceteris paribus*, do better than freshmen. In self-paced sections, freshmen do better than upperclassmen. Blacks are helped more than whites. Black students, again *ceteris paribus*, do better than their white counterparts regardless of instructional format, but the black advantage is almost doubled under a self-paced format. As a byproduct we also acquired a list of factors which did not affect performance: previous mathematical training (as distinct from mathematical aptitude), sex, and concentration plans. We had expected at least two of these variables to be significant.

Our next step was to compute the per-student cost of the increased scores. But undoubtedly the reader has had enough detail to get the flavor of what an educational experiment can produce. This is admittedly a modest example. Crudities of measurement and unjustified assumptions abound. There are no controls for hours of student time or the Hawthorne effect that often results from any increase in attention. (Indeed, we are presently conducting a second-round experi-

ment with a more sophisticated experimental design.) But we would argue that we know more about the process than we did before, not in any complex, metaphysical way, but in the simple, sensible way that we know most things. More importantly, we have the kind of evidence which should persuade a reasonable man that we have a technique for teaching economics more effectively to certain identifiable groups of students. We have examined our instructional process, have learned something about it, and are prepared to improve our educational offerings on the basis of our evaluated experience.

Conclusion: The Case

This piece can be summarized in three assertions: First, systematic, high-quality investigation of educational questions is almost nonexistent.⁷ Second, there are good reasons for its absence. Third, if we were to try, we could learn something about the educational process.

This last assertion is far from a sure thing. At best, as we noted earlier, such learning is slow, frustrating, and difficult. It may be a program whose time has not yet come. It is possible that it is so difficult as to be, for the moment, beyond the power of our conceptual and statistical tools. It may even be that the issues are so hard as to be forever intractable. There are some areas in which the notion of progress is inappropriate.

Admittedly such uncertainties engender profound frustrations. On the other hand, once one has focused on the issue, the notion of spending at least half of one's days poking at a black box labeled education is less than satisfying. And surely, if one believes in the value of the examined life, it would be less than consistent to leave our own activities unexamined.

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3. This point is made by David Riesman, in the "Commentary and Epilogue" in *Academic Transformations*, eds. Riesman and Stadtman, p. 440.
4. "A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper, for we know that we have made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be made."
5. For another discussion of the Keller Plan, see the article by B. F. Skinner in this issue, p. 200 ff.
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B. F. SKINNER

Designing Higher Education

The principal function of education is to transmit the culture—to enable new members of a group to profit from what others have already learned. It follows that the principal task of the student is to learn what others already know.

These are not popular contentions. They do not seem compatible with a conception of the teacher as one who helps the student discover the world for himself, or who stimulates a natural curiosity, or who guides intellectual, emotional, or moral development, or who makes the learning process more meaningful. On the contrary, teaching as the transmission of what is already known is often openly attacked as imposing the teacher's values on the student, as intervening in a natural process of growth, and as undermining the freedom and dignity of the student. The teacher is enjoined to avoid telling what he knows and to look for meaningful interchanges of other kinds.

If we ask for supporting evidence of the benefits which follow, we are likely to be told that the effects of these alternative practices are not measurable. Measurement is appropriate only to the transmission of what is already known. We must not expect to quantify the extent to which a teacher helps a student discover the world for himself, or arouses his curiosity, or guides his development, or makes learning meaningful. Quantifiable evidence may well indicate that new ways of teaching have been less effective (the student has indeed learned less of what is already known), but he has undergone other, more important, changes, the evidence of which is necessarily qualitative. In fact, examinations mean little and should be abolished.

The qualitative evidence is not always reassuring, however. Practices designed to replace the transmission of what is already known have had some unanticipated effects which can scarcely be said to recommend them. For example—

1. The student who from kindergarten through college has been commended by teachers who are on the alert for signs of discovery is likely to have an exaggerated notion of his powers of discovery and of how much he has actually learned.

2. When tradition is dismissed as restrictive and creative efforts therefore start from scratch, works of art, music, and literature are necessarily, in a quite literal sense, primitive.

3. Those who have been left to learn how to think by themselves are quite unable to discover all the techniques which have accumulated over the centuries. With respect to intellectual self-management, they are therefore almost defenseless against bad logic, superstition, mystical nonsense, and demagoguery. Their ethical self-management is similarly defective. It is not surprising that some of them should have tried to make a virtue of irrationality.

4. Many cultural practices have prevailed because they support behavior which

"takes the future into account": they give people current reasons for behaving in ways which have important though possibly remote consequences. Those who confine themselves to matters of current relevance lack this support and are forced to be, in the strictest sense, existentialists; they have not discovered the past and have no reason for behaving effectively with respect to a future.

The picture is not so bleak as I have painted it, because no teacher *merely* aids discovery, or stimulates curiosity, or guides development, or makes learning meaningful. Students do read books, enter into informative discussions, listen to music, see works of art, and thus learn about what others have said and done and how they have said and done it. Some transmission of the culture has gone on, as it were, under the counter. Many contemporary educational philosophers nevertheless seem dedicated to minimizing transmission, and I believe that they have done so for ideological reasons largely unrelated to education.

It is easy to be misled by what I have called the Idols of the School.¹ The Idol of the Good Teacher is the belief that what a good teacher can do any teacher can do, and the Idol of the Good Student is the belief that what a good student can learn any student can learn. For reasons which are still beyond analysis, teachers are sometimes extraordinarily effective even when their students are not outstanding, and students sometimes learn a great deal even without the help of good teachers. A combination of good teacher and good student may have almost miraculous results. Nothing much needs to be done about higher education when these conditions prevail, but we must not forget the vast numbers of ordinary teachers who cannot profit from the selection of good students, or the vast numbers of ordinary students who do not have good teachers. For them, effective educational practices must be designed.

An effective design must be based upon an understanding of behavioral processes. The basic questions are these: Why should anyone teach, and why should anyone learn? They are questions about human behavior, and recent advances in the analysis of behavior are helpful in answering them.

Education was once mainly punitive. The rod, the cane, and the dunce cap were the schoolmaster's tools. The student learned or suffered the consequences. The pattern is still often defended, even by those who were once caned or ridiculed ("It was good for me!"), and something can indeed be said for it. Under punitive sanctions many students acquire techniques of self-control which carry over into higher education. This was true when universities were little more than libraries, and when only those who did not need to be taught acquired an education. When universities began to teach, punitive sanctions were added, and it is still true that most college students, whatever their professed ambitions or long-term goals, go to lectures and read textbooks largely to avoid the consequences of not doing so. Let those who disagree look at the evidence to be found in the average student's response to an occasional relaxation of sanctions (an unexpected holiday or reduced assignment, for example) or at the anxiety characteristically associated with examinations. (And let those who still disagree beware of the Idols of the School!)

Aversive control is not easily justified in a democratic society, however, and there are many other reasons why humane efforts have been made to find alternatives. Teachers have naturally preferred that their students should learn without being coerced and that they should even enjoy their studies. The learning that occurs in daily life seems to show these features. Why not bring the real world into the classroom and throw away the birch rod? Arrange conditions under which the stu-

dent can do what he wants or likes to do rather than what he has to do.

This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, but it has been misunderstood and misrepresented. The punitive conditions are contrived by teachers, but non-punitive conditions in the real world are natural. What began as a change from coercion to positive inducement seemed to emerge as a change in the role of the teacher. The teacher could find things to interest the student; he could guide his development; he could be part of his natural social environment; but he could not teach. The real world would do the teaching. The teacher could only help the student learn.

Was this not an unexpected gain? Would the real world not be more likely to produce naturally effective behavior? An appeal to nature is always compelling, and it is still a strong theme in educational philosophy. It appears to challenge the notion of teaching as the transmission of what others already know. What the student learns from contact with the real world is jeopardized when the teacher interferes or meddles with the natural process. There must be no intervention.

Unfortunately, the real world cannot bear the strain which is thus imposed upon it. Not much can be learned from it in one short lifetime. The natural environment has more variety than a badly designed classroom, but it is nevertheless still repetitious, and personal contact with it is limited in scope. When teachers abandoned aversive practices, they lost control. They discarded some subjects and postponed others until the students were "ready" for them. There is a similar effect in higher education. Coverage is reduced when the explicit transmission of knowledge is minimized. The *relevant* world also lacks scope.

What is learned from real life is also faulty. It is well known that the first effect of a natural environment in building athletic or artistic skills often proves troublesome at later stages; the coach or teacher must suppress early natural forms of responding if a final performance is to be perfected. There are intellectual parallels. Outstanding achievements have, no doubt, often been the culmination of a natural process of development, but it is because the instances are so rare that we call them outstanding, and it is perhaps just because they are the exception that we attribute them to genius rather than to outside help.

The physical environment teaches awkward behavior as readily as skilled; the social environment teaches aggression and competition as readily as good will and cooperation; in both worlds, adventitious consequences breed superstition. The real world is strongly punitive, and we are as likely to escape from many parts of it as we are to play hooky from school. All these features have parallels in the world of books. The student may not learn much if he reads only books of current interest; what he learns may be useless or untrue; and bookish knowledge may be largely adventitious. Certainly, vast numbers of students learn to stay away from books altogether as soon as they are free to do so.

Turning students over to the things which currently interest them does not solve the motivational problems that arise in dispensing with overtly punitive methods. It is essentially the abandonment of teaching. There is a much more promising way to remove punitive techniques from the classroom—including the easily concealed aversive features of college instruction—without abandoning the transmission of the culture or the communication of what has already been learned by others. The alternative is surprisingly simple, and I have no doubt that the historian can find many early statements. The problem is not, however, to state an alternative, but to put it into general practice, and we are only now in a position to do so. Recent advances in

our understanding of human behavior supply not only the means, but the confidence needed to make significant changes.

We need to replace contrived punitive conditions with contrived alternatives, rather than with the natural alternatives to be found in the current "relevant" environment. The alternative to punishment is what the layman calls reward, but lay usage has long obscured an important detail. Behavior is indeed modified by its consequences, whether rewarding or punishing, but the important thing is *the way in which a consequence is contingent upon behavior*. The prescriptions of the Utilitarians never worked because they emphasized the consequences (pleasure and pain), while neglecting the contingent relations. Under what conditions and at what moment is an act followed by a pleasurable or painful consequence?

The experimental analysis of behavior is concerned with the contingent relations which prevail among three things—the situation in which behavior occurs, the behavior itself, and its rewarding or reinforcing consequences. Extremely complex and subtle contingencies are set up in the laboratory and their effects studied. The results have suggested alternatives to both the punitive sanctions of traditional education and practices in which teaching is turned over to the real world.

A simple contingency of reinforcement in primary or secondary education—such as a token economy or a credit-point system in a classroom—may seem like nothing more than reward in the traditional sense. This is true because the reinforcers have been made as conspicuous as possible in order to make them more clearly contingent upon behavior. To bring a disrupted classroom under control or to replace a punitive environment as quickly as possible, simple and conspicuous consequences may be needed. But higher education clearly calls for something else.

The traditional instrument through which one person benefits from the experience of another is a book, and what is called a textbook is designed to work as expeditious a change as possible. But why should a student read a book or study a textbook? The possibility is worth considering that his behavior in doing so is a simple function of the clarity and frequency of the reinforcing consequences. But what are those consequences? Traditionally, he discovers the extent to which he has understood what he has read from the grade he receives on a test, but a grade is not contingent on behavior in an effective way. Unless the material is itself reinforcing because it is currently of interest, which it cannot always be, he will presumably read, if at all, only to avoid the aversive consequences of a low grade. Much more immediate positive consequences need to be contrived.

The traditional concept of reward suggests something extrinsic to the behavior itself, and it is true that we could reward correct responses to passages in a book with, for example, money—with, say, the remission of parts of a fee paid at the beginning of a course. But nothing so crude is needed. A student is presumably in college to "get an education," and progress in doing so is itself reinforcing. The only requirement is that progress should be conspicuous. A student will continue to read a book if there is evidence that he is undergoing a significant change, that he is increasingly better able to do and say things, that he is progressing toward the completion of the book or the course of which it is a part or the curriculum of which the course is a part. For students who are not thus reinforced, other reinforcers must be found, but, in general, students can be induced to read—attentively and with pleasure—by making sure that the consequences are immediate, clear cut, and frequent. And what holds for reading holds for other parts of the educational assignment. The necessary conditions can be most easily met if—

1. The student moves at his own pace. Differences in the rate at which students work may be genetic or environmental and are probably both. Of importance, however, is not the source of the differences, but the solution of the problems they raise. A student who is forced to go too fast misses many reinforcing consequences and, indeed, misses more and more of them as he falls further and further behind. A student who could move faster but is held back is not receiving reinforcements which lie within his range. The principle of individual pacing is as applicable to graduate instruction as to teaching in the first grade.

2. The student should not merely "soak up information"; he should respond, and his responses should be immediately evaluated so that successful responses will be reinforced.

3. The student should move through the material in such a way that what he has just learned helps him to take the next step. Signs of increasing power are important reinforcers. Reinforcement will be maximized if he masters each stage before moving on.

There are readers who will strongly resent these references to behavioral processes in a discussion of higher education, and, unfortunately, only those who have had some firsthand experience with operant conditioning will be easily persuaded of their relevance. But it is no longer a matter of theory. Instructional systems which observe these principles have been designed and tested and have been conspicuously successful in inducing students to study energetically, carefully, and with pleasure. What is learned need not be relevant to their current life; it can therefore be selected to be relevant to their futures. Under these conditions students are less likely to move to escape from education—not only in minor ways such as being inattentive or forgetful, but by taking time off or dropping out of school or college altogether.

Good programmed instruction observes these principles, and a good program is a dramatic demonstration of their power. It is an extraordinarily useful device in acquiring knowledge of a new field in an expeditious way. But the exigencies of contemporary higher education often call for a more thoroughgoing restructuring of practice, and the Personalized System Instruction originated by Fred S. Keller is an outstanding example of what can be done. A recent report evaluating the system with respect to science teaching describes the procedure as follows:

A student beginning a Keller course finds that the course work is divided into topics or units. In a simple case, the content of the units may correspond to chapters of the course text. At the start of a course, the student receives a printed study guide to direct his work on the first unit. Although study guides vary, a typical one introduces the unit, states objectives, suggests study procedures, and lists study questions. The student may work anywhere—including the classroom—to achieve the objectives outlined in the study guide.

Before moving on to the second unit in the sequence, the student must demonstrate his mastery of the first by perfect or near-perfect performance on a short examination. He is examined on the unit only when he feels adequately prepared, and he is not penalized for failure to pass a first, second, or later examination. When the student demonstrates mastery of the first unit, he is given the study guide for the next unit. He thus moves through the course at his own pace. He may meet all course requirements before the term is half through or he may require more than a term for completing the course.²

Thousands of courses are now being given on the Keller Plan in the United States, South America, and elsewhere. Adjustments to local conditions may have to

be made concerning scheduling, grading, and the logistics of material, space, and record-keeping, but the essential features can be preserved. Such a course covers standard material, but covers it much more thoroughly while avoiding most, if not all, of the aversive features of traditional practices. At any given time, the student knows where he stands—what he has done and still has to do—and the same information is available to the instructor and useful to him for different reasons.

Such a course may be constantly improved, since, as in other kinds of instructional programs and in contrast with traditional texts and lectures, weak points can be easily spotted and corrected. Overall modes of presentation will no doubt continue to be improved as experience dictates, but it has already been established that the so-called motivational problem in higher education can be solved in this way. An environment can be constructed in which the student has abundant reasons for studying, and for mastering material, even when it is not currently relevant to his personal problems or interests. It is therefore possible for education to enable new members of a group to profit from what other members have already learned—and in a highly expeditious way.

In contrast with the other contributions to this volume, I suspect that these will appear to be the words of a philistine. But the position seems to me not only defensible, but inescapable. Must we not ask educators and philosophers of education to state as clearly as possible the observable differences between students who have had and who have not had a “higher education”? And should they not say how education is to convert one into the other? I submit that the purposes and goals of education most often set forth in traditional discussions have suggested useful practices, but have masked an unwillingness to be specific about these basic issues.

Of course it is important to stimulate the student’s “natural curiosity,” but curiosity is of little avail if the student looks only at the world about him. If in our efforts to stimulate curiosity we sacrifice the transmission of what other curious people have already discovered, we deny the student access to an immense world lying beyond his immediate reach.

Of course it is important that the student be creative and imaginative, but if, in making absolutely sure that he is not being imitative, we ignore or conceal the creative achievements of others, we deny him the chance to play a role in a creative process reaching far beyond his own lifetime. The creative achievements of the past have come from men who for the most part, as Newton said of himself, “stood on the shoulders of giants.” It is no service to the student to insist that he stand with his feet firmly planted on solid ground.

Sooner or later a discussion of the goals of education turns to ethics and morals, and it is precisely here that the appeal to a natural process of growth is most damaging. That part of a culture which unquestionably demands transmission is its ethical and moral practices. People are not ethical or moral by nature, nor do they simply grow ethical or moral. It is the ethical and moral sanctions maintained by other members of a group which induce them to behave in ethical and moral ways. To leave ethical and moral behavior to the natural endowment of the individual and a natural process of growth is to promote ethical and moral chaos. We must accept that a culture *imposes* its ethical and moral standards upon its members. It can do nothing else.

In more general terms, we must also accept that in transmitting a culture, education *imposes* what has already been learned by others upon its students. To a considerable extent it must decide in advance what a student is to learn. Current

philosophies of education spring in part from an unwillingness to take on this responsibility. Educational policy-makers are unwilling to specify what is worth knowing, and once again they leave the decision to the student. But the student is in no position to specify what will ultimately be useful. This is obvious when he is beginning the study of a large field, such as biology or physics, but it is equally true as he enters upon a broader "education for life." Personal idiosyncrasies certainly need to be taken into account, and a program which yielded regimentation and uniformity would be bad educational design, but there are sources of regimentation and uniformity in programs which leave decisions to students, too. We should not be misled because students are readier than we are to accept the responsibility of designing their programs, because their readiness may spring only from current satisfactions.

Those who let students themselves decide what they are to study and leave teaching to the physical, social, and textual environments are essentially abdicating as teachers. They betray students who already care about their future, and fail to help those who have never had any reason to care. It is possible that education will someday be held responsible for the millions of young people who are now not only not well prepared for the future, but not even sure that they have one.

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MICHAEL NOVAK

The One and the Many

It is odd to talk to academicians today. An astonishing amount of hostility toward teaching has become, it seems, devastatingly commonplace. It is not difficult to tempt many persons to leave the university for a new position elsewhere; many are glad to "get out." A once attractive vocation seems to have soured; a major emotional shift seems to have occurred—a profound shift in self-image, a fundamental conflict, perhaps, between a professor's self-image and the image of the professor in the mind of many students. Too often, the relationship is no longer one of deference and esteem, but of resistance and silent contempt; and some professors are not confident in their own minds that their work and way of life are justified. If there is blue-collar discontent, alienation on the assembly line, there is also discontent in the academy.

In the 1960s, professors and administrators lost credibility from two directions. Those who sympathized with at least some of the claims made by movements of reform and protest were then, and are still, castigated as trendy, treasonable, and spineless. Dr. Ronald E. Berman, Director of the National Endowment for the Humanities, recently wrote:

One great university after another passively accepted its own disgrace: I speak not only of rocks thrown through windows, or the universal spray can—worse than the Reformation fig leaf—hiding facts behind ideology, or the uproar of heckling, sign waving, shouting, assault, and other spineless accommodations to academic approval. I mean of course the timeserving commencement speeches which from one end of this country to the other incited the academy to break its own traditions and destroy its own values.

On the other side, those who at one point or another drew a line and would not countenance any further disruptions of university traditions were then, and are now, castigated as reactionaries, oppressors, or self-servers.

Feelings about these matters are still raw. Friendships have been sundered. Although peace has descended on the campuses, and economic constraints like blinders direct the eyes of all to more basic, plodding realities, it would be a mistake to think that the great issues opened up by the 1960s have been resolved. In many ways—affirmative action programs are one—the power of the radicals is still felt, and others still feel resentment. In many ways, those who were not radical seem once again to be in control, trying to reestablish a bearable normality. It is as though an abyss had opened up, as if many peered into it, and as if the prospect of chaos and struggle was too terrifying to sustain; all have drawn back. The struggle is unresolved as many reconsider, reassess, redefine themselves.

The sixties were a fevered time, dreamlike, nightmarish to protagonists on every side. How is one to interpret dreams? What may we find out about ourselves from the nightmare? Three legacies from the sixties provide some clues.

When I recall my own positions during that long decade it is with mixed and

troubled judgment. In 1961, I published in *Harper's* an essay, "God in the Colleges," which was later reprinted in anthologies of the student left and in my *A New Generation: American and Catholic* (1964). I was then at Harvard; by 1967, I was publishing the essays that were to become *A Theology for Radical Politics* (1969), which grew out of the early, idealistic student movements of Stanford. By 1969, I was lecturing on *The Experience of Nothingness* (1970) and soon was to begin working toward *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (1972). The mad, turbulent, but exceedingly illuminating experiment at Old Westbury, where I taught from 1968 to 1972, obliged me to stand on what was taken to be the ideological "other side." This finite horizon of concern and experience informs the reflections that follow, which must necessarily—it is part of the given situation—have a personal ring.

Pluralism is dear to me, both for reasons of theory and for reasons of temperament; but what sort of pluralism? I like best situations in which I have one voice among many—in which other views besides my own are clearly argued. It makes me nervous when consensus seems to accept my views as "true." Part of the truth, yes; a useful perspective, perhaps; even, occasionally, a better presentation than any alternative. My own history has been not only Catholic but deeply so, and surely it is true that secular traditions and Protestant traditions and Jewish traditions and others are almost certain to approach any given issue from a different direction. I know in advance—it is a privilege that goes with being part of a minority—that my view is partial.

Yet there is a way of disposing of the facts of intellectual pluralism that is stifling and shallow: the agreement not to disagree; the declaration that fundamental differences are beyond the range of reasonable discussion; the suggestion that choices of ultimate standpoint are finally emotive, or nonrational, or nonverbal—and, in any case, divisive, unscientific, and outside the bounds of university discourse. There is often a tacit acceptance of pluralistic difference that is so tacit as to be tyrannical. It gives its choicest awards to those who agree to mind their own business, to be pragmatic, and to discuss seriously only those differences that can be settled experimentally (in a rather routine and impersonal sense of "experimental"). The decision of the Carnegie Commission not to tackle the problem of university curricula is an example of such a refusal to open up significant questions. It amounts to *laissez-faire* in the life of the spirit that we no longer tolerate even in the world of money.

Every discussion has its season. There are many occasions when the discussion of ultimate questions would obstruct the accomplishment of practical business that can and must be done. American democracy nicely got around the problem of religious diversity by establishing procedural rules for the state in secular matters and keeping the state as far as possible out of religious and moral matters. What works for the state, however, does not work for the university. The reasonable articulation, investigation, and criticism of one another's fundamental human standpoints are part of the business of becoming fully educated.

As it stands, many highly intelligent Americans do not subject their own fundamental standpoint to public criticism; even our language for talking about such matters is awkward, gross, underdeveloped. How could it be otherwise, when at few places in the university (even our journals tend to group the like-minded) is such discussion practiced? One might, following an ancient usage, call such discussion "dialectics." It does not so much concern principles and their implications as it does

one's sense of reality, one's story, one's standpoints. It concerns how one got to the principles one has, how they function in one's intellectual life, and how they look from other standpoints. When Professor Galbraith and Professor Friedman argue publicly, for example, matters of most interest seldom come to the surface: not who is right on a given issue, but how and why each came to the standpoint he now occupies, and whether his reasons for so doing withstand criticism. Of deepest interest is whether to begin from a "conservative" or a "liberal" standpoint. Such discussion is dangerous; it cuts quite close to the joint between person and idea. For that very reason, a limitation of inquiry to the ideal of impersonality, objectivity, and intellectual coolness seems obscurantist. Civilized people ought to be able to articulate calmly and clearly why they occupy the standpoints they do. Such choices profoundly affect their perceptions and judgments.

In this context, one of the valuable legacies of the sixties is the legitimization of dialectics. The ideological shifts of the sixties required more and more intellectuals to justify their standpoint, to come forward to articulate and to defend it. Many discovered that they had forgotten how they had reached their present standpoint; in defending themselves, they stammered and groped. Many discovered that they were more "conservative" than they had thought; or more "religious"—or less so. It is far easier in 1974 to raise hard questions about one another's standpoints than it was in 1961.

Two other factors have contributed to this advance. The early faith of the 1960s in the power of science and professional intelligence to solve society's problems has been chastened by the rigors of events. It is now commonplace to note, as it was not in 1961, that prickly moral dilemmas must be consciously and critically faced in all attempts at social engineering. In population control, in genetics, in community research, in medical practices regarding death, in questions of energy and ecology, it is now almost conventional to raise questions of moral justification. It is no longer sufficient merely to act "professionally." The standpoint of the professional is precisely what is in question.

Second, the growing sense of the interdependence of all problems—hence of the interdependence of all disciplines—has changed the status of interdisciplinary work. Whereas once the word "interdisciplinary" suggested something like a fad, a kind of pious protest against specialization and proficiency, the same word now suggests something obvious and powerful: viz., the serious desire to treat problems from more than one standpoint, in order to respect their, so to speak, roundness and wholeness. The issues surrounding an appropriate definition of death, for example, are at once medical, legal, and cultural; no one standpoint alone is to be trusted.

Interdisciplinary work of the required sort is not easy, as was an earlier kind. No mature scholar likes to be treated by those in other disciplines as a fool. Yet in serious interdisciplinary discussion each party is sometimes naïve—even comic—in the eyes of others. One cannot assume that others begin with respect for one's basic and, as one imagines, unimpugnable humanistic inclinations; lawyers, doctors, and humanists have been known to entertain rather wry and jaundiced views concerning each other's deficiencies.

There is a second great legacy from the sixties. The massive effort to bring heretofore neglected minority students and faculty into the universities made the discussions of the 1950s about "high cult, mid cult, and mass cult" obsolete. Questions of elitism were raised in a wholly new context, as also were questions of meritocracy. The ensuing discussions have often been intemperate or intransigent,

full of resentment and anger. The stage has been set for a fresh approach to questions of high intellectual achievement, and to the relation of academic elites to various American communities.

From my own point of view, the underlying consideration is suggested by terms like the new pluralism or the new cosmopolitanism. A fresh intellectual agenda has been set before us. Those in fields like literature, history, government, philosophy, sociology, and anthropology are those most involved, but the new agenda also includes such professions as medicine, law, architecture, business, and urban planning. Perhaps the question can be put in terms of curriculum. What ought the undergraduate curriculum to be, and how should the curricula of graduate and professional schools be related to it? But the question can also be put in another way: How should we relate the curriculum of the university to the many communities of the nation, and of the world?

There has long been in the British character an internal dialogue between utilitarianism and a sense of duty that utilitarian theories, even when dominant, could not quite satisfy. Thus John Rawls' *Justice* has given to many the very great pleasure of seeming to put into words, and to organize, convictions they had long held in a groping way. In a quite powerful way, Rawls' work grows out of and speaks to the Anglo-American tradition. And yet there are many other cultural traditions, and many other groping senses of justice, still powerful among many Americans. The Asian-Americans, the Indian-Americans, the Slavic-Americans, and others still participate in traditions older than a thousand years, and their perceptions of the relations between individuals, families, and larger social groups are rather remarkably different from those imagined in Rawls' magisterial book. Suppose, then, that philosophy departments were to favor the traditions out of which Rawls' work springs. Would they be adequately serving the other cultural traditions of the United States, whether by way of more accurate articulation or by way of fair and exact criticism? Or would they, implicitly at least, be strengthening elites in some traditions to the neglect of elites in others?

All through American academic life there is, for good reason, an emphasis on the language, literature, political traditions, and even historical experiences of Great Britain. Children learn in school to distinguish rather clearly between England, Scotland, Wales, and the two Irelands. But most children do not learn to distinguish between Moravia, Bohemia, and Slovakia; or between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; and so on around the world. Yet the United States is marvellously placed among the nations for providing links with all other cultures on this planet. Immigrants from virtually everywhere have transplanted themselves to this once silent continent, inhabited then by a fraction of the 220 millions who now occupy it.

The cosmopolitanism of the American university might, accordingly, well exceed that of all other nations. It might well become, indeed, not a cosmopolitanism merely of presence, cosmopolitan because students and faculty from all over the world are enrolled in it. It might also become cosmopolitan in spirit; in world view, in tradition, in method, in standpoint. There is a pronounced restlessness among foreign students and faculty on American campuses, in part because of the narrowness and power of Americocentrism. But, by a rather obvious parallel, those American-born students whose heritage derives from the non-British cultures of the world also fail to find their existence and their outlook publicly confirmed in the university's daily proceedings. Is this an admirable state of affairs? Is it as creative as it might be?

It is one mark of an educated person that he or she knows more than one language. But many millions of Americans have been and still are bilingual, without educational encouragement. Why are there not rewards and incentives for maintaining the vitality of the many languages of the world the immigrants brought with them? Why are credits not given in school for studies in the languages indigenous to our various neighborhoods? Why do not departments of the Romance languages, departments of East European studies, and others develop programs for preserving and strengthening the language capabilities of, for example, Italian-, French-, Spanish-, and Slavic-speaking communities? As matters stand, there are few rewards in the United States for other than the maintenance of the English language; the speaking of a second, foreign language is still best kept a private rather than a public fact.

There are, it seems, two distinct cultural networks in which the people of the United States participate. The first is the national culture, serviced and maintained by national magazines, national television networks, and other national systems of distribution and coordination. The second consists of the many other subcultural networks, regional, religious, ethnic, and local, down to family network and neighborhood. It is regrettable that the universities and colleges are so often perceived to be, and are, agents of the national superculture and do so little to defend, nourish, and strengthen the local networks within which most citizens actually live.

Some will object, of course, that to "balkanize" (even to call attention to) the many subcultures of the land would be to detract from the common culture. They say this, generally, because they believe that the bonds of the common culture are fragile. That is to say, they concede, far more powerfully than their opponents, the *reality* of the existing subcultures; it is this reality that makes the common culture seem in their eyes to be so fragile. But the distinction between the common culture and the many subcultures is not the same as the distinction between the national culture (the superculture) and the many subcultures. Would anyone really like to argue that the commercialization, standardization, and neonization of the American landscape achieved by the superculture is really representative of the common culture? The common culture has, rather, always been more local, more modest, more republican in Jefferson's sense. The common culture has celebrated a kind of decency, civility, tolerance, privacy, and integrity, whereas the national culture has been built by competition, greed, public display, huckstering, and grandiosity. The common culture has favored smallness; the national culture loves bigness, conglomerations, "economies of size."

Perhaps the clearest contrast between the common culture and the national culture can be drawn by attending to the experience of many of the old British-American families in classical New England towns. Many such Americans abhor the incoming franchises, tourists, and modern ways that are "corrupting" the values and the ways they love. It used to be, in such towns, that a man's word was his bond, but law, business, and justice no longer proceed along such lines. The nationalization of values, standards, and practices has favored new types of people: quicker, more flexible, pragmatic, expert in difficult techniques, sufficiently faceless to be able to move about, to fit in easily, to get along. (One thinks indeed of some men in the Nixon White House, without roots, or traditions, or constituencies that might operate as a check upon their efficiency in accomplishing their assigned responsibilities; but one thinks equally of legions of professionals occupying the landscape

everywhere: developers, consultants, experts, engineers, even professional humanists.)

Another way to draw this contrast is to take up Lionel Trilling's useful notion of an "adversary culture." Against which culture, today, would one be an "adversary"? What Trilling first had in mind, it seems, was a culturally Protestant, bland, philistine culture, untutored in the subtle ways of the unconscious, and oblivious as well to the social and political implications of cultural materials. What the adversary culture introduced into American intellectual life was, to put it simply, Freud and Marx. But are the new "pop" liberations the liberations the adversary culture had in mind? The culture against which the adversary culture was adversary has, at least in the media, appeared to crumble without dignified resistance. The meretricious superculture which loudly holds its place is no closer to the true ideals of the adversary culture; indeed, it seems considerably less supportable. At least the old bourgeois culture had a sort of backbone, had a style (rather than a "lifestyle"), was not so prey to fashion. The adversary culture spoke of nihilism and dark tendencies and fateful ambiguities; but is dark Nixon really an improvement over sunny Eisenhower? Does President Ford truly recreate a bygone era?

The common culture is the heritage we presently possess, very largely derived from Anglo-American traditions and deeply embedded in the English language and in ancient British experiences. The national culture, by contrast, is what the technical capabilities of modern commerce have given us, and the almost mindless justification ("You can't stop progress") by which it has generally proceeded. Many of the achievements of the national culture are genuine. The expansiveness of the national culture allowed many of those I grew up with in western Pennsylvania a way out of the mines and the mills. Substantial economic advantages made possible expanded horizons, even a kind of larger sophistication, for millions. Travel and education, leisure and opportunity—the good fruits were many.

The price has also been high. Americans have tended to overestimate the social power of environment and to underestimate the importance of culture; the phrase "social engineering" suggests this blindness to cultural factors quite clearly. When New York City wanted to place high-rise apartments for 20,000 poor blacks in Forest Hills, a middle-class Jewish community, attention was paid to the material factors: sewers, electric power, water supplies, building construction, and the like. But no one planned how to knit together the human beings who would be affected by this substantial migration. The human body itself does not always accept transplanted organs; if the underlying metaphors of urban planning were cultural rather than mechanical, perhaps the bitterness that erupted in Forest Hills might have been anticipated and rather elaborate cultural rules appropriately followed. It is not impossible to integrate races and social classes in neighborhoods whose long-range stability and needs are plotted out with sensitivity. But gross "engineering" is arrogant and stirs rebellion.

It is an urgent and practical matter of the highest importance, therefore, that the curriculum of universities and colleges include sufficient materials about America's (and the world's) heterogeneous cultures so as to be truly cosmopolitan. There is a false, superficial cosmopolitanism among intellectuals in such places as Cambridge, Berkeley, Madison, and New York City. It is true that scholars and persons of talent from all over the nation (and the world) flock to such stimulating centers. In this sense, there is a rather obvious cosmopolitanism. It does not follow that such centers of intellectual vitality truly remain "in touch" with the many diverse subcultures

from which they draw their talent. It is quite likely that powerful myths of enlightenment, expertise, and high-level generalization will generate an unmistakable sense of superiority, indeed of isolation. (One recalls Pauline Kael saying in 1972: "But I don't know *anyone* who voted for Nixon.") The phenomenon of a separate university culture, overlaid upon the cultures of ordinary people, is visible in many nations of Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. Perhaps only the Chinese have made a methodical attempt, forcibly applied, to keep university personnel attuned to the cultures of workers and farmers.

American inventiveness might surely hit upon a distinctively democratic method for solving this problem of the cultural separation of intellectuals. It is not written on tablets of stone that university professors and their students shall think themselves superior to the janitors, policemen, cafeteria workers, TV repairmen, and others who dwell in their midst and all around them. A high percentage of the population of New Haven is Italian-American; it might be hard to show that Yale University has made efforts to confirm, to nourish, and to strengthen that community, or the others in its environs. It would be an egregious error to hold that the personnel of Yale live humanely or humanistically while the citizens of New Haven live prehumanistically or prehumanely. A distinctive way of experiencing pain and death, of imagining one's role as a man or a woman, of trusting in institutions, of placing oneself in respect to authority and dissent, of regarding hard work and the pleasures of living, of approaching occasions of self-control and fair play and political muscle, is surely being lived out in several different communities in and around New Haven. Rich humanistic materials abound there; not all such materials have yet been codified in poetry, drama, novel, or even anthropological report.

The many cultures of the United States are not only immensely rich in themselves; they tie the real, lived experience of some Americans to every other culture of the planet. Hardly a conflict can arise anywhere on earth—in Cyprus, in Israel, in Ireland, in Thailand, in South Africa, in China—without profoundly affecting some American communities. The nerve endings of the peoples of the United States are connected to virtually every extremity of the global body. This cultural reality is an underused resource in American education.

It does not, of course, seem a sound educational strategy to develop separate departments for every cultural group in the United States: black studies, Jewish studies, Italian studies, etc. During an interim period, however, concentrated work in cultural areas where few resources exist might well be useful. Whatever the failures of some black studies programs, the movement toward black studies did have the effect of multiplying exponentially both the quantity and the quality of the attention paid to the history and the cultures of black Americans. Most educated persons are now better informed about the realities of black experience than they were a decade ago.

But the long-range balkanization of cultural studies is neither a practical nor a theoretical advantage. What is crucial is that *all* education be multicultural. Multicultural materials should figure in every course in the humanities and the social sciences, in every part of the curriculum. It should be illegitimate to generalize about "the family" unless the quite remarkable differences between the Italian, the Irish, the Polish, the Jewish, and other traditions of family life are noted. The use of the language of Oxford dons as the paradigmatic model of "ordinary language" is so plainly illegitimate that one wonders how it succeeded for so long. The rather wholesale exclusion of the diaries, plays, and novels of the immigrant ex-

perience from introductory courses in American literature deprives many students of that "flash of recognition" that comes from seeing one's own family experience objectified in a work of art. For many students, such exclusion makes literature ring somehow false, as if it necessarily concerned others but never their own experienced world.

Thomas Bell's (Belejak's) forgotten novel about the mills of Braddock, Pennsylvania, *Out of This Furnace* (1941, 1950), for example, had I encountered it in college, might have instructed me earlier in dramatic possibilities all around me in my youth. I wish I had learned a great deal more than I did about the cultures and political history of Eastern Europe in the several courses in European history and political theory that I took. In retrospect, it is remarkable how oriented to Great Britain and Western Europe our entire curriculum has been; and how deceptively so. Basic works, international masterpieces, still remain untranslated into English from the languages of the Balkan countries and of Eastern Europe, as well as of the other quarters of the world. What we were taught as "humanities" represented in fact only a small selection from humanity's many cultures.

In a word, if ordinary people of the United States begin to lose confidence in the cultural services provided them by America's colleges and universities, there is some reason for their mistrust. Not often does a young man or woman from one of America's many neighborhoods depart for the university and then come back deepened, more articulate, and peacefully self-critical with respect to his or her native neighborhood. Most often, particularly at the "better" schools, the student is perhaps purposely, in any case intensively, "enlightened" from his or her previous unenlightenment, sometimes embittered, almost always alienated from the home. Is it wise or good that so many in our land "cannot go home again"? An educated person ought not to return unchanged; but one would hope that change would be characterized by sympathy, by a greater understanding, by an easier tolerance, rather than by a vague and scarcely nameable hostility.

The curriculum of the future, then, ought to be more thoroughly grounded in the actual pluralism of the American people. The painful gap between the intellectuals and other people might in some measure be eased. (Indeed, this gap sometimes divides the souls of some professors; visits from their families, which they take pains to keep isolated from their colleagues, are poignantly, excruciatingly strained. It is as though a language has been lost.) A stronger connection between the university curriculum and American actualities will, moreover, provide a rich source for cultural analogies relating to the entire range of the planet's cultures.

Yet it is not only a firmer connection between the curriculum and America's diverse communities that is required. The gap between a university education and the actual practices of American professions has also become too broad. This perception is the third great legacy from the sixties. Doctors must daily make decisions about the continuation or discontinuation of elaborate techniques for preserving life that are unparalleled in medical history. Until rather recently, there was little public guidance and support in these decisions; each doctor was alone with his own conscience and the tacit understanding of his peers. During the past decade, a considerable literature and wide interdisciplinary discussion have begun to remedy this situation. Meanwhile, almost every profession (including all those new fields of expertise that since World War II have begun to be called professions) carries along within it a great mass of value-laden material: a mind-set, a way of perceiving and proceeding, a body of techniques, tacit criteria, and long-range aims. Often this

material is remarkably ripe for ethical and humanistic reflection. Why are things done *this* way? Are there alternatives? Are habitual justifications now adequate? How does the work of one profession—urban planning or architecture, say—bear upon another, say, social psychiatry?

One might describe the present situation by saying that there now exists a vast body of literatures, practices, institutional arrangements, and case studies in every contemporary profession, and that this recently developed body of materials has most often never been submitted to the analysis of those in other disciplines. Its underlying metaphors and codified attitudes, its stated principles, its daily practices might well benefit by literary, philosophical, sociological, and other sorts of analysis. Besides the classical texts which quite properly figure in a sound undergraduate education, there are also contemporary dilemmas exemplified in contemporary materials that cry out for critical attention. Aristotle wrote often about the work of his predecessors, but he achieved eminence by tackling newer, contemporary problems, too; so with every other classical figure. There is no necessary conflict between the study of the intellectual achievements of the past and the attempt to face concrete perplexities of the present with every resource one can bring to bear.

The use of one profession as a subject of study by another—the field of television and the use of airwaves by the law, and of law cases by philosophers, for example—is an imperfect but necessary way of trying to grasp parts of our daily, fragmented worlds in at least partial “wholes.” An intelligent application of one profession to the materials of another is not an easy route, and not every step along the way turns out to be either accurately placed or fruitful. But it is a route we will have to walk if the inherent imperialism and specialized focus of each of our modern professions are to be chastened, its implications grasped, its limits noted. The world does not present itself narrowed down and tame, submissive to our individual expertise; in daily life we draw upon each other all the time. We need social, public, and adequately critical models for what should count as good interdisciplinary thinking (in whichever direction we might turn), and what will count as foolish and naïve. Often these models will appear first in negative form: consensus about what may be counted foolish develops well before consensual affirmations.

There are, in a word, impressive humanistic materials buried in the daily practice of each of our professions; and there is in these professions an obvious diversity of intellectual “worlds,” ways of perceiving, methods, interests. But this diversity is analogous, on another plane of discourse, to the pluralism of American communities, and, yet again, to the pluralism of ways of life and thought from which each of us may choose. The turmoil of the sixties, in forcing upon us questions of choice, justification, and identity, has given us an opportunity to rethink both the meaning of our diversity and the meaning of our unity. “The one and the many,” Aristotle thought, was one of the underlying universal problems of natural existence. Building a university curriculum around such a fundamental and perennial theme will not, I think, subject us to fads or carry us far away from the thick realities of daily life. It will, perhaps, keep those of us who are intellectual professionals in closer touch with the remainder of the population of our own and other lands, and, if we are doubly blessed, in closer contact with each other.

MICHAEL R. WINSTON

Reflections on Student Unrest, Institutional Response,
and Curricular Change

DURING A THREE-DAY conference on "Students and Society" held at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in August, 1967, David Seeley of the University of California at Santa Barbara expressed views characteristic of the period when he said in response to a suggestion that persuasion can be a reforming social force:

The problem is time. We have no guarantee that the world won't blow itself up very soon, so I don't like the thought of sitting around dialoguing with Lyndon Johnson while people are being murdered in Vietnam. I can't stand the thought of that. . . . Dialogue is a slow thing. I won't wait for dialogue to do it. People being murdered isn't good and people being used all over the world isn't good, and students in this country not having their rights isn't good. The dialogue is valid, and we should use as much of it as we can among ourselves and with others. But we shouldn't sit down and talk to Lyndon Johnson when people are being murdered. We should decide whether we should murder in return, or whether we should use some other way of stopping the war.¹

This startling but typical statement contains much of the "crisis of the embattled university" in the 1960s: the impatience justified by the shadow of nuclear catastrophe; the grudging acknowledgment of the "validity" of dialogue, but the simultaneous restriction of its use to those presumably already in agreement; facile identification of "the enemy"; presumed sympathy with the "wretched of the earth"; and the easy, even casual mention of whether "murder in return" was an appropriate response to the crushing reality of the failure to alter by conventional protest an unpopular public policy. While the virulent rhetoric of SDS did not surface at all universities besieged by student unrest, it undoubtedly established a tone of unrestrained outrage that was fairly common. Universities, as a vital part of the "knowledge industry," were identified with the political policies opposed by radical students. This should not have been entirely a surprise to university administrators, since an increasingly close involvement with government and industry was the hallmark of the strongest universities in the United States. The relative isolation of American higher education prior to World War II had been ended dramatically by the changed relationship between specialized knowledge and economic growth. As Clark Kerr pointed out in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard, a year before the storm broke at Berkeley in 1964: "The production, distribution, and consumption of 'knowledge' in all its forms is said to account for 29 per cent of the gross national product . . . and 'knowledge production' is growing at about twice the rate of the rest of the economy."² The dimensions of what Kerr projected optimistically for American higher education's newly emergent role in economic development are made clear in his related statement:

Knowledge has certainly never in history been so central to the conduct of an entire society.

What the railroads did for the second half of the last century and the automobile for the first half of this century may be done for the second half of this century by the knowledge industry: that is, to serve as the focal point for national growth. And the university is at the center of the knowledge process.³

President Kerr's buoyant expectation reflected the enormous success American universities had achieved in fulfilling the accelerating technological and scientific demands of a "postindustrial" economy. They accommodated rapidly increasing numbers of students and from more diverse social origins than their European and British counterparts, and at the same time established research leadership in a substantial number of disciplines. In sharp contrast with the success of American universities was the almost universal sense by 1970 that the system had broken down, that major structural alterations had to be made in the governance of universities and in their relationship to society. Analysts pointed to student alienation and professorial anomie throughout the system of higher education.⁴ At the peak of the crisis, the typical responses of most faculty and administrators were characterized by pragmatic and adaptive institutional accommodation to some student demands for reform of university governance.

It seems to me that the extensive debate of the 1960s about the social role of universities, as well as the modest reforms which came in the wake of politicization and violent disruption of university life, tended to obscure critical educational problems, because of the crisis atmosphere and the need to achieve ad hoc solutions to institutional problems. Before discussing those, it would be useful to distinguish among the four general categories of students in the system: (1) undergraduate liberal arts, (2) undergraduate applied arts and sciences (for example, music, pharmacy, or engineering), (3) professional, and (4) graduate. Of these four, the university crisis of the 1960s was most clearly focused in the undergraduate liberal arts group. Although dissatisfaction and unrest appeared in the others at various times, they had neither the same breadth nor intensity. The vocationally oriented undergraduate populations and the professional students were in most cases only marginally involved in student activism.

When we turn to undergraduate liberal arts students, it is necessary to distinguish between those demands which were essentially social or political and those for institutional reform. It seems clear now that the political demands were based on a misapprehension of the extent to which universities can directly influence public policy. The "National Student Strike" of May, 1970, for example, included the demand that "the United States government cease its escalation of the Vietnam War into Cambodia and Laos, [and] that it unilaterally and immediately withdraw all forces from Southeast Asia."⁵ More realistic was the further demand that "the universities end their complicity with the United States war machine by an immediate end to defense research, ROTC, counterinsurgency research, and all other such programs." This category of student demand highlighted the social and political role of technical knowledge, but in few instances were students concerned about the specific content of undergraduate curricula. The faculty and administration responses to the demands tended to accept the students' assumption of the instrumental nature of the university's role in society. This continues to be, in my judgment, the basic failure of university reform efforts in the 1960s. They were ad hoc and overly responsive to mercurial and self-proclaimed student leaders. Rather than react too little, many universities tended to overreact. But, for the most part, the aims and content of the undergraduate curriculum were not scrutinized

systematically, and curricular changes tended to be simply expansion of student choice of courses.

At this juncture in the history of the United States, it is imperative that a fundamental reshaping of undergraduate curricula be undertaken. The institutional improvisations of the past decade merely delayed the process of rethinking what American college students should know and understand of the complexities they now must confront. There are two basic considerations: the fragmentation of knowledge which has resulted from excessive specialization, and the altered position since 1945 of the United States as a world power. American colleges and universities have had roughly three approaches to curriculum construction. The first phase was a narrowly prescribed "classical curriculum" comprised mainly of Latin, Greek, and mathematics. This held unchallenged sway until the revolution wrought by Charles W. Eliot's introduction of the elective system at Harvard, which was a crucial step in the growing professionalization of American academic life.⁶ The elective principle of curriculum design permitted the introduction of the natural and social sciences, and encouraged departmentalization of faculties. This, in turn, enabled the colleges to become the foundation for the new graduate schools that were emerging during the same period. The third major phase was the General Education movement that began at Columbia as early as 1919, but did not flower until two decades later. The Columbia curriculum was based on the assumption that "there is a certain minimum of . . . [the Western] intellectual and spiritual tradition that a man must experience and understand if he is to be called educated."⁷ The "great books" variations of general education that flourished under John Erskine at Columbia, Robert Maynard Hutchins at Chicago, and Stringfellow Barr at St John's College shared the assumption that it was the obligation of a college to provide its students with an understanding of the past, the capacity for critical thinking and humane judgment. All these efforts were later overwhelmed by the pressures of professional specialization and the general loss of a sense of what specific knowledge an educated person should master. In the perspective of the present, several matters become clear. First, the general education and "great books" advocates paid little attention to American culture. There was a general belief that there were few significant discontinuities between the great tradition of high European culture and American culture. The readings generally began with ancient Greece and Rome and sped along to the high points of nineteenth-century Western European thought. American intellectual and social history was a minor footnote at best. The second striking feature was the total absence of any effort to present students with an understanding of ancient African or Asian civilizations or of the many cultural configurations which owed little to the European achievement. Graduates of these programs had little preparation for understanding America or the world beyond Europe.

Now it seems clear that the enormous changes in our understanding of American and world history should have some fundamental consequences for the ways in which we devise curricula to educate college students. What do we wish undergraduates to understand about the development of *man*? Can we continue to be satisfied with a narrowly focused view of Western European culture and institutions? To those who would point to the plethora of special "area studies" that emerged after World War II, it is necessary only to indicate how little they have affected the basic undergraduate curriculum. In many institutions which boast of excellent graduate programs in Chinese, South Asian, or African studies, there has been little

spillover into the general education programs for undergraduates. An undergraduate may in some cases enroll in a course on Chinese or Japanese civilization, but this usually remains a fragment and seldom amounts to an occasion for achieving a new understanding of the broad spectrum of institutional and social patterns. Where there are remnants of "general education," there is little likelihood that students, when they are introduced to the Homeric epics and early Greek civilization, will also learn about the contemporary *Upanishads*, the achievements of the Chou dynasty or the Kingdom of Kush; or that when they study Carolingian Europe, they will place this in the comparative perspective of the Kingdom of Kanem, the culture of Kyoto, or the Abbasside caliphate. This provincialism in transmitting the "high culture" of the West, at the expense of a broad understanding of the civilizations of mankind, has had disastrous consequences. Some of our "best educated" people are bereft of any sense of the global traditions of man. The specialized, pragmatically oriented area studies programs are clearly not satisfactory for this fundamental *educational* purpose, as distinct from the function of training someone to be a bank or State Department representative in a non-Western country. The tragedy has been further compounded by the distorted picture of the American past that has been the typical undergraduate fare in American colleges and universities. Many educated Americans are now unaccountably bewildered by their inability to grasp the complexity of the American past. In the stress of the last decade, there have been sudden discoveries of multicultural and ethnic strands in our history that have been simply ignored on a vast scale. "Native American" and "Black Studies" programs have been as tangential as the graduate "area studies" programs. They remain "exotic" appendages grafted onto the schedule of courses offered, often under political pressure, but scarcely affecting the basic curriculum. If "American Civilization" courses still exclude the 20 percent of the population of Colonial America that was black, or if American literature courses continue to find no place for Charles Chesnutt, Countee Cullen, Sterling Brown, or Richard Wright, is there any real possibility of undergraduates arriving at a sound understanding of American culture?

On a different level, the curriculum must face the issue of values. For more than half a century, the liberal university ideal has triumphed, forcing considerations of value to the periphery of college education. The secularized educational institutions of this century decisively ended the era that Andrew D. White of Cornell called "the regime of petty sectarian colleges."⁸ While it is true that there were abuses in the effort by the old American college system to produce "Christian gentlemen," the adoption of an instrumental and positivist posture by the "new regime" has also had unfortunate results. It is reasonably clear that one source of student dissatisfaction with college and university intellectual life in the 1960s was its failure to address problems of value. The extraordinary flourishing of a kind of religious "underground" at many institutions may be dismissed by some skeptics as a passing fad, but it seems to me to be a manifestation of a genuine need that many students recognized—the desire to formulate an ordered sense of humane values amid positivistic and materialist chaos. Some aspects of the rejection of academic standards were related to the sense that skills learned in universities were unrelated to meaningful purposes, that competence separated from meaning was an empty achievement. The liberal ideal of freeing learning from the bonds of metaphysics has become so exaggerated that many students have fallen prey to ideological and cultist beliefs far more restrictive than the religious formalities of "the petty sec-

tarian colleges" of the nineteenth century. "Emancipation from the bondage of the soil," Rabindranath Tagore wrote some years ago, "is no freedom for the tree."⁹ In a fundamental sense, education is necessarily circumscribed by matters of value, and to attempt to burst those bonds is to reduce education to mere training. If universities are to reclaim their authority in human affairs, they must face the problem of preparing students to arrive at an understanding of the forces which have brought global society to its present *terminus ad quem*, providing a matrix of understanding broader than the confines of Western civilization. Further, it is vital that students become equipped intellectually, by means of a curriculum which has a coherent and comprehensive view of the American past, to comprehend the conflicts of value and meaning in a pluralistic and democratic society. These prescriptive remarks are not intended, of course, to be exhaustive, but merely suggestive of how little American higher education was moved to a basic reconsideration of the undergraduate curriculum during the past decade. The agenda for the future should include more than the largely superficial, adaptive institutional adjustments to student unrest; it should undertake the development of a new organon for comprehending global society.

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RICHARD SENNETT

The Artist and the University

IN THE 1920s, American universities began adding painters, musicians, writers, and actors to their academic faculties. A few English universities followed suit in the late 1940s, the Germans began the practice in the middle fifties, and even that bastion of petulant purism, the French university system, has recently permitted a few practicing artists to teach in the sacred groves of Arts and Letters.

The dealings of the artist and the academy have, from the artist's point of view, been at best a matter of uneasy necessity, at worst a disaster enervating the artist's creative powers. Ben Shahn's lectures, *The Shape of Content*, voice what has become a common set of complaints. The academy gives the artist a largely adolescent and unsophisticated audience for his work; the bureaucracy of the university, demanding fixed schedules and duties, forces the artist into an unproductive mold; even the financial security the university offers, which in almost all cases is what has drawn the artist into its orbit, stands accused by Shahn and others. Somehow this security puts the artist out of touch with "real life," with "real life's" uncertainties and, therefore, its stimulation.

These complaints certainly deserve to be looked at with a jaundiced eye. The reader of Mozart's letters for the years 1780-1781 can find the composer making the same complaints about his patron, the Archbishop of Salzburg, that his present-day counterpart makes about academic bureaucracies today. If being patronized has its intrinsic trials and gives the artist an all-too-easy target to blame for his own creative checks, it is also true that there is something special about the patronage of universities. It follows a special period in time, a period where artists cut loose from personal patrons and attempted to act as entrepreneurs in big cities. That entrepreneurial effort was a failure for almost all artists who attempted it, so that what the university has gradually absorbed is a refugee community. Forced out of an unworkable economic system into the university's embrace, this refugee community still clings to the values, however, of the landscape from which it has been expelled; thus the peculiar tensions between the bureaucratic patron and its artist.

It was Mozart's generation which began the entrepreneurial experiment in earnest. In 1781 Mozart broke away from Salzburg to Vienna, hoping to earn through public concerts the income he was once accorded by the Archbishop. He wrote to his father that he had consigned himself to chance. In Balzac's *Lost Illusions*, we are shown the picture of a young writer, moving again from a small town to a capital, who in the hectic world of mass journalism in Paris hopes to leave behind the personal dependence he knew in the small town. The growth of public expositions of painting, through academies, salons, or anti-salons, all had the same effect: to give the artist anonymity as freedom, in the midst of a mass market, which he had not known under the intimate, stifling conditions of court or small-town life in the past.

It is fashionable now to sneer at the entrepreneurial ethos, to view it, if not as morally evil, as at least shamefully vulgar. The frenzied life of the nineteenth-century capital made a great gift to its artists, however. It accustomed them to believe that they need not sell their personalities to another person, ingratiating themselves, flattering him, altering this passage or that theme at his suggestion, in order to work at all. Under the entrepreneurial economy of the big city, the work itself drew apart from the man working and his social relations. And this separation of the worker and his work—in an age of badly digested Marx it should be underlined—was a damn good thing. It accustomed the artist to think of his efforts as greater than his circumstances, to think the work worthwhile despite its approval or disapproval at a given moment.

If an entrepreneurial city gave artists notions of insulation and artistic integrity, it did not give them bread. The irony of this economic ethos is not its cultural contradictions, but that the market itself was seldom distributive. Pianists in New York City now, a city still in the old pattern, are a good case in point. It is estimated that there are eight hundred classical pianists in New York trying to have full concert careers; there are five concert halls in the city which “count”; in a given year between thirty to thirty-five of these eight hundred pianists will appear in these halls, and of the thirty, at least half are so well known that they appear year after year. Around fifteen new pianists get a hearing in New York each year, the hall often paid for by themselves; they have a paragraph in the *Times* which describes them as “promising” or “accomplished,” and they sink back into obscurity.

And yet pianists keep coming to New York. They come even though they could perform frequently and to appreciative audiences in many other cities and towns in America. In talking to them one finds that Mozart’s “consignment to chance” still touches them, that despite all the visible evidence they guard the illusion that they will be one of the few elect. One also finds, beyond this fantasy, the strong belief that they can be free in a great city as they can nowhere else, that their work in this milieu does not become the whole of their lives, that indeed, the chances of success being so slim, their relations with other musicians and other people in the city are not a priori determined by their status. Is poverty the price of freedom? The issue is more complicated.

The modern university has inherited people for whom the financial realities of the entrepreneurial city have become no longer bearable. In the last decade, it has also drawn into its orbit young people who have grown up through the university system or the art colleges, and have decided to pursue artist’s “careers” within the university rather than break the umbilical cord. Yet for both the older generations and the young, the values of the entrepreneurial city remain dominant in their lives, even as they have moved out of a context where those values make sense.

Universities are distinctive as bureaucracies for two reasons. They are structures in which personal relations outside the office and alliances at work fuse. An academic does not “do a job,” he or she has even something more than a “career.” He uses his perceptions of the world as an economic and occupational tool. The tendency is, therefore, for people of like perceptions to band together in professional relationships, to a greater degree than is true in large law firms, big newspapers, or hospitals. Universities are also organizations in which status plays a strong role. The politics of the last decade have established no real trend, for the democratization of university life is waning as quickly as it made its appearance. The institutional change of the last decade, the unionization spreading among faculty, is not a

challenge but a reinforcement of the old status patterns, of activities and duties assigned to each "grade" of work, of expectations fixed, made into routines. Entrepreneurial feats in this milieu become frowned on from below as well as from above.

In a highly personal, status-oriented bureaucracy, the artist holding onto the old urban values has good reason to feel the institution is encroaching on his work, that he is losing his autonomy, that he has to commit the whole of himself, when all he wants is money to do his own thing. Stripped of the enduring hyperbole which attends the complaints of all servants against their masters, criticisms of the university by Ben Shahn and others make sense in terms of the artist's own prior history, in a milieu which had given him a sense of life even as the milieu made it nearly impossible for him to live. To feel that the economic security of the university is "unreal" makes sense; in Balzac's Paris, the precariousness of daily existence was the basis upon which the artist built a double image of himself, as at war and as a secret worker.

What is the solution? To adapt? To have a "career" as professor of abstract impressionism or instructor in musical comedy? It would be better to entice the artist out of the academy, back into the city on entrepreneurial terms, by addressing the economic question in the city. The university is by its nature unfitted to the task of universal uncle; it is not a microcosm of society, certainly not a microcosm of the city. The values of the entrepreneurial city are worth preserving, and they are not transferable.

It is disturbing that much of the support which comes to the artist from foundations or from government comes to him on university terms. That means, even if he is not supported at a university, he is given money for "a year off," a sabbatical, travels abroad—all metaphors for getting away, all metaphors of escape. The economic order in which he is suffering is not addressed; after the Guggenheim in Paris one returns to the upper West Side, awaiting a recital in two, three, or four years which the *Times* will call "promising."

Dealing with the economic difficulty of the artist, enticing him out of the university, is very simple in form. It is to pay the artist for his work, not for his time. It means paintings commissioned, not a year of support at the Rhode Island School of Design.

Paying for work, not time, was the very essence of the artist's urban experience in the last century. To argue that this system was or could again be just is absurd. Who commissions, what cabals, intrigues, and in-fighting are necessary to gain a commission, are inescapable vices in such situations. But the dangers of work created by committee or by government are relative to another set of dangers, embodied in an academy at once intimate, ordered, and hierarchic. The more artists complain about the "death" they feel in the academy, the more they have to face the discomforts involved in what they have come to think of as life. In the end, the possibility of injustice may appear a lesser risk than the possibility of enervation by absorption into the professoriat.

If the university has "failed" to provide a home for the artist, the failure is not a matter of bad programming; it is a fated, inescapable consequence of the evolution of artistic culture in cities, the impossible economics which produced this culture, and the very structure of the university, so unsuited by its intimacy and status grading to receive these refugees from New York, London, or Paris. And what has been said of artists here could equally be said of the mosaic of intellectual worlds

and activities which in the last century existed outside the academy. The university has become a dumping-ground for a culture which at once gave serious people a conception of freedom and failed to provide them the means to be free. There is no crisis of the humanities or of the arts in the university; if one must use the word, there is a crisis built into the very structure of the culture.

S. L. WASHBURN

Evolution and Education

NO INSTITUTION CAN function effectively without clearly defined goals; particularly is this true in times of change. The traditional college was part of a way of life that found its meaning in tradition (classics, history, and philosophy) and in religion. With the rise of science, and with the importance of education for many careers, the traditional activities were crowded out of the curriculum, and the small college was replaced by the multiversity of today. Many efforts have been made to keep a modicum of order in the curriculum by breadth requirements or by a return to the past through programs based on great books or comparable philosophies. These fail because the intellectual issues are not bounded by the multiversity itself or by the educational system. The many opportunities requiring advanced training are part of the modern world. The problems are real and will become more complex. The notions of the nature of the world and of man which formed the foundations of the traditional college are simply incorrect, and educational progress must start with a statement of the goals of education *as it could be*.

Education should give an understanding of the world and of man, as well as offer vocational training. The process should be pleasant and continue throughout life. The traditional structure of the university based on departments prevents the attainment of these goals, and since the culture no longer provides unifying solutions, there is no intellectually satisfying way for the student to proceed. If a student wants to understand the nature of the world, the information is scattered in departments of astronomy, chemistry, geology, mathematics, and physics. It would be difficult enough to take all the courses, but even if the student had the prerequisites and the time, in the end he would have to make a synthesis which his professors have not made. Avenues of approach to the understanding of man are far more labyrinthine. Numerous biological sciences, the social sciences, history, and the arts are relevant. In short, the university is divided by tradition, research, and for the convenience of professors. It not only does not help the student attain broad intellectual goals, but makes it difficult for him to master knowledge from more than three or four closely related departments.

The universities are highly successful in vocational training: the production of professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, business administrators, engineers, and professors proficient in research. The universities fail in putting knowledge into a form in which it can be used by the educated person. They fail in conveying to the public the progress in knowledge that is essential for democracy, for informed decision-making. Obviously, knowledge is growing at a fantastic rate, and techniques are getting more complicated. More departments will have to be formed and more specialties created. This expansion is a necessary part of progress and of human adjustment to a world of undreamed-of possibilities. But at the same time

there needs to be a different sort of progress, progress toward a general understanding of the nature of the world.

Clearly, no solution to the present educational dilemma exists. The task, therefore, is to start working toward different methods of education that will give the tools of knowledge to any intelligent person. One solution is to supplement existing educational opportunities with new kinds of educational experience. This can be done through courses built on cases that illuminate the kinds of contributions the sciences and the humanities can make. The case-study method offers a proved technique that could be applied to problems of scientific and humanistic knowledge. For example, continental drift contains a new perception of the continental plates, the interior of the earth, the process of mountain formation, as well as the background for biological evolution.¹ The proof of drift involves obtaining cores, radiometric dating, magnetic reversals, and reveals the relations of techniques to the progress of science. Why the theory was not accepted for many years raises the whole question of the importance of individuals in the history of science. The examination of ten to twenty cases over the course of a year could give the student a good idea of the physical sciences—what they can and what they cannot do. By selecting cases that are both fundamental and controversial (such as continental drift, origin of life, composition of the moon), science could be presented as an ongoing human activity. The astronomy of quasars, black holes, and new techniques is radically different from that of the conventional telescope of not so many years ago.² Cases could be chosen to reveal the forefront of advancing knowledge, to stress the groups of scientists providing the techniques on which the progress rests, and to point out the vocational possibilities.

Since knowledge is in flux, the cases would be reviewed and often changed. Lectures would be supplemented by books and articles that would be constantly appraised, edited, and replaced. The need for continuing education would spring directly from the nature of the cases. Science is not static, and if science is to play any effective part in democracy, people must understand the nature and implications of technical progress. Science is far too important to leave to the scientists; the future of the human race depends on the human use of scientific knowledge. In summary, the cases should give a clear understanding of the changing nature of the scientific enterprise. They should show the fascination of knowledge and the power of techniques. They should help people to see the nature of a wide variety of sciences, and why highly specialized technical training is necessary if one is to contribute to the progress of any of the sciences. In addition to gaining some understanding of the nature of the world and of science, the cases should show the diverse careers open to those trained in science.

The case studies of scientific advances should put the departments in perspective. They should help everyone to see what the various departments do and how they supplement one another. For example, if this educational plan had been in effect when the concept of continental drift was being accepted some ten years ago, it would have been the obligation of departments of geology to provide the new case materials, of historians of science to put the development in perspective, and of philosophers to comment on the human understanding of the everlasting hills.

Such an innovation would not require great changes in the structure of the university. It could be done by relatively few people if they had the support of colleagues and administration. The suggestion that some courses be based on a small number of carefully selected cases does not mean that all courses should be

organized in this way. For example, a student interested in a language or the history of a country or physics would major just as one does at present. The cases would compete with survey courses. They would attempt to give the opportunity for general understanding of knowledge through the analysis of selected materials.

The purpose of the case-study approach is to give insight into the meaning of the various sciences. This should be contrasted with the elementary course which is the first stage in training a professional. For example, a widely used elementary paleontology text contains some five thousand technical words and names. A major part of the effort in an introductory course using such a text concerns the mastery of a vocabulary useful only if the student continues in that subject. The same text gives no sense of the excitement of the discovery of the fossils. The information is not related to either intellectual history or technical progress. One would not learn in its pages that the history of paleontology was closely related to anatomy, embryology, genetics, and that evolution might be studied as it is reflected in the structure of macromolecules. In contrast, case studies might stress the meaning of evolution, experimental analysis of the processes involved, and the nature of progress.

During the recent controversy over the teaching of evolution in the public schools in California, neither side welcomed the opportunity for public debate. The scientists opposed statements from the religious point of view and fundamentalists opposed the teaching of science. The newspapers put the issue in terms of whether Darwin was right. But a theory of evolution based on molecular biology is very, very different from anything Darwin imagined; it takes nothing from Darwin's importance to look at the evidence as it is today. Radioactive elements provide a time scale. Continental drift gives a geographic setting. Molecular biology reveals the genetic mechanism far more thoroughly than has Mendelian genetics. The point of case studies is to help people to see how problems of this kind may be approached, to see the role that the human mind may play and how little it may accomplish without modern techniques. The debate on evolution in California revealed that there was no general understanding on the present state of knowledge nor any comprehension of how one might communicate a modern understanding of the nature of the universe.

A relatively small number of case studies of recent scientific revolutions might serve to clarify some concepts about the world as it is now interpreted by scientists. Comparable studies on the nature of man would be a much more difficult project. There are numerous reasons for this, but the most fundamental one is that our culture builds errors about human nature into the educational process. The essential point is that the human species is the product of the process of evolution, and selection is not a substitute for divine creation.

The human species evolved to its present form some thousands of years ago. The selective pressures which determined the course of human evolution were those of the world of hunters and gatherers. The brain evolved in a feedback relation with ways of life which have ceased to exist. The result of this evolutionary history is that the unaided human brain makes a series of errors which are universal. For example, prior to modern science, theories about the nature and cause of diseases were remarkably similar all over the world. It was believed that disease was caused by some outside spirits or evil magic entering the person, and that the cure lay in a wide variety of customs which attempted to remove the cause. Such activity may be justified because it sometimes helps the sick person psychologically, but faced with the problem of disease, human beings took remarkably similar actions, all of which

were based on mistakes. General agreement does not mean that the conclusion is necessary, efficient, or correct. Given only the uncorrected information of the senses, the human brain may come to conclusions that are universal, but wrong. Universal beliefs not only may be wrong, but they may be further complicated by an additional characteristic of the brain. Human judgments are accompanied by emotion. Emotion is essential if beliefs are to give rise to actions. As Paul MacLean has put the matter: "... primitive systems of the brain have the capacity to generate affective feelings of what is real, true, and important."³ The brain not only makes universal mistakes, but it invests them with feelings which make them "real, true, and important," and thus removes them from challenge and discussion.

Disease was chosen as an example of universal human error because there has been scientific progress, and it is possible to see the cause of the error, at least to some extent. The primitive view of causes is a more complicated problem because so much of that view is still with us. In the small, limited world of primitive people, causes were seen as the actions of people—or of spirits that were very much like people, only with added power or special attributes. This source of universal error remains with us. It lies behind the simplistic blaming of complex social problems on people. Throw the rascals out and all will be well. And it is embedded in religions. Thoughts about the relation of the human species to the world are still dominated by the errors of the primitive, prescientific world.

Courses might be set up comparing all the prescientific beliefs about diseases. Magic, cults, and customs could be a fascinating study, and people could speculate on which customs may have helped and which hindered in dealing with the problem of disease. But all such study is useless when the goal is curing diseases. The comparative study of spiritual intervention is even more fascinating, but equally useless if one is seeking the effective guiding of human behavior.

In the understanding of the physical world, there has been immense progress over the last century. The progress is clearly based on the development of methods which provide answers to basic questions. There has been no comparable progress in understanding the nature of man, and it is not even clear that people know how to ask useful questions. For example, it is often claimed that a knowledge of history is essential if we are to avoid the mistakes of the past. But is there really any evidence that historians understand the present in more useful ways than other people? Since a student cannot possibly take courses in the history of all peoples, the useful meaning of history requires some kind of abstraction, some generalizations from the boundless but uncertain "facts." In contrast to a course outlining the history of some country, a case study would present some body of historical information to show how this helps us to live today, to make more useful decisions. The case studies would not replace the traditional courses, but would call attention to the resources of history and would make it clear how these could be mined. If the nature of man is to be understood, there need to be analyses of cases which show just how the past illuminates the present, just how history is useful. It is by no means obvious that the rapidly changing modern world can be operated effectively using the customs (laws, economics, political systems) of many years ago.

In selecting a number of cases (twenty to forty) to help in understanding the nature of man, the first might concern the brain. For example, there are individuals in whom the two sides of the brain have been divided—that is, the cortex on the right side is disconnected from the cortex on the left.⁴ These divided brains give a remarkable set of clues to basic human problems, and the results are very different

from the common sense of our culture. Both sides of the brain think and can use symbols, but only the left is conscious and can talk.⁵ The often repeated statement that language is necessary for thought is wrong because the non-speaking side can solve problems. The behaviorist point of view that language is just learned without any special anatomy in the brain is wrong. Chomsky is right on the importance of the human brain for learning language, on the basic structure, and on the great difference between human language and the communication of other primates.⁶ If we are to understand the human species, the first step might be the study of the split brain and all the information it yields on thought, language, and the basis for communication.

The split brains show that, just as in the case of the physical sciences, there is no way to gain knowledge by thought alone. Understanding of the brain comes from intervention and experimentation. A philosophy of how we think may bear no more relation to reality than a philosophy of earth, air, fire, and water does to chemistry.

Starting an effort to understand our species by a case study on the brain is one way to avoid the biases of our culture which now dominate the whole academic system. For example, warfare, physical violence, and torture have been an important part of human behavior, yet these receive scant attention in the curriculum.⁷ It has been estimated that about 25 percent of males were killed in primitive fighting. A case study on the relation of the brain to violence might open this area to discussion and show some of the fundamental relations of biology and behavior. Through his evolution man has evolved a biology which easily allows him to learn aggressive behaviors.⁸ Biology does not make the behavior inevitable, but it makes it highly probable, unless controlled by custom. A case study on violence would demonstrate how biology, early experience, and custom interrelate to affect the frequency and nature of this kind of behavior.⁹ The study of aggressive behaviors is particularly useful in showing the problems which come from language. Words describing damaging behaviors usually have highly emotional connotations, and it is easy to see how difficult it is to speak of the behaviors without using a vocabulary which implies the conclusions even before the events are fully described.

The selection of the kinds of cases needed to analyze human behaviors would in itself be an educational enterprise. In a course on human nature, the cases might change from year to year, and each case would involve lectures and readings. The new selections would form the basis for continuing education, for any interested person to keep up to date. The main tasks of the departments would remain as at present, and cooperation in the case-approach courses would take only a small percentage of departmental time. A small number of professors would have to provide continuity and coherence to the courses, but three or four professors for each course would be enough. These would not have to be the same people from year to year, but they would have to devote substantial time and effort, since much of the data would be new to any particular professor. To make the suggestion more concrete: departments could allocate one professor's time for one term. Surely a small demand on any one department.

Behind the suggestion of a case-study approach to understanding the nature of the world and man is the assumption that survey courses give only a superficial statement of the conclusions of a traditional piece of knowledge. In contrast, the cases would delve deeply into an important problem and would show how it was related to technical information, history, literature. The essence of the well-chosen case would be in its ramifications. Knowledge is changing rapidly and in important

ways; to participate intelligently in modern democracy, citizens must be able to recognize the implications of an event or discovery and make choices in a way which is not possible at present. Continuing education is not a luxury, but an essential part of a modern democracy. Just as traditional classical education fitted a way of life and sprang from a set of beliefs and values, so modern education must fit a new way of life. The primary contrast between the two is that the traditional system saw wisdom coming from the past and was built around the power of the Word. Present education must open the way to constant adjustment and change, and ancient texts no longer offer clues to reality.

The highly adaptable, emotional, social creature we call man learns best in the early years through emotionally rewarding interpersonal bonds, later through clearly visible, socially important objectives.¹⁰ In education, discipline is no substitute for internal motivation. In the young, play is the primary internal drive for learning, and the repetition which is necessary to master skills is guaranteed by play in all cultures not dominated by European educational traditions. Our system separates education from life and substitutes examinations for life. The classroom reduces the most intelligent, imaginative, exploratory primate to a bored robot, learning "facts," most of which form no part of a preparation for life. Our species has a remarkable capacity to adapt, or the revolt of youth would have been much more violent and prolonged. Everything we know about primate nature shows that the present form of the educational system is neither necessary nor efficient. Education should be for clearly defined goals and operated in accord with an understanding of human nature.

Many people now spend one third of their lives getting educated. Surely that vast expenditure of time and human effort should be pleasurable, meaningful, and liberating. Education will be successful only when dropping out is irrational and when everyone can enjoy and use the progress of knowledge. No one knows how great the ultimate changes will have to be, but surely we know enough to begin to adjust the educational system so that everyone may gain some understanding of the nature of the world and the nature of man.

I stress that I am talking about only a small proportion of college education, something on the order of two courses taken in the first or second year. If the experiment succeeded, the case studies would lead to students making much more informed choices from the departmental offerings. Success would not lead to a multiplication of courses because one of the basic assumptions of this suggestion is that it must be possible to raise the main issues in a relatively small amount of time. So far I have been discussing the possibility of approaching modern knowledge at the college level through a series of cases, hopefully leading toward an understanding of the nature of the world and the nature of man. But since this issue of *Dædalus* is on education in general, I would like to close by considering the implications of the study of human evolution for the educational process.

The first point is that the survival of species depends on their adapting to the conditions of their time. Adaptation is the fit between populations and reality. Those who do not adapt become extinct. The most important result of evolutionary understanding is the emphasis on the present. If all the history of all forms of life were fully known from their beginnings some 3 billion years ago down to the beginnings of European expansion, the events of the last centuries could not have been predicted. The rise of science, spread of populations, and technology are new. The lesson of evolution is that behaviors must be brought into useful relation with the

problems of the present, and if these conditions are new, no knowledge of the past may be relevant. In saying this I am in no way belittling the study of the past. I find the study of the past fascinating, intellectually liberating, and echo Simpson's challenging phrase, "One hundred years without Darwin are enough!"¹¹ If I were selecting cases for a course on human nature, evolution would certainly be one. But what I am insisting on is that the meaning of the past is to adapt to the present so there may be a future. A corollary of this is that the more rapidly times change, the less there will be any simple lessons from the past.

The same logic applies to comparative information. Suppose we had all the information on political and economic systems of the nineteenth century; it is not certain that we would have any information useful for planning human behavior in the year 2000. Knowledge of history and of comparative institutions may be useful only in freeing us from the bondage of the past, but not for determining what is useful under radically new circumstances. Since it is my belief that circumstances are really new and are changing at an accelerating rate, the most important part of any educational system is how it adapts, changes, and helps people to live happily and intelligently in the new world increasingly dominated by the results of modern science.

The implications of evolution are very different from cataloging the past. Hopefully, the implications can be made clear with case material in a short time, and this might interest some students to pursue the study further. If so, they would find information in departments of anthropology, biochemistry, biology, genetics, geology, paleontology, and others, depending on the particular college or university. There would be prerequisites in chemistry, mathematics, and physics. This shows how different it is to raise the problem of the meaning of evolution and to show what kinds of knowledge are relevant, or to learn how to be a specialist.

A second point which bears directly on the problem of education is that through evolution species are produced whose behaviors adapt them to ways of life. In the case of the primates, much of the adaptation is through learning. The point can be generalized. A species easily learns those behaviors which have been important in its past. The brain of the human newborn is not a *tabula rasa*. The reason human beings easily learn to speak is because the brain is adapted for this biological function. From a biological point of view, sexual activity has to be pleasurable, but childbirth does not. In planning educational experiences, the design may be left to tradition, or it may be based on what is known of the nature of the human being.

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Agonistic Structures in Academia: Past to Present

STRUGGLE IN ACADEMIA did not begin in the 1960s.* In some ways it disappeared. I recall clearly a remark made to me in 1967 by a German-born middle-aged teacher in an all-boys high school in New York City: "Ach! These boys expect you in the classroom to be their friend. When I was a boy, everybody knew that the teacher was the enemy." The speaker's eyes twinkled, but the statement was meant seriously. The twinkle was there because he knew, and knew that I knew, that the enmity he referred to, however intense, was on the whole basically a ritual or ceremonial one, accepted as more or less part of the game of schooling.

This enmity between teacher and pupils was longstanding in the all-male world of earlier academia. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman noted in 1967 that in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American colleges "the students were continually struggling with the faculty, whom they almost regarded as the enemy," engaged in enforcing rules "often of the most trivial kind."¹ "Trivial" more than suggests ceremonial or ritual conflict. Had they worked back through history, Jencks and Riesman could have said much the same thing of Renaissance colleges and universities, medieval universities,² and even of St. Augustine's education as reported in his *Confessions* (I. ix-xi, xiv). Proceeding forward, they could have reported similarly of early twentieth-century colleges and universities, though a lull set in at mid-century. Richard Hofstadter was complacently writing in 1952 that the earlier "episodes of almost hysterical rebellion, malicious pranks, and even more personal violence against tutors and college presidents" were "unheard of in the modern college."³

By 1967 the old kind of ceremonial enmity between teacher and (male) student was largely outmoded or even outlawed. But the newly prevailing situation was more dangerous. Ritual contest had provided a way for the young to prove themselves. With such contest inoperative, out-and-out hostility could come into style. On the college and university campuses it already had. A new mythology of confrontation and no negotiation was in the air, felt everywhere even though not universally effective. In the new mythology teachers were either students' friends, or nothings.

The ceremonially agonistic structures in academia before the unrest of the sixties have been given only peripheral attention in most histories of education. They were, however, fairly ubiquitous, even in higher education, often articulately programmed, and frequently determinative not merely of educational styles but even of subject matter. I propose to excavate some of these structures here, not with the idea that they fully explain why the unrest of the sixties developed, for the agonistic structures were attenuated before the sixties, but because they may help us better understand what the unrest was by giving it deeper historical perspective.

The agonistic of the past resulted from a disposition to organize the subject matter itself as a field of combat, to purvey, not just to test, knowledge in a combative style. The agonistic was more than a manner or a milieu. It had also to do with content, and in absolutely crucial areas and surprising ways. When the agonistic mode of education was functioning at its maximum—as, for example, in medieval and Renaissance universities—a student was not formally taught to be “objective” about knowledge. He may well have become objective in his approach to truth, insofar as this is possible, and in his regard for truth, as is more possible. But such objectivity was either a product of individual enterprise or was an academic spinoff, or perhaps a mixture of both. The formal educational operation proceeded by having the student defend or attack a thesis. Boys at Harvard College in the seventeenth century still defended theses about logic, rhetoric, and grammar.⁴ They learned subjects largely by fighting over them.

The roots of these agonistic procedures which prevailed so widely and so long in academia were doubtless manifold. They extended beyond the academic milieu, until recently an elitist milieu, into the nonacademic world. Some, for example, were economic (contention is encouraged by economies of scarcity, widespread in earlier ages); others were sociological (early cultures can tend to heighten personal tensions, if only because their supply of information is relatively scant and hard to manage, so that abstract objectification eludes them). Among the deepest of roots, however, if not indeed the deepest roots of all, were those buried in procedures for managing knowledge: polemic is fostered by the oral noetic economy of early man. Oral modes of storing and retrieving knowledge are formulaic in design and, particularly in public life, tend to be agonistic in operation.

An oral culture does not merely have a quaint liking for proverbs, epithets, and other formulaic expressions; it is absolutely dependent on them. Clichés constitute its thought. Constant repetition of the known is the major noetic exercise. Largely because they deal in formulas, in what is already known, all oral cultures—which is to say, all early human cultures as well as many still very much alive today—foster agonistic performance, or virtuosity, in their management of their store of knowledge, and do so with a single-minded intensity sure to affect formal schooling when it finally begins.

The same forces which foster combativeness in oral cultures also foster extreme noetic conservatism, even when behavior in a given culture may be otherwise volatile and erratic. Knowledge in an oral culture is managed and manageable only if formulas are kept relatively rigid and unchanged: otherwise it is distorted and vanishes. Originality threatens disaster as it no longer need do when writing can store or “park” knowledge outside the mind for use at any future time as needed, freeing noetic powers for pursuit of new thoughts. The oral, and agonistic, roots of Western academicism are identifiable in antiquity in the dialectical procedures of the Socratic dialogues as reconstructed by Plato. But the orality of both Greek and Latin culture is more widely evident in their apotheosis of the *rhetor* or *orator*, the public speaker, who was considered in ancient academic tradition generally to be the ideal product of the overall academic educational effort—and with reason, since success in political leadership generally called for oratorical prowess, personal or vicarious.

And, for all their ascendant literacy, medieval universities remained basically oral and deeply agonistic in life-style and intellectual style. All testing was conducted orally by disputation or by disputation-like viva voce examinations. The conten-

tiousness favored by the oral tradition was encouraged and abetted by the dialectical approach, typified in Abelard's *Sic et Non* and as inseparable from the universities as the universities were inseparable from scholasticism. St. Thomas Aquinas casts what today would be a textbook or treatise, his *Summa theologiae*, in agonistic form, organized in "questions," each of which is handled by presenting first objections to the answer, then the answer with proof, then responses to objections.

The orality and the accompanying agonistic style inherited by academia from its remote past were simultaneously reinforced, weakened, and endlessly complicated by Renaissance humanism. The humanist revival of classical antiquity necessarily gave renewed life to the ancient rhetorical (oral) ideal: Renaissance humanism was much taken with Cicero's apotheosis of the orator as ideally the most learned and accomplished of all human beings. By comparison with medieval scholastics, Renaissance humanists were often activists and if anything more combative than their scholastic predecessors.⁵ They favored involvement in existentially polemic decision-making through rhetoric (persuasion to action), rather than pure scientific investigation, for which they often had very acerbic words.

At the same time, however, despite this reinforcement of the oral, Renaissance humanists intensified medieval preoccupation with texts and, with the help of print, in effect invented modern textual scholarship. Renaissance elementary schools and middle schools made much more of the teaching of writing than earlier schools had—if always under the overriding supposition, not always entirely articulated, that the paradigm of all verbal expression was oratory. Humanists patterned even letters quite commonly on combative oratorical models.⁶ As late as the mid-eighteenth century, and certainly in many places much later, when writing was made more and more a part of the students' work, even what was written often was written to be ultimately read aloud to others and thus injected into the contentious oral world.⁷

This orality remained in more or less heavy residue through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. McGuffey's *Readers* (at least 120,000,000 copies sold between 1836 and 1920, according to estimates) were basically oral in conception. They sensitized schoolchildren to "sound-conscious" literature, as Daniel Boorstin has put it,⁸ and programmatically exposed them, in oral-culture fashion, to the lives of heroes (agonistic males—female models in McGuffey were mostly little girls, not adult women). The "elocution" contest, growing out of the eighteenth-century "elocution" movement, which undertook to make oral recitation of a text composed in writing sound like spontaneous oral performance (only actors had done this previously), was a last attempt of the old orality to regain lost ground.⁹ Elocution contests appear to have vanished shortly before the sixties in the United States, though traces may remain still, perhaps in the relatively oral South.

Much of the thrust of the agonistic tradition in Western education was connected with the fifteen-hundred-year history of Learned Latin, which also was disestablished in the 1960s in critical local settings such as Oxford and Cambridge Universities and globally in the Roman Catholic liturgy of the Latin rite. Psychologically and sociologically, the use of Learned Latin had had sweeping effects, still virtually unnoticed by historians. Academic education was until long after the Renaissance, with negligible exceptions, only for boys, as it had commonly been from antiquity, and Latin language study can be viewed as a puberty rite for males.¹⁰ By the Renaissance—and indeed for centuries before—Learned Latin was eminently qualified as an instrument for a puberty rite. First, Latin moved boys out

of their families into the tribe. As it had gradually ceased to serve as a vernacular language between the fifth and seventh centuries and had become chirographically controlled, with its spoken use dependent on writing rather than vice versa, Latin had also become a sex-linked language, used only by males (again, with quite negligible exceptions). Learned Latin was not a "mother tongue" in the most real sense of this term: it was not used by mothers to raise their children, as vernacular Latin had been until the sixth century or so. Learned Latin was exclusively a tribal language, and Renaissance educators such as Sir Thomas Eliot urged that boys as young as seven years of age be removed from women's company, including that of their own mothers, and put into an all-male environment to assimilate the language. Latin was the only entry into the tribal wisdom purveyed in academia: in the West in the sixteenth century, and even later, it was not possible, for example, to learn grammar or metaphysics or medicine or most other academic subjects unless one knew Latin, for there was no effective way to set forth academic subjects in the vernaculars, which had no adequate vocabulary or semiotic (interlocking language-and-thought processes) for such technical matters.

Secondly, learning Latin took place in the physical hardship setting typical for puberty rites. Learning Latin normally entailed physical punishment, not as an incidental matter but as a regular procedure. In Renaissance art, a schoolmaster is recognized by his bundle of switches, and the literature attesting to their use is massive. The not infrequent protests against too much physical punishment voiced by some educational reformers are further testimony to its prevalence. Chastisement with the birch or various equivalents was only the ultimate among many physical hardships which the Latin schools imposed: early hours for assembling (six o'clock commonly even on the dark winter mornings of northern Europe), strict rules of behavior (often including conversation in Latin, even in recreation hours), constant supervision by proctors, and all sorts of competitions which played on the boys' desire and need for agonistic activities, but of course at the same time increased the stress.

Moreover, the very contents of the course for Latin learners were largely of a cut with the puberty rite hardship setting and with the agonistic style of instruction. What the schoolboy read in Latin included epics and histories full of violence and tales of valor, together with orations pitting one speaker against another. The histories read were packed not only with war but also with such orations. In *The Boke Named the Governor* Thomas Eliot insists, following Plato's *Republic*, that the boy must be given stories of military and other physical prowess to "inflare" his "courage." A widespread nineteenth- and early twentieth-century doctrine, cited by Hofstadter,¹¹ that the classics disciplined or toughened the mind, perpetuates the same agonistic framework. It merely shifts the *agōn* in Latin study to the interior: to acquire discipline and strength, the Latin student now does violence to himself instead of studying and imitating others in hardship situations.

The combination of physical threat from switching, agonistic methods of teaching and testing, and highly martial subject matter could often result in an academic setting something like that of a present-day "survival course," which romantic tradition now sets up in nature's woods rather than in the classroom. The hardship situation in Renaissance schools produced the typical *esprit de corps* and male "bonding pattern" among "old boys" that has since been produced also by the British public schools and, *mutatis mutandis*, by the countless all-boys' Latin schools in the United States through the early part of this century.

What relevancy to the present academic situation is to be found in these agonistic structures, antique in origin, slow enough in collapsing to be sure, but conspicuously decadent already a century ago and clearly moribund or vestigial, though still clearly discernible, by the end of World War II? In terms of direct "influence" or "action-interaction" theorems, probably little enough. In terms of deeper structures and their evolution, perhaps a great deal. The agonistic structures of academia suggest that in educational history beneath changes in teaching methods and curricula and classroom populations, and even beneath articulate theories of educators concerning the nature of education and of the mind, deeper patterns can be discerned, patterns in the evolution of consciousness itself. *Agonia* lies at the heart of the evolution of consciousness, not merely in academia but throughout life, as can be seen, for example, in accounts such as that of Erich Neumann in *The Origins and History of Consciousness*.¹² There is a deep agonistic structure in academia as well as in Balinese cockfights.¹³ As is often the case, an etymology reveals the obscure and irresistible forces at work: *ludus*, the Latin word for school, means also play, with all the agonistic color this term sports.

The agonistic elements in academia are entangled with the dialectic of masculine and feminine, the history of which makes the evolution of consciousness at least partly intelligible. A realignment of agonistic structures, to which the polemic climate of the sixties is related, came about as the function of male ceremonial combat changed in the academic world, particularly in the realm of higher education. If it be recognized how much the agonistic academic tradition was structured by masculine needs, academic education for girls and women, first in their own schools and then through coeducation, can be seen to have much deeper and more complex significance than that commonly assigned to it. The entrance of women onto the academic scene everywhere marked the beginning of the end of the agonistic structures. None of the conspicuously agonistic structures had place in the early girls' schools. As females entered schools originally only for males, more or less *pari passu* Latin was dropped first as a means of instruction and then as a required subject; the agonistic, thesis method of teaching was replaced by less combative methods; written examinations were substituted for public oral disputations and examinations; and, of course, physical punishment was reduced or suppressed.

These developments were not isolated but closely related phenomena—that is, paraphenomena, linked in various subtle ways and related to, among other things, ceremonially agonistic intellectual life-styles congenial to males as males. Although it may be difficult to assess all the factors in play, it appears no accident that the last bastions of Latinity in the British Isles, for example, namely the boys' public schools, have also been the last to maintain an exquisitely competitive life-style, to resist coeducation, to persist in regarding public speaking as a matter of major concern, and to retain physical punishment.

The alliance between masculinity and an oral academic world is inevitable in early cultures for a grossly physical reason: the typical male voice can articulate words in far greater volume than the typical female voice. Until electronic amplification of the human voice, few if any women's voices could project articulate and intelligible speech to audiences of hundreds and indeed thousands of persons to whom male orators from classical antiquity through the early twentieth century often had to bellow their orations. Conspicuous public display of what many philosophers considered the human race's most distinctively human activity, speech, could generally be effected only by postpubertal males.

The physical requisites for effective oral delivery were imperious: they encouraged, if they did not entirely determine, many of the typical features of the pre-electronic oral style of speech and of thought, particularly the elaborate and formal development of various kinds of repetitiveness: antitheses, parallelisms, enumerations, and the whole battery of formulaic expressions which the old-style orators and their audiences knew and reveled in. Such heavily loaded oratory persisted into the beginnings of the present century, but has completely disappeared from all but the most antique speakers of our electronic age. On radio and television we address thousands and even millions in a style like that of a tête-à-tête. Writing governs our oral delivery as never before, and since writing is interiorizing and non-forensic in comparison to oral address, the agonistic edge of oratory is dulled. The bellowing male voice is out, and the style that went with it is now quaint and amusing. Many of the first television generation, who populated the colleges and universities in the sixties, have no idea of what most oratory had been like for thousands of years up to their own grandfathers' or fathers' days, nor of the older styles of classroom teaching paralleling such oratory.

A second connection between masculinity and oral polemic is psychological or psycho-physiological. This is the connection via ceremonial combat. Oral combat is necessarily ceremonial: of itself, it cannot kill, even though those who indulge in it may have murderous desires. So long as persons continue talking to one another, they show that they are less than totally hostile. Talk can preface complete hostility. But it is itself essentially social, communicative, and to that extent unitive. When complete hostility takes over, talk ceases and opponents take to court or to blows or "cut" one another metaphorically by not communicating at all. Ceremonial combat, vocal and other, not only among human beings but pretty well through the whole animal kingdom, is significantly, and often spectacularly, more the business of males than of females.

By and large throughout the animal kingdom, males are certainly under a compulsion to fight one another far more than females are. Put another way, this would seem to indicate that males are the more insecure sex in some profound sense, basically restless, under more strain.¹⁴ On biological grounds the insecurity can readily be pinpointed, at least in the case of the higher animals. Among mammals, a male embryo must in very short order start excreting its own testosterone or its masculinity will be destroyed by its mother's female hormones; the female embryo has no such problem.¹⁵ In this setting, masculinity can be seen from the beginning as existence within an environment which is a threat and on which one is nevertheless totally dependent. This might be called ontogenetic insecurity, the insecurity of each individual male of the species.

There is a phylogenetic male insecurity, too: males are expendable. As Darwin early discovered, evolutionary natural selection comes about more from the elimination of males than of females. In many species the males are the larger and stronger fighters who principally protect the species against other hostile species. This means that they are doomed to be killed more often than females. The male marked for death, or "fay," is well known in folklore and literature. Death of a male generally makes little difference phylogenetically, since a group with fewer males and many females can normally propagate itself with an efficiency impossible to a group of a few females and many males. "Nature's primary impulse is to make a female."¹⁶

To ontogenetic and phylogenetic insecurity can be added, for human males, psychological insecurity. All infants' early lives are bound to a feminine environment,

totally before birth and all but totally for several years after. A male infant needs this feminine environment as much as does a female infant. A young boy is faced with the problem of proving himself, not simply by being what he is but by doing something to show that he is not what he came from—that is, not feminine, a sissy. Typically, he fights with another boy—a surrogate for himself—to prove that he can stand up to the insecurity he must carry within himself all his life. No wonder male opponents can and often do become fast friends: the opposing male is an essentially ceremonial enemy, who underneath is known to be in the same plight as the one who fights him.

Feminine insecurity can be very real (as competition between females can also be), but it is typically not of this sort. It is more a matter of self-realization, not of contentious dependence on a hostile environment. Fighting among females is less ceremonial, more real and “commonsense”—undertaken, for example, to defend their young. Fighting by females is typically more straightforward, less spectacular, less “abstract,” and more lethal. Folkloric wisdom has it that women fight to kill—that is, for issues which are vital.

Fighting human males are prone to brag, as they do in oral narrative and as Bobby Riggs did in more or less real life; fighting females do not do so even when engaged in fighting that is conspicuously ceremonial, as struggle between females can be made to be among humankind. Ceremonially contesting females can be unnerved by the bragging male, as Margaret Court was, or alternately enraged and amused by it, as Billie Jean King was. They do not typically retaliate in kind by bragging themselves. There are no female Falstaffs or Don Quixotes: Chaucer’s Wife of Bath and James’s Isabel Archer could be their respective counterparts, but they operate on other grounds. Males and females typically relate differently, in depth, to the profoundly agonistic oral world—this is a psychological commonplace, but has hardly been, as it deserves to be, a commonplace of educational history.

Bragging is a normal feature, not an aberration, of the masculine sectors in the oral culture out of which academia first grew. Like other manifestations of ceremonial combativeness, including classical rhetoric and the Balinese cockfights reported on so insightfully by Clifford Geertz,¹⁷ bragging registers a special need of the male psyche and advertises masculine insecurity by attempting to compensate for it. Early oral combativeness and the early and long-lasting ascendancy of rhetoric, I would suggest, were ways of dealing with this same insecurity. So, too, in the perspectives suggested here, was the academic world itself.

Puberty rites and ceremonial combat and the masculine-feminine dialectic warrant attention as they are represented on the academic scene because they are phenomena where the conscious and the unconscious meet. When they change in academia, it is not academia alone that is changing, but consciousness as well. For this reason, such phenomena, though most obvious in the “classical” tradition of education, are matched by related developments, some parallel and some complementary, in more practical, less elitist education, as I have spelled out in some detail in *The Presence of the Word*.

It appears evident that ceremonial combat no longer operates and no longer can operate in the academic and intellectual world of the West as it did in the past. The intellectual world is still competitive, surely, but in ways more muted and less scholastically programmed than during the ascendancy of the centuries-old, and indeed aboriginal, rhetorical-dialectical tradition. Even the defense of the doctoral dis-

sertation, the last grand remnant of the old agonistic way of teaching, appears today clearly doomed in the few universities in the United States where it still survives. The combat which marked the sixties was no longer of the old self-consciously ceremonial kind. Something had happened to the previously ascendant masculinity of academia—and, of course, at the same time to femininity as well. Connections between the campus crisis and women's liberation movements were more direct, and at the same time more profound and veiled, than many have made them out to be.

For some generations, the gradual attenuation of academic ceremonial contest had shown that masculinity was in some sense on the run in academia. At the sub-conscious level, this was what shifts in faculty-student relations and also the quite irresistible drive in the sixties toward intervisitation and coeducational residence halls were ultimately about. These were final steps in phasing out the academic male puberty rite world, concluding what coeducation had begun. Now the bisexual milieu of the home would continue into adulthood uninterruptedly. But coeducation had not been the first beginning of the liquidation of the old ceremonial academic *agonia*. It had been rather the beginning of the end. Earlier beginnings can be discerned in the romantic movement and before that in the Renaissance, when academic attention shifted away from agonistically tooled abstractions, which represent the masculinizing path from the subconscious to the fully conscious, toward a closer attention to the human lifeworld in its concreteness. The self-fulfillment emphasis that has marked curricular reforms since the 1960s has a long history, in the subconscious as well as in consciously advanced educational theory.

In the sixties, paraphenomena of the development here treated are countless.¹⁸ First, the conflict of the sixties tended to be between students and administration (abetted by conflicts between diversely polarized teachers) rather than between students and teachers: this meant, in effect, that the principal arena for academic ceremonial combat had been vacated. Student-administration conflict had not been unknown earlier, but earlier the administration was not too distinct from the faculty—college presidents often also taught and faculty shouldered many disciplinary tasks, so that the focus of contest had been student-versus-teacher. Secondly, attacks on faculty members in the sixties tended to be because of a faculty member's personal beliefs, not because of his behavior as a teacher or disciplinarian. Again, combat had moved from the ceremonial arena and had become an *ad hominem* attack, in which the attacker pursued his opponent anywhere and everywhere. (In male-with-male ceremonial combat, one male never pursues another beyond a given limit: for infrahuman conspecific males, from stags and tomcats to Siamese fighting fish, flight is an inhibiting mechanism for the victor—in human ludic terms, the football player who steps outside the gridiron cannot be tackled.)

Thirdly, there was a feeling that if one argued with a teacher about the teacher's own subject, one risked losing. Here the rationale of earlier academic struggle is lost sight of: one argued, with some risk, against a more skilled opponent in order to acquire skills and knowledge like his, and he attacked you, ritually, in order to teach. Fourthly, the academic world itself was often attacked not on academic grounds, but on grounds of social injustice as such: the academic arena was bypassed again. Fifthly, whereas agonistic educational methods had prepared students for the extra-academic give-and-take of politics and diplomacy—here the

classic example was the exquisitely agonistic British Latin public school—the new agonistic proposed in the sixties (by some, not by all) was revolutionary guerrilla combat, a different sort of thing, perhaps highly intellectualized, but designedly and directly lethal, not argumentative and ceremonial. Sixthly, the advancing of “non-negotiable” demands was, superficially at least, an attack on formal negotiation, with its rules of give-and-take—though, in fact, the urging of such demands itself quite soon became ceremonial. Verbal hostility cannot be total hostility, and always has a ceremonial frame.

Most of these paraphenomena are often loosely subsumed in statements about anti-intellectual or antirational elements in the conflicts of the sixties. Without denying this quality of the conflicts, the present reflections suggest that something historically and psychologically deeper was at stake. Ceremonial contest was being rejected or bypassed or otherwise done away with. The antirationalism occurred within this larger framework of rejection, for it was through ceremonial contest that rationalism itself had historically come into the ascendancy.

Finally, among the paraphenomena of the sixties one finds not only a female identity crisis but, I strongly suspect, a male identity crisis in some ways more intense—a crisis seemingly to some degree reflected today in the widespread male addiction to sports on television, which brings male ceremonial contest into the home (with the commentator’s oral accompaniment, simultaneously combative and objective). Safe at home, the postpubertal male can both have his cake and eat it—to the abiding annoyance of women, if we can believe the countless cartoons about irate television sports widows. Erich Neumann has observed that the absence of institutions such as puberty rites in present-day technological culture “is one reason for the incidence of neuroses in youth.”¹⁹ Perhaps so, but in academia, we certainly cannot go back to the old puberty rites. Should we have new puberty rites? It appears quite impossible consciously to design puberty rites: most of the effective patterning in them had been from the subconscious. Are there new ones already on hand? The same ones for both?

These reflections do not propose to explain all that went on in the sixties, but they may remind us of ways in which the academic present and the academic future are things of the past perhaps more profoundly than we have commonly known.

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Coeducation and Women's Studies: Two Approaches to the Question of Woman's Place in the Contemporary University

ONE OF THE most striking changes to come out of the decade 1964-74, a decade of educational turmoil in the United States as in most industrial societies, was the near universal acceptance of coeducation. One by one the bastions of male privilege have opened their doors to a select female student body, and with equal fanfare the major women's colleges (with some notable exceptions¹) hastened to admit men students. Administrators, faculty, students, and alumni appear to have given overwhelming endorsement to the concept that justice and equity of treatment require that both sexes be educated together. However widespread as that endorsement has been, it has been accompanied by little critical inquiry into what coeducation actually means as an experience for students. Coeducation obviously involves a social policy with regard to access to educational institutions. If genuinely equal treatment of the sexes were an educational goal, then it should also involve changes in the content of the curriculum, what is taught, and the varieties of human experience examined. It might also affect the very creation of knowledge because a new group with new social perspectives would be recruited into the research activities of the universities which are today the major creators of knowledge. Finally, if coeducation were really to result in equal treatment for males and females, there should be the same pattern of career development for men and women into the professional elites of society. Up to the present, however, attention has been focused on the access of women to institutions of higher education, with little or no thought given to the relationship of women students to the curriculum, women scholars to research activity, or women graduates to the occupational structure of society. When access is considered in isolation, the logic of coeducation as an equitable social policy appears to be overwhelming. The logic for educating women in male-controlled institutions is by no means so strikingly apparent, however, when one views the question of equity of treatment of the sexes from the perspective of the content of the curriculum, the opportunity to participate in the creation of new knowledge, and the potential for subsequent career development.

The decade of the sixties produced mounting evidence that in the English-speaking world coeducation had clearly lacked something of importance for women students. Since 1969 in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the mushroom growth of women's studies courses and programs, directed with varying degrees of academic rigor toward the examination of selected aspects of women's experience, has given clear evidence that women students do not find their intellectual needs fulfilled by the conventional curriculum and the traditional sociability groups of a coeducational college.

It is no accident that the rise of coeducation has been accompanied in these highly industrialized societies of the English-speaking world by a growing demand

for special academic programs for women. It is in the most highly industrialized societies that critics of the modern industrial state have drawn attention to the widening gap between the returns for male and female work and to the increasing concentration of women workers in the service areas of the work force. The climate of the 1960s, which has encouraged criticism of modern technological society from the point of view of its environmental hazards, has also created a popular awareness for the first time of the facts long since documented by feminist scholars about the negative impact of industrialization and the capitalist labor market upon women's access to adequately paid and dignified work. With the differential between rewards for male and female work (either manual or intellectual) increasing in modern societies, there is clearly a need to revise the received view of modernization which has hitherto been accepted as a force for the improvement of women's status. Certainly the existence of the differential and its accentuation over time demonstrate a pressing need for remedial action which will bring women into the work force on a more competitive basis.²

Once the question of remedial action is raised, it immediately becomes necessary to ask why almost a century of access to higher education for women in the United States has not apparently had some impact on this general pattern of female employment in industrializing societies. The proponents of coeducation today argue that admission of women into elite male colleges will automatically provide them with intellectual skills which will enable them to enter the work force on equal terms with men. The proponents of special women's studies programs, on the other hand, argue that far from requiring further exposure to male-controlled institutions women students need to share in the experience of other women and to develop educationally in relation to a female peer group. They reject the simple mechanism of access as a solution to the question of equality of treatment for men and women students and argue that women are more likely to develop intellectually and master some field in the humanities or the social sciences if they approach it through a curriculum directed toward the analysis of the experience of their own sex-group. In the area of the natural sciences, proponents of special programs for women argue that women students are currently so poorly prepared for work in the mathematical and natural sciences at college level that they are best able to develop these intellectual skills while learning in a female peer group. Advocates of special programs for women are able to cite positive evidence for their views in the data for the United States which show that twice as many women achievers per thousand women enrolled are produced by women's colleges as are produced by coeducational institutions.³ Once this sort of evidence is carefully scrutinized, it suggests that in the area of motivation, levels of aspiration, and the achievement of identity as an intellectual worker there may be many negative aspects of admission to predominantly male-oriented institutions of higher education for women students.

The problem is that the mechanism of coeducation, though it appears on the surface the simplest road to equitable treatment of the sexes, conceals within itself many difficulties and obstacles in the way of achieving this goal, though few educational theorists or educational historians have paid serious attention to them. The dilemma which is posed for women students in institutions which have developed along the model of male colleges and professional schools is a variant of the classical dilemma faced by suppressed ethnic minorities and colonial peoples seeking to liberate themselves from the inhibitions of subordination to the values of a dominant culture. Is liberation to be achieved by mastering the skills of the domi-

nant culture, or is it to be found through achieving the capacity to confront, analyze, and articulate another kind of experience which commands no place in the institutions which are the guardians of the dominant culture? Victims of European oppression in the Third World may answer this question with relative ease because they possess an indigenous culture to which their search for authenticity may be directed, and because the tides of cultural nationalism may be harnessed as sources of political power through which Third World societies may selectively direct the use to which Western culture and technological skills within their native lands may be put. The problem is more complex for women seeking a place at the center rather than at the margins of the academic institutions which create and transmit the learned culture of the West. On the one hand, to be in command of that culture women must master skills in mathematics and the hard sciences which have traditionally been defined as unfeminine and neglected in the education of females. On the other hand, if these skills in abstract reasoning are to be applied in a manner which draws on the inner springs of creativity, they must be acquired in a way which is no threat to the female identity. This can be achieved by an educational experience which is critical of many of the assumptions of a male-controlled culture and which takes the female as the norm rather than the deviant exception to the life of the mind. One precondition for such a view of intellectual life is a sense of solidarity with female colleagues. Otherwise the weight of a lengthy cultural tradition which denigrates female intellect will take its toll, epigrams like Dr. Johnson's on women preachers will sink deep, and the woman student will be perpetually nervous and self-conscious about her own intellectual performance.

Even should such female sociability be carefully institutionalized within the educational community (as it once was for educated males), there is no basis in Western society for political organization along sex lines alone so that the Western woman, if she wants to influence the way her culture is defined and transmitted, must attempt to do so from within the centers of existing prestigious institutions. This strategy may be modified by the creation of parallel female institutions, but it can be argued that the resources required to support major centers of learning and research are now so vast that they cannot be mobilized by private effort. Furthermore, women's colleges and universities can hardly hope to undermine the traditional patterns of Western culture unless the direction of the institutions is such that the role assigned to women scholars is responsible, dignified, and unequivocal.

In order to understand why there should be any need to establish the authenticity of the woman scholar, it is necessary to examine the historical forces which have shaped the roles assigned educated women in the United States, the pioneer society in the development of coeducation. These forces have ensured that the educated woman has with few exceptions been trained to view her education as fitting her for marriage or for some service role which involves her in applying knowledge defined by male scholars.

It is usually assumed that coeducation was introduced in the mid-nineteenth-century United States for the purpose of raising the status of women and altering the conventional relationship between the sexes. This assumption bears no relationship to the historical forces actually responsible for the development of coeducation. At the level of the high school and the state university the arguments for coeducation were ones of economy and efficiency. The goal of educating women was the utilitarian one of securing a pool of trained teachers to staff the school system at a minimum of cost. Within the private colleges the most striking example

of the pressures encouraging coeducation can be found in the history of Oberlin College, long celebrated for its liberal pioneering role in the early development of coeducation. Oberlin was founded on the manual-work pattern of many early evangelical schools whose purpose was to allow the sons of farmers to work their way through theological training to prepare for the ministry. By the 1830s promising Western candidates for the ministry were being kept from going East to college by shortages of ready cash, yet the rapid expansion of Western settlement created an ever-expanding need for trained clergy. The manual-work school was improvised as a solution to this problem. In its early informal manifestations young men would undertake to work the land of a minister with sound theological knowledge if he would instruct them in return for their labor. Oberlin was a formal institutionalization of such an arrangement since the college was linked to a five hundred-acre farm where it was hoped that the students would produce enough in crops to reduce the cost of their education considerably. No sooner was the experiment launched, however, than it became clear that another element of cost could be eliminated if there were women students who could carry out the domestic chores in return for instruction. Once admitted to the college, they duplicated there all the existing service roles of women within the domestic economy. Classes were not held on Mondays so that the women students could launder and repair the men's clothes. Cooking and cleaning were done on a careful schedule outside classroom hours, and the women students always waited on table. Thus the effect of the experiment was hardly consciousness-raising, and those few feminists, like Lucy Stone, who were early Oberlin graduates were radicals on such questions before they entered college.⁴

It was not long, however, before the economic considerations which had fostered the coeducational experiment at Oberlin acquired more elaborate justifications. These were essentially utilitarian with the utility defined from a male point of view rather than as affirmations of the dignity of the female intellect. The presence of the women students, it was thought, contributed to the psychic well-being of the men. There could be no morbid thoughts of "Popish celibacy" or hints of "monkish vice" on the part of men students with so many available and suitably educated young women on hand for marriage. Suitably educated meant, of course, trained to be a suitable mate for the kind of man who was an Oberlin graduate. Church and college authorities recognized that the role of the itinerant Western minister was a lonely one which lacked the traditional social supports which church and parish offered more settled clergy. What was to take the place of the eroding or nonexistent community was marriage to a mate whose education had equipped her to share her husband's religious and cultural aspirations. Thus we see in Oberlin's inspired improvisation a prototype of the coeducational institution which was to develop in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Women graduates with their disciplined minds and funds of useful knowledge would provide the cultural supports for a lonely male existence which could no longer draw on the resources of established religious and cultural institutions. This response to the problems of the uprooted in the new world was first evoked in evangelical Protestant culture faced with the social demands of missionary activity in the sprawling settlements of the great West. It was to be secularized in the twentieth century to provide the rationale for coeducation for the upwardly mobile and rootless middle class of urban America.

There was, of course, a tension between the traditional Christian view of the female as subordinate in marriage and the idea of the female as colleague in missionary endeavor, but it was not perceived as such by Oberlin's early advocates of

coeducation, or by later nineteenth-century proponents of the new system. Contemporary views of the female psyche fitted nicely with utilitarian assumptions about the purpose of coeducation. The nurturing instincts were thought to be dominant in the human female, while the acquisitive instincts derived from hunting were purely male. Thus, it was perfectly feasible to educate women for service activities like teaching, for which they were paid a bare subsistence wage, without opening up the threat that educated women would become real competitors with males in the employment market. It was believed that the intellectual powers of the female could be fulfilled only through applying knowledge in the service of others, and therefore it was possible to educate women without ever considering their intellectual skills on the same level as those of males. The logic of these views of the female psyche prevailed during the development of graduate education for women so that advanced degrees for them became training in the application of knowledge to one of the service professions such as nursing, librarianship, social work, or home economics. All such activities, even the tending of books, could be made natural extensions of female nurturing activities, presumed to have their own psychic gratifications and rewarded at a level which enabled an efficient democracy to develop the basic cultural and welfare institutions at a minimum cost to the taxpayer.

The essential concern with the application of knowledge rather than its creation by women which characterized the early coeducational colleges was shared by the early women's colleges such as Mt. Holyoke and Rockford College in Illinois. But the social milieu in which this concern was expressed resulted in a real difference between graduates of the two types of institution with regard to decisions about the uses to which learning was to be put. Early coeducational colleges assumed a male definition of the useful in females and encouraged marriage. Women's colleges, on the other hand, turned out several generations of graduates whose special experience in college had required them to develop talents for leadership and to define high standards of performance for themselves. They accepted the belief that education viewed as an end in itself (rather than as preparation for marriage) was a special calling for women which ruled out the possibility of family responsibilities, and they therefore escaped the role conflicts which were to paralyze later generations of graduates attempting to combine marriage and a career. Thus encouraged to self-definition, many developed new areas of activity for women such as social work, and many became celebrated public figures. Their memoirs provide a lively and spirited account of their educational experience. Because they eschewed marriage, however, their model of the educational process was a single-sex one. They could not, therefore, come to grips with the central question posed by the emerging pattern of American higher education: could women share in the creation of knowledge on equal terms with men, or was the role of the educated woman merely its application in service occupations or its simplification for transmission to the young?²⁶

Nowhere was this central issue more vividly illustrated than in the careers of women who were early graduates in the sciences. This was an area in which it was difficult to contrive easy applications of knowledge which did not encroach on such male activities as engineering. The early women graduates of M.I.T. were able to avoid the speculative challenge of the laboratory as well as the threat of poaching on male preserves in employment by branching out into household science and food chemistry. These fields quickly developed a status similar to the service professions. They became areas of study with a low research content requiring minimal levels of

institutional support and thus easily accommodated within established academic settings without noticeable impact on the traditional male disciplines. Even the most energizing education at the undergraduate level could not counteract the intellectual limitations of such sex-stereotyped graduate careers. Indeed the development of graduate programs confined to the study of domestic processes and the preparation of food completed the process of adjustment by which women were admitted to institutions of higher learning. They entered college on supposedly equal terms with males, but their intellectual goals and career aspirations remained separate and unequal.

This accommodation to the potential for change inherent in the admission of women to institutions of higher learning in the United States resulted in the long run in a declining position for women scholars within the American university. This decline set in after what appeared to be the initial success of women graduates of the first generation admitted to higher education. During the years of peak expansion of the American educational system in the twentieth century, women were actually represented in decreasing numbers on the faculties of four-year colleges. Over the three generations during which there have been qualified women graduates available for academic posts, the high point of female representation on university faculties was reached in the 1870s and '80s. After that date, there was a relative decline in the number of women faculty members, and this trend began to accelerate markedly after 1950.⁶ The clear preference for male scholars which this trend exemplified was and continues to be their supposedly greater potential for research. Thus it is clear that a century of experience with coeducation has not so far resulted in a situation which offers the same opportunity to women to influence the way their culture is defined and transmitted as is available to men. Yet without such equality of opportunity, women's education must remain a derivative process which offers neither the insight which comes from confrontation with one's own experience nor the drive to master and advance a field of knowledge which is the true mark of the scholarly imagination.

Given the scarcity of resources available for the support of education and research, it is clear that with one or two exceptions it is not possible to develop parallel women's institutions which will offer levels of support for research activity comparable to those available in male-controlled institutions. Instead women must find their way into positions of influence within existing institutions and attempt to redirect the allocation of their resources toward the needs of women scholars and women students. The quickest route to such positions of influence will certainly be found through the recruitment of faculty. A significant proportion of women on the faculty of coeducational institutions would eventually sensitize them to the dimension of coeducation as an experience for women students which lies beyond the simple question of access.

There are serious dangers in the current approach to the problem of recruiting women faculty being adopted in the United States. The attempts to use federal legislation to force affirmative action programs on the institutions with regard to the employment of women faculty can be easily circumvented by large institutions where a few low-status programs staffed almost exclusively by women can be created to achieve an apparently respectable percentage of women faculty. In any case, large institutions like the University of Michigan, Columbia, and the University of California have tended to enter into such protracted negotiations over precise affirmative action policies that little positive action has so far resulted. Moreover, forced

compliance under affirmative action programs does little to change attitudes. Senior faculty and administrators tend under these circumstances to view women scholars as problems to be ignored or neutralized as much as possible, instead of seeing them as part of the solution and as potential leaders in reshaping institutions which have too long responded only to the needs of male students. It is difficult to build a more comprehensive curriculum or a livelier intellectual experience for either sex in such a climate of politicization and confrontation. Furthermore, where compliance with the hiring of women faculty is externally enforced, it will be difficult to achieve the reallocation of resources necessary if the services and scholarships required to give women students equal access to graduate education in the prestigious professional faculties are to be made available. The extent of the reallocation required is rarely recognized although today 74 percent of graduate students in prestigious graduate schools are male, and in significant fields like biochemistry only 1.5 percent of women B.A.s go on to the level of the doctorate, while only 2.3 percent of women B.A.s go on to the doctorate in physics. Certainly until the day when women faculty and women trustees are a majority on university decision-making bodies, forced hiring of women faculty cannot alone achieve the reallocation of resources required. Some cooperative strategy is essential—one which attempts to transform male definitions of scholarly roles while at the same time sensitizing institutions to the needs of their women students.⁷

There are also serious hazards with regard to women's intellectual training and their employment opportunities in the development of special women's studies programs as opposed to the development of a curriculum within the established disciplines which is more responsive to women's needs. The major hazard of the special women's studies program is that it trains women with low academic status and low employment potential, rather than women with impeccable professional credentials who can command acceptance within conventional disciplines. This is a danger which must be avoided if women are not to be relegated to areas of marginal scholarly importance within the university. Of equal importance is the undeveloped state of the discipline so far as the study of women is concerned—whether the field be history, anthropology, psychology, sociology, literary studies, economics, or political science. In none of these areas is the field sufficiently advanced (apart from the work of a core group of scholars) to ensure that the important questions are raised and the fruitful research targets defined. Instead, many courses in these fields are presently mounted using texts from the writings of earlier feminist scholars published in the 1920s and 30s. These, though important achievements in their day, are no basis on which to build a clear understanding of how contemporary scholarship in such fields can be brought to bear on women's experience. To cite some examples, Alice Clark's *The Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century* was a major scholarly achievement when first published in 1919. Today there are fundamental corrections to be made to Clark's thesis about the impact of capitalism on women's role in the work force because historical demographers have developed new knowledge about family size, mortality rates, and life expectancy in the seventeenth century. Similarly, many courses drawing on Marxist methodology proceed in ignorance of current scholarly opinion among anthropologists regarding the political significance of descent in the female line. If we are not merely to repeat the errors and misconceptions of earlier generations, we must control the enthusiasm of young instructors which may lead them to respond to the demand for courses on the subject of women's experience without the solid grasp of the field necessary to

formulate the relevant questions and bring the best recent research to bear on the topic. Thus, though there are now about 1,300 courses and programs offered in 1,000 colleges and universities, these figures should not lead us to believe that much has changed in the undergraduate curriculum, that much new knowledge is being conveyed, or that much progress has been made in dealing with an important pedagogical problem. It will take more than hundreds of hastily assembled courses to reorient disciplines whose entire range of methodological assumptions is based upon norms derived from male experience.⁸ Even were research on women's experience more advanced in the major disciplines of the humanities and the social sciences, it would be questionable whether from the point of view of scholarly creativity it is most fruitful to isolate the analysis of this aspect of human experience from the consideration of others. It would be questionable because the real goal of any program to make the major cultural institutions of society responsive to women's experience must be the transformation of perception so that we can break away from models of action which have been derived from stereotyped male roles. The isolation of critical analysis of women's experience in separate institutes and programs would permit conventional scholarship in established disciplines to continue unmodified by new questions and new insights whereas examination of women's experience should bring about the reformulation of questions within existing fields and the revision of their methodological assumptions. If there is a social basis to thought in the Mannheim sense, then every effort must be made to integrate perceptions from different social perspectives into the current approximation of truth in any field.⁹ The example which most vividly illustrates the need to synthesize differing perceptions of social issues arising because of differing sex roles comes from the history of medical social work. The great pioneering figure in creating this predominantly female profession, Ida Cannon, noted in her memoirs, written in the 1940s, every major criticism of health-care delivery in the United States which more radical critics were to perceive in the 1960s.¹⁰ Yet because she defined her teaching role only in relation to other women social workers many chances were missed in her lifetime to transform perceptions of health-care problems by male members of the medical profession. This example illustrates the dangers inherent in transmitting the perceptions of the woman scholar only to the self-selecting group who are predisposed to enroll in "women's" fields. Important insights available to only one social group will not be generalized, while remediable social problems may be explained away as part of the inherent characteristics of one sex or the other.

The major role which research in the area of women's experience could play within a university setting is in precisely the transformation of perceptions of male professionals which Ida Cannon regarded as beyond her teaching competence. This possibility has not yet been grasped by the advocates of separate women's studies programs though it is in the area of institutional provision for the transfer of the results of research now being done on female psychology, on the images of the female now being discovered by historians of science and the social sciences, and in particular by historians of medicine and psychiatry, to established professional schools such as law and medicine that the promise for the future lies. Assumptions about sex roles and ideas about family structure which are now the subject of the most searching critical scrutiny in the humanities and the social sciences remain unchallenged in professional education because of the failure to provide an institutional framework which will allow synthesis and development from the existing flurry of research on women's experience. Without such an effort at synthesis the in-

sights of another generation of feminist scholars will remain fragmented, and conventional professional education, the path to most positions of prestige and influence in postindustrial society, will remain as it does in 1974—largely untouched by the ferment of the last decade on feminist issues.

Thus the decade 1964-74 has seen a new awareness of the extent to which coeducation at the undergraduate and graduate level has failed to bring women into positions of authority in the definition and transfer of learning. In the United States there have been significant attempts to modify the curriculum and to control the process of recruitment so as to ensure that institutions of higher learning are more responsive to the needs of women. However, within the drive to establish separate women's studies programs and to force recruitment of women faculty, there have been contradictory elements which could, if unmodified, prove counterproductive in the long run. In the short run can we expect to see much change within the educational system and among professional elites by 1984? Will the undergraduate curriculum have been transformed? Will women students occupy proportionately the same number of places in professional schools as they now do in arts and science programs? Will there be a comparable influx of men into the educational programs of the service professions? Will there be female Oppenheimers and Szilards pushing at the frontiers of knowledge and leading the way in the conceptual breakthroughs of the more abstract sciences? Will the impulse to achieve equity of treatment for the sexes in education, which is basically a question of social policy, result in an academic world where the pursuit of knowledge is more intense and the intellect spurred to greater levels of creativity? Will there, perhaps, be a reversal of the trend toward coeducation and a reversion toward a single-sex educational community?

It is safe to predict that even with massive intervention by the state there will be relatively little change in any of these areas by 1984 because the university alone cannot solve the problem of cultural attitude, and it cannot singlehandedly contrive the conditions which will release the intellectual powers of those whom Western culture has always seen as exercising their minds in ways which were compensatory for or complementary to the minds of men. If there are serious efforts at developing remedial programs in basic sciences and mathematics for women undergraduates whose schooling has not prepared them to compete for admission into schools of medicine and engineering, we may see a significant change in the composition of these professional groups. If the research which is now being carried out in the humanities and social sciences is disseminated through the established disciplines, then we shall see not so much a revamping of the undergraduate curriculum by 1984, but a major critical re-evaluation of the methodological assumptions of the social sciences. If nothing else has changed, students should certainly be hearing less about sex-linked expressive and instrumental roles by 1984. It will, however, be a massive scholarly undertaking to revise the assumptions and eliminate the biases that have been built into all the efforts to observe and analyze society and are so central to the modern consciousness. This could occur through the kind of revolution in perception which does spark intellectual creativity; an unambiguous effort to accommodate to the experience of women could make the academic world a livelier place. Certainly there will be a revived and critical role for the private women's colleges which have not succumbed to the current fashion for coeducation. Given the current rate of change we have no reason to predict that women will have achieved influential, let alone majority, representation on the decision-making bodies of the major public institutions, and this being the case, the significant evidence

about the most effective ways to allocate resources in the education of women will still come from private institutions. If they are to rise to this challenge, they will have to abandon their exclusive commitment to the liberal arts program and begin to deal openly with the problems of discrimination which women will continue to face for many decades in professional and business life, and they will have to deploy resources for a variety of research activities which they have not so far seen as an important responsibility.

There are already signs that all of these opportunities will be taken up by private women's colleges in the coming decade, and for these reasons they will continue to attract students of a high caliber. For the rest there is little evidence to warrant predictions of startling change in the contours of graduate and undergraduate education by 1984. The radical feminist organizations on the campus, the day-care demonstrations, the action groups pressing for new programs and for the hiring of women faculty have identified a problem with deep roots in American educational history, but so far the diagnosis of the problem and the plans for action have been scattered and diffuse. It is to be hoped that the decade to come will see a much more determined effort to work within the structures of existing institutions to make them responsive to women's needs than was the case in the past decade. The words of the spokeswomen for the Women's Studies College at SUNY/Buffalo speak volumes for the disillusionment of the enthusiastic pioneers who saw a single academic program as the base from which to work to transform an institution which they saw as either hostile or indifferent to its women students. After recounting the history of many battles regarding their academic status and some successful efforts to improve the basis of their financial support they conclude:

With these added resources our work may perhaps become less tangential to the University. We no longer have faith that exemplary action is enough; we believe that we must become more courageous, competent and aggressive in university politics.¹¹

Given the institutional structure of intellectual life today, it is to the apparently mundane arena of budget committees and university decision-making bodies that resources to support research and teaching activities are allocated. The feminist utopians of the last decade saw the wave of the future in creating counter-institutions; the next decade will see a renewed political concern for working to transform existing ones so that women students secure the changes in curriculum, the research support, and the professional training which are essential if coeducation is to be a genuinely egalitarian educational policy and if "women's studies" are to be more than the decorative frill to be afforded after other priorities assumed to have greater academic "justification" have been met.

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ROBERT E. LANE

The Self-Analysis of Educational Belief Systems

AS WE EXPECT the intelligent citizen to be guided in his political life by his political philosophy, or at least by some conscious belief system, so we expect college teachers to be guided in their teaching by their educational philosophies or some approximation thereof. On a number of occasions I have asked my carefully selected, expensively educated students to outline their political belief systems (ideologies), the guiding principles of their political thinking and behavior. Let one of them, singularly gifted and vulgar, speak for many of the others:

I very much want to steer away from the sham intellectualizing that is the Yale trademark. . . . Trying to write this paper has proven to be a real bitch. I found that I really don't have any definite opinions, any logically constructed philosophy of life, not one of the way that society should be constructed or administered.¹

Even political science graduate students found, as they confronted themselves in small groups, that their ideological cupboards were somewhat bare or, more accurately, filled with unlabeled bottles whose contents had to be discovered rather than inventoried. Further, almost everyone who entered upon these self-examinations found the process of discovery exciting, revealing, and sometimes painful. Should we ask ourselves, with the help of a colleague, "What is *my* educational philosophy?" A real bitch of a question, to be sure.

I will argue that informally, but systematically, we can improve the quality of higher education by making conscious our unconscious educational ideologies or belief systems. I would imagine that every educational belief system includes both an educational philosophy dealing with a justification of the goals to be pursued and an educational psychology regarding the effects of various "treatments" on students: how their curiosity may be aroused, their analytical powers developed, their mastery of a subject promoted. Further, as in other fields, these ends and means will be so entwined with one another that they are not easily sorted out. I am constrained, therefore, to imagine that educational belief systems are generally like other belief systems, but different in certain respects. Given our profession, they are likely to be somewhat better organized than, for example, the political beliefs of the mass public. They will be somewhat less compartmentalized. (A belief about the importance of "sensibility" will inform concepts of the educated man and concepts of seminar procedure; and egalitarian value will shape concepts of university government and of treatment of almost any humanistic or social subject matter.) Compared to other groups, college teachers, no doubt, will try harder to differentiate aspects of disliked positions (less stereotyping); they will be a bit more tolerant of ambiguity. The constraints of logic, never very binding in belief systems, will be a little bit more effective; the rationalization of self-interest will be more subtle and, perhaps, refer to a more inclusive self.

Structure and content are closely related. The hierarchical organization of beliefs may be more apparent in the professoriat than in other groups. Abstract principles like those contained in the literature on progressive education may guide choices on how and what to teach. It is likely that the "guiding principles" have to do with implicit premises of the world as a domain of conflict or harmony, of people as trustworthy or objects of suspicion, of authority as unchallengeable or vulnerable. These premises form a set of core beliefs—about oneself, about others, about the nature of authority, about the nature of causation, of ethics, of knowledge itself.² Because these premises are unconscious, they pattern and structure educational beliefs in ways quite unknown to the individual. Can we make them conscious and so give to each person a better handle on them? That is the challenge.

On the level of conscious principles, we are not without considerable help, and we must not psychologize educational philosophy to make this support disappear. If the teacher is a traditionalist, there will be much in Aristotle to guide him: the dual emphasis on morality and wisdom, both practical and abstract, may give his teaching a dual thrust. The return to first principles, the notion of happiness as the pursuit of intrinsically excellent activities, the view that education must shape men for the kind of society they live in—all have a conservative quality that the traditionalist may find satisfying and that will, no doubt, help him frame a coherent educational belief system informing his daily work. If he is a progressive, he may turn to Dewey, for whom education and philosophy were inseparable, finding congenial the emphasis on personal growth, on openness of mind and the rehearsal of alternatives, and on reasoned reflection. There, too, he will find ways of joining his concern for social reform with individual development, and he will appreciate the standard applied to both society and individual behavior.³ If he is an existentialist, he might find in Jaspers a statement resonant with his world-view. The university, says Jaspers, should, in addition to providing professional training and facilitating research, help its students to "reflect on the over-all implications of his proposed work" and encourage a "quest for intellectual clarity as a way of life, a form of human existence."⁴ Aristotle, Dewey, Jaspers all urge reflection, and perhaps the search for coherence in the materials of the unconscious is as good a route to reflection as any other—at least for some of us in this business now.

But there are more accessible sources. Recently we have been exposed to press discussions of the Newman Report, the Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, the report of the Assembly on University Goals and Governance (to which this symposium is a sequel). Surely these are addressed to the very situations in which we find ourselves and of course our educational belief systems would prosper were we to read these materials. The college self-studies are additional sources closer to many of us. Harvard's "Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society,"⁵ the Swarthmore *Critique of a College*,⁶ the Oxford *Report of a Commission of Inquiry*⁷—these works do, indeed, enrich our concepts of what we are doing; certainly they made a difference not only in their own colleges but elsewhere. But for the mass of college teachers they do not seem to have greatly enlarged our consciousness or changed our practices.

Shifting the perspective to another literature, that dealing with teaching, might one there discover the sources of an ideology? Gilbert Highet's distinguished work lifts that genre to the level of literature and offers some cues.⁸ For Highet, teaching is everywhere; it is part of our helpfulness to others. Good. He helps us see how to do the job better.

But, I suspect, Joseph Axelrod is talking more about our real selves when, on the basis of his interviews on the educational concepts of college humanities teachers, he outlines five "teaching styles" and the rationales that lie behind them.⁹ Perhaps they are ideologies, more likely defenses; certainly not philosophies. First, there is the drillmaster or recitation class teacher. He teaches a foreign language with much success. He does not use problem-solving; he does not require discovery, inquiry, discussion: he teaches a skill and a subject. Second, there is the content-centered teacher. "His task, he says, is to cover the materials of his discipline systematically in order to help the student to master them. . . . The student is there to learn. . . . Joint inquiry is nonsense." Third, there is the instructor-centered teacher, a charismatic figure with a national reputation. As a "model, [he] demonstrates to his students what he believes are the best ways of apprehending the works and handling the concepts of literature. . . . It is not the subject matter of a field that ought to be at the center of class activity, but what an instructor does with that subject matter." Axelrod suggests that this kind of teacher is an intellectual, whose own experiences and visions and sensibilities are central, rather than a scholar, for whom the body of knowledge in the field forms the core of his conceptual world. Fourth, there is the intellect-centered teacher, in whose courses "the emphasis is on the how and why of knowledge, rather than on the what." For such instructors "analysis and problem-solving constitute [the] basic teaching means and the major devices they use in testing students." And finally, fifth, the person-centered teacher focuses on the student as a motivated (or not motivated) individual; he seeks to grasp and use the concepts of "challenge," "growth" and "personality integration" in his teaching. Teaching, for him "must be undergirded by a theory of human development." Axelrod does not favor any one of these methods, but suggests to the apprentice teacher that "within each of the styles, it is possible to find excellent and poor teachers. Thus each style has its own excellence."

With this discussion, some little distance from Aristotle and Dewey, we are, I think, talking about the people we know. It is within this smaller ambit that our educational belief systems emerge. Can we do better?¹⁰

Strategies of Self-Analysis in Education

Within the confines of our capabilities and times and interests, there is a resource which, properly employed, might greatly improve our clarity of purpose and our effective translation of purpose into action: our consciousness. The term has been widely employed and misinterpreted, from the early discussions of "false consciousness" to the currently fashionable "consciousness raising." Some interpreters of modernity suggest that modernity's most important achievement has been to increase human consciousness—that is, to detach us from convention, to release us from stimulus-boundedness, to increase our ability to reason from the kind of "first principles" that were inaccessible to Aristotle and the ancients. More than others, academics have a capacity for this consciousness; more importantly, they have a much larger capacity for consciousness than they employ. I have a suggestion for using and enlarging this capacity.

Specifically, it seems to me, we all have stored in our unconscious (technically, I suppose, our preconscious) the materials out of which we can frame more coherent and usable educational belief systems. We all have distilled from the culture certain values, jumbled as they are; we have vague ghosts on our mental screens of what an

educated man ought to look like; and, after our crises and moratoria, we have concepts of our own identities, what we are and what we might be like as teachers. These living materials, however inchoate and dormant, must be awakened from their beds in the unconscious and given alert and vital forms.

The means employed to awaken to consciousness those elements of an educational belief system that lie latent in the college instructor's mind must be consonant with his own sense of dignity. They must be colleague-oriented. Student evaluations serve a purpose (and generally are found to be fairly accurate), but a different purpose. The administration cannot to good effect require a statement of educational ideology; the store of platitudes is so rich we would hardly bankrupt ourselves in even an extended essay ("to develop an inquiring mind," "to preserve our heritage," "to provide the tools of analysis," etc., etc.). It is to our peers that we will respond—and then only under the right circumstances. Further, the problem is not to provoke a statement, but to elicit thinking, reasoning, self-confrontation, the matching of goal and means, the penetration of the surface phrase to find the rationale beneath. I do not believe we possess a criterion for judging "the best" answer—but that is not the point. The point is rather that each individual should judge his own "best answer" by examining and reflecting on his own standards and reasoning and practice.

Thus I come to the focused conversation (not the interview) as the chosen device. Much fatuity may result, of course, as the inexperienced talk to the unreflective, the dogmatic, the inveterate anecdotalist, the skillful manipulator of impressions; and, most intractable, the man who says, "but I am a scientist [or scholar]; what has all this to do with me?" But there are some guidelines, among which are two rather different intellectual traditions. The first of these traditions is the brand of therapy which in Carl Rogers' terms is based on the "hypothesis that the individual has a sufficient capacity to deal constructively with all those aspects of his life which can potentially come into conscious awareness." The method works, and the hypothesis is fruitful, says Rogers, only if the therapists' "operational philosophy has already moved in the direction of *feeling* a deep respect for the significance and worth of each person" treated.¹¹ This is a test for the proposed method; it should restrain those who might undertake these conversations in the spirit of "unmasking" an opponent.

Would it strain our sense of congruence too much to draw an analogy between this variety of therapy and that variety of philosophical method called, among other things, the British ordinary language school of philosophy? The analogy rests in part on the idea that within our ordinary store of knowledge and unconscious resources we have the means of clarifying our daily problems, especially our conceptual or "meaning" problems. The tell-tale query, "What do we mean when we say . . . ?" throws the question back on the questioners; the illumination comes through a set of testing situations, often drawn from daily life (but also from bizarre situations), which prick out the boundaries of the manifold meanings of a phrase, revealing much that is at first hidden, inchoate, implied—in short, unconscious. I am suggesting, therefore, that part of the task before us is to clarify our concepts and that this simple philosophical method, here stated in somewhat caricatured form, offers promise.

Let us not be too solemn or pretentious on this matter, for we are speaking of how the nonphilosopher and the nontherapist can help a fellow college instructor clarify his thought and improve his practice. Some simple phrases, insistently em-

ployed, can help: "How do you mean that?" "But you said earlier. . . ." "Specifically . . . ?" "I don't see how that serves the purpose you mentioned," and, above all, "For example?" Confronted by such questions, the college instructor must return again to mine his unconscious; he must confront himself, look behind his facile assumptions, link what he does with what he says, and, if the method is working, link what he says with what he subsequently does.

What Questions Should Be Asked?

Students differ. But the main questions are those of purposes and of means. With one advanced and reflective graduate-student teaching assistant (not in a class for which I was responsible) I tried some educational self-analysis. More than most, this young man had thought about the purposes of teaching and is an excellent teacher. I shall call him Theseus because Theseus found his way out of a labyrinth with a simple ball of string—the name expresses a hope for a simple method. I asked him what he was trying to do in class, and later followed this by other questions on ideal concepts of the educated man, the ideal teacher, the general purposes of an education. These questions seemed to be tapping the same vein, but I was not sure at first what the priorities might be. In response to the first question about what he was trying to do, there emerged a mixed answer dealing with the importance of the subject matter ("to teach about styles of political action, political processes, machines, bureaucracy, poverty policy") and with analytical capacities ("systematic thinking; I make the students explore ideas, search for inconsistencies, relate matters to larger concepts"). Another theme emerged from his subsequent illustrations: he was teaching how the structure of social classes and the uneven distribution of power are revealed in a variety of discrete, latent, rationalized social forms: the upper-class status of municipal reformers, the implicit assumptions of Banfield's *The Unheavenly City*, the distribution of benefits from political machines like Tammany Hall, the bias behind the "clean government" concepts of "keeping government out of politics." I missed the occasion to ask the questions that would have caused my partner to reflect on the precise social messages he was seeking to convey. Like any competent therapist, the inquiring partner must be sensitive to the *patterns* of meaning only slowly revealed in the conversational material.

✓ But for many of us in the humanities and social sciences, our ideologies, our religions, are epistemological; they turn on the question "How do we know?" rather than "What is to be known?" Ideology grows up around uncertainty, and the basis of our knowledge is uncertain. It develops where self-concepts are challenged, and as "men of knowledge" our self-concepts are heavily involved in the status of our knowledge. It is said that "an ideology builds up like an oyster's secretion around strain,"¹² and under conditions of exploding knowledge, of conflicting models of explanation, of the "affective neutrality" of science challenged as irrelevance and withdrawal, we feel the strain. Theseus's purpose of encouraging "systematic thinking" among his students, then, was a purpose inevitably shaped by his educational/scientific ideology. Had I had the wit and the time, what might I have helped him to learn about his own belief system here?

For Theseus, an educated man "can feel and think at the same time"—that is, he is compassionate and committed, but also cool and analytical. That was in March. In May, when we reconvened, the "educated man's" feeling side was less in evidence: "He is critical, skeptical, creative; he can tolerate ambiguity and cope

with complexity; he has a low tolerance for bullshit and propaganda; he looks for implications of such alleged phenomena as 'the cycle of poverty.' Further, and more conclusively, Theseus wondered whether he should not have assigned *Stonehenge Decoded* to reveal a "beautiful" power of analysis, and Watson's *The Double Helix* to show the scientific method at work. Neither of these books, of course, bears directly on the analysis of class structure; their relevance is that they help with the analysis of analysis. Finally, since we talked in March, and in some measure as a consequence of our March discussion (so Theseus said), he has increasingly taken up the role of "devil's advocate" in class for the very purpose of increasing these analytic powers, of challenging the superficial, of forcing heterodox thought of all kinds, of confronting students with alternatives to their positions, whatever they be. The epistemological ideology was ascendant over the social message, the exposure of class bias in our social structure and politics. I should then have come back to his version of the committed and compassionate educated man whose humanism we might cultivate in class. Had Theseus forgotten him? Perhaps he had altered his own priorities. Very well, but should that not be done consciously, the trade-off noted, or a strategy devised to embrace both? Like all complex interesting men, Theseus is many persons; could I have helped him introduce one Theseus to another?

The seamy side of purpose is "need." Theseus reported that in the last session of the class the students talked about what they got out of the class, the relevance of the material to their own lives, including such problems as "what does it mean to 'sell out'?" They spoke with animation about their own changes in attitudes in the course. Evidence of having had an influence on our students would be gratifying in many ways to all of us. But as I listened to Theseus's account, and watched his own animation, I thought of David Winter's recent study of *The Power Motive*, where he reports the ranking of Wesleyan and Harvard students' "need for power" according to their occupational plans: those planning to go into teaching had the highest need for power (those planning to be psychologists and clergymen ranked second and third).¹³ Since he is a friend, I asked Theseus about this: Was some of the pleasure of this last session derived from a gratification of his need to affect people, to change them, to elicit emotion from them—manifestations of his own power? He allowed that this was, of course, possible, and I allowed that there were other ways of interpreting his gratification. The exploration of the personal needs gratified in the teaching experience can be excessively personal, bordering on discourtesy. It shares the problem of all such inquiries: nothing is what it seems. It has the same difficulties that beset the sociological version of "unmasking" and invites pop psychologizing. But, of course, it *is* getting at something fundamental: What is it about teaching that is satisfying? How do we construct our ideologies out of our rationalized personal needs? And, more basically, who is this person that is the instrument for effecting the purposes claimed? Let us leave it at that; it is not a necessary question for bringing much of a person's unconscious ideology into the light of day. There are too many resistances—though probably not so many as might be imagined. (At least I found that to be the case in the student answers to my question about their ideologies.)

The kind of assisted self-inquiry I am proposing could go in a number of directions, too many to develop here. Francis Sutton and associates have analyzed *The American Business Creed* "in terms of the *strains* to which men in the business role are almost inevitably subject." The authors go on to say that, as with men in other

positions, "businessmen adhere to their particular kind of ideology because of the emotional conflicts, the anxieties, and the doubts engendered by the actions which their roles as businessmen compel them to take, and by the conflicting demands of other social roles which they must play in family and community."¹⁴ The heart of the matter is this: others (students or clients, colleagues or competitors, superiors) expect different and incompatible things of us, producing a kind of strain which must be rationalized—hence, our educational ideologies. Were these strains and incompatibilities clarified in our conscious minds, perhaps our belief systems, or educational philosophies, would represent purposes closer to those our longer-range and "truer" selves hold dear. What would Theseus have said had I asked him what he thought the students (the better students? the average students?) expected of him, what the department chairman expected of him, and what kind of behavior would most likely advance his career. Surely the reconciliation of these matters would not have been easy, and he would have required of himself some kind of rationale for his behavior. He would have to make sense out of it.

Mannheim outlined a historical sequence which he thought marked the road we are traveling: the first step was from an "ethics of fatalism" to an "ethics of conscience," the latter characterized by a sense of our own capacity to change things and a belief in our own undetermined freedom of decision. The next step, he said, the one he proposed we could now enter upon, was an "ethics of responsibility" where "conscience itself should be subjected to critical self-examination in order to eliminate all the blindly and compulsively operating factors."¹⁵ Of course, Mannheim was largely concerned with political ideology, but the point can also be made with regard to our educational belief system and consciences. We can, in this way, identify the manner in which our belief systems serve our interests and, of course, we could also perform the much pleasanter task of identifying the interests behind the ideologies of others. Might not our image of an educated man, the man we would like to create, bear a surprising likeness to the relatively prosperous, secure, intellectually concerned person we see in the mirror? Is there a class bias in this? Our conversationalists will differ, no doubt, in their answers.

We have mobilized vast resources for studies of the American system of higher education. We have studied our own colleges in some marvelous detail. Can we study ourselves? Theseus said his teaching changed at several points after our conversational self-analysis. He wanted more. Perhaps others might have the same experience.¹⁶

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DONALD LIGHT, JR.

Thinking about Faculty

WITHIN ANY educational system are basic forces which shape its response to external pressures. Whether they be a surfeit or paucity of funds, a baby boom or bust—in short, whether one looks back on the sixties or ahead to the coming decade—these forces are present and change slowly. If one wishes to analyze correctly the problems of higher education today and design policies that will work, one must understand these forces well.

Perhaps the greatest shaper of higher education is the faculty, not as a vague collection of diverse individuals, but as a cluster of professions with a certain structure and certain values. If it is disheartening to see most institutions abandon their distinctiveness to imitate the few which are said to be outstanding, if one worries about what is lost when over one quarter of all students attend institutions of over twenty thousand and one half attend schools of ten thousand or more, if the insistence that all academic subjects be treated as equally worthy and nonacademic subjects as unworthy seems wrong, if one finds universities responding to social needs in a way that serves professional reputations more than the needy, if one wonders why interdisciplinary programs are so hard to launch, then one wants to know more about the structure of the academic professions.

There are some common beliefs which start us on the wrong track. One is the functional integration of teaching and research—the assumption that each enhances the other. This assertion ignores an impressive amount of evidence to the contrary. If research-scholars teach better, it is due to their being smarter and more energetic rather than to their doing research. While much depends on what kind of research is being done and what courses are being taught, as well as who the individual is, most faculty feel they have two jobs competing for their time.¹ This is particularly true outside the humanities. But the belief survives empirical refutation. (a nice irony in itself), because it helps to integrate conflicting elements in the university and keeps faculty from being aware of these conflicts.

Another belief centers on the idea of a single academic profession. This term suggests that all faculty are of a kind, when in fact they differ in important ways. These differences become more clear, as does the relation between teaching and research, if the character of “the academic profession” is understood.

The Structure of the Academic Professions²

A profession is a special kind of occupation which gains exclusive control over a prestigious body of esoteric knowledge. It is allowed to recruit, train, and license its members in return for promising to work honestly in the best interests of its clients.

If this definition is accurate, then there is no single academic profession. Rather, there are academic professions, because the knowledge base for each profession is its discipline. To regard all kinds of faculty as members of one profession blinds us to research showing that each discipline attracts different kinds of people, performs research in widely differing ways, knows only certain fields and is quite ignorant about other areas, has different types of careers, and faces distinct problems of its own.

Not only does each profession have its own special knowledge, it also has its core work. While teaching takes most of a professor's time, it is published research which the profession rewards. In this way the academic professions differ from the service professions like law or dentistry; for the primary goal in academia is not the application of expert knowledge, but the creation of new knowledge. A study sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education confirms what has been known for many decades: The professor who publishes in professional books or journals earns more, gets promoted faster, and works at a more "prestigious" institution.³ The true professionals, then, are those professors who do scholarship and publish, not those who primarily teach. If research activity is used as the measure of the professional, then two-thirds of American faculty qualify. If publishing anything will do, then about half of American faculty are professionals. But if the professional is the person who steadily produces scholarly works, about 20 percent of the faculty belong to the academic professions. Thus, not only are there many distinct professions in higher education, but only a fraction of American faculty are true professionals—that is, research scholars who produce a substantial body of published work.

If scholarship is the core activity of the academic professions, teaching undergraduates is not. Despite all the arguments that scholarship gives teaching its lively edge and teaching puts narrow research into broad perspective, the two are in conflict for the professor's time and orientation. Research and graduate teaching are *professional* activities, while teaching undergraduates is an *institutional* activity. In nearly every poll of faculty, from state colleges to elite universities, professors are reported as wanting more time to do research or to teach graduate students in research, and less time for college teaching. Yet these faculty uniformly say they enjoy teaching. What is going on? Quite simply, the weight given to publications for salary increases and promotions, even at institutions where faculty publish little, is so great that professors feel compelled to take time from their teaching in order to advance themselves. They wish, however, that the quality of their teaching counted more toward advancement than it now does. At Stanford University, only 20 percent of the faculty believe that teaching greatly influences advancements, while 51 percent wish it did.⁴ At a nearby state university, 4 percent rated teaching as important for their career, but ten times that percentage wished it were. Here is a pathology of the American system—and not the American system alone—which tries to fuse brilliant, rare scholarship with universal, public education.

The injuries to students and faculty alike come from there being only one model of the successful professor. Our greatest need is to provide at least as many paths to distinction in academia as exist in the legal profession. There a person can aspire to be general counsel for IBM, a senior partner of a law firm, a professor of law, a distinguished judge, or a champion of citizens, like Ralph Nader. The legal profession honors all of these callings; each provides great rewards. For university faculty, the most obvious model besides the research scholar is the excellent teacher, but neither great nor less prominent institutions consistently reward this calling.

Alternate Models for Higher Education

Few realize that before this century began there were three models of the academic man and the institution in which he worked. All three shaped American higher education and are still important today for thinking about its purposes.⁵ First, the English or Oxford model of the eighteenth century emphasized mental discipline for a ruling elite. The implicit goal was to provide a common social, moral, and intellectual experience for sons of the elite. Here the professor served, above all, as a moral and intellectual teacher. Thus, a specific subject was not so important in itself as in the mental discipline it developed. Teaching provided an occasion for instilling moral and intellectual values. From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, America's elite colleges and universities drew heavily on the Oxford model.

The second source of ideas about higher education came from Scotland, whose universities in the nineteenth century were public and open. Scotland already had an extraordinary literacy rate, higher than England's, and the Scottish approach to higher education fit nicely on the top of a broad base of public education. In contrast to the English at Oxford, the Scots emphasized practical subjects such as accounting and government. Consequently, they valued the professor for what he knew about a specific subject and the audiences he could draw. In a country like the United States, with its predominantly utilitarian view of public education, this concept of higher education and its faculty gained considerable influence. It signaled a curriculum and an organization entirely different from the Oxford model and best seen in the land-grant universities where practical subjects were offered to working adults all over the state by traveling teams of faculty. Nothing could differ more from the model of elite education.

The third ideal, of course, came from Germany. It emphasized scientific training—even in the nonsciences—and scientifically conducted research aimed at expanding knowledge. As an institution, the university served other functions, particularly to certify people in various pursuits so that they could enter respectable careers. But the heart of the university lay in scientific research. This model differed from the other two in its neglect of teaching, except for training future scientists. Unlike the other models, the chief activity was publishing research; thus it regarded the professor primarily as someone who discovered new frontiers of knowledge through research.

The German model transformed the faculty in the United States from a small group of men who shared the same education and intellectual heritage, regardless of which subject they taught, into a cluster of disciplinary professions, all eager to establish their own societies, journals, and distinctive identities.⁶ It altered the undergraduate curriculum. Charles Eliot "integrated" the old idea of undergraduate education with the new research thrust by allowing research faculty to offer any courses they wished and letting students choose among them. In reality, the elective system allowed faculty to teach their research specialties, leaving general education to chance.

Institutionally, this model usually mixed with one of the other two, creating research universities with elite, liberal arts colleges inside them or research universities with mass, utilitarian colleges and large extension efforts reaching out to farmers and businessmen. Although this "academic revolution" least affected private and denominational colleges, it nevertheless created an entirely new structure of

prestige which slowly pushed most of the private and denominational colleges to the periphery. This one-dimensional status system also made institutions more competitive and thereby reduced diversity. The resulting stratification produced institutional mobility, as normal schools upgraded themselves to teachers' colleges, teachers' colleges to liberal arts colleges, the latter to regional universities, and these to national ones.

Problems Resulting from the Academic Professions

The demise of diversity has a specific character; it has resulted from the well-intentioned effort of institutions to acquire good reputations in a situation in which the academic professions have established only one standard of excellence. This homogenizing thrust behind institutional mobility also has something to do with the increased size of campuses and the general notion that bigger is better, more comprehensive. Bigness and prestige are related, because one must add on graduate programs to gain stature.

The price for these trends can be seen in Robert Pace's refreshing study *The Demise of Diversity*.⁷ It might also have been called *Celebration of the Liberal Arts College*. In measures of faculty and peer involvement, academic satisfaction, stimulating academic experiences, and meaningful campus life, the alumni and students of these colleges rate their experience one or two standard deviations above the alumni and students of comparable universities.⁸ These institutions do what educators dream a college should do. They make profound differences in the people who pass through them, not only in terms of the college experience but in terms of lasting breadth. On measures of broadened literary acquaintance, awareness of different philosophies and cultures, appreciation of art, music, and drama, friendships and social development, and the ability to write and speak effectively, the liberal arts colleges come out ahead. In particular, select colleges do noticeably better than select universities. Yet these institutions are now closing at a rapid rate.

The elective system, which treats each academic subject as equally worthy, was necessary; without it, the undergraduate curriculum could not have been reconciled with the full range of academic professions, each proud and devoted only to its fraction of knowledge. By the same token, subjects outside the disciplines do not exist academically and subjects between them create professional strains. This also explains the peculiar way in which universities respond to social problems. They do not fit neatly into one academic profession or another; often they do not lend themselves to journal articles. But one task of the academician, particularly someone building a career, is to *make* his or her work on a social problem count academically.

At the institutional rather than the individual level, this pattern has profoundly affected professional schools, which by definition are directly concerned with social problems.⁹ They, too, have been forced to play the only game in town—academic prestige—and this has meant that educators are trained by research scholars and lawyers by professors with equally little firsthand experience. Nathan Glaser has recently argued that the conflicts between practitioners and research faculty distinguish the schools of lesser professions like education, social work, the clergy, and city planning, from the schools of law and medicine.¹⁰ This assertion is simply inaccurate. The research-vs.-clinical debate has dominated law and medical schools in the past decade. The only way for the service professions to avoid the distortions of academic prestige is to hire the best practitioners to senior posts and give them control over much of professional training.

Policies for the Future

If the academic professions have generated not only some of education's greatest accomplishments, but also some of its major problems, is there a way to reduce the problems without diminishing the accomplishments as well? I think there is. Let us begin with an earlier observation—that only 20 percent of all faculty publish scholarship with any regularity. The other 80 percent have been studied and treated in the terms of this special minority, terms which simply do not fit. As a result, we know little about the careers, hopes, sources of satisfactions, and fears of these men and women. Instead we know that they do *not* publish, that they do *not* conduct sustained research, that they do *not* have light teaching loads, that they do *not* teach graduate students. We also know that, having no alternate model, they seek the professional ideals, a quest that can lead only to humiliation and a downgrading of their current, valuable work. Table 1 shows the actual and ideal time (in percentages) spent doing various activities. As one looks across the first two rows, one can see an increasing disparity between what faculty do and what they wish to do. The gap widens in concert with the values of the academic professions to such a degree that faculty in schools with no graduate students and few research facilities want to devote nearly half of their time to these activities.

Clearly what higher education needs in the years to come are alternate models of academic work. Given the complexity of this subject, let us take the simplest but most central model—the good, undergraduate teacher. Since teaching is basically an institutional and local enterprise, this model requires not \$10,000 national awards for distinction, but careful assessments of teaching quality that affect promotions and salaries at each institution. Many people ask how the quality of teaching would be measured, but those who ask typically do not try to find out. Meanwhile, dozens of colleges and universities are evaluating their faculty as teachers in a serious way. The methods are flawed, though no more flawed than the methods for evaluating scholarly excellence, and they are improving with experience.

It is particularly important that such a reform become widespread in the next decade, because the tight job market will mean that graduate students trained to do research will filter down to colleges and universities that could not have attracted them before. They will carry with them the research model, and if left unchecked,

Table 1
Faculty Reports of Actual and Ideal Time Devoted to Academic Activities, by Rank of Institution¹

Activity		High	Medium	Low
Undergraduate Teaching	Actual	29%	46%	64%
	Ideal	25	34	43
Graduate Teaching and Research	Actual	50%	45%	15%
	Ideal	65	58	47
Administration	Actual	21%	19%	21%
	Ideal	10	8	10

Source: Talcott Parsons and Gerald Platt, *The Academic Profession: A Pilot Study* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1968), Table VI. I.

¹ The scale used for ranking colleges and universities combined measures of research orientation and institutional quality.

will press these institutions to ape Harvard or Michigan. Given the limited pool of brilliance in any one generation, this will simply mean more second-rate scholarship and less devotion to teaching. Fortunately, pervading all faculty from great universities to lesser colleges is a demand that teaching count for more. This demand can reasonably be interpreted as widespread alienation; faculty at all levels do not like to spend large amounts of time doing something for which they are not rewarded. Either they want to do more of what counts, or they want what they do to count.

To make teaching an honored and influential calling in higher education, we must know much more about teaching faculty and their careers.¹¹ One problem for both teaching and research faculty is that the career ladder ends when one becomes a professor at about age forty. There you are, Professor of Sociology, specializing in deviance and stratification, and you have twenty-five years to go. With each year it gets harder and more frightening to switch fields. Structurally this is a badly designed career, one encouraging defensive, stale people in the senior ranks.

This problem of career might well be linked to another, the professional obstacles to launching interdisciplinary programs. Such programs can stimulate faculty as well as students, and many reports on higher education have recommended them.¹² If institutional funds are arranged in the right way, and if such ventures in education are rewarded locally, professors would have nothing to lose and everything to gain by entering a new venture. In short, if administrations put real clout behind excellent and imaginative teaching, and keep rewarding their faculty for doing so throughout their entire career, they will get what they bargain for. It is worth a try.

Anything grows from its beginnings, and the college professor begins as a graduate student. The shame of the graduate schools for years has been that they constrict the imagination and teach buoyant souls to plod. They also fail to train students in the work they will be doing most of their lives—teaching—at the same time that they train students in what only a few will do—research. Needless to say, there are great opportunities for growth in graduate schools, and with the job market so tight, perhaps they will do better. If one school made its graduates stand out from the rest by giving them excellent supervision in teaching, they would be given preference in the job market. Soon other graduate schools would follow suit.

In conclusion, major problems resulting from the structure of the academic professions can be overcome without injuring research. It must be recognized that 80 percent of all faculty do not contribute to scholarly excellence, while the other 20 percent devote considerable time to undergraduate instruction. Promising policies are those which realign rewards and programs to fit this reality and which create new models of excellence for what most faculty do already. In effect such policies would broaden the values of the academic professions and make their structure more flexible. Teaching has a local, client-centered quality which lends itself easily to a diversity of student needs and educational approaches that disciplines shaped by research alone cannot accommodate.

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JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN

On the "Oversupply" of Graduate Students

ONE OF THE most poignant results of the increase in the number of persons completing graduate degrees in recent years has been the frustration that their search for employment has entailed. It has been argued that some of them had no real interest in their subject anyway, and they merely entered graduate school out of indecision regarding their ultimate goals or to escape the draft or to restructure the university. But one who has taught graduate students during the past decade must conclude that such motives, if they existed at all, were hardly representative, especially of those who persevered to the end. Not only is it unfair to ascribe "base motives" to most of them; to do so suggests, rather cruelly, that in their pursuit of higher learning, they were not moved by the same high principles that some scholars of an earlier generation have insisted were the forces that propelled them to study literature or philosophy or science or whatever.

If one sat in seminars with graduate students during the last decade, he could not but be impressed with their seriousness of purpose, their diligence, and their industry. There they were, with a confusing and unpopular war adding greatly to the normal pressures and anxieties of persons trying to launch careers. Moreover, there were new problems that beset virtually every university as it became the battleground for numerous causes, some deeply affecting the university itself and others only peripherally so. And yet many of the graduate students were not only steadfast in their efforts, but gave ample evidence of their commitment to discover new knowledge and share it with others. Their papers, many of which have already been published, are not infected with that syndrome of "publish or perish" that some palsied hands seek to impute to any and all scholars who are connected with institutions that dare to evaluate their writings. Rather, they reflect that healthy attitude one finds in all true scholars who feel obliged to place on the record, to share with others, the fruits of their endeavors. They could argue, with considerable reason and logic on their side, that their motives have been at least as high as those of the Depression-ridden generation of students whose methods of competition for jobs they now hold would make some sharp business practitioners blush with embarrassment.

In any case, the new doctoral candidates and graduates are a fact of life, and no amount of exorcism can cast them out. And, apparently, no amount of strenuous effort on the part of their professors can find jobs for all of them. Consequently, some professors wring their hands and reproach themselves for not having persuaded prospective graduate students to look elsewhere as they made their plans for training for their life's work. The weaker ones, if there were any, should have been discouraged; clearly professors are obliged to join with their universities in counseling candidates against plunging into areas of study for which they have neither ability, aptitude, nor suitability. One must always guard against the flattery of a

student's wanting to study with a professor, when sheer desire is the student's strongest or only qualification. And what professor has not strained to discover promise in a student who presents himself to study with him? By the same token, one must resist the temptation to admit unqualified students merely to give the appearance of being connected with a flourishing institution that attracts large numbers of graduate students. No institution can really flourish if numbers are a more important consideration than quality.

Some persons in higher education seem to forget that just a few short years ago graduate training for a teaching career in almost any field seemed a wise course to pursue. In virtually every state in the union new public colleges and universities came into existence in the 1950s and 60s with widely heralded plans for admitting huge numbers of students who would, in turn, need large numbers of teachers. The State of New York, which had long depended, for the most part, on private institutions within its own boundaries and public institutions elsewhere to provide higher education for its citizens, began to multiply its own higher education facilities many times over. California, with an already admirable network of institutions, expanded existing colleges and universities and built several new ones. Other states and cities expanded their own facilities, though none needed to go so far as New York or California. It required thousands of new teachers to staff the new and expanding colleges and universities in many parts of the country. For several years the demand increased almost daily, and prospective young teachers experienced no difficulty in finding attractive positions. Indeed, the real danger was that there would be a shortage of qualified college and university teachers.

In 1962, the authors of a special study on the training of historians called for a significant increase in the number of persons pursuing the doctoral degree in history. They warned that unless there was such an increase, there would not be sufficient professionally trained historians to replace those who left the field by retirement or death, to say nothing of supplying personnel for new and growing departments. There was a similar sense of urgency in other fields. Who cannot recall the grand rush to the fields of science and mathematics, with generous support for graduate study supplied by the federal government. Those graduate students and universities that were not successful in securing such support were bitterly disappointed; but they would not give up. The promise of lucrative opportunities in higher education spurred students in those fields to make the necessary sacrifices to pursue graduate studies wherever they were accepted.

What has happened in recent years could not reasonably have been predicted except by experts on demography in cooperation with experts on long-range economic trends. The colleges and universities have not increased at the rate that some forecasters anticipated, although the numbers in higher education, particularly from so-called minority groups, have steadily increased since the end of World War II. Community colleges and other alternatives to four-year colleges have increased enormously; and some administrators in such institutions take the view that persons with "research degrees" are ill-suited for the task that their teachers must perform. Happily, not all such administrators take this view. Some recognize that the old cliché of one's being overtrained for the job does not apply to the task of expanding the horizons and improving the intellectual insights of adults or near-adults.

Meanwhile, state legislatures have been pressed to curtail appropriations for higher education in order to accommodate other "needs," and private benefactors, for a variety of reasons, have not been so generous as some had hoped. Conse-

quently, some colleges and universities have fallen on hard times, which has meant not only the reduction of projected teaching personnel, but the actual termination of some teachers on the regular staff. This has inevitably led to the increase in the size of classes, sometimes numbering in the hundreds of students with no breakdown into smaller units for more effective teaching even in basic courses. A college with more than one thousand students in a basic course—and this is not a hypothetical case—with no discussion sections, no teaching assistants, and no opportunity for students to participate in the learning process is tragically understaffed. When this situation exists, for whatever reason, that college contributes to the oversupply of teachers just as surely as the high enrollment in graduate schools has.

In a sense, then, it was not the predictions that were so inaccurate. Rather, it was unforeseen and unexpected developments that played havoc with planning in graduate education. It was either the budgetary crunch or the austerity program, real or fancied, that eliminated the need for new teachers and that frequently penalized the students themselves because they were deprived of the kind of careful instruction to which they were entitled. The result was a picture of oversupply of trained scholars which, in reality, was a woefully inadequate support of the educational enterprise. One is tempted to speculate on how dramatically the picture could change if, all of a sudden, our national priorities were so reordered as to place education much higher on the scale—say, above space exploration, six-lane highways, excessive political campaign expenditures, and spectator sports. It is entirely possible that such a reordering would result in the absorption of the surplus teaching personnel now looking for jobs. It might even create a shortage of highly trained teaching personnel! Unfortunately, one cannot sit and wait for such a happy eventuality—least of all those who are in the ranks of the unemployed.

Meanwhile, our response to the oversupply of college and university teachers has been characterized by a lack of imagination regarding those who dare to prepare themselves to follow in the footsteps of the noble professor. Some have looked at the dismal picture of the high ratio of applicants to jobs and have said that it would be folly for a young man or woman to prepare to be, say, an economist or historian when there are no jobs for them in higher education. There are others who strongly disagree and insist that the problem cannot be solved simply by announcing that persons should not be training for nonexistent jobs. And so the debate is on, and has become heated. The motives of the disputants are, at times, mixed. Some professors, not all, see in the cutback of graduate students an opportunity to spend more time with their own affairs—writing, consulting, traveling, and the like. On the other side, some professors, not all, want unlimited admissions as a kind of insurance policy by which they can fill their own seminars and lecture courses. They are reminiscent of the European professors of an earlier day who solicited large numbers for their courses because that was the basis on which they were compensated. Doubtless there are many on both sides whose motives and reasons are high-minded and whose convictions are serious and honest. Even so, there are ways of looking at the problem that transcend purely personal, professional, or even institutional interests; and they are worth considering.

We need to continue to remind ourselves that in a society such as ours—where institutions, and even needs, are rapidly changing and expanding—persons trained in traditional fields can perform numerous functions other than teaching. Historical and literary societies are discovering that persons trained in history and literature can serve them more effectively and successfully than the "lay personnel" who have

customarily served such institutions. Economists are finding employment in cooperatives, labor organizations, neighborhood councils, and mercantile establishments. There need not be a predictable limit to such possibilities. Last year a young graduate student in history went to the office of a large national mail-order house to collect some information for her doctoral dissertation, and the officers of the company persuaded her to join the staff as historian of the company. A young man went to a state library seeking information for a paper and remained to become the head of the manuscripts collection there. A student trained in medieval studies recently became the librarian for a large Eastern law firm. Those of us who are trained in the traditional fields should have at least as much imagination as outsiders in coming up with exciting possibilities for persons so trained.

To discourage persons from pursuing graduate studies in the manner and for the reasons that some of us are doing at the present time is to make presumptions that are, at best, untenable. The decisions that many students have made to pursue higher studies have not been made lightly. Some have dreamed of becoming chemists or political scientists for as long as they can remember. Their thinking and planning have been along these lines. Their studies have been pointed in that direction. It is a serious responsibility that one assumes when one advises such persons that they should forget about the very thing that has preoccupied them for years. While it may be the responsibility of the professor to inform the student of the difficulties of securing employment, if and when they exist, it is doubtful that he should go beyond that point.

When one offers advice designed to discourage an aspiring young scholar, he may be placing serious intellectual as well as psychological obstacles in the path of someone who, a few years hence, may well contribute more to knowledge than the "wise counselor" himself. To offer such questionable advice would be to say to the prospective scholar that while the field is one that was quite all right for his elders, it is no place for him. This is a presumption scarcely worthy of a committed academician who could not possibly anticipate the various uses to which such training might be put. Finally, those who have deep commitments to the pursuit of knowledge should shrink from any position that would place it on a purely material level. While one must be practical in this life, one must also recognize other motives and values in the pursuit of learning. Without such recognition, the academic enterprise is likely to suffer from the presence of too many pseudo-scholars whose interests are not only primarily material but venal as well.

TALCOTT PARSONS

Stability and Change in the American University

JUST UNDER A YEAR ago there appeared under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Science's Assembly on University Goals and Governance a book entitled *The American University* which I co-authored with Gerald M. Platt.¹ Completed in the early summer of 1972, the book explicitly confined its major attention to the ideal type of the relatively elite, more or less "full" university characterized by the institutionalization of research functions, a graduate school of arts and sciences, an undergraduate college, and a ring of schools for training in the applied professions, the roster of which has varied somewhat from case to case. The authors of this book were acutely conscious that the ideal type on which they concentrated their attention did not stand alone, but was a pace-setting component of a very much larger and more ramified system. We thought, however, that its significance was of salient strategic importance for understanding the American system of higher education as a whole.

Substantive work on the book was terminated rather shortly after the subsiding of the era of worldwide disturbances in the university system of higher education. The academic year 1971-72, however, proved to be one of the most peaceful witnessed in a number of years, and if anything the calm has become more pronounced and deeper in the two years since the summer of 1972. The purpose of the present brief article is to assess what has come out of the period of turbulence, followed by one of renewed calm, in which the university system has been involved. This will of necessity be a rather limited attempt at appraisal, but I think certain things can be said.

To what extent has the main structural and institutional core of the elite university remained intact through the vicissitudes through which it has passed, and how far has it been modified, and how substantially? The radical alternative to maintenance would be a fundamental revolution so that the university's resemblance to what existed in the early 1960s would be scarcely discernible today. It is our impression, on the basis not of a systematic study but of a somewhat impressionistic review of available evidence, that the integrity of the structural core has by and large survived without at least "revolutionary" alterations.

Evidence for this conclusion is based on three main sources. First, I have had personal experience of some degree of intensity in the decisive period in four institutions which in different ways fit the typological model of reference. The first is my own institution of Harvard, from which I formally retired a year ago but with which I have kept a certain amount of touch. The second is the University of Chicago, in which I served as a visiting professor for one quarter in the year 1971 and another in the fall quarter of 1972. The third is the University of Pennsylvania, where for 1973-74 I served as a part-time visiting professor on an appointment extending throughout the academic year. Finally, the fourth is Brown University,

where in the spring semester of 1974 I had rather intimate associations occasioned mainly by delivering the Colver Lectures at the University. As my second source, I am greatly indebted to the book edited by David Riesman and Verne A. Stadtman entitled *Academic Transformation*, which reviews what has happened in the decisive era at 17 institutions.² By my admittedly crude classification, 10 of the 17 belong predominantly to the type with which Platt and I dealt in *The American University*.³ Finally, the third source is unsystematic and miscellaneous reading and conversation about the situation at various institutions. Some of them are represented in the above lists, some of them are not.

In the final substantive chapter of *The American University*, Platt and I made a good deal of the multifunctional core which we called the "bundles," following a stimulus from Neil Smelser.⁴ The university type with which we were concerned brought together a number of distinct functions. First among these is the inclusion in its personnel and curriculum of virtually the whole range of the intellectual disciplines, usually classified in the tripartite rubrics of natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. This, of course, is particularly the case for faculties of arts and sciences. A second function is the inclusion in the activities of such faculties both of teaching and of research. Unlike some other systems there has been no major American tendency to extrude the research function from the university. A third prominent function is that of the teaching of graduate students, destined for the most part to be academic professionals, as well as that of undergraduates—that is, the combination of a graduate school and an undergraduate college. Finally, the fourth function is the drawing close to the core university of the schools for training in the applied professions. The three classical instances are those of law, medicine, and engineering, but certain others have become increasingly prominent, such as business and public administration, education, and training in what are sometimes called the helping professions, such as social work. The exact list of professional schools varies from university to university; for example, it is minimal at Princeton. But when one looks at the elite university system as a whole, one cannot omit reference to this feature. The analytical problem is why these multifarious functions have remained together in a single bundle and have not come to be distributed among structurally separate and distinctive units.

Our first contention about the aftermath of the disturbances of the 1960s is that by and large this bundle has remained intact and has not been broken up into separate elements.⁵ Its construction and strengthening were major features of university development from about the turn of the last century, and one striking outcome of the time of turmoil is that the structures built in this period have by and large survived. Along with other conditions in the society, such as financial support of at least minimal adequacy and political tolerance—though since 1971 there have been problems on both fronts—I should attribute this survival more than anything else to the involvement of relatively strongly professionalized faculties, the products of long and stringent processes of intellectual training either in graduate schools of arts and sciences, or in professional schools, or sometimes in both. The content of their training and their attitudes toward it have been strongly shaped by the values of cognitive rationality, as Platt and I have called them.⁶

It was an aspect of the disturbances of the 1960s that there were quite strident movements advocating at least a major diminution in the prominence of cognitive values, if not something approaching their overturn. These movements advocated change in two primary directions. The first of them is perhaps best tagged by the

term "relevance," which has meant, above all, concern for political reform, and which was generally accompanied by an attack on the so-called doctrine of "value neutrality" in the intellectual disciplines. Although it was most stridently advocated by certain groups of students, especially undergraduates, this concept was shared to some extent by some faculty members. The second direction was that of self-expression and a "freer" pattern of life with respect to which discipline in the intellectual sense was felt to be a hindrance. By and large, however, advocacy of these changes has subsided in the intervening period, and I think it fair to say that though new forms of political involvement of members of university communities have developed, and concern with aesthetic expression has presumably increased, the dominant tone is still a commitment to the primacy of intellectual and cognitive values.⁷

On the whole it seems fair to infer that the criteria for the evaluation of candidates for faculty appointments at the very least show a prominent pattern of continuity with those before the disturbances of the 1960s. Similar things can be said about the ethos of graduate and professional students. My personal experience in four institutions also confirms the view that the intellectual seriousness of a large proportion of graduate students has not shown a substantial decline in favor of either or both of the other two foci of concern. Indeed, on their part and on that of junior faculty members of my acquaintance, some intellectual work of the highest level that I have encountered in a rather long teaching career has come to my attention within the relevant period. There are, of course, changes. One of them is the phenomenon of "the new medical student" which was reported on by Renée Fox of the Department of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania in a recent unpublished paper. Professor Fox feels that, compared to the medical students she studied about twenty years ago, a much larger proportion of the current generation is seriously concerned with what she calls the "existential" problems of medical practice and of their patients as people. There is a considerable increase of interest in phenomena of suffering and death. It does not, however, follow that the current generation of medical students is less concerned with technical standards on the rational-cognitive side of medicine than were their predecessors. Somewhat similar things can be said about students in law schools, who tend to be more attracted by the possibilities of a public service orientation of law rather than with the standard corporate practice of a previous generation.

In faculties of arts and sciences there has been a good deal of talk about giving more attention to teaching, especially at the undergraduate level. Indeed, in his latest annual report, President Bok of Harvard made the introduction of a program for training in teaching by the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences his principal theme.⁸ He felt it to be feasible and to be a serious obligation of the graduate school. I would think it likely that the Harvard example is not an isolated instance, and that an important movement in this direction will soon be underway. As in the medical case, however, it does not seem to me to be likely that there is a major trend, as many advocated during the disturbance, away from the professional concern of academic people with intellectual values and with research. My own expectation is that the main trend will be toward a synthesis of the two facets of the role of the academic profession rather than the serious downgrading of one and corresponding upgrading of the other.

This brings us to certain questions about the undergraduate college, both in the group of institutions with which Platt and I have been primarily concerned, and in a substantially wider group, especially the more or less elite liberal arts colleges.

Students at the relatively elite colleges constituted the storm center of the disturbances we have been through, so it is not surprising that changes have been most prominent in this sector of the system of higher education. Indeed, I think substantial changes have already occurred and there are signs that at least some of them will stick. The most important of them can probably best be discussed under two headings which are categories of classical sociological significance. The first of these might perhaps be called authority structure, though this term does not cover the whole of what I have in mind. The second concerns sex composition at both the faculty and student levels.

In the first of these contexts the more radical sector of the movement of dissent carried a highly antinomian flavor. The extreme of this was the experimental establishment of what were sometimes called "free" universities, that is, some kind of collective process aimed at learning in which no status distinctions whatever were permitted between teachers and students or among students at different levels of competence. To my knowledge, none of these experimental attempts has proved to be stable and come to be an institutionalized part of the system of higher education. On a less radical level, however, there was much talk about "student power" and a greater participation of students in various forms of academic decision-making. Two contexts of such decision-making may appropriately be distinguished: one in curricular matters, and the other in what has come to be called "governance." In the former, there has certainly been a trend toward broadening the areas of independent responsibility and initiative open to students, including undergraduate students. In many ways this has been an acceleration of a very long-term trend away from the rigid curricula prevalent before the days of the elective system. There has been, however, a substantial increase in opportunities for students to help in the design of their own curricula. Related to this has been a wave of objection to the older mechanisms of evaluation of student performance, notably the grading system. Detailed formal requirements have been considerably mitigated, and there are various other facets to the problem.

These, of course, are trends which did not originate in the 1960s, but go rather far back. I have the impression that even at the undergraduate level for both teachers and students the main outcome of the period of turbulence has left the principal intellectual standards intact, even though the organizational setting in which they are implemented has changed. The crucial points are whether or not either students or faculty members had turned decisively away from commitment to intellectual achievement and the disposition to reward, through whatever mechanisms, excellence in such achievement. I personally do not see the evidence that there have been any decisive changes in this respect.⁹

A major part in this continuity of the main ethos has presumably been played by the relatively firm professionalization of academics in connection with their roles as members of faculties. In my opinion the continuing salience of the research function is of fundamental importance in this respect. The achievements which establish the reputations of the more elite members of the profession have rested above all in their contributions to the advancement of knowledge, and the intellectual quality and theoretical importance of these contributions. The most famous members of faculties are people with these kinds of achievements to their credit. Furthermore, the same ethos permeates the student level. I think first of graduate students and 'in particular' of the importance attributed to the dissertation. However, the same principle applies at the undergraduate level, particularly in the importance attributed to theses sub-

mitted by candidates for distinction. The prestige aspect of intellectual achievement becomes, it seems to me, increasingly important in proportion as the more authoritarian disciplinary constraints of previous stages of academic development have become less prominent. The continuing primacy of the cognitive focus also has a special order of importance. This concerns the maintenance of the structural distinctiveness of institutions of higher education vis-à-vis other structures in the society. In a politically pluralistic society it does not seem to make much sense for the university to transform itself into a protective base for movements of political reform, nor does it make much sense for it to transform itself into a glorified colony of artists. These are, of course, extreme formulae, but not unfair in the light of certain ideological movements.

It is convenient to use the relations of the sexes as a primary focus for the changes which have occurred most conspicuously at the undergraduate college level, but which have also permeated student life in graduate and professional schools and changed the character of faculties. It is, of course, a commonplace that there has been a great increase in the spread of coeducation. An impressive number of institutions previously confined to students of one sex have introduced the admission of the other sex as well. This, of course, has been most prominent in the cases of what were previously all-male colleges like Yale, Princeton, and Dartmouth. A number of previously all-female colleges, however, though by no means all of them have done the same thing. For example, Smith, Mt. Holyoke, and Bryn Mawr have remained exclusively women's colleges. But even here cooperative arrangements with neighboring men's institutions have resulted in a great deal of coeducational instruction. In the background there are two particularly conspicuous innovations. One is the step from coeducation to what is frequently called "coresidence," that is, both sexes share the same basic residential facilities. Along with this has gone a very notable loosening of the so-called "parietal" regulations so that the behavior of men and women students has been increasingly treated as their private concern and not a proper subject for administrative regulation. This, of course, does not include the basic problems of maintaining order or, for example, controlling theft and other unpleasant disturbances of dormitory life. This is perhaps the most conspicuous area in which something like a revolution may be said to have occurred in the last decade or so on the American academic scene.

There has also been conspicuous pressure to increase the proportion of women in certain graduate schools, and especially at faculty levels. It is a notable fact of the larger society that the so-called "women's liberation movement" has not subsided along with the more general student disturbances, and pressure is coming from that movement and from government sources to increase women's participation at various levels. It has already made considerable headway.

This movement and its influence have been closely related to a more general egalitarianism, one major manifestation of which has been the pressure to increase the proportion of members of socially disadvantaged groups who are given the opportunity for quality higher education. This movement to increase the proportion of minority group members—notably blacks, but also, for example, so-called chicanos—in student bodies has been most prominent at the undergraduate college level, although by no means confined to that level. One example is the special program supported by several foundations for the training of black students in law in various prestigious law schools. One of the conditions in that particular program is a commitment on the part of the recipient to practice law in the South. The proportion

of black lawyers practicing in southern communities has already been quite substantially increased by this program.¹⁰

This egalitarian trend, a society-wide phenomenon sparked by the civil rights movement of the early 1960s, has had very wide repercussions. In some of its more extreme manifestations it has produced the open admissions policy adopted by the city system of higher education in New York. The question of possible "discrimination in reverse" which was raised before the Supreme Court in a University of Washington Law School case still remains unsettled at the legal level. However, it is important that the movement and its consequent pressures have already substantially altered the composition of the student bodies of even the more elite units of the academic system, and of course not without rather severe disturbances in the process. Nevertheless, this also is in line with a long-term trend. A comparison of the composition of such student bodies by family origin will reveal that the process of "democratization" has been a continuing one.

The inclusion of such disadvantaged groups as blacks and chicanos in higher education has a certain parallel, though it is by no means exact, with the inclusion of Jews earlier in the present century. The more elite sectors of the system of higher education, though not in the political sense anti-Semitic, were notably restrictive at the level of both student admissions and faculty appointments with respect to Jewish participation, although somewhat less so with respect to other categories of what was then called the "new immigration," notably Roman Catholics from Ireland and eastern and southern Europe. In these respects there has clearly been a major transformation. Probably the Jews are very substantially overrepresented, relative to their proportionate numbers in the population generally, at almost all levels of the academic world, and by no means least in its more elite sectors. In the light of this previous history it does not seem likely that the egalitarian features of the recent trend will necessarily upset the core patterns of the academic community. The problem of changing participation of the sexes, however, raises a somewhat different set of issues.

Evidence from an as yet unpublished study of faculty members by Platt and myself at least suggests that the participation of women at faculty levels tends to involve a role pattern which is different from that of men.¹¹ It is our hunch, which we hope to examine carefully in the near future, that this is not a simple matter of "sexism," that is, of discrimination on grounds of sex, but that it may very well turn out to be at least partly a matter of sex-typed differences of preference and inclination. Two contexts will serve to illustrate such differences. In the first case, we find that women faculty members are by and large less concerned with commitments to research than their male counterparts of comparable training and appointment status and, correspondingly, are more concerned with teaching. Second, as between the two primary grades of teaching performed by members of faculties of arts and sciences, women faculty members are more concerned with undergraduate teaching than with graduate teaching. They tend to assume a kind of "caring" role vis-à-vis their students to a higher degree than their male counterparts.

If there is to be a major change in the sex composition of the academic profession, these differences and others comparable to them may in the longer run bring about considerable changes. I mention these straws of evidence simply to raise the problem of whether this will occur and in what form. It could turn out that undergraduate teaching would become a particularly feminine prerogative, but we cannot be sure. At any rate, there seems to be a warning against one of the stances of the women's liberation movement that there should be not merely iden-

tity of opportunity, but identity of formal result of career lines for members of the two sex groups.

I may come back for a moment to certain problems touching governance. First, with reference to student participation, there has been a substantial increase in student representation on various decision-making bodies, notably various kinds of committees. In a minority of institutions this has extended to formal student participation in faculty appointments even at the senior level. However, it does not seem to me that there has been a major change of revolutionary proportions establishing essentially decision-making equality between faculty and students or otherwise radically altering the fourfold stratification scale I mentioned above in connection with the institution of tenure.¹² One way to put this estimate of probability is that the university is fundamentally a collegial, not a democratic, association. The formal equality in ultimate decision-making of all the participating members should not be regarded as an imperative of this type of social structure. Again, the primary focus of its difference from a democratic association lies in the commitments of the faculties to a career guided by values of cognitive rationality and aiming at maximal competence in their implementation. It is only where student prerogatives are protected by some kind of outside force that they have succeeded in upsetting the main outline of this balance, as for example, at the Free University of Berlin.

An apparently rather different issue concerns the problem of unionization and collective bargaining at faculty levels and in relation to academic administrations. A drive for unionization has indeed taken place, but it has had and is likely to have limited success. In particular it seems accurate to state that the elite core of the academic profession has not been engulfed by this drive, and that it has been most successful in those systems where mass teaching of undergraduate students is most prominent, such as the city system of New York. It has notably not succeeded in becoming established in the faculty of New York University.¹³

The drive toward unionization, if it goes far enough, would certainly introduce profound alterations into the social structure of the sectors of higher education affected. It is often put forward as an alternative to the institution of tenure. Judging by its consequences in industry and some sectors of governmental administration, however, it seems likely that it would shift the emphasis in the direction of prerogatives of seniority as distinguished from the connection between tenure and academic freedom. Unionized organizations very generally have been forced to accept a rather rigid system of seniority prerogatives which cannot be broken through in the name of excellence of individual achievement. This problem leaves a large question mark for the future of the academic world.

In conclusion, I would like to restate my impression that the core structures of the more elite American university have by and large survived intact at a time when the storm of disturbance has conspicuously subsided and has remained calm for approximately three years. The question of whether it will remain so, of course, will require much more systematic and thorough testing than I have been able to subject it to. However, if it stands up to such testing, it seems to me that two primary conclusions may legitimately be drawn. The first of these, already stated above, is that on the whole the level of institutionalization of the main pattern which had been attained prior to the 1960s was relatively firm. There is no question that this framework has been subjected to severe pressures, but by and large it seems to have come out with relatively minimal alteration. Much of this alteration, moreover, is in directions for which there was a good deal of precedent in the developmental trends es-

tablished well before the era of turbulence. I would hesitate to predict a future smoothness of development. It seems likely that the tensions involved in the development of the cognitive complex and its institutionalization in higher education will remain severe. It is far from impossible that comparable periods of disturbance await us in the future, and in future cases their consequences might be substantially more disruptive than the recent experience has proved to be. Nevertheless, I think it justified to claim that the establishment of the university system has constituted a major development of the structure of American society and culture and one which will not easily be pushed aside.

The other conclusion concerns the validity of the emphasis which Platt and I gave in our interpretation of what was at work in the disturbances themselves. Especially in the final substantive chapter of *The American University*, we stressed the concepts of inflation followed by deflationary crisis, using the model which had been developed in economic theory but applying it primarily to noneconomic components of the social and cultural system.¹⁴ We interpreted a major feature of the disturbances to constitute a deflationary crisis in certain respects comparable to the financial panics which were common in advanced economies until certain orders of control had become established. We think, above all, that the relative rapidity with which disturbances have subsided, and the fact that the newly won stability has now lasted about three years are, at the very least, consistent with this interpretation. It is a point of view not commonly put forward by students of higher education, and we think it ought to be further developed and broadly considered in future research in this area.

REFERENCES

1. Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, *The American University* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).
2. David Riesman and Verne A. Stadtman (eds.), *Academic Transformation: Seventeen Institutions Under Pressure* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973).
3. Parsons and Platt, *The American University*; the ten are University of California at Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, University of Michigan, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Rutgers, Stanford, University of Toronto, and University of Wisconsin. This classification is certainly true also of the two not included in the above list with which I have had personal contact, namely, University of Chicago and Brown, and also of three other notable ones not on either list, namely, Columbia, Cornell, and Yale. See Riesman and Stadtman, *Academic Transformation*, and Parsons and Platt, *The American University*.
4. *Ibid.*, chap. 8.
5. Talcott Parsons, "The University 'Bundle': A Study of the Balance Between Differentiation and Integration," in *Public Higher Education in California: Growth, Structural Change, and Conflict*, ed. Neil Smelser and Gabriel Almond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
6. Platt and I have some new "hard" evidence for this continuity. The American Council on Education has kindly made available to us the data of a survey of faculty members collected in 1973. About one-third of the institutions in their sample were the same as those in our 1968 sample, and many of the questions used appeared on both surveys. For the two highest prestige groups of institutions on our five-level scale, the four most highly valued goals out of sixteen included were all primarily expressions of cognitive values. These included teaching students to think clearly and logically, to respect empirical evidence, and to achieve mastery of the content of their discipline. On the four cognitive goals the percentages of respondents ranking them highest ranged from well in the 80s to the high 60s. The highest of the others who favored more noncognitive goals received priority from only 46 percent of the respondents.

7. See especially the annual report, dated April, 1974, of Edward H. Levi, President of the University of Chicago, entitled "The State of the University." Levi makes the commitment of his university to intellectual excellence the primary keynote of this notable report.
8. Derek C. Bok, "The President's Report, 1972-73" (Cambridge, Mass.: President's Office, Harvard University, January, 1974), multilithed.
9. The case of Brown University is a particularly interesting one. In 1969, largely under pressure from an undergraduate movement, the Brown faculty adopted what was called the "new curriculum," which introduced a very major step in the direction I have just spoken of. There were several facets to this change, but one abolished all distribution requirements, though those of concentration were retained; and another gave the student the option of being evaluated on a pass-fail basis, as it is usually called, in any or all courses. The program also greatly broadened the opportunities for students to design programs of study on their own initiative, though approval by a member of the faculty was still required if credit was to be given. Recently, as reported in the *New York Times*, there has been an atmosphere of student apathy in these matters, and the faculty did limit the proportion of courses where pass-fail grading would be permitted for any one student. The faculty in general has refused to repudiate the main idea of the new curriculum. Students, however, have become in some sense more "conservative" in their attitudes toward it. As shown in various documents about the situation, one of their concerns has been the acceptability of recommendations to admitting authorities in graduate and professional schools. I have the impression that the main intellectual climate of Brown has not been revolutionized away from the predisturbance standards. This brief account is based both on oral communications and on a set of documents, committee reports, and reports of officers of the university and the like, and articles in the alumni and student magazines which were made available to me. The *New York Times* article to which I referred was published on Sunday, February 24, 1974. I am particularly indebted to Professor Martin Martel of Brown University for making these materials available to me.
10. Robert Spearman and Hugh Stevens, "A Step Toward Equal Justice: Programs to Increase Black Lawyers in the South, 1969-1973," An Evaluation Report to Carnegie Corporation of New York (New York: Carnegie Corporation, April, 1974, pamphlet).
11. Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, "The American Academic Profession: A Pilot Study" (Cambridge, Mass.: Department of Sociology, Harvard University), multilith, 1968, out of print.
12. In Parsons and Platt, *The American University*, chap. 3, we attempt to extend the concept of tenure from the senior level only to include three others: junior faculty, graduate students, and undergraduate students. I do not take space to explain this here, but the reader can find it fully discussed in the above reference.
13. "World," *Saturday Review*, June 29, 1974.
14. Parsons and Platt, *The American University*, chap. 8.

JEROME KAGAN

On the Uses of the University

MOST CITIZENS ARE quick to acknowledge the distinctively different functions of parks—depending on the age, intention, and talent of the users. They are far less objective about the university even though it, no less than the park, serves constituencies whose hierarchies of needs vary with social class, ethnicity, and vocational aspiration. There is, therefore, variability in the characteristic profile of faculty and student concerns in our postsecondary schools—from junior college through university—with each person committed, at least initially, to validating the value decisions he has brought to the institution.

Although most social institutions have more than one purpose, they survive for long periods only by being unusually efficient at a central function that the community has continued to value. For the American university, that function is the transmission and creation of knowledge. The discord among the tenants of the university stems not from that premise, but from disagreement over the content of the curriculum, the manner in which it is transmitted, the degree to which the interests of students or faculty should dominate the institution's daily life, and the particular uses of knowledge.

Since the vast majority of colleges and universities devote more of their resources to teaching than to original scholarship, some of the functions of the university are sophisticated extensions of those served by the elementary and high schools. For example, the university continues to remind its matriculates of their cultural origins by tutoring them in a special style of composition and speech, offering particular interpretations of the present, and rehearsing a dialogue of complementary interrogatories and replies that the larger community is prepared to respect. The university is sensitive to the maturity of its audience and occasionally seasons these presentations with alternative histories and premises that sharpen logical tools, reorganize corpora of knowledge, and prune obsolescent dogma that has reduced the clarity with which the self and the self's position in the larger community are perceived.

For a moderate proportion of its temporary audience, the university teaches technical skills that are most efficiently mastered within its walls, thus permitting a new cadre of engineers, pharmacists, accountants, and chemists to replace retiring cohorts. The university continues to be a good place, indeed in contemporary American society it may be the best place, where those who desire enhanced status or greater power than their parents held can realistically attain the prize.

Finally, the university allows some fortunate young adults the opportunity to perfect special talents that would remain unformed if not tutored by minds with similar interests and more advanced training. Modern Western society has been kind to a small group of families who have acquired sufficient wealth and status that

they need not bother to burden their adolescent sons and daughters with the worry of work. These privileged few can nurture delicious daydreams in which the primary concern is to compose the perfect poem, discover the roots of their prejudices, or field-test the durability and versatility of their emotional machinery.

It is obvious that the relative priority of these functions is not randomly distributed across students, but highly correlated with family background. The daughter of a wealthy San Francisco attorney is likely to regard self-actualization as the reason for attending the college of her choice; the son of a Sacramento migrant farm laborer does not usually have that alternative; technical skills and mobility dominate his rationale for sitting attentively through fifty-minute lectures with three hundred of his peers.

Increasing social egalitarianism coupled with a deeper skepticism toward the relation between fact and truth have created uncertainty (or flexibility, depending on one's prejudices) over the nature of the mental work and pattern of competences that should preoccupy university activity. Consider the extreme case of a faculty and student body who believed that perfection of the ability to enter into transcendental meditation for several hours a day was the most valuable talent to transmit to young adults. If the larger community shared that prejudice, a curriculum dominated by TM would be defensible. The differences in catalogue offerings among M.I.T., Pacific Oaks, and Ferris reveal the immense variety in educational philosophy in America's colleges.

This relativistic attitude toward curriculum is controversial because the majority of college faculty believe that the one outstanding purpose of the university is to create optimal conditions for the exercise of mind. Whether the campus be a graduate research faculty or an undergraduate teaching college, most faculty, whether or not they engage in original scholarship, would like to see the college as a temple and the students receptive to the belief that unconstrained thought can chisel the convoluted surface separating mind from reality and replace false propositions with less false ones.

Many faculty make the simple assumption that a single experiencing of the joy that attends the unfettered manipulation of ideas will inevitably lead to a permanent addiction. The faculty are not naïve enough to consider all youth equally vulnerable to that addiction, and it is generally thought that those who have tasted that delight in the past—a diagnosis usually made on the basis of past grades and test scores—will be most ready for that revelation.

The fact that graduates of certain colleges eventually attain positions of greater secular power and bank books with larger balances is either ignored, regarded as a matter of luck, or interpreted as a fair reward for those who are sensitive and wise enough to understand and appreciate the aesthetics of intellect. Since they were more virtuous, it was certainly not immoral for them to share more fully in worldly prizes.

Since the desire for enhanced status has an organizing influence on most other motives, the educational community generally regards the practices of campuses with higher status as more virtuous. Hence most colleges, regardless of size or wealth, hold that the elaboration of mind is one of the central missions of higher education. Some behave in accordance with that view; many pay it lip service; but none rejects it openly. However, there has been a recent eroding of the faith in the aesthetic beauty and purity of the intellectual life and that erosion has led to nodes of discord.

One of the many factors that has contributed to the recent mood of doubt is a partial corruption of some faculty by the temptations of power offered by the secular community. This charge does not originate from a pollyannaish view that this behavior is necessarily immoral in any universal sense. Morality, with only a few exceptions, is mainly a local matter; in this case, it is judged by the members of the university. From the perspective of the students, some faculty violated their devotions. Some faculty are not sure whom they serve. The secular demands on the science faculty have led to some dissembling, and the university has become, for a few, a downtown office from which international business is conducted rather than an extension of the study at home.

The history of rebellion has a few lessons to teach us—one of which is that the large group that awards power to the small one above it remains loyal only so long as the former believes the latter has virtue. The large group is quick to tear down castles when those with temporary authority become more concerned with their personal needs than with those of the community they are supposed to serve. The secure tenure of authority requires that the subordinated accept direction from those persons who they believe are justly entitled to that intangible prize. The rebellions that created Christianity, European republics, and campus unrest were catalyzed, in part, by an increased narcissism on the part of those in power. Selfishness may not be inherently good or evil, but it is inimical to the stability of contracts based on voluntary commitments.

The optimal relation between student and faculty is not unlike that of a good marriage in which each partner identifies with the other, shares a common lore and aims, and views the other's welfare as taking priority over his or her own. America's educational institutions will continue to display different profiles of the concerns described initially. But that list of functions will continue to include an affirmation of the beauty of intellectual inquiry and the conscientious tutoring in its methods. That assumption is the common thread that unites the small, elite private junior college in New England, the four-year state college in California, and the large state university in the Midwest.

Assertion of the primacy of intellectual inquiry does not mean that the university can be indifferent to its position in the larger society. The church tried to ignore the larger community and, finding itself alone, quickly scooped up its robes and scurried forward to join its necessary complement.

The contemporary university has decided to serve by helping citizens determine what is true rather than what is right, because its human and inanimate resources are, at the moment, more expert in tutoring the methods of logical analysis and empiricism than those of phenomenology or authoritative persuasion. It is likely, as Heisenberg has suggested, that harmony in a society requires a common interpretation of unitary principles and that poetry provides the greatest insight into those themes. But the university does not possess a recipe for the creation of poets. It knows how to help youth decide what is empirically correct and logically coherent; it is less able to influence what will be phenomenologically satisfying.

The propositions, whose truth value as truth man wishes to assess, vary with long cycles of history and perturbations of social crisis. That variation is a serious source of tensions between students and faculty. Fortunately, there are some issues that pique both groups. But faculty are likely to pursue problems they believe can be answered, while the student prefers to probe those he feels must be answered. Propositions about the honeybee's ommatidia can be as beautiful as propositions

about social unrest. But the scholar is happiest and most productive when the question he selects permits valid probing and engages the work of others. Faculties celebrate the process of inquiry; students wish answers. It is not an easy task to persuade the young that the pursuit is a legitimate and vital enterprise.

I recall an informal luncheon meeting with ten graduate students in the program in clinical psychology and public practice that was administered by the Graduate School of Education at Harvard. At one point I asked these bright and enthusiastic students what they wished to do as professionals. "Help people," was their unanimous reply. When I asked, "Why?" a vigorous and lengthy discussion followed. And then I provoked them with a challenge that continues to arouse some guilt. When the moment seemed right, I suggested that if that afternoon each of them were given a special power that allowed them to touch sad and unhealthy people, and with that contact render each one well again, they would become quickly bored. Their answer was preceded by one of the longest and most painful silences I can remember.

The university, like the family, has changed with time, eliminating some responsibilities and taking on new ones, while retaining its basic structure. The family does not grow maize any more; the college does not require chapel attendance. But the university has retained, and I hope will continue to retain, the central function for which it was created. The family's task is to persuade the child of his basic value and to provide him with a refuge when he is distressed until he is mature enough to handle both challenges autonomously. The university's task is to provide the young adult with the opportunity and incentive to question his existing beliefs and with the knowledge and skills that enable him to synthesize a more coherent view of his relation to nature and to his past.

JACQUELYN ANDERSON MATTFELD

Liberal Education in Contemporary American Society

IS THERE STILL a place for liberal education in contemporary American society? My spontaneous response is a resounding and unequivocal "yes," if by "place" one means "need." If I understand the question correctly, it asks in slightly different words the old question of whether higher education in a democracy should equip all able persons for specific occupations and professions, or whether it should disregard the utilitarian and provide instead instruction intended to train and integrate the faculties of mind (reason, imagination, emotion) so that individuals can better seek understanding and make sound judgments. For the purpose of discussion I will call the first of these two kinds of postsecondary education "professional," though I use it to include as well all specialized training, preprofessional, occupational, and technical; and the second, I shall call "liberal."

Before making a case for the retention of the term "liberal education" and for the importance to our civilization of continuing to emphasize the purposes which have served to define that image of higher education, it seems important to state two of the obvious points we generally omit in our shoptalk. First, we should keep in mind that "liberal" and "professional" learning are not necessarily mutually exclusive, though we have historically made them out to be so. The dichotomy that existed between the education offered free men and the manual training imposed upon slaves two thousand years ago, or the contrast between the classical university education of the leisure class and the vocational or technical instruction available to the working class after it gained literacy as recently as a hundred years ago, has no genuine counterpart in modern discussions of the presumed distinctions between general and preprofessional, or liberal and professional education. We now commonly assume that all men and most women who attend our colleges will be employed specialists of some kind, and that all will enjoy a standard of living that affords a degree of leisure enjoyed only by the wealthiest stratum of society until a few generations ago.

All modern students, then, are in varying degrees candidates for both professional and liberal education as they enter college and at all points in life thereafter. Whether the education they are actually offered through formal instruction can be said to be "liberal" will depend in large part on *how* they are taught those subjects they might choose to study. There is nothing inherently "preprofessional" or "liberal" in studying a work of art, a social problem, or a natural phenomenon. Only a few faculty members use the occasion of teaching, not only for imparting information for its own sake but with the deliberate intent of showing students how study of the matter at hand is related to human dilemmas and human values, or how facts, reason, and judgment must be integrated before one can appreciate, criticize, solve a problem or obtain understanding in any seg-

ment of any branch of learning. Some of the least liberalizing teaching is done by the strongest advocates of "liberal education."

Regardless of the approach taken to teaching by their faculty, whether students can ultimately be considered liberally educated will depend more on themselves than on their teachers, for each student takes selectively from his family, his peers, and the total environment what he is consciously or unconsciously seeking and ready for at any given time. There is very little evidence to suggest that a student is likely to become a different sort of human being for having studied in a "preprofessional" rather than a "liberal" college. Many who teach and administer recognize that what were once believed to be evidences of the *effects* of a particular kind of education on students, when examined dispassionately are found to be more closely correlated with the student's personality, maturation, motivation, and goals than with the institution's philosophy and degree requirements. While there has been considerable unanimity as to the proper objectives of liberal education among its protagonists, it should also be remembered that there is continual disagreement even among those protagonists on what its duration, structure, and content should be. A number of liberal arts schools have very different curricula.

Yet the values, skills, and achievements of any cross-section of the graduates from very different colleges, or from successive curricula in the same college, make it evident that curriculum does not result in appreciable differences in the later rational or ethical behavior of the students, in their taste for learning, their appreciation of culture, or in any of the other benefits once thought to result from education in a college reflecting one or another view of what should constitute an undergraduate education. The bachelor's degree requirements found in a preprofessional curriculum usually specify a sequence of courses in a single branch of learning or in a small number of closely related ones selected by the faculty as providing a student with the knowledge and methodology required for advanced study that will lead to scholarship in a single academic field or to a specialized profession. The English major steadily making his way through such requirements with the goal of entering a distinguished graduate school of arts and sciences, or the chemistry major with an eye fixed on medical school, often grows in ways associated with liberal education. Such a student is likely to gain not only the desired competency but an increasing ability to think logically, to express himself clearly in writing and orally, to see relationships, formulate a set of personal values, and so forth. Conversely, the student in a college which prides itself on resisting early, too-great specialization by establishing B.A. requirements that include the selection of courses across a broad spectrum of subjects and establishes only a minimal number of courses in a major may through a chance exposure become fascinated by a particular subject and set off on a life-long quest to master and contribute to it. Or such a student may discover his professional calling when he becomes aware that he has come to select courses that not only satisfy the college's requirements for distribution and concentration, but which have an internal coherence which suggests the predisposition to a particular vocation and has been the source of conscious or unconscious specialization. And students in many kinds of institutions studying for very different personal ends quite commonly find or develop a taste for one or more of the arts through extracurricular or credited study or for reading in one or several areas of knowledge which have little or nothing to do with the field of their postcollege employment but which provide intellectual and aesthetic pleasure in leisure throughout a lifetime.

So far I have admitted that the attainment of the goals for liberal and preprofessional education may occur simultaneously in a single student, and may do so regardless of the kind of institution in which he has studied. I have acknowledged that we know very little about whether different curricula labeled "liberal" are more or less successful in helping bring about the improvement, discipline, and free development of the mind and spirit of students. I have even conceded that in evaluating liberal education, unlike preprofessional or professional studies, we seem unlikely to be able to prove or disprove that institutions have attained the goals they have established for their students. Nevertheless, I believe that this generation of contemporary American society, more than any preceding one, must preserve and support at least some institutions whose faculty and students will continue to design and test and redesign education programs that have as their express purposes those intellectual, personal, and social ends traditionally associated with liberal education. In a society so beset by potentially death-dealing problems some solutions may come from technologists and engineers, but if those men and women are isolated by their way of looking at knowledge from the basic questions of human existence and social concern that mark the liberally educated, the imagined horrors presented by the most chilling "future novels" may pale beside reality.

It is hard to imagine that any dispassionate observer of the United States on the threshold of the fourth quarter of the twentieth century could dispute the need for more of its inhabitants to exercise responsible leadership, to examine information and points of view critically, to respect facts, exercise judgment, participate as informed citizens in governance and matters of the public weal. It is hard to believe we ourselves would not welcome an end to all the kinds of prejudice that weaken and destroy our social fabric. An evening in front of the television screen reminds us that, though the human being is the only animal whose brain registers pleasure from the stimulus of thought, modern people, who all too often feel empty, purposeless, and helpless, do little to use their intellectual capacities in ways found effective in overcoming these same feelings at other times and in other cultures. Liberal education explicitly attempts to teach in ways that encourage the individual to be well informed, to make connections and see relationships, to come to informed judgments and act upon them, to use reason to overcome fear and suspicion of the unknown. To the extent that at least some of our most intelligent citizens can achieve the goals of such education, there is the chance that individual and collective freedom, peace, and creative activity will be able to survive in a time of technological and bureaucratic oppression. For this reason alone it is essential to the health of our country that there be *some* institutions devoted to offering liberal education, and some liberal studies in *all* institutions of higher learning. There is a second equally important reason for continuing the efforts to understand the assets of liberal education and to finance it. The very existence of such programs or institutions is evidence to those who by their own natures and intellectual preferences are drawn to them that there are places even in our contemporary materialistic society for people who are primarily concerned with modern manifestations of the most fundamental human problems.

Like any minority, these men and women need affirmation that their differentness from the mainstream is acceptable and valuable. They are attracted to a liberal education because they are fascinated by concepts of personal freedom, respect, responsibility, beauty, and goodness, are caught up with the search for

meaning in life through reason, imagination, and personal relationships, and are engaged in the attempt to understand the world in which they exist. Men and women who find their way to formal education at any age with these objectives in mind need the example and companionship of others who also find learning and discourse challenging, pleasurable, necessary to their full growth, even indispensable to their existence. People in whom are combined high intellect, personal sensitivity, and social awareness are rare at any time and in any culture. That small minority of the community of scholars, who, though trained as specialists, nevertheless can function as generalists and liberal educators in the classroom, provide affirmation to those who, because of the questions they ask and their approach to knowledge, would otherwise feel as alien in the modern university as in the marketplace.

It is admittedly improbable that more than a modest fraction of those who teach or those who study are genuinely committed to humanistic intellectual pursuits. Clearly more people are moved to learn in order to gain employment, security, or recognition than are moved to learn in order to fill a craving to understand, to satisfy curiosity, or pursue self-knowledge, wisdom, and human service. Equally intelligent people have different reasons for study, different ways of learning, different interests and abilities. In addition, the educational goals and personal needs of any given individual also change and are different at different periods of life. Not only must a modern democracy ensure that higher education exists in as many forms as are required to prepare a broad spectrum of young people to enter the society in a variety of needed roles, it must also make quality education available to people of *all* ages in order that they may develop their capabilities to the fullest throughout their lifetimes. There would be less futile debate about whether there is still a place for liberal education in contemporary America if we would recognize that for many people the need to learn skills and information that equip them for work may precede by many years awareness of a desire for learning for its own sake, while for others, years of grappling with the search for self and of investigating knowledge from a variety of standpoints are essential before they can determine for what work they will want to be trained. Many intelligent people would, if given the opportunity and encouragement, alternate liberal, preprofessional, or professional study in various combinations and alternations from adolescence through old age according to their unique patterns of personal development. For this to happen we must discard the notion that "college" can ever be the capstone on an education that will serve the graduate adequately through the remaining two-thirds or three-quarters of his life. We must provide continuous access to professional, preprofessional, *and* liberal education to people of all ages, races, and both sexes.

The question is not whether there is a *place* for liberal education in contemporary society. The need is there. The question is whether, in the face of the economic inflation and depression which threaten the survival of educational institutions, and of the central role of capitalism, technology, and the specialist in determining the contours of higher learning, faculties can be persuaded to offer, students to study, families, public and private donors to finance, and society to approve and support learning that states intentions so ephemeral as "enlarging and refining intellectual capacities and judgment, providing knowledge of general cultural and social concern, and bringing about the improvement, discipline, and free development of the mind and spirit" (Oxford Dictionary). It seems unlikely that the few voices of those calling for the higher education of all citizens, so that this nation may be informed by some nobler purpose than the production

of experts to take their place in The System, will succeed in catching the public's attention or can call for the "amen" of a giant technological and capitalistic bureaucracy. Not many scholars or members of the so-called intelligentsia have commented upon the relationship of violence and the sense of helplessness within an increasingly dehumanized and technocratically controlled environment to the loss of a sense of culture and intellectual community. Perhaps that is because the prevailing view of what is appropriate for the scholars' attention is for the most part several steps removed from the dilemmas facing the human species or any individual within the species.

Professional pressures on the faculty since 1900 have led to the rapid acquisition of new information. They have as a consequence made new information the absolute objective of research, and made advanced study one more form of training experts. This has led to an anomalous situation in some universities and colleges where there has been a call for renewed attention to the quality and content of undergraduate education, and of general education in contrast to concentration within disciplines. General education has been dubbed "anti-intellectual" and studies in nonquantifiable areas, "soft." Even colleges which have taken a leading role in the history of liberal education are finding it increasingly difficult to get senior faculty to teach introductory level or general education courses. One wonders whether we would not long since have adopted the European model of education, extending secondary schools by one or two years and offering only study-in-depth in the various disciplines in college, were it not that freshmen and sophomores who fill giant courses pay full tuitions vital to the trembling balance of the budget and provide employment for the graduate students who largely instruct them. In contrast junior and senior undergraduates and especially graduate students attend classes with much smaller enrollments, and graduate-student tuitions do not cover the cost of their education. Thus the younger student who is less likely yet to be committed to a professional career is paying proportionately more for an education and receiving less faculty attention, if any at all. And this is the student most likely to be seeking a liberal education. In spite of the 1969-70 spirit of student-initiated "reforms," few faculty members are interested in developing or teaching courses intended to show relationships among fields or to demonstrate the interplay of subjects required in dealing with a complex concept, the history of an idea, or a social or political problem. Because faculties are not hired or rewarded for doing so, few of their members will. The present high prestige and financial security that come to scholars who are often indifferent teachers too often indirectly denies liberal education to undergraduates.

This is not the first time that liberal education has seemed superfluous or extravagant to many. But it may now be more endangered than in previous times because there seem to be fewer men and women within the institutions who are convinced of its being essential. Those faculty members who *are*, unfortunately, are often wedded to some particular curricular structure or content rather than to the open investigation and continuous experimentation necessary if we are to find timely and effective means of achieving the ends of liberal education. And not all the theses, commissions, studies, or analyses can bring about self-renewal of the institutions that have traditionally housed humankind's search for understanding and that now are staffed by such faculties. It is quite possible that the colleges and universities which survive the present financial crises will have done so not by accommodation to new social requirements, but by dramatic withdrawal into an elitism and

conventionality that will gradually make them living fossils, while the art of education springs up in new places on a new day. Until we are sure that that is what will happen, we who are still a part of traditional colleges and universities have a responsibility for continuing to work to create or recreate a climate in our institutions where liberal education, call it humanistic endeavor, will not be stifled but nourished. Irrational fear of the unfamiliar, rejection of the untried, prejudice against the uncommon are not found exclusively among the uneducated. And educators, like everyone else, are less courageous when their livelihood is threatened. Still we must insist that the unexamined myths that so often determine our educational policies and practices be tested and changed where the results would indicate change is needed. We must fight internal and external pressures that tend to erode the tradition and values of liberal education, to destroy the diversity among institutions, and within each institution. We must revitalize liberal education only because it remains the best means yet found by which scholars, artists, and teachers can contribute to the solution of the critical conditions that threaten to engulf the human race.

THOMAS BOYLSTON ADAMS

One Wide River to Cross

HIGHER EDUCATION is all that is left of our faith. Religion failed us by the middle of the eighteenth century. We turned to reason and the law. But when the Constitution we had devised for the dignity of man was made an instrument for the extension of slavery, we had no recourse but violence. After the Civil War we tried science and wealth as the way to salvation. From some to more we would go, from riches to richer, from high to higher, even to everlasting. We stand terrified before the atom.

The means with which we sought God, by which we tried to channel and tame greed, with which we discovered and let loose supernal power remains the best product of our striving. Education to some of the favored of the human race has provided much of what earlier generations demanded of divinity. So the less privileged have come to worship education. Those who know it best, are aware of its shortcomings as well as the advantages it confers, believe—as far as they believe in anything—in education.

As our knowledge has increased, our demands have moderated. We know that we can raise the whirlwind just as effectively as the Jehovah with whom Job conversed. Medicine and biochemistry have promoted health more effectively than miracles. We have gone a long way toward reducing infant mortality. Even death, the insoluble, is a less immediate problem. After long life it is no more than the laying down of a burden. Youth, never less than dangerous, has at least a decent chance of survival and even happiness.

A considerable part of the heaven that all the generations of men have imagined and sought is ours for the asking. And yet in sheer numbers probably there are more people just plain miserable on the face of the earth than ever before in history. This is at once a tribute to our scientific genius and an indictment of our social failure. The proportion of the totally miserable to the partially satisfied has shrunk—a hopeful statistic—but the gross result threatens the very structure of world society.

And even that part of the race that is more comfortable is terribly insecure in its comfort. The industrial balance is too precarious. A rise in the price of oil can disrupt the economies of the most fortunate nations, as can indeed the failure of a banking system or a political scandal. And, for all, the atomic bomb is an apocalyptic reality. The *dies irae* may at any moment burst on us and of our own making.

We know that this material condition of the world in which we live is the result of higher education. We cannot but speculate that the intellectual attitudes of the human race may be susceptible to a similarly drastic transformation. So far no serious effort has been made. The universities have shunned the problem of ethics.

Most Americans look upon the university as a sort of trade school. A university education holds promise of a better job at higher pay. It is the high road to success

in the law, in business, in the innumerable material expressions of applied science.

Yet the real problems of the world, especially the American world which has progressed so far in a material way, are ethical. Every American child born could have sufficient amounts of every necessity of life. It could have educational opportunity. It might even become civilized. It does not because that is not the way our society is constructed. The controlling agents are commercial and political. At most, the university is a mild critic of the scheme of things as they are. The imperative need is to educate those who actually possess the power to act. And the education they lack is moral and ethical.

It was the ambition of the advanced educators of the latter part of the nineteenth century to offer to young men in college a broad opportunity to enlarge and cultivate their minds. It was thought that young men's characters would undergo a subtle change. No longer slaves to a classical education, parrots of dead languages, they would have some acquaintance with Latin and Greek, but real familiarity with the mind and thought of Greece and Rome. They would know something of the whole history of the Western world. They would be at least amateur critics of its art. They would understand the principles of mathematics and make a beginning on science with at least an understanding of what were the purposes of geology, biology, and chemistry. Above all, they would be able to speak and write the English language. They would have some knowledge even of the alien cultures of the East.

It was a large order, but it worked somewhat. The elective system became general throughout the nation. A type of young man began to emerge from the colleges perhaps less disciplined than previous generations, but much more broadly schooled and more enthusiastic for the intellectual life. These men eagerly seized on the opportunities of the time, entering into the postgraduate professional schools and making a powerful mark on the great age of American expansion. Whether a residue of a simple American past or an osmosis from the teaching of the universities, they had on the whole high standards of ethical behavior. Medicine, the law, and the sciences all benefited. Politics felt the personality of Theodore Roosevelt; William Ostler was the beau ideal of the medical profession; a whole college generation rushed, ahead of its contemporaries, to the rescue of France; and when Woodrow Wilson tried to save "democracy," the college men knew what he meant by the word.

The awful disruptions and passions which followed World War I carried into limbo the athletic Christian. All that remained of nineteenth-century idealism was an occasional conservative Christian anarchist sitting on the ruins pointing with long skinny finger toward World War II. The rest of the world, driven by forces quite beyond control, simply reacted.

The universities filled as best they could the demand for trained men. Diversity and specialization became necessities for survival. There was no time for thought, only for training. Physics and chemistry left no time for history. In protest the students of literature and the traditional arts ignored even mathematics. The intellectual world decided it was split into scientists and humanists. Having decided it was split, it began to make some effort to rejoin at the college level, revising the elective system to include required subjects in alternative fields for balance. There was some improvement, but the problem remains unsolved.

Confounding theory, in recent years it appears to have been the scientists who have taken the most serious view of history. Perhaps it is because they are in a posi-

tion to do something about it. Or perhaps it is because they know more facts. Firsthand knowledge of atomic physics induces respect. The important movements to warn politicians and governments and peoples of the necessity for accommodation among nations, even if for no more noble end than survival, have been led by scientists. There have been plenty of artists and writers to back them up. But the academic community as a whole and especially those men of academic background in positions of power have been slow to recognize considerations other than the apparently practical as being of any real importance.

The jargon of the military creates "theaters of war" as if murder and destruction were some great show. The jargon of the press creates "peasants" whose hard work on the land and ignorance of mechanics relieve them of the other accustomed characteristics of human beings. And college men, who ought to know better, repeat these jargons and in doing so diminish their own humanity, make false judgments and a mockery of education.

The two most discouraging documents of our time are the Pentagon Papers and the transcripts of the White House tapes. One would like to toss them into the trash with other bad novels. Such things cannot be real. But they are real. This is the record of college men at work. This is decision-making at the top. The law has become a school of chicanery. Cheating, apparently cultivated in college and maybe learned there, is perfected by daily practice. Skillful lying is a virtue, especially when used on a great scale. Government is a field for mere gamesmanship. An advanced degree from a graduate school turns out to be a certificate of blindness. Higher education has taught no values. Nothing has been learned but the vulgarity of price.

Were this all, it would indeed be time for the next Gibbon. Fortunately it is not. College men have not all the comfort they had in some earlier troubles. They cannot claim—when the industrial machine mires down in a slough of greed, and government is not only corrupt but stupid as well—that they have not been consulted. The machine is their creation, and the men at the controls are now their men. The Capitol in Washington, whose ruins so little imagination is required to see, is filled with college graduates—in the Department of the Executive, in every cranny of the immense bureaucracy, and on Capitol Hill itself where the people, college-trained or not, send college men to represent them.

But the universities can say, with half a show of truth, that the wrong college men have been chosen for these important jobs; that they had no part, or little part, in the choosing; that the centers of protest against the general malfeasance have been the universities; that the students, and quite often the professors, have raged against imperialism, the abuse of power, military idiocy, the immorality as well as the stupidity of Asian wars. Allowing for some leaven of self-interest—the draft for an unpopular war is a powerful motive for dissent—this is so.

It is of little use to hunt for scapegoats. It is much better to admit failure and do something about it. Higher education by its successful exploration and exploitation of the material universe has exaggerated out of measure one fundamental problem which is as old as society itself and has offered hardly any solution. The problem is the concentration and abuse of power. Without concentration, nothing can be done; with concentration, abuse is invited. Power is poison to weak intellects. Its action on abnormal personalities is that of oil poured on hot coals. Even wise and well-balanced minds are altered and changed when unusual power is suddenly placed at their command.

Governments and laws inherited from the eighteenth century or derived from models of more antique design coped with reasonable success with the increasing release of energy until 1914. Social stability was shattered then and has not returned. Some progress has indeed been made in learning to manage the new tools. The difficulty is that the tools multiply faster than does society's ability to master them.

The fault is not in the tools, but in our management. Our education has concentrated on the indefinite extension of the means of manipulation of the material universe. How that manipulation would affect people has been a secondary consideration or not considered at all. Yet when we have got around to worrying about such matters, we have had at least partial success.

A simple example is the motor car. Engineers made it able to go too fast for existing roads. Then other engineers devised roads on which it could go faster. Still accidents increased. So all kinds of safety devices were built into cars, and new traffic patterns were invented—all to no avail. Then the supply of gasoline was reduced. A national speed limit was imposed. Almost everyone, recognizing the necessity, respected it. Abruptly and precipitously the accident rate dropped.

There is no need to multiply instances of the success of education at the lower levels. People behave rationally and considerately when they are persuaded that rational and considerate behavior is necessary. Laws can only promote ends. Results are achieved when laws are generally accepted. The democratically accustomed American, brought up now for three generations in the automobile habit, tends to manage speed more sensibly than the class-conscious European to whom the automobile is a symbol of aristocratic privilege, and who frequently, now at middle age, possesses one for the first time.

The rules for the ordinary operation of a mechanical society are pretty well understood. We can certainly live with it, resolving as they occur the endless problems of ecology, urban sprawl, economics, health. All these are, comparatively speaking, simple. It is the unlimited release of energy that baffles us. We are so very much afraid of this that we have accepted partly—certainly to a degree that shocks what remains of the generations of pre-atomic America—the theory of political absolutism.

As the amount of available energy has increased, the demands for concentration of control have brought severe pressure on democratic institutions. The world of the independent farmer and mechanic has been translated into the corporate farm, the marketing cartel, and the total industrial complex of concentrated capital and concentrated labor. Within these complexes individual expression is severely limited. Political independence theoretically remains. The individual with his vote and through his representative can redress the balance. But even this weak political control is threatened with extinction by the demand for security from atomic destruction.

In the President of the United States, and in the President alone, is vested authority over the future of all the citizens of this country and in practical effect of most of the world. By one majority vote once in four years the President is made a holy person. His intimates and advisers are unseen. His acts in the name of national security cannot be questioned until after they have occurred. The President of the United States has ceased to exist. He has become an occult force known as the White House.

Beneath this White House lies the power structure of the nation: the federal

bureaucracy, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the vast agglomeration of capital represented in corporations and lending institutions, the armies of labor represented by the unions. Within each of these substructures, the individuals have yielded more and more of their independence in obedience to the compulsion toward security. The actions of the leaders are secret. Communication is secret. Large areas of government offices and of private corporations are forbidden territory. Attitudes which we abhor in "totalitarian" states have become our habit.

It seems unlikely that these trends are going to change rapidly. The threat of atomic destruction is likely to remain with us for a long time. The exigencies of great-power politics, real or imagined, are not suddenly going to vanish. The accumulation of capital into vast corporations managed by faceless men is not going to cease. Labor will continue to concentrate more on union than on the quality of work performed. Our society will continue to be pressed to sacrifice individual liberty to secure the comfort and safety of the group. The potential for destruction already so apparent in scientific development is being realized by more and more nations. It is a real question whether, under such pressures, democratic institutions can survive.

The solution, if there is a solution, probably lies in education. We need to build a moral standard by which a free society can exist. Minds educated to understand values and to choose freely among values are the necessity. Two hundred years ago the family in America was supposed to begin this education and religion to complete it, with some assist from the study of the classics. All three of these forces, when they exist at all in the twentieth century, exist in far weaker form. If our presidents are any criterion, and very probably they are, the rule is sufficiently illustrated.

There is no use in harking backwards to a supposed golden age. Let us rather be glad that Napoleon had to make do with black powder and cannonballs and that George III had no atomic bombs at his disposal. The technical achievements of our age and the skills our technical schools teach and perfect are not going to be controlled by stern self-righteousness nor yet by cynical power politics. We have got to discover a new method of education that suits our time. Failing control by the moral standards of those who achieve power, the pressure of forces is almost irresistible toward state control and the extinction of the democratic dream.

The problem is the construction or development of minds capable of operating with balance and control, with integrity and decency, in a world where power is infinitely available. We know we can turn out technicians. But can we educate ordinary people and, more importantly, the most ingenious and clever people to be virtuous?

Virtue here used is in the sense of the eighteenth-century translation of *virtus*, the highest attribute of the Roman citizen in the days of the Republic. And today it must be more than Roman, more than *virtus* and *pietas* rolled together, for it must include much that came into the world with the New Testament and much of the more ancient philosophy of the East as revealed by modern scholarship. It has nothing to do with its debased use in contemporary language as a somewhat cynical expression of sexual customs. It is what we would wish to find in all those who achieve positions of responsibility, however small or great—honor, courage, self-sacrifice, generosity, and loving-kindness toward all sentient things.

It is probably too much to hope that virtue, even supposing it can be induced by some educational process in every human mind in youth, is likely to stick there. The world is a spotty place, and the supposed virtuous citizen who remains unspotted from the world is too often a prig. Rather, virtue is a curious growth, an accumula-

tion of desirable qualities often appearing in strange places, as penicillin in a tank of fungus or a tough quality of oak growing on a stony hillside. It is at once the result of education and experience; not just of precept but example too. And always growth. Therein, perhaps, lies the clue to the riddle. The opportunity throughout life for higher education: the inducement to those in politics, in business, in the arts, in labor, to be part of the continuing process—the university as the stage for all this, the forum, the *stoa*, to which the worldly man expects to come to teach, to learn, to discover himself a student subject to the most intense criticism and review of his worldly acts.

Nobody has ever defined virtue to the complete satisfaction of anybody else, and certainly nobody has ever devised a formula for creating it. Aristotle has a reputation as a teacher, but as a pupil Alexander of Macedon must be considered no more than a partial success. Seneca had worse luck with Nero. And in American folklore and history no one stands higher than Abraham Lincoln who taught himself.

The most significant American epoch occurred some two hundred years ago. The habit of going to church was strong. Doubtless tearing the minister apart had a certain usefulness in starting discussion at the church door. But regular intellectual human contact, as a matter of habit, was the chief value of going to church. Everyone went to church—whether in Puritan New England or Anglican Virginia. There was always chat and discussion after church, and it was apt to turn from the sermon to public affairs, to the rights of man, to the inalienable rights of Englishmen, to revolutions and constitutions. These church-door discussions continued during the week in innumerable taverns. It was a peripatetic society, forever on the move on foot from place to place, forever talking as it moved. And when the time came, it wrote and ratified the American Constitution and created an enduring government and nation.

Our present world is, apart from obvious mechanical changes, significantly different in a most important respect. Ours is an unsocial world. Its mechanics tend to lock each individual into a box or series of boxes. Wheels have taken the place of legs, radio and television have taken over conversation. Acquaintance is confined to office or sport. Like meets like. Ideas are not exchanged except among peers. The physicist speaks to the physicist, or perhaps to the chemist, the banker to the banker, or perhaps to the merchant. Those who earn their living by the work of their hands seldom speak at all because the human voice is drowned out by the din of machinery and in the car or at home the electronic device does the talking.

We are a receiving society. Politics is a performance before television, our tastes are induced by advertising, our opinions by the newscaster. We do not talk back. We turn to another station. There are fewer newspapers, and we are losing the habit of writing letters to the editor. On the whole, discussion bores us, except perhaps in our specialty. Sport is more amusing, outdoors if the weather is good, on television at all times.

Virtue is seldom demanded, never expected. The taste of the audience is bound to affect the quality of the play. And so the work of society goes on quietly, out of sight, and the product of society deteriorates. Since the means for producing a better product are constantly improving, the result is discouraging. With more power, more machinery, and more college-trained people, society should improve. Measured in the terms of the Declaration of Independence we have not done too well. Especially in our cities the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are not conspicuously advanced.

Just what the eighteenth century understood by the pursuit of happiness is not easily defined. It was pretty clear about life and liberty because it was familiar with the alternative as denigrated and negated by the practice of European societies. "Pursuit of happiness" was Jefferson's way of expressing the desire, inherent in human beings, for something more than a full belly and a quiet place to enjoy good digestion. Undoubtedly in that "something more" was included the opportunity for higher education in the practical arts, of course, but above all the profound satisfaction of historical, mathematical, and philosophical studies. For this he founded the University of Virginia. John Adams, an American in Paris, thrilled by the glories of its ancient civilization, shocked by its human poverty and the cynicism of its aristocratic government, in 1780 wrote home to his wife:

I must study politics and war that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. My sons ought to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, naval architecture, navigation, commerce and agriculture in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry and porcelain.

His enthusiasm endured, and nine years later he founded the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and wrote its charter "to cultivate every art and science which may tend to advance the interest, honor, dignity and happiness of a free, independent and virtuous people."

In the vision of both the Virginian and the New Englander the greatest happiness was, implicitly, the opportunity to serve mankind in the fullest and most extended definition of the Latin word *virtus*. That opportunity is not yet available to all Americans. Even college, the avenue to understanding, is too expensive for most. Advanced study is pursued at great cost and with narrowing purpose in the hope of getting the cost back. And, after all, the world is filled with graduates of universities, holding university degrees of varying and often considerable impressiveness, whose ambitions are as low and whose concept of civilization is as limited as those of a hog on a farm in Iowa.

The eighteenth century took a realistic view of human nature. In its constitutions it did its best to protect the future of freedom and independence. It could imagine virtue, but not in political opponents. Even Washington, a generally accepted model, had his difficult times.

Like our deservedly respected, but perhaps sometimes overidealized or even deified founding fathers and mothers, we are still seeking a method. Virtue eludes us. Six or seven generations have passed, and our studies of music, painting, and so forth are still interrupted by the study of politics and war. Neither academies nor colleges grown into universities seem much closer to solving the great questions of human conduct, especially human conduct in positions of power. The practical problems of health, prosperity, and even the creative arts seem easy by comparison.

We have given up the rod as the first requisite of child care and hellfire as a strong inducement for right conduct. We have also pretty much given up church and hard drinking. There are plenty of modern substitutes. Psychiatry satisfies some. LSD others. And Billy Graham may be a sufficient replacement for Jonathan Edwards, although his language and his imagery seem less commanding. But the diversity of our approach has brought us no closer than our forefathers to the solution of the central problem of putting in positions of trust persons worthy and capable of trust.

We need to admit our failure. We have created a truly wondrous technological society. And we do not know what to do with it. We have not even half tried to

tackle the difficult task of developing citizens of virtue. We had best get on with that task. We can be confident that if we do not our technical skills will blow us all up if we are not sooner consumed in our own waste. The machine is running out of control.

Even to begin to accomplish the task of redeeming our civilization, a generation of study and effort would seem to be needed. And that much time is apparently not available. We are impelled to proceed now with the means at hand.

The means are the universities. We cannot wait for this year's graduates to live long enough to take over the management of the world, even supposing we knew they would do a better job of it. We have got to do something with the managers who are now running it.

The isolation of individuals in a mechanical world is at the root of the evil. There is no open marketplace for ideas. Education is in danger of following the model of food in the Stop and Shop, where everything is processed, packaged, and available; where each item can be had at a price; where the price has more to do with the outside of the package than the value of the goods inside; and where neither quality nor price is subject to the control of the customer except through channels so long and devious that patience is exhausted long before change can be made.

The universities need to move as rapidly as possible in the opposite direction. They have long known the danger. Farsighted administrators have struggled against it for years. They have tried to insist on "general" education. But much more thought and time and money need to be spent to join people in the process of pursuing education into groups where exchange of ideas and information is possible. And the process should be extended to include many, many more of those who are said to be in "active" life. The politician and the businessman should be encouraged, if need be dragged, into the university both as student and teacher. The hierarchy of the university should be encouraged, pushed if necessary, into the rotten world that surrounds it, learning something of the base jobs, the boredom, the fear that fills the life of the bench worker, the corporate underling.

Our society is founded on the belief that in the nature of man lie the seeds which properly nourished will continue and improve civilization. That man is educable to perform all practical tasks, including producing nuclear energy for any purpose, is proved. Whether the qualities of character needed to control these energies can be cultivated is an unproved hypothesis.

We might begin our search for a solution by putting education back together again. There are no "humanities," there are no "sciences." There is only the human race poised on the edge of eternity, where as individuals it has always been, but not before as a race. Any studies that will bring it back from its uncomfortable perch are welcome. All studies have some use. The methods of education developed in every study are applicable to every other. Education is one, as the problem is one, being humanity itself. Whether education has any future depends on whether mankind has any future.

The most useful aspect of the scientific method is abstention from deliberate lies. No scientist can hope to last long in his profession if he falsifies his data and comes to untenable conclusions. This method could be applied to advantage to much that goes on in the "real" world.

But every individual mind is controlled by a great number of images stored in the memory. These images are the product of experience—that is to say, personal history—and of study—that is to say, general history, the vicarious experience

gained from knowledge of the experience of others. The great use of the method of the humanities is the multiplication of images available in minds for the purpose of comparison.

Any individual who claims even the rudiments of education needs the basis for control provided by a well-stored memory. Having tasted *premier cru*, he can recognize *vin ordinaire*. The statesman becomes distinguishable from the cheap politician; the wise and considerate act from the act of barbarism.

Unless education can combine its methods to produce a new type of mind, at once investigative, truthful, and responsible, it will fail. Failure is unthinkable, for if education fails, so does the society on which it is built, the very world itself. But the vanity of the diversity of our learning is such that failure stares us in the face.

Had some temerarious cleric suggested in the thirteenth century that mankind would someday doubt the existence of its own soul and that the church would become an institution for the self-perpetuation of its clergy, he would have been burned at once. The protection of the capital invested in the cathedrals would alone have been sufficient cause. Yet today the virgin of Chartres looks down into an empty church on a dead faith. Our wonder is for the art she inspired.

We have invested our capital just as recklessly in education as once Europe did in religion. But even as we approach the gates of heaven we see that by the same way is the road to hell. Faith falters. Perhaps hereafter idle tourists will come to gape at our architectural remains or even the rituals of our professors. Or perhaps, one more great problem solved, still students, now of every age and race, will crowd to learn and to create.

DANA L. FARNSWORTH

Social Values in College and University

IN THE UNIVERSITY world the satisfaction and complacency of the 1940s and 1950s changed rapidly in the 1960s to intense criticism and dissatisfaction. Some of us took refuge in the idea that American education could not have been too bad, or it would not have produced so many excellent critics of itself. But we could not avoid being concerned about the spectacular manifestations and the wide scale of this criticism. Paradoxically, the unquestionably high ideals that were professed by those engaged in protest were expressed in speech and actions that could be construed as both immoral and illegal. To the traditionally minded, the protests appeared fully as deplorable as the injustices that were their objects.

It is thought that the protests waned for three reasons: the protesters were physically exhausted, they had achieved many of their goals, and they came to realize that tearing down institutions was dysfunctional in getting constructive change accomplished. I would question these. Young people are not exhausted quickly, and in the case of a college community, a new generation arrives every four years. They did achieve certain reforms, but the impact on society overall is dubious. It was during the period of disturbances that events occurred which, when they emerged into the light, suggested that many persons in public life had learned little about acceptable ethical standards. Moreover, we began to see among students not increased conviction that they were able to change what was perceived as wrong, but widespread frustration, doubt, and feelings of helplessness mixed with cynicism. The value of customs and symbols associated with religion, marriage, patriotism, family pride, and cultural identification has been seriously eroded and was frequently ridiculed or disregarded.

Those of us who have had extensive experience with students over the last four decades cannot help wondering about the effects of the wide swings in their morale, life-styles, and customs. Higher education in America might well benefit from more sentiment among faculty members and administrators toward a frank espousal of programs that enhance the responsibility of young people in the college community while promoting their ability to respond to the needs of society and their own needs in the present and the future. Peer group influence among college students is fully as strong as that exerted in street gangs, but it is centered not so much on encouraging action as in proselytizing in favor of particular attitudes. This tends to cause each generation of students to make up their minds on current concerns in terms of group opinion rather than on the merits of the issues. Whatever one's opinion may be of the desirability of being simple and artless as compared to being sophisticated and worldly wise, it certainly seems advantageous to develop an intellectual atmosphere that encourages openness to new ideas, promotes idealism, and strongly supports the development of life-long curiosity and the acquisition of means to satisfy it.

It may be true that values cannot be taught, but they certainly can be learned. People need significant role models whom they respect and admire in order to develop values. Faculty members and others who influence the young—notably parents and folk heroes—are not in a position to exert much permanent influence if they exhibit little or no consistency between the values they espouse and those they practice. For individual faculty members, the question of how to promote values in an exceedingly complex society poses a difficult problem. They will satisfy neither themselves nor others if they adopt a particular value system and then insist on its acceptance. Leaving the development of values to chance or to other institutions seems equally irresponsible and ineffective. I would suggest, as a reasonable point of view, that everyone connected with higher education should adopt the attitude that development of values is a prime purpose of colleges and universities.

But any discussion of values should not be construed as advocacy of any particular set of values for all members of the university community. Instead, the search for values worthy of emulation should be a part of the continuing quest of a true education, in college and throughout life. The strength of a free society depends upon diversity, freedom of choice, a chance to learn from errors as well as successes, and respect for the freedom and dignity of all its people. A practical goal is that of developing the habit of thoughtfulness, examining the possible results of one's actions and learning the skill of predicting the consequences of one pattern of behavior as compared to others. As Bronowski has observed, "The concepts of values are profound and difficult exactly because they do two things at once: They join men into societies, and yet they preserve for them a freedom which makes them single men."¹

I have always thought of the university community as one of the most notable creations of Western civilization, an ideal place for the development of a proper balance between reason and contemplation, on the one hand, and constructive action for the benefit of mankind, on the other. This ideal has become obsolete (if it ever was accurate) because of the changes that have come about recently, particularly increased enrollment and greater emphasis on attaining employment skills. Yet our colleges and universities are different from most other institutions, in that they are sufficiently flexible to move in various directions when enough of their members see the desirability for doing so. They have access to both the ideas and the resources to consider seriously, and to act upon, the concerns for the quality of life experienced by all people. That, in fact, is what values are all about.

Transmission of Values

Throughout these shifting changes many of us who work with students closely have been heartened rather than discouraged by some of their attitudes and motives. Their disgust with the policies of exploitation and dishonesty that they see in many of their elders is being molded into a firm determination to build a better society with high regard for sincerity, concern for others, and consideration for the needs of persons not yet born. When any society sets itself the goals of providing the highest possible level of education for all its citizens, it places itself in great jeopardy if at the same time it does not provide for equal opportunity and justice for everyone. The sometimes chaotic conditions that we find in our colleges and universities today are partly a response to the fact that higher education is no longer an elitist experience, and the social climate there no longer mandates an isolation

within academic structures. Our young people are grappling with life, and in order to do this effectively they need to comprehend the values which we may have abstractly espoused, but have not translated into the foundation of a just society.

Part of the difficulty may also be that the majority of students are in late adolescence, still working through the tasks of experimentation and self-individuation that characterize this period. One of the advantages of having people of widely different ages involved together in the educational process is that fewer issues become polarized along the age factor. When students of varying ages learn together, points of difference in attitudes among varying age groups can be examined firsthand, and dogmatism thus minimized.

The most effective motivation toward accomplishment in young people is contact with an admired and respected person who encourages them both by showing a personal interest in them and by being worthy of emulation. The mere fact that such a person shares thoughts and experiences with a student, remembers him as an individual, and encourages him for progress he has shown, is a powerful spur to intellectual and character development.² Higher education in America must move toward action as well as analysis, frankly espousing programs to enhance the responsibility of young people and to encourage the development of their ability to respond to their own needs and those of society.

Freedom and Responsibility

All attempts of society to regulate itself come up against the problem that occurs when the rights of the individual and the rights of others come into conflict. Methods of resolving such conflicts then become the primary concern. No person can have complete freedom, but all persons need some freedom. Complete equality is impossible, but equality of respect, of opportunity, of dignity, and of justice is ideally possible. Some control is clearly necessary. The person who is most in control of himself is the one most likely to be the freest, and from this idea flows the concept that a free people are a disciplined people. Those who control themselves are both more disciplined and more free than those who are controlled by somebody or some group on the outside.

Discipline in this context is not "making others behave" or "being forced to behave," but is instead a system of training, a set of accepted customs or rules that make it possible for a person to reach a state of orderliness through self-control. It is not synonymous with punishment. The eventual goal in developing persons who have real freedom is not prohibitions and restrictions, but self-control with maturity, understanding, and a proper balance between self-interest and concern for others. The individual understands what limits are necessary in order to achieve a particular goal, and because of his understanding he obeys the limits without compulsion.

Since maintenance of a durable and satisfying society requires harmonizing many, often contradictory, goals and personal desires, some groups within that society should assume at least partial responsibility for the task. Law and police agencies are not sufficient by themselves. Religious groups aid greatly, but their differences may at times overshadow their common goals and ideals to the point of becoming foci of controversy. By their own behavior, members of institutions of higher learning might well set an example of how to minimize conflict and increase cooperation when important issues are at stake. They need the courage to criticize comments and actions of their own colleagues which are basically destructive of

human freedom, even when those colleagues are well-meaning persons who fully believe that they are right. This should be done by attempts to examine issues through methods that do not increase polarization or fanaticism, but instead find bases for common understanding, thus shifting the debate to a search for achieving goals that all parties desire. This task is not easy or simple, but it seems self-evident that denunciation and violence toward those with whom one disagrees are destructive of both freedom and good will and are self-defeating in the end.

The University and Universal Values

The goals of a liberal education, sometimes considered too esoteric to be of practical use, can well be considered as leading to the sense of disciplined value which we are discussing. Even though most of them cannot be taught, they can be learned and can be transmitted through personal example: (a) attainment of sustained interest or curiosity in many areas of knowledge, but with the capacity to narrow the range to manageable proportions for self-development; (b) respect for the resources—physical, spiritual, and personal—that make satisfaction possible. Shared resources should be guarded by everyone, and the ways and means of accomplishing that task should serve as a paradigm for husbanding the resources of the larger community of the nation or world; (c) acquisition of communication skills that permit life-long pursuit of learning, including the ability to listen to and understand others; (d) awareness of one's own intellectual heritage, together with some capacity to appreciate the heritage of other societies and civilizations; (e) sufficient knowledge of human behavior in all its forms, so that those social restraints will be fostered that permit a maximum degree of freedom for everybody; (f) respect for all human beings, regardless of their race, color, ethnic background, or religion, even when the behavior of some of them is unacceptable. The most glaring failure in this regard is our treatment of those who go to prison, where they are treated as if we knew nothing about how persons who have offended society can be rehabilitated; (g) the ability to encourage and formulate processes by which the values essential to a civilized society are transmitted from one generation to another, incorporating those changes that are necessary for their survival and improvement; (h) the achievement of a proper balance between self-regard and concern for the welfare of others; (i) the quality of being able to disagree with others without becoming angry; the conviction that differences of opinion should be settled by rational authority rather than by force. This must be combined with a "constructive intolerance" or a just indignation that does not remain silent in the face of attitudes or actions that are inimical to the future of individuals or of society; and (j) the habit of inquiry and doubt, practiced in such a way that the individual avoids becoming either a fanatic who sees simplistic solutions to complex issues, or a cynic who sees no merit in any constructive activity.

These goals have been summarized in many ways. I once heard a student inquire of President Pusey as to whether a Harvard student should be proud to be an intellectual. His reply was, "Of course. An intellectual is a person who puts a high premium on thinking but an even higher one on thoughtfulness." Gilmore has recently summarized the goal as being a productive personality: an individual with cognitive skills, a clear sense of identity and self-esteem, and the ability to deal with ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity, together with the strength and courage to

make decisions. He almost always has a highly developed internal value system which commits him to a fundamental integrity in his own behavior and an inherent respect and esteem for others.³

Perhaps wisdom, a word we have used so frequently but often with incomplete understanding, is the most inclusive. Jonas Salk has recently discussed this concept in relation to the urgent questions facing higher education at the present. He stresses the need to develop and inculcate values that will permit optimum human progress in the future, a task requiring the ability to recognize signals warning that disaster may be ahead. Wisdom, he contends, implies making judgments in advance rather than retroactively, and hence the capacity to make judgments and to act is a primary goal. Wisdom is now more necessary than ever to maintain life itself on this planet, and it is our only real alternative to paths toward alienation and despair.⁴

This has been said to be the age of the nonhero. Certainly persons who can be widely admired, respected, and trusted are in short supply. We can increase their numbers in the future only by long and patient care in upholding those values that are consistent with the welfare of all persons. Our colleges and universities are among the few survivors of the storms that have swept away many institutions of the past. They have become the repository of values essential to a free society; we need to identify those values, realize them within ourselves, and find ways of transmitting them within the new structures of the future.

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JOSEPH RHODES, JR.

A Dialogue

A LITTLE OVER ONE HUNDRED years ago the two most prominent thinkers in England addressed themselves to the question of the university in separate speeches delivered within a year of each other. Thomas Carlyle, the Scottish philosopher-historian, was elected to the Rectorship of the University of Edinburgh in 1865 and delivered the required speech at the University on April 2, 1866. John Stuart Mill, the British philosopher-social theorist, had been similarly elected Lord Rector of St. Andrews University in 1865; but, because of pressing business in Parliament (he served as an MP for one term), he was unable to give the inaugural address until February 1, 1867. Carlyle spoke extemporaneously and was warmly received by a cheering audience. Mill's effort was characteristically comprehensive, lasting nearly three hours, during which it is reported that the Divinity students cheered his remarks on Free Thought. Neither speech was exceptional or particularly distinguished. What was remarkable about these speeches was that they were given by two men who personified the two major themes in British thought at that time. Perhaps better than any other contemporary, John Stuart Mill represented the best of British Radical thought and action; in modern terms, he was the ideal liberal. And, while the view held by some modern students that Thomas Carlyle was a "neofascist" is certainly excessive, he was given to describing the likes of John Mill as "Exeter Hall Dogs." Seldom do we have an instance of such diverse visions being applied to the university at approximately the same time and by such men of distinction as the author of "On Liberty" and the Sage of Chelsea.

Surprisingly, the two speeches bear some notable similarities. For example, on the question of the importance of classical education in the university curriculum, an issue that had attracted considerable debate at the time, Mill and Carlyle take almost identical positions. They both regarded such classical education as an indispensable part of a university education. Carlyle, the author of some of the most popular historical studies of his day, understandably shaded his vision of classical study further toward its implications as history. He considered it "highly expedient to go into History; to inquire into what has passed before you on this Earth"; and, in light of this, "the history of the Romans and the Greeks will first of all concern you." The study of Greek and Roman history was essential to any serious student; for "there you have two of the most remarkable races of men in the world set before you, calculated to open innumerable reflections and considerations; a mighty advantage, if you can achieve it;—to say nothing of what their two languages will yield to you." A study of Greece and Rome would serve as an inspiration. To acquire a knowledge of Greek and Latin would obviously help one in this endeavor; such a study would make the task of discerning the message of these classical ages that much easier: the languages themselves would be tools to achieve this historical inspiration. Carlyle advises his audience that "You will find, if you read well, a pair of

extremely remarkable nations, shining in the records left by themselves as a kind of beacon, or solitary mass of illumination, to light-up some noble forms of human life for us, in the otherwise utter darkness of the past ages; and it will be well worth your while if you can get into the understanding of what these people were, and what they did . . . perhaps some of you will get to see the old Roman and Greek face to face; [and] you will know in some measure how they contrived to exist, and to perform their feats in the world." This was the highest honor that Carlyle knew how to pay to the memory of a people.

Mill took a position almost identical to Carlyle's, but with a slightly different emphasis. He supported the instruction of university students in the classical languages, but he saw such studies as ends in themselves and not a mere vehicle to a better grasp of the historical significance of the ancient world. To him the issue at stake was the "vexed questions between the ancient languages and the modern sciences and arts." In his view, it was "a great absurdity that history and geography should be taught in the schools, except in elementary schools for the children of the labouring classes, whose subsequent access to books is limited." "Who ever learned history and geography except by private reading?" he asks. This did not rule out any consideration whatsoever of history on a university level; there was a definite need for exposure to the philosophy of history; but such a study would impart a critical faculty to students of history and not the "mere facts of history." When John Mill said he wanted the university curriculum to include classical languages and no others, he meant exactly what he said.

Mill argued that the university should not even attempt to educate its students in any of the modern or "living" languages. He did not "agree with those reformers who would give a regular and permanent place in the school or university course to modern languages." This was not because he considered knowledge of such languages as unnecessary. On the contrary, he believed that "no one can in our age be esteemed a well-educated person who is not familiar with at least the French language, so as to read French books with ease; and there is great use in cultivating a familiarity with German." His point was that these modern languages were much easier learned through travel than through formal instruction: "Living languages are so much more easily acquired by intercourse with those who use them in daily life; a few months in the country itself, if properly employed, go so much farther than as many years of school lessons." Here Mill reveals his class background more than anything else.

Carlyle, a man of the most humble of origins, saw the matter differently. While reflecting in his speech on his school days, he recalled that "What the University can mainly do for you, what I have found the university did for me, is, That it taught me to read, in various languages, in various sciences, so that I could go into the books which treated of these things." Mill thought the university should teach Latin and Greek exclusively, a position that we might have anticipated in view of the fact that he mastered both languages by the age of seven; but his argument for this rather extreme position goes far beyond the peculiarities of his own experiences.

Interestingly enough, one of Mill's principal arguments for the prominence of the classical languages in university study closely parallels that alluded to by Carlyle. His position that "the only language . . . and the only literature, to which I would allow a place in the ordinary curriculum, are those of the Greeks and the Romans" rests, to a considerable extent, on his belief that it is impossible to know a people so "unlike all of us . . . as the Greeks and Romans are" except through their

record left in their own tongue. Translations can be extremely misleading; "we must be able, in a certain degree, to think in Greek, if we would represent to ourselves how a Greek thought." This view does not differ significantly from Carlyle's that a serious student might come "face to face" with the ancients by reading their original records. Mill, however, takes his argument a step further than this.

Carlyle reasoned that it was important to study the classical world, and hence the classical languages, because such study would "inspire" the serious student, literally meaning by this that the student would be encouraged to live a better life, a life aimed at a higher level of moral tone. Mill acknowledges and agrees with this but he sees an additional benefit from a study of the classics: they are a joy to read because of their perfection as works of art. "In studying the great writers of antiquity," he states, "we are not only learning to understand the ancient mind, but laying in a stock of wise thought and observation, still valuable to ourselves; and at the same time making ourselves familiar with a number of the most perfect and finished literary compositions which the human mind produced."

"... in purely literary excellence—in the perfection of form—the pre-eminence of the ancients is not disputed." The classical authors achieved this level of perfection, according to Mill, because of the extraordinary discipline of their intellect. He saw the secret of the classical style as the discipline to write or speak with such "perfect good sense" that the style employed was undiscernible. The ancients "knew what they wanted to say; and their whole purpose was to say it with the highest degree of exactness and completeness, and bring it home to the mind with the greatest possible clearness and vividness. It never entered into their thoughts to conceive of a piece of writing as beautiful in itself, abstractly from what it had to express: its beauty must all be subservient to the most perfect expression of the sense." To illustrate his point, Mill calls upon his audience to consider any oration of Demosthenes. "There is nothing in it which calls attention to itself as style at all: it is only after close examination we perceive that every word is what it should be, and where it should be . . . the perfection of the workmanship is only visible in the total absence of any blemish or fault." Mill then drives home his point by recalling that Demosthenes strove for such a "style" of speech because it was not his object to "make the Athenians cry out, 'What a splendid speaker!'" but to make them say, "Let us march against Philip!" The classical artists of thought, represented by Demosthenes, expressed themselves without literary ornamentation; and as a result, "They show us at least what excellence is, and make us desire it, and strive to get as near to it as is within our reach." From the treatment that Mill gives this subject in his speech, it is apparent that he feels a deeply personal affection when he talks about the beauty of classical literary art.

The question of the role of art in the university was another area of apparent agreement between the two speeches. Following the line of his discussion on classical literature, Mill exalts art to a rank equal to that of "Philosophy, Learning and Science." In doing so, he anticipates that he would run counter to the main current of British thought on the subject; it would "amaze and puzzle Englishmen" to consider "the art of a country as a feature, in its character and condition, little inferior in importance to either its religion or its government." Mill offers two explanations for this attitude of his countrymen: "it may be traced to the two influences which have chiefly shaped the British character since the days of the Stuarts: commercial money-getting business, and religious Puritanism." The commercial instinct dismisses art as frivolous, and Puritanism, "looking upon

every feeling of human nature, except fear and reverence for God, as a snare, if not as partaking of sin, looked coldly, if not disapprovingly, on the cultivation of the sentiments."

To Mill, who himself had survived a terrible period of depression in his youth through the discovery of poetry, the "cultivation of the sentiments" was not merely an object of personal pleasure; rather, it was a vital element in the growth of a man's personality. In this, Mill closely follows the views expressed by contemporaries of his such as Matthew Arnold. The refinement and elevation of feeling make superior civilization possible. A sensitivity to the finest expressions of art improves the man. This occurs because there is "a natural affinity between goodness and the cultivation of the Beautiful, when it is a real cultivation, and not mere unguided instinct." Beauty acts as an inner guide. "He who has learned what beauty is," Mill continues, "if he be of a virtuous character, will desire to realize it in his own life—will keep before himself a type of perfect beauty in human character, to light his attempts at self-culture." To emphasize this point, Mill then refers to a thought of a great German poet: "There is a true meaning in the saying of Goethe, though liable to be misunderstood and perverted, that the Beautiful is greater than the Good; for it includes the Good, and adds something to it: it is the Good made perfect, and fitted with all the collateral perfections which make it a finished and completed thing." Since "no other human productions come so near to perfection as works of pure Art," it is to the good of the nation and the individual that the university include art, in all its forms, within the curriculum. In this way men would move further away from the sole motivation of fear and closer to a pursuit of beauty and perfection.

Carlyle propounds as lofty a goal for art education as does Mill; in fact he refers to the same idea from Goethe. After speaking on the meaning of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* for a discussion of the university, Carlyle concludes that "the highest outcome, and most precious of all the fruits that are to spring from this mode of ideal educating, is what Goethe calls Art." He then expands on Goethe's meaning: "Goethe calls it music, painting, poetry: but it is in quite a higher sense than the common one, and in which, I am afraid, most of our painters, poets, and music-men would not pass muster. He considers this as the highest pitch to which human culture can go; infinitely valuable and ennobling. . . ." Always the dialectician under the cover of his rhetoric, Carlyle develops his point now by first supporting it and then denying it. First he affirms the reasonableness of Goethe's vision: "Very wise and beautiful his notion of the matter is." And then he negates it by making it remote: "It gives one an idea that something far better and higher, something as high as ever, and indubitably true, is still possible for man in this world." Then he confirms and denies it with: "I confess it seems to me there is in it a shadow of what will one day be; will and must, unless the world is to come to a conclusion that is altogether frightful." As a true artist Carlyle had no trouble imagining the coming of another Golden Age.

There are, of course, several other areas within these two speeches that correspond to one another. One other probably requires mentioning here. So far we have considered instances of agreement where Mill was on his strong ground and Carlyle was basically venturing afield of his domain. An example of the opposite sort would be the question of religion and the university; here Carlyle is at home and Mill is only speculating.

In terms of their words—to what extent their analyses of the proper role of

religion in the university constituted an idea about religion—these two men agreed here. Mill was applauded when he made a forceful statement in support of freedom of religious thought within the university. This was a matter of considerable concern throughout England. To Mill the question of religious freedom of thought was an issue of freedom and not really one of religion. Carlyle takes no explicit position on this issue here, but he would not have disagreed with Mill. The real difference was that Thomas Carlyle believed in and feared God.

The spirit of Puritanism was not dead in Thomas Carlyle. When reaching in the speech for an example of a man to confirm his observation that "The British nation,—including in that the Scottish nation,—produced a finer set of men than any you will find it possible to get anywhere else in the world," his hands fall on the shoulders of Oliver Cromwell. The world of mid-seventeenth-century England was one of disorder and collapse. Like Moses coming out of the desert Cromwell swept upon the people and led them out of the captivity of the indulgent royalty:

It was in this state of things that the Puritan struggle arose in England; and you know well how the Scottish earls and nobility, with their tenantry, marched away to Dunse Hill in 1639, and sat down there: just at the crisis of that struggle, when it was either to be suppressed or brought into greater vitality, they encamped on Dunse Hill,—thirty-thousand armed men, drawn up for the occasion, each regiment around its landlord, its earl, or whatever he might be called, and zealous all of them "For Christ Crown and Covenant" That was the signal for all of England's rising up into unappeasable determination to have the Gospel there also; and you know it went on, and came to be a contest whether the Parliament or the King should rule; whether it should be old formalities and use-and-wont, or something that had been of new conceived in the souls of men, namely, a divine determination to walk according to the laws of God here, as the sum of all prosperity; which of these should have the mastery: and after a long, long agony of struggle, it was decided—the way we know.

So as not to leave any doubt in our minds Carlyle underlines his message: "I should say also of that Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell's, notwithstanding the censures it has encountered, and the denial of everybody that it could not continue in the world, and so on, it appears to me to have been, on the whole, the most salutary thing in the modern history of England."

Mill would not have agreed with this; there is much in Carlyle's speech that he could not have agreed with. In his younger years Mill, too, had placed the greatest share of importance on the back of authority; but the years had changed him. Carlyle speaks of an occasional dictatorship as being the ingredient necessary to preserve democracy; Mill would have never subscribed to such an idea. Mill saw nothing especially wonderful about actions just because they were inspired; Carlyle, on the other hand, worshipped heroic action.

Throughout his speech, Carlyle's emphasis is on action. His exhortations to the students are all calls to action. He advises them to be diligent because, to him, work was a special variety of heroic action. Going back a bit, the final turn in his dialectic on Goethe's idea of art ends with an example that is intended to give us hope for attaining Goethe's impossible goal: if rough peasants can be made into soldiers, then anything is possible. Carlyle holds up the fact that armies can be drilled into fighting units to prove the accessibility of perfect beauty. And to go a little further back, Carlyle's judgment of Demosthenes differs considerably from that of Mill. Demosthenes was no doubt a great orator, but Carlyle had little use for "niceties of language"; and in his opinion, Demosthenes "advised next to nothing that proved practicable; much the reverse. Why tell me that a man is a fine speaker, if it is not

the truth that he is speaking?" Carlyle had in mind someone else as the hero of Demosthenes' era:

Phocion, who mostly did not speak at all, was a great deal nearer hitting the mark than Demosthenes. He used to tell the Athenians, "You can't fight Philip. Better if you don't provoke him, as Demosthenes is always urging you to do. You have not the slightest chance with Philip. He is a man who holds his tongue; he has great disciplined armies; a full treasury; can bribe anybody you like in your cities here; he is going on steadily with a unvarying aim towards his object; while you, with your idle clamourings, with your Cleon the Tanner spouting to you what you take for wisdom—! Philip will infallibly beat any set of men such as you, going on raging from shore to shore with all that rampant nonsense." Demosthenes said to him once, "Phocion, you will drive the Athenians mad some day, and they will kill you." "Yes," Phocion answered, "me, when they go mad; and as soon as they get sane again, you!"

Mill does not place as much emphasis on action as does Carlyle. But, in an indirect way, he comes very close to the meaning behind Carlyle's position. Let us pick up Mill's speech at the point where he deals with the university and religion. According to Mill, it is very difficult for the university to teach morality and religion directly because "Moral and religious education consists in training the feelings and the daily habits; and these are, in the main, beyond the sphere and inaccessible to the control of public education. It is the home, the family, which gives us the moral or religious education we really receive; and this is completed, and modified, sometimes for the better, often for the worse, by society." In terms of moral education, the university can do little more than set a good example. "The moral or religious influence which a university can exercise, consists less in any express teaching, than in the prevailing tone of the place." Included in this "tone" are the nature and content of courses offered by the university, but Mill has something more basic in mind. By the moral tone of the university he principally means the spirit in which members of an academic community interact with one another. Action is important to Mill, too; it shapes moral life.

There is much in these speeches that conflicts; but the factor that is most unlike between them has nothing to do with the explicit arguments they make. As one follows Carlyle's and Mill's thoughts through these deliveries, one gains the impression that the vision of life that motivates Carlyle's effort is profoundly different from that of Mill. Carlyle's vision is streaked with shades of terror. After lamenting the fact that his society had entered an "age of revolution," he proceeds to explain his deeper concerns. "I am but saying in other words that we are in an epoch of anarchy. Anarchy plus a constable. There is nobody that picks one's pocket without some policeman being ready to take him up. But in every other point, man is becoming more and more the son, not of Cosmos, but of Chaos." Explaining one source of Victorian earnestness, he then reacts to his own observation by saying that because man is faced with the terror of chaos engulfing him, he can only put his head down and "expend every particle of strength that God Almighty has given him, in doing the work he finds he is fit for; to stand up to it to the last breath of life, and to do his best." All his life Carlyle had struggled to "stand up to it."

As with almost any of his works, this speech shows the delicate balance of Carlyle's sense of terror. He obscures it beneath his somewhat satirical method of speech; but just beneath the surface of his wit lies the swirling fears that had animated him all of his life. Something in the world or within himself deeply frightened this man. If the spirit of modern life dwells in the regions of terror, then Thomas Carlyle was one of the first moderns. For this reason his best works strike

us, on the level of feeling, as being extremely accessible, and Mill's, by and large, do not. Mill had better ideas about life; but Carlyle saw life more clearly. We applaud Mill's life and work, but we see ourselves in Carlyle.

The pressing parliamentary business that kept Mill from delivering his inaugural address earlier involved Mill's leadership of the Jamaica Committee movement, a movement which had as its sole aim to try the Governor of Jamaica for the murder of 600 black unfortunates whom he suspected of plotting a rebellion. Mill played a leading role in bringing this Governor to trial. The man who organized the popular support for this butcher of Morant Bay, the man who helped to found the Governor Eyre Defense Fund, was none other than Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle, the poet, has a better feel for life, but his judgment is poor. Consequently it is Carlyle who gives the best explanation for Mill's long record of noble public activity, the Jamaica controversy being just the latest in a long succession of progressive causes. Carlyle thought that only a "noble few" labored in the Lord's work during his age of Chaos. Fighting the good fight was solitary business; and he feared aloneness almost as no other man in his time. Right action, heroic deeds would reduce the pain of the aloneness; it propelled one closer to God and his fellow man. Through heroic action one approached a state of perfection, that is, one ascended toward the infinite Good, the perfectly Beautiful. To hang back, to refuse the call of duty, would alienate one from a more perfect world, a world that was better just by the exact amount of good that would be produced by the heroic act in question. The impulse for right action can be thought of, then, as a desire to create a real world that is better. In Mill's view, the ultimate aim of the university was to make its students "more effective combatants in the great fight which never ceases to rage between Good and Evil." To lose that battle, one that Carlyle constantly waged, would be worse than death; it would be life in limbo.

Therefore, the establishment of a moral climate at the university works because it brings the university into reality. Without it the university is just another set of buildings. And this is the main thought behind both Carlyle's and Mill's speeches on the university. Without moral existence there is no point in discussing the university or any of its courses and studies. As for deciding what acts take priority in creating this moral tone, Mill never had the slightest hesitation. He knew that issues which involved actual life and death were the ones of primary importance. When the workers wanted advice after the Hyde Park Riot, he did not ignore them; and when the gruesome accounts began to trickle back from Jamaica, he did not ignore them. I wonder what John Stuart Mill would have done if Her Majesty's troops had marched on Oxford or Cambridge and then shot down students there who were protesting one of the wars in Africa. He stayed with the Jamaica question down to its bitter end, lost his seat in Parliament over it, and taxed his own health mercilessly because of it; but he speaks with pride of his efforts in his *Autobiography*. He knew that all moral questions begin and end with death.

We began with these two speeches about the university, but we inevitably end up talking about the external world. This is the way Carlyle and Mill gave their speeches, and it is the nature of any serious discussion of the university: the university's reality is not internal.

It is impossible to talk about the university in 1866, 1974, or 1984 unless it exists. There can be diversity—a variety of university experiences is desirable—but the university as a refined state of mind that permeates all higher education will not exist

unless the elements of fear, the right actions that have gone undone, are corrected. As in Mill's day, the problem of deciding what actions have priority is not a difficult one. We must start with those issues which involve actual life; we must first deal with those instances of mortal assault on the university. And since justice has been at least partially restored in Kent, Ohio, this leaves us with a conclusion that may not convince many, namely, that it will be impossible for the university to exist in America so long as justice has not been done at Jackson, Mississippi.

On the night of June 14, 1970, elements of the Mississippi Highway Patrol and the Jackson City Police Department advanced on one of the girls' dormitories of Jackson State College, a black state college in Jackson, Mississippi. There had been a minor disturbance on the campus the night before, and the law enforcement officers were armed with shotguns, machine guns, and personal sidearms. Because a dance had just ended, the area in front of Alexander Hall, the girls' dormitory, was filled with couples returning from the dance. The usual number of hangers-on were also milling about. A few minutes after the police arrived at the building they opened fire without warning into the crowd and at the dormitory. The fusillade lasted for almost thirty seconds; over 300 rounds were fired. When the sound of gunfire stopped two young black men lay dead on the ground and a dozen other young black kids writhed from their wounds in front of the police officers, who calmly reloaded their weapons, not one of them attempting to render aid. Some of them spoke into their radios; one reported back to headquarters: "I think there are three more nigger males over there, one of 'em shot in the arm, one of 'em shot in the leg, and one of 'em somewhere else. They ain't hurt all that bad. The gals, it was two nigger gals, two more nigger gals from over there shot in the arm I believe. One of 'em is over there in the east end. I told—there two nigger females and three males we just discovered, that's a total of ten—Here's another one."

The Department of Justice, then headed by John Mitchell, convened a special grand jury to investigate the shooting. It met for a short time and then adjourned without issuing any indictments. This closed the case as far as the federal government was concerned. The families of the dead and wounded then filed a civil action against the authorities. During the trial of these charges it was revealed by an FBI agent that several of the police officers had lied during their previous statements and testimony concerning their deed that night. These men had testified that they all aimed their fire at a certain window high up in the building. The FBI agent testified that his agency had determined that the window in question was intact the day after the shooting.

Because of the pressure that had been steadily and courageously brought to bear on the federal government concerning the Kent State shootings, the Justice Department, under Elliot Richardson, reopened the Kent State proceedings. Subsequently a special grand jury was convened and then indictments were handed down against some of the men who had fired on the Kent students. When I asked the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the reopened Kent State investigation why they had decided not to go back into Jackson State, he informed me that, in spite of the civil trial, no new evidence had been developed in the case. He admitted to me, however, that there had been no new evidence in the Kent State case either, only more pressure.

It would be a beautiful thing if the universities across the country would demand that justice be done in Jackson State. It may strike some as a small thing—after all blacks have been shot down periodically since they came to America—but it is not a

small matter. We can begin to climb above this gloom of fear that has settled into our soul if the universities were to do this thing. It is only one step, but it is a step that has meaning. I may be wrong, but I think the atmosphere on our campuses would greatly improve if the university community would undertake such a campaign. Some of the unreality might dissipate. Either there is a university in America or there is not. If there is, then it will reveal itself by its willingness to fight for its existence. This fight begins with an answer for the little girl from Topoloo who told me that she had been shot seven times that night, but that she really did not know why "those white men had shot at me."

ROBERT COLES

But How Is Someone to Live a Life?

AFTER SURVEYING HEGEL's massive philosophical effort, Kierkegaard was moved to observe that everything had been taken care of—except, perhaps, for the question of how a person actually is to live his or her life. Even Hegel's elaborately flexible dialectic could not win over the brilliant, fussy, sardonic young Dane; or rather, *especially* Hegel's dialectic, because it was meant to appease (and satisfy and convince) just about everyone. Kierkegaard's objection was, of course, no small or irrelevantly egoistic matter. He was a passionate theologian (as opposed to methodical philosopher); so, pride for him was the sin of sins, the source of man's continuing ability to deceive not only himself but everyone else—and many of us, who are so smart one minute, are capable of becoming quite gullible when it suits our purpose to become idolatrous. For Kierkegaard, quite simply, Hegel had become taken in by his own mind's brazen willingness to account for everything—past, present, and future. The result, an astonishing and revealing irony: abstraction piled upon abstraction, all in the name of understanding the world, and yet no real wisdom for anyone to take into consideration from sunrise to sunset or, for that matter, in bed at night.

During the middle and late 1960s a number of students began to look critically at the knowledge they were being asked to acquire—and, as well, at the institutions which sponsored both them, as students, and their various teachers. If some of the criticism leveled at the universities soon deteriorated into nasty, vulgar, opportunistic invective, there were (and still are) some highly ethical and sensitive youths whose willingness to eye sharply their professors (and, more than it is often appreciated, themselves too) deserves both respect and understanding. Moreover, there was a personal history (a record of growing moral earnestness, sometimes going back many years) to the discontent those youths showed, and that history is not always acknowledged—so anxious are we, upon occasion, to emphasize “psychosexual development” or the sociology of class and caste, as opposed to the ethical responsiveness, the religious sensibility, which individuals gradually acquire in the course of living. All of which William James knew; but then, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is “methodologically” weak, does not feature the unconscious quite enough to suit our contemporary taste, and virtually ignores what I suppose we have to keep hearing called “the social and cultural matrix” of those described and analyzed.

Many of the activists I knew in the South and Appalachia were college students who had left Berkeley and Cambridge, New Haven and Chicago's South Side in order to stand up against segregationist sheriffs or the smoother but no less determined “powers and principalities” which dominate the “coal counties” of West Virginia or eastern Kentucky. They were, not unlike some of their teachers and some of those who have chosen to write about them, intelligent and idealistic, but they were also capable of arrogance and narrowmindedness—the worst kind of ideological rigidity justified, often enough, by the manifest risk to life and limb which had been assumed

willingly in an honorable cause. I think it fair to say that for most of those young men and women the time spent in obscure Mississippi towns, or up any number of mountain hollows, was no mere romantic indulgence or, for that matter, a spell of social protest, pure and simple, if hazardous. Books were taken—novels, social reportage, anthropological texts. And they were read, too. Often at night one heard discussions worthy of college tutorial meetings—maybe more serious and searching, because connected in the minds of those present with actual experiences. I am not talking now about conscious (or self-conscious) “field-work”; nor am I talking about the everyday learning presumably the most rigorous professor would acknowledge as a possibility—even if one is miles from a room called a “classroom” or a “lecture hall.” I am talking about the systematic acquisition of knowledge and, yes, the independent and restless scrutiny of what that knowledge means.

Needless to say, ordinary people as well as writers or scholars (through their books) can be teachers, as one Harvard undergraduate, “on leave” from not only the university but a whole way of life, made very clear to me in the midst of the Mississippi Summer Project of 1964:

I was talking with the people I'm staying with until one o'clock this morning; I'd forgotten they get up with the sun to work in the fields. I felt terrible when I woke up. There I'd been, overlooking that some people have to work all day—not sit up and talk and talk, and then sleep through classes. But I couldn't stop listening to them. They were telling me the history of their family, back to the Civil War. They remember when the last slave in the county died. She was in her nineties. She'd told them about Reconstruction, when the blacks could vote, and she'd told them about the Klan, and the beginning of real segregation, and she'd told them about the floods of the Mississippi, and how the army came in. Well, they went on and on, remembering her and what she remembered. By the time we went to bed I'd learned about planting and harvesting, about the politics of this county, about the way whites and Negroes treat each other—in private as well as in public. You could say I learned some social history, some political science, some sociology and anthropology, some psychology and some economics. I'm going to re-read Faulkner. I'm going to read The Mind of the South again, and The Strange Career of Jim Crow. And it'll be different now, listening to my records—Leadbelly and Billy Holiday and all the others.

He had no more to say for a while, at least on that subject. He had to start “canvassing”: up and down those unpaved, rutted alleys, along which stood the cabins of people then being called—for the first time, and with avowed sympathy—“culturally deprived” and “culturally disadvantaged.” Later that day, however, he was ready to resume:

I went into a house, and they were silent and suspicious, as usual. I tried everything, and finally I decided to leave. But there was a boy, about ten, and he asked me why I was there. I told him—the usual speech: “I'm here to help the people become voters, so they can get a better deal for themselves,” and on and on. He interrupted me, finally: “I mean, why did you come down from the North?” I didn't know what to say. I started mumbling something about justice and equality, and I said it meant a lot to me to know that anyone could vote in this country, and all that. But the boy was ready for me as soon as I stopped. He said: “You'll go back at the end of the summer?” I said “Yes.” I didn't dare say any more; I knew how they felt—just like the whites, actually, who kept on saying we were there on a lark, and would soon leave Mississippi for the next cause, as the Jackson newspapers kept predicting: “These people come down here, and strut around, and soon enough they'll be gone.”

But the boy had something else going on in his head. He asked me: "What about later? Will you come back later, after you're through with college?" I didn't know how to answer; I wasn't sure why he wanted to know that. He saw my confusion: "I was wondering if you'd be coming back here, because if not, we'd still be alone—with the white folks."

The college student did not proceed with a long, self-justifying account of what he said to the boy, not to mention himself. He was frank to admit that his reply had been exceedingly brief: *"I hope I'll be back."* He was also frank to declare his realization that, in fact, the boy had been more than literal-minded in his inquiry: *"He wanted to know whether I was here for a summer of excitement, a 'brief interlude,' or whether I meant business. His mother had been made nervous by the questioning: no Negro ever dares ask a white man questions about his intentions! So, she half-apologized: 'Lonnie, he's always asking how this one and how that one lives their life.'"*

The student went on, as did I, to wonder *how indeed*. Weeks later, after the young activist had made another of his political points, had argued well from his (then) fixed ideological position, he came up with an echo of that sharecropper mother's apology for her son: *"But how is someone to live a life?"* He meant that it was one thing to know about how, say, a given society works, and quite another to live in accordance with certain moral or ethical values which one really respects. He meant, in his own way, to express Kierkegaard's mixed complaint and protest of over a century earlier. And he meant to declare his kinship, out of the events of his relatively short life, with writers like James Agee, George Orwell, and Simone Weil, none of whom were "anti-intellectual," but each of whom had experienced the tension he was then struggling with. When Agee went to Alabama, he learned not only about sharecroppers or, for that matter, about himself: his various assumptions, misconceptions, blindspots. Nor was it only a matter of pride faced and acknowledged: those long passages in *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* so full of amends, embarrassment, shame, self-accusation. Agee was also enough moved by what he saw and heard to write about "education" and did so not just beautifully (he can charm any bird off any tree at any time), but with special force and directness—as if he was, for once, not worried about offending or exploiting his sharecropper hosts, but simply sure of himself: I have learned rather a lot because of where I have allowed myself to go, and what I have been permitted to witness, and I will indicate how much.

Likewise, Orwell found the poor, the "down and out" whom he lived with in London and Paris, or visited along "the road to Wigan Pier," more than pitiable objects, to be described for various papers and quarterlies—a step in the career of an essayist. Much of the middle-class hypocrisy and cant he came to expose so tellingly became apparent to him when he deliberately (and nervously) became an outsider. In a Paris hotel, working as a dishwasher, he came to understand the bourgeoisie and the rich as well as the wretchedly poor and, most important, the elaborate series of rituals (and pretenses) which are indispensable, it seems, to a society like the kind France and England possessed in the 1930s, and no doubt still do. Among the "rock-bottom poor" he learned a kind of rock-bottom candor: *"I discovered for the first time how often we use books to conceal truths from ourselves as well as to uncover them."* As for Simone Weil, and her passionate pilgrimage, no passing remark in an essay like this can do justice to her fierce and unyielding effort to balance the life of the mind with a life of moral commitment. Her days spent working in a Paris Renault factory, or on a farm a hundred miles to the south, enabled her to gain a sense of herself, as a political philosopher and, later, as a woman of balanced and unashamed mystical sensibility, which

one suspects would otherwise have been denied her: *"I saw how dreary, boring and futile their lives were; but I wondered what there was to say about the kind of life I, as a student, had left."*

Among many students whose involvements I have shared this past decade, the ethical struggles waged by Agee, Orwell, and Simone Weil are by no means a matter of abstract interest. Some, but not all, of the protest hurled at our universities in the middle and late 1960s grew out of a sense, on the part of certain young men and women, that the ten-year-old sharecropper's son was right: there was injustice both in and outside Mississippi's Delta, and it was an order of injustice that required not casual condemnation, but a lifetime of attention—hence the careers some, but only some, young lawyers and doctors are now pursuing. Nor would I give the Vietnam war and more recently the so-called Watergate affair total credit for the moral anxieties, one can call them, which trouble at least a certain number of our college students. This journal is now taking note of an event which took place a full decade ago, and I rather suspect, from what I hear today from particular youths (I make no claim to know their exact number, and frankly, I am not sure anyone's questionnaire will come up with such an "answer"), that ethical questions continue to press upon many of them, but do not always get expressed to or heeded by willing and responsive teachers or administrators. We fully appreciate the capacity of the human mind to "repress" sexual inclinations or yearnings, or aggressive "drives"; we are less apt to notice how systematically children, and later, youths, are taught to ignore or brush aside the energies earlier generations (I think of William James) referred to as being generated by "moral intelligence" or "moral sensibility."

It is almost a cliché these days that our campuses have become, once again, quiescent. We are told that students hunger for security, worry about the "job market," have lost their "social concerns," now that they are not subject to the draft, or now that the climate in Washington has become what it is—and promises to be, at least until January of 1977. Yet I wonder how carefully and extensively we have studied the process of "political socialization" as it affects the developing ethical life of both children and youths, especially those who end up with that four-year "bonanza" many of us call the college years. I wonder whether many of our college youth are really all that unconcerned about what is happening here and abroad, or are as thoroughly self-centered or careerist as they appear to be—as unresponsive to the ethical questions that this country, one way or the other, will have to settle, if it is to survive as a democracy. A blue-collar youth, who works a scant five miles from both Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, once called the experience of college just that, a bonanza, and hastened to tell me—out of envy, out of resentment, out of frustration, and, yes, out of lust—what he thought he would do, given such an opportunity:

I'd find out, once and for all, what's the right track and what's the wrong one. I mean, haven't most of the mistakes we've made been caused by people who went to college? Then you hear people looking at someone like me and saying he's dumb, or he doesn't have enough education. There's a priest I know, and he's had a lot of education; but I'll tell you why I respect him: he's a wise man; he's learned to ask what's good and what you should believe in, not only what does two and two make, and how far is the moon from here, and when was Lincoln born.

That youth, also, to all outward appearances, seems indifferent to the news, bored by what some would consider the important issues of our time. *"All I want is to live a quiet life, and make some more money,"* he told me on another occasion. When I reminded him of his own previous words, he laughed and said: *"Well, what do you ex-*

pect, these days?" At first I thought the remark was a bit enigmatic and needed clarification. But I hesitated and thought better, I believe. Perhaps others his age, more "fortunate" than he, better "educated," hunger for an examination of the same urgent moral questions he cannot stop thinking about, even when working on a factory's assembly line—and, like him, feel all too often the futility conveyed by his brief question.

On the other hand, much of the futility he faces is not at all tied to what is happening "these days." There is in his various remarks the reluctant awareness of an existentialist philosopher—maybe not Kierkegaard, and certainly not Sartre, but Heidegger quite definitely; that is, he knows that he shares with millions of others a job which at times bores him and tires him, but also fully occupies him and provides him not only with money, but friends and—well, it is best that he say it:

Hell, I put in the hours, and it may not be the greatest thing, what I do, but I'm doing all right. I come home and then I go out. I have my friends, and I'm saving some money, and I'll be married soon. What more can I ask of life? A lot, I guess. I guess I should ask everything of life. I guess I should look deep into myself and the world, and find some answers. Maybe one day I will. But you can't just blame your job, if you're not happy, or if you're becoming a superficial person—you know, skin deep. That's what kills me about these college students, some of them—my cousin included. They shout at the police, and the government, and they say the colleges aren't any good either (my cousin says), because they don't teach you about the real world, only a lot about this one's books and someone else's books. Well, what's all this business about "the real world"? I'm in the real world, and so are they; so is everyone.

No matter that one moment he is by implication a caustic critic of university life and the next, also by implication, an equally determined critic of those who want their four years at college to be a mixture of all sorts of things (formal learning, experience at work, social action—and as he once put it at his most sardonic, "a few months of saving the world"). What he compels us to think about is at once concrete and abstract: what, specifically, if anything, can our colleges do to satisfy the hunger some of the students feel—a thirst for action to express their ethical concerns? The young factory worker has no answer to that problem, only his obvious mixed feelings; but I am not sure his state of mind is any less clear and precise than that of many who have a right to claim themselves vastly more knowing about university matters. There are indeed particular moments when certain (and only certain) students can find themselves both socially and politically active, and in a position to learn rather a lot. Many students, maybe a substantial majority, have no such interest or ambition—and not necessarily out of apathy or indifference or self-serving acceptance of the status quo. Like the factory worker, they regard college as a task of sorts, a job, work to be done—a step forward in "life." And how easy it is for one like me to scorn those students, but justify (in a condescending way) the same attitude on the part of a factory worker! All of which is to indicate that the vexing ambiguities of class and caste, of social insecurity and social snobbishness, of arrogant idealism and narrow practicality continue to plague any analysis of the American university scene, a microcosm, in many ways, of the nation itself—as one may appreciate better, perhaps, when talking with college students at a "community college," or at a state college, in the North, South, East, or West, or an urban school, public or private, far better than at an Ivy League college.

MICHAEL SCHUDSON

On the Sense of Vocation

IN 1799 JEAN ITARD, chief physician at the Institute for the Deaf and Dumb in Paris, wrote of his attempts to civilize the "wild boy" discovered in the forest and captured by villagers in Aveyron. The boy, whom Itard named Victor, had been abandoned in infancy and had survived without human contact for ten years. While other experts declared Victor a congenital idiot, Itard believed the boy's strange and wild ways to be the consequences of growing up outside society. The boy was entrusted to his care. Itard intended, first of all, to employ all available human knowledge to foster Victor's physical and moral development and hoped, secondly, that by careful observation of his work with Victor he could ascertain what of human character is owed to nature and what to culture. "May I dare to confess," he whispers in his report, "that it is my intention to accomplish both of these important objects?"¹

Nearly two centuries later Itard's efforts were to be greeted with contempt. Student audiences hissed and laughed at Itard in Francois Truffaut's *Wild Child*, a documentary retelling of Itard's work. When I saw the film at the Harvard Square Theater in the fall of 1970 I, like those around me, was drawn to the "free and innocent life" (Itard's words) the child had had in the forest. The scenes of Victor's inarticulate longings for the life he had been abandoned to and stolen from are among the most poignant I have ever seen on film. And yet I could not join the dreamy identification with Victor, nature, freedom, and ecstasy, the easy alliance against Itard, science, discipline, and civilization. Less than a year after the invasion of Cambodia, Jackson, and Kent State, I could not help but doubt the worth of the civilization the West had achieved. But I could not respond as if civilizing were not a task of value, as if my own experience of finding new worlds and new possibilities through reading and studying had not happened, as if learning and liberation were antithetical. I felt hurt by the contempt for Itard. I respected Itard's innocence as well as the boy's faith in science, and the dedication he expressed in his work.

I was then (and am still) a graduate student seeking to establish a sense of vocation. I admired Itard's fervent relationship to his work. And yet his faith in the possibility of science and the beneficence of human reason seemed nearly as remote to my experience as did Victor's oneness with nature. The problem of finding a vocation in scholarship did not arise only in the past few years, but it has been shaped by them; the form in which I have experienced the choosing and rechoosing of a vocation has been molded by almost a century of disillusion with "science" and by the political upheaval in the university and society during the sixties. While the criticism of universities and society that students voiced in the past decade had been heard before, it forced people to listen anew. We spoke, we listened, and those of us who have been students in the past years will hear the echoes all our lives.

Which echoes are strongest and what meaning we give to them will vary with the individual. The way one approaches a graduate school education will differ according to one's background. The experience of the graduate school will be further shaped by the particular department and university involved. But I am going to lay all these variations aside, important as they are, to highlight problems of finding a vocation which in some measure mark a large portion of graduate students of the past decade. I am certainly writing autobiography here, but I think what I write is true for many others. Were that not so, we would not be a "generation" at all; we would not be, more or less, part of the same market for folk-rock radio, health foods, and house plants; we would not recommend books to one another with confidence that taste and sentiment would be shared; we would not all chuckle at *Doonesbury*; we would not be able to dip into a community reservoir of words and memories. We would not have the implicit understanding—one I felt driving to Washington with a friend a few weeks ago when we silently passed the turn-off to Catonsville—that we share even our geographies.

Of course, graduate students of the past decade have much in common with graduate students of earlier years. The legend and life of the graduate student whose eagerness and hopefulness meets only frustration is a long-standing part of university culture. Well before the political struggles of the sixties it was taken for granted that something about the nature of the world or the university or "disciplines" or human organizations turned the hues of study wan, withered students and faculty, and desiccated subject matter. In 1961 Theodore Solotaroff sketched the experience of "the graduate student" as follows:

Exploited by a research or teaching job, subjected to the dislocation of his inner and family life, disarmed by the genteel authoritarianism of the academic will, he has become habituated to the feeling that the deeper questions of personal purpose are not worth asking and that the risks of intellectual freedom, passion, and non-conformity are not worth taking.²

There was, according to another observer in the same year, a "widespread feeling of dissatisfaction among many—perhaps most—graduate students."³ Their everyday life was probably much the same as it is now: the uncelebrated, even unnoticed transition from facing the blackboard to standing in front of it; the gradual accumulation of library privileges and library fines and, with good fortune, an appreciation of libraries; the metamorphosis of an idea or curiosity or accident into a thesis and the thesis into a neurosis; the craziness of storing treasured notes in the refrigerator to protect them from fire while still waking at night from dreams of their loss; the thrashing at the requirements blocking the path to a degree and the tension of having no requirements; the discovery fleetingly—or with good fortune, lastingly—that one participates in a historic community of minds and ideas, hopes and ideals.

But the shape of this life in the past decade has been rebuilt within the moral crisis of the university, within what has been called the "student rebellion" or "campus unrest." Naming the phenomenon by its symptoms has the dubious advantage of enabling institutions to breathe easily when the symptoms disappear, but the clutch of the sixties still holds onto students seeking a vocation in the university and younger faculty who, within the same frame of reference, are doing likewise.

The Sense of Vocation

A sense of vocation, as I mean it, may be something that few people develop in any job or craft or profession and that many perhaps never seek. That does not make

me less inclined to take it seriously or less concerned to know what taking it seriously means.

A sense of vocation relies first of all on outside support by a framework of institutional and personal bonds that respect the worker and reward his or her efforts. For instance, in early nineteenth-century America or in Cuba or China today, the agricultural worker would be buoyed by social respect and reward. The life of the scholar and teacher in the United States never received the high regard commanded by the scholars of Western Europe, but in the years after Sputnik the growing prominence of education and the links of research to power inflated the social regard for university life. With the disruption of universities in the sixties and, even more, with the tightening of the academic job market in the seventies, the outside supports to a sense of vocation in scholarship have worn down.

A sense of vocation, secondly, has an inside dimension: the person finds meaning in his or her work and seeks fulfillment through it. One needs to feel that the task at hand can be done and is worth the doing. A profession is a public avowal as well as a job: "The word itself suggests that a profession is not just something a person does but something he believes in doing."⁴ This inner confidence is related to the outer support, but not in any simple way. Indeed, it may be that the internal sense of vocation develops most strongly in persons or groups who feel themselves least aided by general social regard—the inner world of vocation may enlarge itself in professions that have the least social support. If the external sense of vocation is the reality of the world of scarce resources and stingy regard, its internal sense is the building of myths by which we make ourselves human. The power of illusion creates identity as it selects from our own experience and culture the stories and symbols we will live by. It may be called upon most in jobs which are most formless, most lonely, or most requiring of creative work—the arts, crafts, and what C. Wright Mills called "intellectual craftsmanship."

There is, finally, a feeling of necessity about a sense of vocation, a feeling that one's own involvement in the work is not wholly accidental and that the recognition one's own work obtains is not entirely undeserved. This is a complex of things. It involves a feeling of competence in contributing to the task at hand. It means, as well, occasionally touching some sense of fit beyond mere fitness. It arises in a "potential space" between the inner and outer contours of the sense of vocation.⁵ This, I would suggest, is a space of play: the feeling of necessity arises precisely in the most contingent area of all, that "interplay" between the external side of vocation (the reality of limited rewards) and the internal side (the illusion-building world of privacy and freedom). The external and the internal are both, in a sense, inescapable: the world is what it is, and one feels, wants, and dreams what one does. But in between is an area of escapability where we choose, steer, and create, and where we are terrified by both our limits and our possibilities. In that space the feeling of necessity emerges. Occupation becomes preoccupation without submitting to the world's constraints or the self's illusions.

This notion of the sense of vocation provides the outline for what follows. I want to discuss primarily the crumbling of the outer supports for the academic profession, which helped make the need to establish an inner sense of vocation a more pressing part of going to graduate school in the past decade. Then I will discuss the intermediate area, the potential space of the sense of vocation which, it seems to me, we have least well conceived and yet are most able, as institutions and persons, to do something about.

The Possibility of Scholarship

Is the task of scholarship possible? Is it worthwhile? Can one believe in it? Itard, at the close of the Enlightenment, did not have to ask. A graduate student in the present day cannot help but ask. When I was growing up, there was no such question—none that penetrated my awareness, certainly. In the fifties higher education began to assume tremendous importance, especially for a mobile middle class. I knew when I was in grade school that changes in the math program were not of incidental but of national beat-the-Russians significance. In the same years the College Board, as good a symbol as any of the importance of education in the definition and self-definition of young people, grew enormously (and the American College Testing Program began). In 1957 the Board for the first time released test scores to the students themselves, thus giving them more control over their lives, but leading them to identify themselves in numerical terms.

When I left home for Swarthmore College in 1965, the very idea of a college professor or someone who had published a book or written an article had an aura about it. Familiarity dispelled much (not all) of the aura, and I became critical of college as, indeed, my professors hoped I would be. I began to doubt—first intuitively, then critically and indignantly—the worth of much of the political science I was reading at the time. I began to question the sources of my knowledge. My reserves of good faith in American society wore low at the same time. I had dismissed the *Liberation* magazine articles about American atrocities in Vietnam freshman year—now I came to recognize them as true.

Still, I was cushioned by the assumption that going to college was a fact of life. But then I made a choice. Out of my desire to make sense of myself and my world, my delight in writing, and my discovery of social theory in Tocqueville and Marx and Weber, I chose graduate school and thus set a course toward an academic profession. Only then did I feel the need to justify myself and to be constantly critical of my path. Only when I arrived at Harvard was I uncomfortably aware of my own responsibility for my place. However unique I felt myself to be or wanted to be, it was plain that I was part of a historic drift to the universities. (Why is it that even students of society and history should be startled to find themselves participants in social trends and historical changes?) When I was first aware of colleges, as a high-school freshman, there were 356,000 students in American graduate schools. By the time I entered graduate school in 1969 the number was 828,000, and now it is more than 1,200,000. But who needed statistics to feel small? I was in Cambridge, walking down Brattle Street, seeing at once that everyone looked *just like me*. I was living in a co-op with other young people struggling against the loneliness of their apparent inconsequence: the graduate students derided their professors, the public school teachers complained of their principals, and the secretaries found their solace in the simple fact that they were *not* in school.

That much said, it is not surprising that I wanted to find in graduate school something to which I could devote myself and which devotion others would respect. It took courage and spirit for my college friends to travel, to join the Peace Corps, to enter the working world, or to make painful choices impelled by the draft. But these choices, at least for the moment, justified themselves. Choosing what seemed to be, at the time, the tried-and-true forced me to seek justification, to create within the conventional a meaning and purpose I could recognize as my own.

This task was made more urgent by finding myself in a university whose own

faith in itself was shaken and was still dissolving. I lived in a literate culture more critical of the poverty of social science than respectful of its promise, and more cynical about the "professionalism" graduate schools honored than hopeful it could be transcended.

Is scholarship possible? Is it worthwhile? The questions could not be bracketed. They were linked to each other and to institutional issues. "Is scholarship possible?" became "Is the work of the scholar neutral or detached or value-free?" "Is it worthwhile?" became "Is it complicit? Does it fail to acknowledge and resist overwhelming wrong?" The evidence was accumulating that the universities and the academic professions were institutionally participants in the perpetuation of injustice at home and, even more frightening, in the enactment in Vietnam of a crime which still (I remind you, I remind myself) goes on. At the extreme, even hallowed traditions of the academic world were violated in the interest of national pride and international murder—secret research was carried out, for instance, on biological warfare. In this and other respects—ROTC, recruiting for the armed services on campus—the universities were implicated in the war. These things could be attacked in *defense* of conventional notions of the academic community, and so were most effective in rallying support and disarming opposition. More troubling, to my mind, was the critique of the university's noninvolvement, its professed neutrality, its claim to stand outside politics. Either, the argument ran, neutrality was illusory or else, in a form even more paralyzing for someone seeking a vocation in scholarship, dispassion itself was complicity.

Was it possible to study, to learn, to discuss, and to persuade within a common realm of discourse? Or were we ultimately slaves to our own biographies, our own class origins, our own nationhood? Could there be a social science? Did the plausibility of the sociology of knowledge deny the possibility of a knowledge of society? Do we learn history or do we manufacture it? Did one develop taste or simply enter into a parochial consensus of elite opinion? If the university was doomed or elected to help create society's myths and illusions, could it do so legitimately or was it all done with mirrors? And if it were done with mirrors, was there not a greater integrity to the distorting mirrors we could recognize as carnivalesque than to the mirror that, confusing left and right, breaking three dimensions to two, made claims to verisimilitude?

These were not new questions. They were not even altogether new to me. But they were newly available and nearly unavoidable. The whole world seemed to be asking them of me. Marching on Washington asked them, demonstrations at Harvard asked them, lectures, seminars, and lunch-table conversations asked them. Books I had heard of as an undergraduate but did not read until the problem of knowledge was a problem I had chosen for myself asked them. Herbert Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* and his "Critique of Pure Tolerance," R. D. Laing's *Divided Self*, Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Jean-Paul Sartre's *Search for a Method*, Brecht's "Galileo," and Paulo Freire's essays on conscientization—none of these, which I read in my first two years in graduate school, was part of my course assignments, but they were my primary curriculum.

The Worth of Scholarship

Ordinarily, I could set aside the issue of the possibility of knowing: it was metaphysical or beyond my ken, or else I was simply satisfied with the growing

clarity with which I could discuss it. And there was work to be done—requirements to fulfill, papers to write, books to read, and satisfaction to be found in that, sometimes despite myself. But then the related issue loomed: even if knowledge produced by academic research is possible, is it worthwhile? Can I believe in the work I am doing? Itard, at the beginning of the democratic era, could not doubt that the pursuit of truth would liberate human potential. But the graduate student in the past decade could scarcely regard the scholarship he or she was presented with as self-evidently progressive. Too often it was either scholastic—divorced from significant questions about the human condition—or servile, accepting the immediate expression of human possibility as the framework, rather than the subject, of inquiry.

In some better society, the work of interpreting the world might be or might have been liberating, but in ours it appeared, as Susan Sontag wrote, “reactionary, impertinent, cowardly, stifling.”⁶ She was attacking criticism in the arts, but her words describe the social sciences, too (and the natural scientists who created Science for the People carried a similar critique into their fields). Social science, it seemed, was uncritical of the political and economic and social system in which it lodged; it was liberal; it was conciliatory; either it isolated itself in technological hardware and a quantitative idiom, or it intruded into human lives with tape recorders, questionnaires, and cameras, and all in the name of science. It was not novel to observe that the only passion in the social sciences seemed to be love of dispassion, that advocacy of the neutral and attachment to a cult of impersonality characterized the academic world. But the observation seemed to be more damning in the last decade because the world at large was more irrational and the university’s presumption that craziness was not the order of the day more irresponsible.

Still, for me, the image of the scholar, inventive and brave enough to make sense of the world, modest and detached enough to allow the shape of things to declare itself and dictate terms, remained an ideal. I admired scholars and scholarship—the essays of Clifford Geertz in anthropology, the historiography of Richard Hofstadter, or the persistent genius of Jean Piaget. At the same time, this did not satisfy; I wanted something else, something more. Like others, I looked with hope to the popular culture of the Left for models. There were Fred Wiseman’s documentary films, the journalism of Seymour Hersh or I. F. Stone, the work of political exposé which locally produced “How Harvard Rules,” the work of collectives that produced handbooks like *Our Bodies. Our Selves*, and a few films like *Battle of Algiers* which so many students saw again and again. These were, to widely varying degrees, works of critical intelligence, of imagination, of the engaged employment of art and artifice, disciplined research, and painstaking labor—work, that is, not unlike what some of our own might be. But too often students, submitting too readily to the narrowness of professional norms, regarded these as “other,” as alternatives to, rather than outcomes of, graduate school. Yet these works were products of observation as well as participation, detachment as well as involvement, objectivity as well as intensity, and they were persuasive in large part because they adopted an analytical or documentary style. But their affinities to our own chores escaped us. Too rarely were we able to recognize that the best scholarship was honorable, passionate, and without pretense; too often did we fall into romanticizing works more deliberately political. By seeing the scholarly as essentially dull or corrupt and the engaged as essentially foreign to our graduate education, we helped keep separate the very worlds we should have been bridging.

The Potential Space

And so, when we came to ask the question that always crouched in the corner, begging attention—"am I any good?"—we asked it with reference to the same standards of scholarship we were trying to live down. I. F. Stone was set aside. Self-deprecation stopped short of self-criticism or social criticism. The problems of our lives as graduate students that every so often verged on becoming for us public issues reverted to private troubles ("I am inadequate") or perennial torments ("it's always been like this").

Am I any good? Everything about graduate school conspired to make that as unsettling a query as possible, including the fact that there seemed no way to ask the question aloud. Can I make it? Will anyone notice me? What am I to the academic world and it to me? Graduate students ask this of themselves, of fellow graduate students, but most importantly they ask it of the faculty. The graduate student and the faculty member may share ideas, elevators, or squash courts, but first of all they share a hierarchy in which they hold unequal positions. "The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place."⁷ In the American university, however, neither student nor faculty member is confident of the legitimacy of the hierarchy, or any hierarchy, and there is a tendency for authority to dissolve into a situation of quasi-equality on the basis of quasi-persuasion. The relationship of domination between superior and subordinate is still common in the graduate school, where the professor regards as drudgery the student's work as research assistant or teaching assistant. But the relationship is unstable (are university students in other countries so uneasy about whether to call their professors by their first names?) and authority is uncomfortable for both superior and subordinate.

One resolution of this discomfort is to transform domination into its opposite: if faculty and students cannot distinguish authority from authoritarianism, if all relations of authority are offensive, then the university can sever them and faculty members can replace manipulating students with ignoring them. Indifference would seem a peculiar formula for education in other contexts, but it is a familiar one in the graduate school. The oscillation between being dominated by a professor, in fact or in one's fears, and being ignored results in the student's alternation between "feeling intimidated" and "feeling contemptuous."⁸ It becomes hard to remember that there are other alternatives.

But there are. There is a place for a mentor. One sort of mentor can move the student from bewilderment to comprehension and so provide a sense of progress and of achievement. But the student always finds a next hurdle, and what is settled will soon dissolve without a second sort of mentor: the one who gives students confidence not in their accomplishments, but in themselves and their capacities for growth. In the rare instances, this may be coupled with that self-fulfilling prophecy that changes the world, a sense of confidence not only in oneself but in human beings. Such a mentor plays a nurturing role which, however often it may be fulfilled in fact, is ignored or ridiculed in universities. From one persuasion it is called coddling; from another, it is paternalism. But there is a kind of parenting that is decent and worth modeling—there is a kind of love that makes self-love possible, a faith that makes will conceivable, a seriousness that gives the student room to play. This kind of attention, this intelligent sympathy, opens for the student the

potential space of the sense of vocation. Indeed, it is only in this space that students can learn to take themselves seriously, but not ponderously; skeptically, but not cynically; trustingly, but not blindly. It is only here they can learn to abandon themselves to their work—and so to play.

Staupitz, according to Erik Erikson, served as such a mentor to Luther. Staupitz “evoked enough trust so that Martin was able to experiment with ideas like those he was soon to find deep in himself.”⁹ Lincoln Steffens took on this role for Walter Lippmann and John Reed and Anna Louise Strong—who said that Steffens “set me free.” Steffens had asked Reed what he wanted to do. Reed did not know—except that he wanted to write. Steffens smiled at this and replied, “You can do anything you want to.” Reed commented on this exchange later: “Since then I have gone to him with my difficulties and troubles, and he has always listened while I solved them in the warmth of his understanding.”¹⁰

But too often graduate students fail not only to learn to play in their work, but to understand their activity as work at all. Studying is “school,” not “work,” “preparation,” not “life.” Being paid for it by fellowships, rather than legitimizing it, often only increases the sense of embarrassment. However critical some students may be of the industrial system of labor, in theory, they seem to have internalized it in practice: their hopes for a better society appear to be more unconventional than their fears of failing to live up to the ideals of this one. Before industrial capitalism established itself, British historian E. P. Thompson tells us, “the work pattern was one of alternate bouts of intense labour and of idleness, wherever men were in control of their own working lives.” He suggests that this pattern persists among the self-employed—artists, writers, small farmers, and “perhaps students”—and that this may be a “natural” work-rhythm.¹¹ Perhaps. But if so, it brings with it for these survivors the guilt of feast in the midst of famine and the anxiety of work that cannot measure its progress by the clock.

It is difficult for the graduate student to take his or her work seriously, difficult to take one’s own position—and one, at that, of a rather privileged and rarefied stratum of society—seriously. It was appropriate for Itard to be so dedicated. It was fitting for Charles Eliot to write more than a century ago, “. . . What a tremendous question it is—What shall I be?” to write as a young man, “. . . may I never think that my profession is the world, or that my horizon bounds the universe. And yet, while I honor other professions I must be devoted to my own; not slothful, but diligent and zealous in my calling.”¹² It was all right for him—it defined him as a Puritan, a Bostonian, a man of the nineteenth century. Our day must be governed more by irony than by earnestness—the irony of Thomas Mann, for instance, who writes that Hans Castorp continued his schooling because:

. . . he thus prolonged a situation he was used to, in which no definite decisions had to be taken, and in which he had further time to think matters over and decide what he really wanted to do. . . . Even when it was finally decided—to say when Hans Castorp finally decided it would be saying too much—he had the feeling that it might quite as well have been decided some other way.¹³

It is that undrama in which graduate students are actors. If revulsion at the inadequacies and iniquities of the university and the professions in the sixties led some to give up the idea of a life of scholarship and teaching, for others it may have dramatized the university world enough to make at least an adversary role within it seem worthy of devotion. I suspect that very often in the past years those who have been affected by the “primary curriculum” have sought out adversary enclaves

within the university. For me this meant first an effort to work on a "radical" graduate student journal edited, as we wrote in the first issue, by people who worked "in, around, and in spite of Harvard University." More significantly, it meant participation on the *Harvard Educational Review*, a student-run journal which, in the wake of its publication of the notorious Jensen article on race and I.Q., sought to refound itself on the assumption that morals and politics cannot be divorced from scholarship. We tried to carve out a responsible policy on that basis. It was never simple and was not always done well, but the issues we confronted, it seems to me, were the right ones.

Two other adversarial settings helped provide me with the kinds of regard and sympathy that made work and play possible. I taught in a general education course that trusted students enough to encourage them to trust their own experience in coming to understand society. I participated in discussion groups at the university's counseling center in which one could explore problems of teaching undergraduates. The *Harvard Educational Review* saw itself running against its own past and the prevailing academic ideology of neutrality. The course saw itself as an alternative to preprofessional pressures and an antidote for students overwhelmed by courses in which they had little room to credit their own insights or take their own problems seriously. The counseling center saw itself as adversary to the university's and the departments' neglect of educating its graduate students to be educators.

One wonders, of course, if the adversary models are not more like the mainstream institutions they attack than they would like to think; the alternatives they work out are surely formed and deformed by those they joust with. And there were alternatives outside the university, usually more risky, sometimes more exciting and imaginative, and recurrently in my thoughts. But I began to establish a sense of vocation, I began to make sense of vocation in the adversary spaces within the university. There I could learn to avoid the aimless drifting of Castorp and, even though the decisiveness of Eliot or the fervor of Itard were no longer possible, find a way to take myself and my work seriously.¹⁴

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THOMAS J. COTTLE

The First Child at College

ON THE CORNER of Cheshire and McNulty Streets in Somerville, Massachusetts, stands a simple gray wood house. On the west side of the house is a glorious elm tree, its branches hanging over the eaves of the second floor. The neighbors say the tree is one of the oldest in Somerville, but that it is only a matter of time before it will be hit by the disease that shortens the life of this elegant species. Still it hangs on, seemingly untouched by illness and, for that matter, by the course of history.

Twenty-six years ago, and just beyond his thirty-second birthday, Emil Morosco bought the gray house on the corner of Cheshire and McNulty Streets and moved his wife Sarah and their two small children into its seven comfortable rooms. The corner location made it a special house, Emil's parents said. The elm tree was an important omen, even if the weeds in the small yard were a bit of a nuisance. The house was a financial risk, but with a veterans' loan and a good job in a construction firm, Emil Morosco had little fear of not meeting his mortgage and insurance payments. Sarah could always do part-time work, and the boys, although only small children now, would someday be wage earners themselves. The American dream declared that one have a job, own a house, keep your wife from working, and have a bunch of children. The house on the corner was a beginning.

The years passed calmly for the Moroscoss. The two boys grew beautifully, and two more sons were born in the 1950s. Emil's job remained secure, and gradually he began to think of retirement. There was talk of buying a small cabin in New Hampshire for summer trips. New cars were hardly an every-year affair, but no one can remember the Moroscoss owning any one automobile for longer than four years. Despite rises in prices and property taxes, the Moroscoss were managing. Always there was the house on the corner and the friends advising Emil and Sarah to hold on to it; they could live their entire old age on the equity it would bring.

To hear the Moroscoss recount the last twenty-five years is to bear witness to the turns of history. It is an ascent Emil speaks of when he reflects on his own development. His parents were born in the old country in Castelbuono near Palermo and as far as anyone can tell never attended school. Sarah's father died soon after her birth, leaving her mother with no money. Both families had come to Boston and eventually moved to Somerville. Emil's father, Guido, worked in road construction, spending the major part of his life pushing granite curb stones into place with heavy iron rods. A grueling job usually given to Italians and Portuguese, it left him with a crippled back and arthritis in his neck that tortured him until his death on Christmas Eve, 1965.

Emil had taken the steps his father had wanted for him. He completed two years of high school before entering the army. Education was the most important project, his father had always told him. *"Have your sons go to school. They can never go enough. Don't let them stop. You can always earn money, but you can't always get*

the proper education.” Soon after his first two grandsons were born, Guido Morosco purchased two one-hundred-dollar bonds. *“Money for education,”* he told his son. *“Government money for education. It’s better than gold.”* Emil recalls wondering whether he should tell his father that with public education the boys did not need extra money for school. *“The state pays,”* he wanted to tell his father, but he thought better of it. Besides, it was a lot of money, and there was no reason to hurt the elder Morosco’s feelings.

It was not for grammar school and high school, however, that Guido Morosco had started his little education fund. It was college he had in mind. Often he would walk about the campuses of Harvard and Boston University, dreaming of the day when a grandson of his might attend one of these colossal schools. He dreamed, too, of his own father, buried in Tortorici, and what the old man might have thought had he known his great-grandson might graduate from college in America. For generations no one by the name of Morosco had ever gone to school, and suddenly, in the movement of a single generation, there would be two boys, maybe dozens of boys, attending college!

“It was his dream,” Emil Morosco told me in January of 1974.

“First, the house. Poppa had such a thing about this house, and the tree. I think he’d have shot anybody coming even to look at the tree. But education was his highest priority. That’s what he always talked about. He used to have a saying about how you could always tell an uneducated man, no matter how high he worked his way up. I never understood his dream about college, about sending at least one of my sons to college. When he put those bonds away for them, I thought he meant high school, but it was college. Even then.

“When you don’t have anything, and you come from the old country, like both my parents did, the first thing you worry about is work. When I came back from the war, Poppa could see that employment wasn’t the serious problem anymore. Then, when we bought the house, that convinced him it was time we moved up, in the society at large, I mean. I’d always believed that ownership was the main thing. When a man moved from an apartment to a house, he had moved in more ways than one. You get what I mean? But my father, he thought the way to move was through education. I never saw it that way because college was for rich families, not families like ours. Even when we moved and the boys were doing well in school, I still didn’t think college was part of the plan. They’d finish high school—not like their old man—and if the army didn’t get them, they’d go to work. Maybe they’d stay home a few years with their parents, maybe not, but college? You had to have money for college.”

“But there were lots of families,” I reminded him, *“who didn’t have much money who got their kids to college.”*

“You think it wasn’t mainly for the rich?” Emil questioned me sharply.

“I agree, it was essentially, and certainly originally, for the rich,” I said. *“But not every family with a kid in college was rich.”*

“But it wasn’t only the money. It was what they call a life-style. I knew about public colleges. What the hell, in my business I’d done work for some of the colleges. I talked with fellows there, you know, so I understood what it was all about. But I had this idea you sent your kids to college either if you had a lot of money or no money at all. You know what I mean? People like us, people in between, we sent our kids to high school, that was all. It was the life-style. I mean, what kind of clothes do they wear at college? And what kinds of people do they

meet there? I don't mean political types, I mean, who do they meet there? They go to school with Mr. Rockefeller's sons, or Mr. Kennedy's sons? You know what I mean? I had to ask myself those questions."

Emil Morosco saw me nodding, but he must have detected a peculiar look on my face. "You don't see the serious part of this, but it's shaky for me to think about this. I used to wonder, what if one of my kids goes, let's say to Boston College. That's a reasonable place, okay? Not Harvard, something at our level. And let's even say that he does fine. Then one night comes a knock on the door and there he is, you know what I mean, with a girl. Someone from the college too. Now, how do we know she fits in? Or maybe I should say, how do we know we're up to her expectations? With the way they dress at college you can't tell rich kids from poor kids, except the rich speak differently. For God's sake, I could have the daughter of some New York banker standing right over there in the doorway looking at the way we live.

"See, what I hadn't worked out for myself was that I wasn't ready to be part of the college business. Get what I'm driving at? My kids were ready, but I was the guy who had to get prepared. It didn't fit in with what I thought we were in the society at large. Look, this week begins 1974. I got a father, had a father," he corrected himself, "who never went to school, grade school, and I'm waiting around to see which college is going to accept my son. In a few years we go from nothing to having a choice. It's only a few years. It's not easy to get ready. It takes an adjustment. My son has to make an adjustment, I have to, too."

"What about Sarah? Does she have to make an adjustment, too?" I smiled.

"Sarah's already in college." Emil grinned with more than a trace of pride. "She loves that Michael's applying. As far as she's concerned, he's a college man. You know what it is with me? It's a feeling that even though I know I'm doing something right—I mean, you don't argue with the idea of your kid going to college—maybe I'm also doing something wrong. I keep telling myself it's good, it's important. Maybe I feel I'll be left behind, maybe that's it. I'm willing to consider that as a possibility. But it's more than that. College is sacred. It's like the church. You take your hat off in church, and you whisper, you know what I mean? It's sacred. When you go there, you have to have special feelings, you have to think special kinds of thoughts. It's the best the society has to offer. It's not like a job or a place you go for a vacation. It's a serious thing, going to college. It's sacred, like I say."

"But Emil," I interrupted, "anybody can go to church."

"Well, then that makes college even more sacred because not everybody can go. Lots of people, like me until a few years ago, we didn't think of sending our children to college. It wasn't a possibility for us. 'Course, lots of people do it automatically. The second the child is born they're moving around getting them set up in the best colleges."

"But Michael's going to go," I stated firmly.

"If the Lord smiles on us, he'll go. He'll go to a public school, but he's dead set on going."

"And you support him." I practically gave him no alternative.

"You bet I do. I got it in perspective now. It's the most important step a person can take. It's what separates people in this society. More than money. If you really want to divide this country into the haves and have nots, you ask them one question: 'Did you go to college?' You take a person that earns a million dollars a year who never went to college, you'll find out the minute he opens his mouth. You

can see it on television when they interview some guy. The second he speaks you know if he went to college."

"And if he did?"

"He sounds finer, more refined, like. More cultured, sophisticated, man of the world. Intelligent. It's all the same thing. He sounds better, that's all."

"And that means that you . . ."

Emil cut me off. *"That means I sound less educated than my son. And if you hear us talking you know goddamn well that he sounds more intelligent. He'll be a man of the world compared to me. I've got the corner lot here, but he'll move out of Somerville soon, maybe out of this state in a few years. Maybe out of the country too, for that matter. A college education, there's no telling where he'll end up. Education puts surprises and mysteries in a person's life; working nine-to-five takes all the surprises and mysteries out of your life. You know what I mean?"*

Anyone listening to the conversations in the Morosco home during the winter of 1974 might have heard ambivalence or at least uncertainty in Emil's words. Clearly, there was a lingering tension about his son's admission to college, but there was never the feeling that he was supporting an improper development. Nor was he afraid of some brewing competition with his son, a progression on the part of the younger man by which Emil would feel intimidated. The prospect of his son's admission was, for the while, shaking his sense of social position. Never had I heard him use the phrase "in the greater society" as often as during those winter conversations. The thought of college had changed his perspective. He was a man turning on a wheel, expecting any minute to come out of the shadows and face the sun head on. He was, in effect, watching himself watching himself, that familiar act of self-assessment one experiences when one's sense of security has been challenged. Emil Morosco could speak of his own advancement, but the ascent was described somehow from afar, as though he were looking back and saying, I've come a long way. Rarely did he describe himself living in the precise moment of promotion or achievement. He merely used past positions, salaries, and residences as benchmarks of advancement; he knew, now in his middle years, that he was beyond these points.

With Michael about to enter college, however, Emil saw himself smack in the middle of tangible mobility, feeling his movement in "the greater society" as it was happening. On several occasions he even asked me whether I noticed any physical changes about him. I remarked that waiting and worrying sometimes make people age faster. *"Not that at all,"* he corrected me. *"I'm moving up in the world. If anything, I should be looking younger, and more proud. They aren't going to be able to take this one away from me. Bunch of the fellows where I work have kids in college, but it still isn't the expected way. Getting a kid into college is still a serious event for the people I work with. You shouldn't be seeing age in my face. That's a little elegance growing there. Huh? What do you say to that?"*

Official announcement of Michael's admission to the university came in late March. The Moroscoscins dined out several nights in a row to celebrate. For six months, Emil Morosco had secretly put money away for just this moment. The first night they went to Chelsea to their favorite restaurant. On the second night, amid protests from his family, Emil chose a downtown Boston hotel dining room. He insisted that his family dress up and that Michael invite one of his girl friends. *"I'd like the chance,"* Emil told his wife, *"to be able to say in my way that I'm ready for this, that I can live like I think a person should who's sending a kid to college. It's a day of major change. Close your eyes, you'll feel the ground shifting. Something about*

this generation thing," he whispered, "it's really true. The kids finally take you with them. You take them through high school, but they take you the rest of the way. What we're celebrating is not just Michael being a man. We're celebrating changes in both our manhoods. I'm a better man for what he's achieved. He boosts me up now; we boost each other. We're going to celebrate because my father would have wanted us to.

"This is the second of the three big changes in an immigrant family's life." He winked at his son as though at last the younger man would fully appreciate his philosophy. "The first step is taken by the grandfather. He comes from the old country and plants roots, good roots. Then his son establishes himself as a real American, which means educating his children, educating them all the way. Michael goes to college. Number three is the time when you really arrive, not in the country, but in the greater society." He faced his son. "This change is yours, and I pray to the Almighty that I can see that day like your grandfather would have wanted to see you this night. When your child goes to college, which ought to be practically automatic, you got to pay for him. Send him to a private school, scholarship or no. 'Cause when you've got one kid in a private school, you know you've got real earning power and that means you've got the country working for you instead of the other way around. Then you're a real insider. Then you're in the special clubs."

Sarah looked at her two men with a pride I had never seen before. Emil, too, seemed satisfied, as much by his speech as by her son's accomplishment. Michael, however, looked puzzled. *"That's your theory, dad?"* he asked.

"That's no theory, that's facts!"

"I think you're making too much of it. Clubs and insiders? I don't want to be inside the country. I'll always be an Italian, just like you."

"You speak Italian, smarty pants?" Emil teased him.

"No, but I . . ."

"Then you're no more an Italian than Cottle here." Emil Morosco's look became stern, and his deep brown eyes skipped between his son and me. There was no doubt that this was a man's issue; he never once glanced back at Sarah.

"Now look you two," Emil began. "We celebrate tonight. Just the family. We honor our parents, the country of our parents' birth, and this country too. We have all kinds of faults to find with this country, starting with their treatment of our people. We don't forget for a minute the way my father was deprived of the chance of working. We don't forget how he broke his back with those curbstones on the streets where the rich live. That you can understand. But there's a chance in this country; it just takes a while before you get it. Everybody knows immigrants have to wait in line for their visas and their entry papers. And once they're in, they wait all over again to get a job, to get a house, to get accepted. The mistake everybody makes is thinking it all comes in a lifetime. Your getting into college, my friend, comes after two lifetimes of waiting. It started one helluva long time before you were even born, and it doesn't end for at least another lifetime, with your own kid, if you think you're up to it.

"When I talk to you about clubs, I don't mean downtown clubs for famous people. I mean walking into the Ritz Carlton and having a reservation, eating nice food, wearing nice clothes, having people wait on me, bringing me things to eat. You get my point? When I can do that, then I'm in the society, and no matter what anybody tells you the password is college. Without it you're nothing. Until that day everybody

spots you as what they call a self-made man. But you're going to be a college-made man, and that means you're on the same level as the most powerful people in this country. You'll become a professional!" He pointed his finger at Michael. "You know what that means, professional? It means education. Knowledge, class, money, the best this country has."

Obviously embarrassed, Michael wiped nervously at his nose and cheeks. "You mean I get to end up like the President?" he muttered.

"Don't give me tough-boy talk," Emil admonished him. "Education didn't ruin the President. Selfishness, greediness ruined him, not college. And who's going to get him out if it isn't the smartest men in this country. Don't be cute with me. You've got the big chance. You think winning a lottery's important? All that money isn't going to do what your diploma's going to do, if you think you're up to it. Hundred-thousand-dollar-a-year ball player? It don't impress me. Doing what you'll be doing, that impresses me."

Emil Morosco was finished, but his son had one last protest. "I won't earn in my lifetime what those guys earn in a few years."

"I got nothing against athletes," Emil replied. "But you'll have something none of 'em have. It's called durability. What are they going to do when they're thirty, forty, fifty, the majority of 'em? They'll become like me, except their stories about the past will be more exciting. While they're telling their friends pushing curbstones about how they once hit .230 for the Red Sox, you'll be moving up. They'll be coming down, you'll be moving up. And you still will when you're sixty. You'll see how brains can carry a man when his body can't, but just having brains won't do it. You got to have a diploma. You got to have a lot of what this country decides is the right kind of money. Sometimes it's plain old dollars and cents, sometimes it's credentials. You'll have it all, my boy, if you work. It's there for the taking for the first time in this family's history as far back as anyone can remember. Now go comb your hair 'cause you're still my son until September and we'll celebrate. And when you graduate we'll do it again, except then you'll pay!"

Once again Emil Morosco looked pleased. He waited for Michael to reply, knowing the younger man had declared him the winner. How important it was in that moment for Emil to be able to triumph with words. All of us in the room recognized this. Accompanying me to the door Emil clutched my arm and gave it a squeeze as if to remind me one last time of his physical strength. Then he looked over his shoulder at where Michael had stood. I could feel joy, unadulterated joy spreading into every cell of his body. "How do you like that kid," he said loudly, "thinking his old man's a slouch 'cause I never went to college? You think tonight's the night I should tell him I went to Harvard?" He swung open the door and literally shoved me out into the late afternoon sun.

THEODORE R. SIZER

On Myopia: A Complaint from Down Below

IN JULY, 1972, I resigned as Dean of the Faculty of Education at Harvard, a position I had held since early 1964, to become the twelfth headmaster of Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts. The determination to leave Harvard mystified many colleagues and even some friends. The decision, even for an Educationist, to go Down Below, to practice in the schools, confounded them. Studying children and schools was one thing: devoting oneself day in and day out to their schooling was something else again, a technical, routine task, it was supposed. To *practice* education—in contrast to studying it, or presiding in some political or high administrative post to promulgate policy that might direct it—was considered by many to be demeaning.

But, for some of my university colleagues, there was even more shock: to labor in a *private* school seemed to many to be a kind of treason (a rebuke with a deliciously ironic twist when it came from colleagues with degrees from, and appointments at, “private” colleges and universities). “Private” meant privilege, snobbery, grotesque “manners,” bad things. “Public” meant Democracy, and that was Good.

I thus found myself absorbing punishment from a set of stereotypes, expectations of what is considered “stepping up” or “stepping down” in careers and of what is considered in liberal quarters to be “acceptable” employment. The reality of the intellectual demand and excitement of being a classroom teacher and school principal and of the striking democracy and class and race integration of a school such as Andover were irrelevant, unnecessary. I was out of step, out of convention, and, indeed, for public school partisans, pariah. Poor Ted, they said. Or worse.

In the two years since my return to school work (I had taught in secondary schools in the 1950s), I have learned to understand this stereotyping better, and to see it as but one by-product of all-too-frequent myopia, of modishness, of social science inquiry and university teaching as it affects education. I am not here speaking of methodological modishness: there is almost too much variety and acrimonious debate over technique in the science of society and behavior. What I see now, more clearly than earlier, is rather a commonality of attitude in research and policy studies which restricts scholarly approaches to social scientific inquiry and thus narrows our understanding of what is in fact going on in human groups and how one might make these less destructive, more effective, or more humane.

The Question of Busing

One need go no farther than the inflamed and inflaming issue of “busing.” The issue here is racial isolation, deliberate or unintended, of children in schools, an issue which gained its modern construal from the 1954 *Brown* decision. For purposes

of public policy, it remains almost wholly a constitutional and political question. Do the classrooms have as reasonable a mix of white faces and black faces as is practically achievable, and do the administrative efforts of school authorities reflect a high priority for racial integration? If they do not, efforts must be found to increase racial mixing, by devices such as redistricting, luring interracial student bodies to "magnet" schools, and even the step which has become the flashwords of the issue, "forced busing."

Academic interest in this issue has, with pathetically few exceptions, been focused on the law and on administrative remedies for racial isolation. A small corps of consultants now exists, crisscrossing the country assisting school boards or courts faced with implementing judicial requirements for racial mixing, and an entire literature on the matter is filling the libraries. Academia continues to study the law relating to the racial composition of schools, the politics of communities affected by desegregation orders, and the mechanics of what is called "compliance." Academia and school politicians have overlooked much of what the issue is really all about.

The *Brown* decision rested on a question of deliberate discrimination, the assignment of black children to one set of schools and white children to another. The court ordered desegregation and an end to the policy of racial separation in schools. Since 1954, the issue has subtly moved from desegregation (eliminating separate schools) to integration (creating a system of at least race-blind or, more usually, deliberately mixed schools within an existing school district), to affirmative action (the deliberate creation of racially integrated school districts or, as in a recent New York City decision, integrated neighborhoods). But, however the emphasis has changed, the issue has remained one of more or less racial mixing and of more or less discrimination.

Is that the key issue for children? At one, highly simplistic level, it is. Children deserve equal protection of the law, and thus roughly equal provision for their compulsory schooling. Schools separated by race are inherently unequal, and therefore must be eliminated. This is reasonable law. However, it might be simple-minded psychology and obtuse pedagogy and thus only partly address the needs of children.

Most schoolteachers accept the need for desegregation and for relatively equal provision of services for black children and for white children. The schools in which we work should not be segregated by race, and the resources available should be equitably distributed among races. Indeed, within given school districts they already are, a finding which thoroughly surprised James S. Coleman and his colleagues as they analyzed the data emerging from their Equal Educational Opportunity study in the late 1960s.¹ The practicing teacher sees much more, however. The physical mixing of children of differing races is more easily accomplished than the pedagogical tasks of lessening racial hostility or, *mirabile dictu*, of creating racial harmony. How can people learn to see their own fears and prejudices? How can they be persuaded to moderate these, realistically? Can teachers contain the explosive hostilities that mark most racially and socially comprehensive high schools and concurrently teach toward understanding and racial empathy? Indeed, what do terms such as "understanding" and "racial empathy" precisely mean, what are the psychology and sociology underlying them, and by what authority do teachers act to alter students' (often wholly rational) hostility? These are nice questions, fundamental for the progress of any school, and particularly one under the weight of imposed racial "mixing." Can political or judicial authority responsibly require the integration of the schools in a politically charged community without both recognizing these issues and providing means to cope with them?

Assigning children properly and fairly to racially integrated schools represents about one-tenth of the problem as a responsible teacher sees it. The other nine-tenths of the task is pedagogical, and has been grievously neglected. School integration is fixed in most of academia as a legal and political question: such is the fashion, and those who cut at the matter from another set of concerns, such as pedagogy, are rare and, where present, largely ignored. Indeed, in appearing to broaden integration issues to more than merely a matter of mixing the races in classrooms, they are often labeled racist. (Such may begin to explain some of the suspicion and hostility between what ordinarily would be natural allies: organized teachers' groups and university-based civil rights lawyers and social scientists. The former find the latter both myopic and arrogant. The latter term the former reactionary and racist.)

The Question of Class

To the schoolteacher, the effects of social differences in learning are far more troubling than those associated with race, for reasons of justice as well as of pedagogy. "Failure" at conventionally defined school tasks relates closely to motivation, and a youngster who sees, for whatever reason, no incentive to learn, rarely does. As Edward Banfield has usefully pointed out,² the "future orientation"—an individual's willingness to invest in learning, as well as in other more material things—varies considerably, and follows certain environmental and cultural patterns. The child with low "future orientation" (Banfield calls him lower class) is truant and cares little for the usual bric-a-brac of failing grades, threats, and attendance officers which schools conventionally use. The teacher sees that child's motivation as the first issue with which to deal: the child must want to learn. Education must be organized to provide children of all classes some incentives *on their own terms* to attract them to any kind of formal learning. The current system, the one which we are now painfully race-integrating, is constructed to reward middle- and upper-class children (Banfield's "future oriented"). It threatens or hectors or merely provides custodial services for others.

Such is inexcusable education. It also may be unequal protection under the law: why must the only incentive provided by the compulsory school system be so narrowly defined that it rewards but a single class? Does government have the legal right to punish those for whom that incentive is irrelevant? Put from the schoolteacher's perspective: will the courts be as fair about recognizing class differences as they have been about race differences, and will compulsory school law take account of the needs of children who require different incentives and programs for learning than those we now provide? Can and will academia allow publication of research findings about these class-differing needs and stalwartly protect both their colleagues whose conclusions may not square with conventional wisdom and children from politicians and educators who distort and deliberately misuse these conclusions?

Cast this way, one can view recent court decisions such as that by Federal Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr. requiring racial "mixing" within the Boston public schools only as legally interesting but notably incomplete and philosophically unjust. Garrity's decision is incomplete because it requires only mixing, and the costs attendant thereto, but it does not *require* substantial programs within schools to contain the explosive results of that mixing and to improve racial understanding, programs which may well cost far more in funds and imagination than any busing scheme

alone. Garrity gave Boston children and teachers a partial remedy. Furthermore, the decision leaves the task of integration to the City of Boston alone, a city whose limits may have made some demographic sense in the seventeenth century but which make none at all today. A single gerrymandered district, made up disproportionately of lower-middle and lower income peoples—and thus of racial minorities—carries the burden for “equality” and racial harmony for the entire region. The poor black child and the poor white child are forced to integrate, while the middle and upper income child, safe in suburbia, studies their agony in social studies class. “What kind of justice is *that*?” the history teacher is asked. “Why call a newspaper ‘liberal’ that applauds a court decision which gives a cruelly difficult social task to but a part of the community, and a disadvantaged one at that?” Few in universities have much help to give that history teacher. Some argue that the country has to press these issues from some vantage point, and the legal flog available to whipsaw the citizens of the City of Boston is a good one. Such may be good politics, and better law. However, it is shameful justice, and poor pedagogy.

If one wishes to provide its citizens with places for formal learning and if the culture is to reward “investment” (for example, taking the time and effort to learn to think clearly, to understand one’s community, to learn a saleable skill), then institutions for these purposes—schools—must be places where “investment” is valued. “Investment” is a middle-class value (using again the Banfield construal), and some social scientists and most schoolteachers know that it exists in a school only if a majority of the students there share that value. Belief in “investment” is a subtle matter, not one easily imposed. It grows out of the tone of a school, mostly as the result of peer pressure. If the values of a majority of the students in a school are against “investment,” then all the efforts of integrationists, schoolteachers, educational equipment manufacturers, and worried parents go to naught. The result is the chaos caused by students whose values, for good or ill, lie elsewhere.

Put positively: if one wants the children of Banfield’s “lower class” to learn the skills and attitudes which are now the staple expectations of Americans for their educational system, then one must see that they attend a school infused with an investment ethic, most practically a school where a majority of the students already have this ethic. *Ergo*, one must bus “lower-class” children to schools where the predominant enrollment is of “middle” and “upper-class” students; and this inevitably will mean busing across metropolitan lines, which are today most often the boundaries of class ghettos.

This line of inquiry is challengeable, of course. For ideological or practical reasons, one may not want to impose a middle-class investment ethic on everyone. Current goals of academic achievement may be inappropriate and require change. Less disruptive programs than forced busing may be more useful to try first, efforts such as community development (the deliberate effort to create pride and community spirit—middle-class values akin to the investment ethic—within lower-class neighborhoods).

However, even if not here analyzed further, the foregoing example of pupil assignment across an entire metropolitan region is sufficient to highlight an option—the “mixing” of classes, rather than, or in addition to, races—rarely pursued in current considerations of policy relating to equal educational opportunity. It is an option painfully relevant to teachers who see class hostility and differences played out daily in their schools. The excessive focus of the university and legal fraternity on race mixing, and its fear (save for academic Marxists) of facing the facts of social

class differences in America, not only distorts the issue of equality in education, but fails to address a key aspect of the current crisis, the question of class, an aspect which is tearing the schools apart. Those of us working with children, even in schools such as Andover which reek of the investment ethic, are intensely conscious of this.

The Rights and Fragility of Children

What the foregoing two examples highlight is a difference in emphasis, in priorities, about issues as seen by many practitioners on the one hand and by social scientists and university educators on the other. To the schoolteacher some high university priorities smack of modishness, of faddism. The cynics in the schoolteachers' room see the current interest in the "rights of children," for example, as only a quite predictable extension of women's rights—which itself followed in knee-jerk fashion after black rights, and so on. As in those earlier movements, though for different reasons, the leadership of the children's rights movement is neither wholly nor in part made up of children, or even particularly those who daily work with children. Child advocacy comes from the same quarter as consumerism, civil rights pressure, and civil liberties concerns: young social scientists, usually trained in the law, persons who in an often noble and equally often self-righteous way serve our culture as social advocates.

However, the less-than-cynical teachers applaud this movement. They see all too many battered and criminally neglected children in their schools, the offspring of rich and poor alike. But the teachers long for a broader emphasis than currently espoused within the movement, a consideration of additional concerns. What is "a child"? Legally, a child is a "minor," and a "minor" is someone under eighteen years old. Administratively in education, in most states, one is a "full-time" student from age six to age sixteen, and one's progress up the educational ladder is by age: ten-year-olds are fifth graders, sixteen-year-olds are eleventh graders, and so forth.

This is practical organization and legally and administratively neat, but it flies in the face both of several generations of good social science evidence and of sensitive schoolteaching. No one of us develops in all our aspects (say, intellectual, social, and emotional) at a rate consistent across these aspects or along time. We grow in spurts and plateaus, in starts and stops, and rarely in strict pace with Father Time. Clever teachers have broken "age grading" in many elementary schools; and some high schools, while retaining "classes" for social purposes, accommodate students with varying rates of intellectual development. But the rule in law and in school is that you are what your chronological age says you are.

Somehow, education and society must recognize individual differences in growth and development, and not categorize children strictly on the basis of age. It is obvious to a schoolteacher that not every fourteen-year-old, for example, is best served by full-time attendance at school, and that some of these individuals might well benefit from such full-time attendance, however, when they are twenty-four. The system, with its current compulsory school attendance laws, and its failure to recognize the differing needs of differing individuals at differing points of their life cycle, militates against this. People suffer. Somehow the imperatives of human development need to find their way more into the thinking of advocates of children's rights, and into the thinking of those concerned with school organization and administration.³

The schoolteacher sees another side of children often missed by the scholar-ac-

tivist, their *fragility*. There is a poignancy and perspective that comes from contact with an awkward, frightened, uncertain child (even if he or she is a physically towering teenager) which the scholar at a remove often misses. Such fragility needs protection, as enumerated in most children's rights programs, but is also provokes feelings of paternalism (or maternalism, as the case may be), sentiments quite foreign to many advocates of a (supposed) conception of freedom. Paternalism in part denotes making unilateral decisions for another, deciding for him what his best interests are; it also denotes caring. The fragile child needs caring, caring that may even require protection from himself. At the extreme, this notion is elementary, as with the "unilateral" action of an adult yanking a baby's hand away from the blades of a whirling fan. It is far more complex when it involves adolescents, who resent their own uncertainties and fears at the same time as they are confused by them. Surely there are times when an adolescent needs assertive mothering or fathering, a firm if caring hand. The limits of this assertion of adult power over someone less than adult are unclear and worrisome, and require careful study. The "child advocacy" movement needs more sensitive recognition of this area. The fact is, however, that many in the movement who do not work closely with children forget how *young* they are, and thus propose theories about them and policies for them which are distorted, incomplete, or even harmful.

Why Myopia?

The foregoing are but three examples of what strikes a schoolman as the limited view of education and schooling which all too often dominates the university study of educational issues. It is fashionable to approach racial integration of schools merely from legal and political perspectives. Academia does not object when one overlooks or avoids crucial questions of social class in analyses both of the equality of educational opportunity and of student assignments to schools. Some scholars insufficiently consider the practical implications of existing research in human development, and academic advocates of the "rights of children" need sensitively to understand the poignant fragility of the process of growing up.

Social science inquiry in education is too often trapped by fashion, tradition or otherwise, and by a myopia resulting from inexperience, and thus fails both to extend our understanding of the process of education and to provide sound bases for policy.

There are at least two reasons for this myopia, one having to do with the support of inquiry in education and the other with the character of university attention to the problems of schooling, particularly in schools of education. The 1960s showed a great spurt of funding for educational research and development from foundations and the federal government, a wave of new resources which might have revolutionized the study of education as federal subvention earlier had revolutionized the study of medicine. This happy hope did not come to pass, it now appears, for after 1967 these new funds were increasingly focused by their grantors on problems as the federal bureaucracy defined them—and the federal grantors were as much victims of myopia and fashion as anyone else. Little support emerged for the maverick, the counter-cyclical movement, or the critic whose work seemed impractical. The fashion was to wage the battle for children of the War on Poverty in schools kept fundamentally as they were, to do what we were doing today, only better. In a sense, such a deliberate focus gave the game away: it assumed too

much, making the reforms within the fashionable parameters necessarily so modest as to be insignificant. Unless support for fundamental and unshackled inquiry by able scholar-professionals is obtained, the continued superficiality of inquiry is assured. And unless this support is sustained, allowing for years of exploration, trial, and dispersion of results, little good will accrue to children. It is easy to forget that today's most respected thinkers about education—John Dewey and Jean Piaget—labored for decades with their inquiry, with no quick or readily “practical” answers. Scholarship about learning is complex, largely uncharted. The utmost of patience is needed, and those who must bear the costs of this patient inquiry, such as the government and foundations, must accept this fact.

Even more than mere patience and persistence is required. The thesis of this paper is that current inquiry is too often narrow, and insufficiently cognizant of the real needs of children and schools. While schoolteachers and researchers often have the same eventual goals in mind, their perspectives of these are often quite different, if both reasonable. It is the blind man discovering the elephant *par excellence*.

From the perspective of practice, several out-of-fashion notions beg for inquiry. The use of jobs—paid employment—as a part of “growing up” needs thorough study, both as a way of illuminating the causes of destructive alienation and segregation of youth as now exist and of rethinking the social purposes of child labor laws and practices.⁴ Badly needed (in colleges as well as schools, it must be said) is careful work on the curriculum, tying together philosophical theories of knowledge, learning theory from psychology and sociology, and the practical constraints of educational politics and pedagogy. No fresh overarching arguments for the whole curriculum, whether loosely defined or prescribed or focused in one school or in multiple “educating” settings, exist. The tyranny of departmentalism continues (the formal curriculum for a given student is usually the random sum of its virtually independent parts), and teachers-to-be go little beyond the ideas presented in Whitehead's *Atms of Education*. Where work has started—such as in Philip Phenix's notion of “synoptic” thinking or in Jerome Bruner's conception of the structure of subjects or a theory of instruction—there have been few efforts to extend or deepen the ideas. They remain as notes, speculations, hunches, articles of limited use to the practicing teacher. What is rather required is work such as that seen in the current discovery or rediscovery of developmentalism, particularly the extensions of the work of Piaget. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg's research is, for the schoolman, especially provocative and represents the kind of inquiry that deserves sustained support.⁵

The structure of schools of education, and of inquiry into learning and schooling in academia in general, also promotes myopia. Nathan Glazer has identified some of the flaws in the constitution of what he calls the “minor professions” (e.g., education, social work, city planning), but as the teacher observes them the gulf between practice and the university is most critical.⁶ As Glazer points out, in the “major” professions, ones that are “free” (that is, ones that allow individual self-governing professional practice rather than service as employees in institutions controlled from outside the profession), those who practice are of high status. The surgeon who cuts well is lionized, well paid, respected. The top practicing lawyer shares esteem with the top law professor. No such analog exists in teaching. Indeed, the highest status education professor is likely to have emerged to that rank by a *cursus honorum* which actually *avoided* practice in schools.

Given this condition, it is no surprise that myopia exists. Part of the professoriat

which is conducting inquiry into learning and schools has never experienced them, save as students themselves, and the failure of these scholars to sense the subtleties of the craft of teaching and to identify the wisest ordering of priorities is no surprise. Education is full of clever professors who lack the finesse which only firsthand experience can give. That some do not see the scholarly lacunae this lack causes is distressing; that others who do see it deride it is lamentable.

At the other extreme are the Education professors who come to the university from careers wholly in practice. All too often when a person so experienced becomes a professor, he adopts the Old Dog mode, passing on his tricks to the New Dogs, lecturing on the techniques he used to get his former job in the field done. Such a mode is, obviously, too accepting of the past and the status quo, and it rests on far less fundamental theory than, say, the practical steps a surgeon uses in the removal of a cancerous lung rest on anatomy and biochemistry. The level of critical and self-conscious reflection upon the process of education by its practitioners is lamentably low, and such is often exhibited when practitioners become leaders of inquiry and training in universities. Their disregard of—even antipathy to—theory is overwhelming.

And so the profession in the university is paralyzed, staffed by well-meaning but often insensitive and inexperienced social scientists on one hand and by unreflective ex-practitioners on the other. Some universities, of course, have tried remedies. The “clinical professor” idea—the appointment of a scholar-educator jointly between a college and a school—long pressed by James B. Conant, has not taken root to any significant extent, largely for practical reasons stemming from the conflicting expectations and demands on the professor’s time of university and school. Efforts at mixing practitioners and scholars in research projects have been bravely tried, but all too rarely successful: discourse is simply too difficult. (Curiously, such efforts have been more productive outside universities than within them, in organizations such as the Education Development Center, a nonprofit corporation long active in curriculum development, and the Children’s Television Workshop of *Sesame Street* fame.)

In sum, neither the turmoil of the 1960s, with its demands for “relevance,” nor the new funding for research succeeded in narrowing the gap between theory and practice in education, between university views of problems in the schools and practical educators’ sense of the shape and direction of efforts to understand children’s learning. After two years of work, close again to high school students in the classroom and without, I am persuaded that the gap can be bridged only by individuals who have both relevant scholarly training and sustained experience in education, by persons whose careers alternate between inquiry and practice. Perhaps the sense of my university colleagues that my career move Down Below was as ill advised as it was unconventional is what is amiss. While the argument is self-serving, I wish that the *cursus honorum* I have chosen were more popular, perhaps even the rule rather than the exception.

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“EDWARD GRADD”

The American Credo . . . of Higher Education

ABOUT HALF A century ago, George Jean Nathan and H. L. Mencken, to those generations of college students as Paul Ehrlich and Ralph Nader are today, authored a small book from which the first part of this title is taken. It was, the subtitle claimed, “A Contribution Toward the Interpretation of the National Mind,” and it contained no fewer than 869 “fundamental beliefs” describing the American character, plus about a hundred pages of introduction and explanation. Although, as anyone who remembers Nathan and Mencken would know, many of their propositions were sharp-pointed and bitter-humored, their intent appeared to be serious. Anyway, the first sentences of *The American Credo* so insist:

The superficial, no doubt, will mistake this little book for a somewhat laborious attempt at jocosity. Because, incidentally to its main purpose, it unveils occasional ideas of so inordinate an erroneousness that they verge upon the ludicrous, it will be set down as a piece of spoofing, and perhaps denounced as in bad taste. But all the while that main purpose will remain clear enough to the judicious.

That main purpose, borrowed for this little exercise, was to try to hold a mirror up to nature—an especially clear and sharp mirror that revealed not the exterior but the interior, the usually unspoken beliefs and tacit understandings. What do the participants in American higher education really believe about the enterprise in which they are engaged? What do they say to one another in the cocktail lounge of educational meetings after the second drink, as contrasted to what they say in meetings themselves? If an anthropologist were sent to Higher Education instead of the Trobriand Islands, what would he come back with? If a psychologist applied his “depth tests,” whatever they might be, to the colleges and universities and the practices therein, what would the analysis reveal? If an organizational sociologist were sent out to uncover the “hidden agenda” of this institution, as he has with industry and government, what would he find? As Nathan and Mencken say:

Deep down in every man there is a body of congenital attitudes, a corpus of ineradicable doctrines and ways of thinking, that determines his reactions to his ideational environment as surely as his physical activity is determined by the length of his *tibiae* and the capacity of his lungs. These primary attitudes, in fact, constitute the essential man.

What is the “essential man” of American higher education?

No one can say, of course, but anyone can try. Indeed, most educational meetings and pronouncements do try, and the rhetoric is by now surely familiar. This is a different effort: to distill from experience some of the more tightly held yet pervasive beliefs about the enterprise, beliefs that come closer to the core of being than the rhetoric issued by educational statesmen or associations that cannot afford to reveal too many professional secrets or offend too many of their constituents.

The following is only one man’s starter toward a complete list.

Objectives & Evaluation

1. For American higher education these are troubled times. (They always were.)
2. The proper standards for higher education are not being realized.
3. Higher education always needs "bold new thought," "imaginative innovations," "basic articulation of purpose," "rethinking and rededication," "fundamental clarification of objectives," etc., as proved by the fact that similar calls in earlier times have not produced satisfactory versions thereof.
4. People who keep calling for the "clarification of the objectives of higher education" really mean that others should agree with them.
5. Nothing is wrong with the objectives of higher education, only with its efficiency.
6. Nothing is wrong with the efficiency of higher education, only with its objectives.
7. What is wrong with higher education is too much research and not enough (good) teaching.
8. The research done in American universities is valued more than the teaching not because it is more important, but because it is measurable in publications and because it brings in overhead. Anyway, good teaching is an intangible affair.
9. The degrees of higher education are inflated these days just like the currency; they do not mean what they did in my day.
10. The key to understanding the system of higher education, which everyone knows but no one talks about, is that some institutions are better than others.
11. What we are really after are "quality" and "excellence," but unfortunately those are such complex and intangible matters that our own assessment is the best proof that we have achieved it.
12. Misleading claims are always being made by governments and misleading advertising is always being put forward by business; but when a college or a university certifies by a degree that someone is liberally educated, that really is the fact of the matter.
13. Everyone knows that there is a lot of shoddy performance in higher education—always, of course, in the other fellow's classroom, laboratory, department, or institution. But there is a tacit agreement not to specify; false advertising is left to Madison Avenue and the correction of last year's mistakes to General Motors.
14. No assessment of higher education will get far if it (1) says anything good about the system, or (2) says anything specific. The former is *de rigueur*, and the latter runs into someone's vested interest. Calls for "fundamental reform" and "bold initiatives" go down a lot better.
15. Higher education is always in need of "sound evaluation," but people cannot agree on what ought to be evaluated, no one knows quite how to do it, and if truth were known, no one really wants it. Objective evaluation of performance is for the other fellow.
16. The constant debate over "the purposes" of higher education is carried on by humanists and social scientists. The natural scientist, bemused by his colleagues' obsession with the topic, gets in on the act only after he becomes an administrator.
17. Only land-grant schools do a good job of service to the community. Anyway, no self-respecting "real" university should try.

The Undergraduate Program

18. The only two things common to collegiate education are the degree (the baccalaureate) and a time period (four years). Everything else is "the glory of diversity."
19. Teaching is much better on the humanistic side of the campus, which only underscores the unfairness of the larger salaries and greater prestige on the scientific side.
20. Higher education spoils a lot of raw talent by disciplining it into conventional grooves. We would get a lot more geniuses out of the new generation if we encouraged their "natural creativity."
21. If an undergraduate comes in contact with four really inspiring teachers in the course of his program, he's lucky.
22. At any given time undergraduate study suffers between not enough relevancy and too much relevancy.
23. Colleges can train minds and build character, but the trouble is that they are really being used by parents as a refuge for, and escape from, their young.
24. Increasing the productivity of college teaching is far different from increasing productivity in industry or agriculture because it is essentially based on a one-to-one relationship—even if the class does happen to be rather large.
25. It would be good for the country if everyone went to college.
26. When the students complain about the impersonality of the university, they are just feeling sorry for themselves or trying to put the blame for academic failure on "the system."
27. The students coming to the colleges and universities are not prepared well enough for higher education to do much with them. The fault is with the high school.
28. The liberal arts colleges do a better job of education than the big universities because they are smaller and hence can take into account the individual student.
29. The private liberal arts colleges accept on faith the advantages of smallness and the public universities the benefits of bigness—and both are rationalizations of necessity.
30. The "best" colleges and universities are not really best—they only get the better students to begin with and have the most prestige.
31. In most states students can get a better undergraduate education at the state university than at the best liberal arts college in the state.

The Graduate Program

32. Higher education fell upon bad days in this country when the mantle of leadership moved from the liberal arts colleges to the universities.
33. The continuing respect given the Ph.D. degree in academic circles is remarkable when you consider that everyone has been through that mill and knows better.
34. Until quite recently the graduate schools in the United States were straining to meet the demand; now they are overexpanded and having difficulties retreating. Overall, that is called educational planning.
35. The graduate school is really a self-indulgent conspiracy against the common educational good: it is okay for the narrow specialist, but bad for "true" liberal education.
36. Since too many Ph.D.s are being awarded in too many departments in too many

places, the university system should get together and decide who can award them in order to maintain standards—without encroaching on institutional autonomy, of course.

37. The system is now giving Ph.D.s to everyone so the real doctoral work goes on at the postdoctoral level—again, inflation at the top.
38. Most doctoral candidates are carried through to the degree by their sponsoring professor: he gives the student a dissertation topic, helps to write the dissertation, and protects against his faculty enemies through the final examination.

Governance, Administration, & Personnel

39. What is really needed in the governance of higher education is more "democratization": that is, more voice to the students, the faculty, the minorities, the women—anyone, in fact, except the board or the administration.
40. The one place not to look for educational leadership is the federal government; it is full of mediocre bureaucrats who only get in the way of any creative ideas.
41. Higher education is a system that needs to cut down on wasteful competition and institutional rivalry—but, of course, without federal or state imposition and without relinquishing the virtues of diversity, pluralism, and academic freedom.
42. The stress on pluralism in American higher education is a rationale that allows each institution, discipline, and indeed professor to be left alone.
43. From today's view, the net effect of the student rebellion of the late 1960s was negative; if anything, the campuses most "reformed" are now in worst shape.
44. Although the faculties of higher education are always complaining about something, they still prefer the campus to "the real world"—and every academic administrator knows it, and moreover believes that most faculty members could not make it out there.
45. To a lot of parents, college faculties are radical critics of the established order. To a lot of students, they are the toadying supporters of the reactionary establishment.
46. No self-respecting scholar would want to be a university administrator—even less a foundation officer. Both posts attract mediocre scholars with a flair for organization. All the same, that does not prevent a certain amount of envy when the other fellow gets the job.
47. The administrators of higher education are so concerned over budgets that they never get involved with real educational problems.
48. The leaders of American higher education do not measure up to the giants of the good old days.
49. Whatever the administration wants is wrong. Whatever the students want is suspect. Whatever the faculty wants is right.

Funding

50. Government subsidies to higher education are fully justified, and in various forms. Objections thereto are either reactionary or anti-intellectual, and usually both.
51. Higher education may not be valuable enough to the buyer to sell at its full price, like automobiles, but it is to the society. Unfortunately, since the individual customer does not value it sufficiently, the society has to.
52. If the government, federal or state, would only give money to the colleges and

universities to use as they see fit, that would be the optimal use of public funds for the support of higher education.

53. Cutting down basic research funds to the universities is shortsighted; it means that the nation is drying up the source of knowledge that underlies national security and the cures for cancer, food shortages, and the population explosion.
54. A decade ago money was needed to train more Ph.D.s for college faculties; now that there are too many, money is needed to find them jobs. And the entire society, including of course the uneducated, should be taxed in order to support that privileged group.
55. The private universities need to be sustained in order to retain their independent influence on the entire system—even if by public money.
56. The public universities are killing off the private liberal arts colleges by discriminatory price practices—of a sort the society would not tolerate, say, in the oil or steel industries.
57. There is nothing wrong with higher education that more money won't cure.

Finally . . .

58. The more things change in higher education, the more they stay the same.
59. All the criticisms of higher education are old ones; it is just that new people are making them.
60. The best way to handle an educational problem is to appoint a commission or committee, and then forget about it.
61. If one could only find it, there must be "one best way" for higher education.
62. Higher education is always in crisis: money, curriculum, shortage of teachers (projections for the 1970s), excess of teachers (actuality of the 1970s), student action, administration . . .
63. If someone has the connective phrases, he could acceptably deliver a commencement speech or address most educational conferences with the apt use of "mission," "challenge," "urgency," "quality," "excellence," "reform," "renewal," "objectives," "unity," and the "national purpose."
64. What is good for higher education is good for the country.
65. The time to act is now.

It may well be that a few, some, several, many of these are off the mark—unfair or, worse, wrong. But some such catalogue must represent beliefs about purpose and organization beyond the usual rhetoric. Are not such beliefs, these or others, exerting a heavy influence on the operation of the system, as a genuine piece of reality? Are such private assumptions not motivating alongside the public professions? Is such a credo not part of the system too?

Back to the close of *The American Credo* itself: "Well, here is an attempt to assemble in convenient form, without comment or interpretation, some of the fundamental beliefs. . . . It is but a beginning." Make up your own list, starting with number 66.

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
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